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SYNOPSIS 
This thesis examines the formulation and implementation of us 
policy towards China during the Clinton Administration's first 
term of office. Its central contention is that the Clinton 
Administration's China policy-making process was founded on 
largely on domestic political calculations, to the detriment of 
America's long term broad strategic interests in the People's 
Republic. This is exemplified by his advocacy, implementation, 
and eventual abandonment, of a strategy of linkage toward 
China. This thesis contends that President Clinton's 
preoccupation with domestic political calculations led to three 
major flaws in his Administration's China policy-making 
process. Firstly, it led to a failure to define a hierarchy of 
US priorities in China. Secondly, it led to a failure to 
articulate a coherent framework for US China relations to 
either the Chinese or domestic American audiences. Thirdly, 
Clinton failed to commit himself to, or provide leadership on, 
China policy except in the event of a political crisis. 
Accordingly, these flaws encouraged splits within the 
Administration whereby different agencies pursued their own 
agendas with Beijing. As a result, the Clinton Administration's 
China policy appeared confused, incoherent and discordant. This 
served to undermine both the US strategic relationship with 
Beijing, and domestic legitimacy for US China policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines the policy-making factors and motivations 
behind the Clinton Administration's adoption of a strategy of 
linkage in its policy towards China in May 1993, and subsequent 
policy formulations and implementation through its first term 
of office 1993-1996. Specifically, the thesis considers the 
bureaucratic and philosophical issues that interacted and 
produced a China policy predicated on domestic political 
factors, rather than bilateral strategic factors through this 
period. The formulation of China policy, like US foreign policy 
in general, requires the balancing of two perspectives. 
Firstly, policy-makers must assess and define a vision and 
hierarchy of US interests in China. In other words, they must 
define a long-term strategic framework for US relations towards 
the People's Republic of China (PRC) . Secondly, policy-makers 
must consider the domestic political environment to China 
policy, and seek domestic legitimacy. Domestic approval helps 
to underline US credibility in China and bolsters Washington's 
bargaining power with Beij ing, by presenting an 'American' 
China policy. Further, domestic legitimacy affords the 
president greater flexibility and trust in the conduct of US 
relations with China. 
President Clinton was the first president to be elected 
into a fundamentally post-Cold War environment in which the 
framework of US-China relations had altered radically. During 
the Cold War, the Sino-American relationship had been based on 
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mutual gee-strategic interests, recognised by the 'strategic 
triangle' that existed between the US, China and the Soviet 
Union. However, from the mid 1980s and into the post-Cold War 
period, US-China relations embraced a far more bilateral 
character, driven by its own dynamics. Foreign policy officials 
and analysts came to identify relations with Beijing as one of 
the most important challenges facing US foreign policy. This 
highlights the importance of effective China policy-making. It 
also demonstrates the negative implications of a Clinton 
Administration China policy motivated by domestic political 
factors rather than bilateral strategic factors. 
During the Cold War, China's importance to the Washington 
lay in its value to US strategic interests. Following a debate 
on China that gathered momentum through the 1950s and 1960s, 
policy-makers were persuaded that the development of diplomatic 
ties with the PRC served US interests more than the existing 
stance of antipathy towards and isolation of Beijing. Thus the 
strategy of engagement with China was born, and it became 
entrenched as the Nixon Administration and subsequent 
Administrations pursued the development of bilateral 
governmental ties. During most of the Cold War period, the US 
had little interest in China other than its value to US Pacific 
and global strategic interests. Indeed Americans knew very 
little about the PRC. With a few exceptions, the development of 
governmental ties with Beij ing ran parallel to US domestic 
political attitudes towards China and China policy from the mid 
to late 1960s to the late 1980s. 
From the mid 1980s the nature of US-China relations began 
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to change. The gradual emergence of detente, and the strategic 
views of leading Reagan foreign policy-makers diminished the 
perceived strategic importance of China to the us. However, US-
China relations adopted a more bilateral character, driven by 
economics and trade. It is also important to acknowledge that 
military to military ties were at the forefront of this 
expanding bilateral relationship. Bilateral ties such as these 
fuelled the view that relations with China contained their own 
importance and dynamics, outside the geo-strategic context. 
As a result, the nature of engagement with the PRC 
altered. Both direct governmental and non-governmental contacts 
increased, as did the range of US interests in China. Many more 
non-governmental actors, such as the business community, 
developed stakes in the design and implementation of China 
policy, and lobbied the Reagan Administration accordingly. 
Growing awareness and knowledge of China resulting from 
America's growing participation in its development had an 
impact upon the strategy of engagement. It reinforced efforts 
to investigate and develop areas of mutual interest and 
cooperation. However, it also highlighted areas of dispute, 
such as China's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
and its treatment of Tibet. Thus engagement increasingly became 
an avenue through which bilateral disagreements could be 
resolved, through diplomacy and negotiation. The Reagan 
Administration and early Bush Administration were forced to 
take greater account of propagation of domestic views on China 
in their formulation of China policy. However, by 1988 
prevailing opinion regarded US-China relations to be in an 
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unprecedented state of health. 
America's relationship with and engagement of the PRC was 
fundamentally challenged with the Tiananmen repression of June 
1989. Prior to Tiananmen, China had been the leading example 
and inspiration for the transition from authoritarianism to 
liberal market economics, and it was anticipated, democracy. 
Tiananmen transformed China in the eyes of America into an 
oppressive pariah. The great majority in the US regarded the 
Tiananmen repression as an attack on American and universal 
normative values, and demanded an appropriate response from the 
Bush Administration. President Bush indeed led international 
condemnation of Tiananmen, and ensured· that the US was the 
first country to impose punitive sanctions. However, he 
defended and pursued the strategy of engagement with Beijing as 
a means of promoting improvements both in China's conduct and 
in US-PRC relations over the long term. This stance drew 
intense domestic criticism as China, far from showing 
contrition, actually grew ever more defiant. Thus the President 
Bush's adherence to engagement came under increasing attack 
from members of the foreign policy community, lobby groups and 
in particular, the Democrat-controlled Congress. The domestic 
political consensus that had endured almost twenty years of US-
PRC relations had collapsed. 
The collapse in consensus was accompanied by the 
politicisation of China policy, and in particular the annual 
renewal of China's Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) trading status. 
Democrats in Congress assailed Bush's China policy both for 
genuine philosophical reasons (on which they were joined by 
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many Republicans) and for political partisan reasons. Central 
to these assaults were Congressional attempts to seize the 
initiative on US China policy by imposing a strategy of 
linkage, whereby conditions would be attached to the renewal of 
China's MFN status. 
Democrats in Congress achieved some success in portraying 
Bush as a president who placed his personal relationships with 
repressive Chinese leaders above human rights and democracy. 
Clinton recognised the political value of this tactic, and 
coopted it as part of his campaign for the 1992 presidential 
election. 
In effect, Cl in ton adopted and advocated a strategy of 
linkage for China policy for domestic political reasons. Given 
Cl in ton's success in the election the 
policy were huge. Clinton's mandate 
implications for China 
for China altered the 
rationale for US relations with the PRC from broad and open 
engagement, to a linkage strategy that deferred the critical 
and valuable economic and trading aspect of bilateral relations 
to perhaps equally valuable human rights progress in the PRC. 
Despite the potentially enormous implications of this 
mandate, Clinton identified three objectives for China policy 
founded on domestic political calculations. These were 
adherence to his campaign pledges and the concomitant 
implementation of linkage, the forging of consensus with 
Congress on China policy, and the determination to retain 
presidential flexibility in the conduct of China policy. While 
consensus with Congress provided China policy with the benefits 
of domestic political legitimacy, Clinton had other 
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motivations. The president had far higher priorities on his 
agenda, including domestic concerns such as economic 
revitalisation, the budget, healthcare and education. Clinton 
wanted to prevent the kind of political inter-branch clashes 
endured by the previous Administration from impacting upon his 
real priorities. Further, he wished to delegate a consensual 
China policy to government officials leaving him free to 
concentrate on other issues. 
President Clinton clearly placed domestic political 
imperatives above bilateral strategic imperatives in the 
formulation of his China policy through 1993-94 and indeed 
throughout his first term of office. This essential imbalance 
was reinforced by critical flaws in the Administration's China 
policy-making process, caused by Clinton's political 
orientation. These flaws were threefold. Firstly, Clinton 
failed to define a long term vision of China policy. Secondly, 
therefore, he failed to articulate to either his Chinese or his 
domestic audiences a clear hierarchy of US interests and 
priorities in China. Thirdly, Clinton failed to commit to and 
lead on China policy. These flaws had two vital implications to 
the detriment of the formulation and implementation of China 
policy. They facilitated an undisciplined approach to China 
policy within the Administration. The failure to define a clear 
hierarchy of us interests in China, and the absence of 
leadership at the highest levels allowed different agencies to 
pursue their own agendas with China. Thus the Clinton 
Administration's China policy appeared confused, inconsistent 
and incoherent. 
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Further this flawed approach to policy-making undermined 
both the bilateral strategic imperatives, and the domestic 
political imperatives of US relations with China. On the 
bilateral level, the Administration struggled to achieve 
progress on its objectives in the areas of human rights, 
proliferation and trade. Washington's credibility in Beijing 
plummeted, and bilateral relations deteriorated, as illustrated 
by the crises concerning the visit of Taiwanese president Lee 
Teng-hui in June 1995, and the Taiwan Strait crisis of spring 
1996. On the domestic level, partisan politics returned to the 
domestic debate on China policy, especially after the 
Republican sweep of the 1994 mid-term Congressional elections. 
Congress was determined to seize the initiative on China once 
more. Its tendency to adopt a short term partisan approach had 
negative consequences for US-China relations, exemplified by 
its role in the visit of Lee. The Administration struggled to 
deal with these initiatives. 
Clinton only committed himself to China policy in the 
event of a domestic political crisis, such as the 1994 MFN 
decision and the visit of President Lee. Having dealt with the 
political crisis, he disengaged himself from China policy, 
leaving its fundamental flaws unresolved. Only with the Taiwan 
Strait crisis of 1996 did Clinton and the Administration begin 
to seriously address these flaws. 
Methodology and Scope 
An immense number of books and articles have been written on US 
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relations with China, especially following the expansion of 
bilateral ties from the mid 1980s, and in particular following 
the June 1989 Tiananmen repression. Four areas may be 
identified. The first examines the philosophical aspects of US 
China policy, cri tiquing the rationales of engagement, 
containment, confrontation and isolation. Prominent amongst 
these are works by Robert G. Sutter, Richard Bernstein and Ross 
H. Munro, Cronin and Cronin, Gideon Rachman, and David 
Shambaugh. In 
China 's Future 
particular Robert 
in World Affairs 
G. 
(1996) 
Sutter's book Shaping 
and David Shambaugh' s 
article in Current History 'The United States and China: A New 
Cold War' (September 1995) offer excellent overviews of the 
contending 
Conflict 
rationales. Bernstein and Munro ' s The Coming 
in The in China (1997) and Rachman's article 
Washington Quarterly 'Containing China' (Winter 1996) put 
strong cases for the growing threat of China and the need for a 
strategy of containment. A special mention is required for four 
articles by Winston Lord that proved to be influential 
arguments in favour of linkage; these are 'China and America: 
Beyond the Big Chill' in Foreign Affairs, Fall 1990, 'Misguided 
Mission' in the Washington Post, December 1989, and 'Bush's 
Second Chance on China' and 'Will Bush Support the Chinese 
People?' both in New York Times, May 1990 and October 1991 
respectively. 
A second category of US-China literature concerns 
discussions of specific policy. Amongst the multitude of 
presentations, works by the following authors stand out; 
Richard Bush, Steven I Levine, David Zweig, Lean T. Hadar and 
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Robert G, Sutter and Kerry Dumbaugh in a Congressional Research 
service Issue Brief. Hadar's 'The sweet and Sour Sino-American 
Relationship' in the CATO Institute's Policy Analysis (January 
1996) provides an excellent overview. Richard Bush's article in 
Current History, January/February 1993 is particularly 
significant, given the author's central role in China policy-
making through 1993-94. Bush provides a strong conceptual 
context to Clinton's advocacy of linkage, and accurately 
predicts the essential components of Clinton's strategy toward 
China as defined by the May 1996 Executive Order 12850. 
The third area examines the history of US-China relations. 
The most informative and authoritative are Harry Harding's A 
Fragile Relationship (1992), Robert Garson' s The United States 
and China Since 1949 (1994) and Rosemary Foot's The Practice of 
Power (1995). Raymond L. Garthoff' s Detente and Confrontation 
(1985) offers clear analysis of US-China relations in the 
context of the Cold War. The final category, where the sources 
are more limited, concerns specific analysis of the China 
policy-making process. Two pieces of work, that examine in 
detail the policy-making process in the Clinton Administration 
through 1993-94 by David M. Lampton stand out. His chapter 
'China Policy in Cl in ton's First Year' in Lilley and Willkie 
(eds) Beyond MFN: Trade with China and American Interests 
(1994) analyses the policy-making process behind Executive 
Order 12850 and the 1993 MFN decision. Lampton pursues his 
analysis over the subsequent year to the MFN 1994 
recommendation and the decision to drop the strategy of linkage 
in 'America's China Policy in the Age of the Finance Minister• 
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in The China Quarterly September 1994. After the End, edited by 
James S. Scott, examines US foreign policy-making in the post-
Cold War ~intermestic' environment. One chapter, authored by 
John T. Rourke and Richard Clark, is dedicated to the policy-
making processes underpinning the Clinton Administration's 
China policy. The chapter provides a valid and informative 
account of the problems experienced by the Administration, and 
by the president 1 in developing China policy in a highly 
pluralistic policy-making arena. Foot's The Practice of Power 
is particularly good on the issue of the domestic 
legitimisation of China policy. Further a number of articles 
that appear in the Washington Post and the New York Times 
provide excellent insights into the policy-making process at 
particular times. 
This thesis attempts to fill a gap in the current 
literature by examining in greater detail the degree to which 
the Clinton Administration's China policy-making was predicated 
on domestic political factors. It attempts to address the less-
explored area of the policy-making process by looking at 
Clinton's domestic political calculations and illustrating how 
this had a detrimental effect not only on the China policy-
making process, but also on America's strategic relationship 
with the PRC. Thus the thesis explores why and how Clinton came 
to implement a major philosophical change in US strategy toward 
China, in the form of linkage. It then explains why and how the 
implications of Clinton's preoccupation with the domestic 
political environment, and in particular Congress I undermined 
the pursuit of linkage and US China policy subsequent to the 
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abandonment of linkage through his first term of office. The 
general themes of Clinton's approach to China policy-making are 
also examined in the context of broader models of US foreign 
policy decision-making. This perspective will be discussed 
later in the Introduction, and reflected upon in the 
Conclusion. 
Although the thesis draws upon existing literature, it 
relies heavily on critical primary documents and in particular, 
personal interviews with key actors and observers of the 
policies and period in question. The interviews cover a broad 
range. They include key Administration officials responsible 
for the design and execution of the Clinton Administration's 
China policy, at the elite level in the significant form of 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
during this period, Winston Lord, to professional staff and 
aides such as the State Department's Robert Perito and Frank 
Jannuzi. The thesis also draws upon an interview with 
Ambassador Michael Armacost, who played a unique and vital role 
in the abandonment of linkage. The interviews also cover key 
figures on the Congressional side of the policy-making process 
during the period in question, such as Richard Bush (former 
House Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs and aide 
to Rep. Hamilton), James W. McCormick (former House 
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs and aide to Rep. 
Leach) and Bruce Wilson (former House Ways and Means 
Committee) . Bush is acknowledged to have performed one of the 
most critical roles in the China policy-making process through 
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1993-94. 1 The interviews also included leading figures in the 
lobby groups community who participated in the debate on both a 
philosophical and a political level. Mike Jendrzejczyk was and 
is the Washington Director of Human Rights Watch:Asia, and 
Calman J. Cohen is President of the Emergency Committee on 
American Trade (ECAT) . Although the sample of interviews is far 
from exhaustive, those that are included were able to offer, 
through their experiences of the policy-making process, 
valuable insights not reflected in the current literature. A 
full list of interviewees is provided in the bibliography. 
Similarly, a full list of the primary documents used is 
provided. However a few deserve special note. Of course 
Executive Order 12850, and President Clinton's statement of MFN 
1993 and MFN 1994 are central documents that outline his 
Administration's strategies on China. Wins ton Lord's 
Confirmation Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on March 31 1993 is significant in that Lord explains 
in detail his perspective on the importance of China to US 
interests, the value of a strategy of linkage, and the 
importance of engagement with Beijing to fulfil the ambitions 
of linkage. The Hearing before the Subcommittee on Trade of the 
House Ways and Means Committee on February 24 1994, United 
States-China Trade Relations, is also valuable. Not only does 
it include Assistant Secretary Lord's Mid-Term Review on China, 
a document that expresses the Administration's lack of progress 
1 Lampton suggests: "When the definitive history of US-China 
relations is written, he [Bush] will be seen to have played an 
important role." David M. Lampton, 'China Policy in Clinton' s 
First Year' Chapter One in James R. Lilley and Wendell L. 
Willkie (eds), Beyond MFN: Trade with China and American 
Interests; The AEI Press (Washington, 1994) p.25 (note 43). 
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with the Chinese, but it also illustrates Congress' frustration 
with the Administration's mismanagement of China policy. 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher's address of May 17 1996, 
'American Interests and the US-China Relationship' is notable 
for being the Clinton Administration's first full-dress speech 
dedicated to the issue of China policy. The address is 
reproduced in Christopher' s memoirs In the Stream of History: 
Shaping US Foreign Policy for a New Era (1998). 
Levels of Analysis 
The thesis is divided into two parts. Part One, comprising of 
four chapters, provides the context to the central analysis in 
Part Two by explaining the evolution of US China policy, and 
the strategy of engagement with China, from the Truman 
Administration up to and including the Bush Administration. It 
also explains the domestic political backdrop to evolutions in 
policy and strategy throughout this period. Two chapters are 
dedicated to the Bush Administration, regarding the strategic 
and domestic political dynamics of his China policy 
respectively. This reflects the importance of this period in 
establishing the context to the Clinton Administration's 
approach to China policy. 
Chapter One explains the rationale behind developments in 
US policy toward China from the Truman Administration up to and 
including the Reagan Administration. Specifically it examines 
policy-makers' thinking on China policy with regard to their 
perceptions of US national interests throughout this period. 
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The chapter reflects four broad stages in the evolution of US 
strategy toward China from 1948-49 to 1988. These were Truman's 
deliberation of accommodation with the new People's Republic of 
China; the pursuit of the isolation and containment of the PRC 
from 1950 to the early 1960s; the process of rapprochement in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s; and US China policies following 
the normalisation of relations in 1979. The chapter also 
examines the wider philosophical aspect of US China policy, as 
defined by two eras. The first, triggered by the Korean War of 
1950, centred upon a strategy of isolation and containment of 
Beijing. The second, stimulated by strategic and bilateral 
reassessments in the mid 1960s concerns the decision to engage 
Beijing, a strategy that became entrenched over the next twenty 
years. Chapter One proceeds with the following themes. It 
demonstrates how the nature and premises for engagement altered 
over time, and how US strategy for China reflected evolutions 
in US thinking on the broader geo-strategic perspective. It 
also shows the symbiosism between US relations with the PRC at 
the gee-strategic level and the bilateral level. That is to say 
progress at one level often stimulated progress at the other. 
Finally, Chapter One highlights the roles of certain 
individuals in the policy-making process, such as Henry 
Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski. 
Chapter Two illustrates the evolution of the China policy 
debate within the domestic political environment from the late 
1940s to 1988 and the end of the Reagan Administration. 
Specifically, it highlights the major tends in domestic opinion 
and how they influenced the design and implementation of US 
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China policy throughout this period. In doing so, the chapter 
examines general public opinion, informed opinion, the media, 
Congress and non-governmental actors. In effect, this chapter 
introduces the idea of domestic political legitimacy, and its 
impact on China policy. Thus it also emphasises the 
governmental task of leadership, and the courting and moulding 
of domestic political opinion. Chapter Two notes how US 
domestic opinion toward China swings between fascination and 
optimism, and fear and pessimism for China and Sino-American 
relations. This phenomenon had clear implications for 
successive Administrations' handling of the relationship. It 
also notes how the US public tend to offer general moods rather 
than specific ideas of proposals for China policy and US 
foreign policy in general. 
Chapter Three examines the Bush Administration's resolute 
adherence to a strategy of engagement with the PRC, predicated 
on the President's belief in continuity and the strategic 
importance of China to US interests. The analytical perspective 
of the chapter focuses upon two major challenges faced by the 
Bush Administration; the Tiananmen Square repression of June 
1989, and the decline in Cold War tensions. Tiananmen forced 
Washington into a reevaluation of its relationship with Beijing 
and provided a stern test of the benefits of engagement with 
China. The chapter highlights the debate on the most 
appropriate strategy for stimulating reform in China. While the 
Bush Administration defended engagement with the PRC, the great 
majority of opponents maintained that US leverage ought to be 
brought to bear through a policy of linkage. Specifically 
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proponents of linkage demanded that China's MFN trading status 
should be made conditional on Beijing's conduct in areas such 
as human rights and proliferation. 
The Bush Administration was also forced to reassess US 
interests in China as 
bilateral dynamic of 
Cold War tensions diminished, 
bilateral relations replaced 
and the 
the geo-
strategic dynamic. Issues such as China role in the UN Security 
Council during the Gulf Conflict of 1990-91, and its 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction complicated US 
policy-makers' attempts to place US-China relations on a post-
Cold War footing, especially given their struggle to define an 
suitable response to Tiananmen. 
Chapter Three notes that the Bush Administration's 
reaction to these two major challenges helped to refine, 
develop and consolidate the strategy of engagement. However, 
the controversy associated with Bush's adherence to engagement 
also stimulated and consolidated debates on alternative 
strategies. 
Chapter Four attempts to show the growing importance of 
the domestic political environment on US China policy-making 
during the Bush Administration. It begins by noting how the 
increasingly bilateral nature of the US-China relationship 
throughout the mid to late 1980s had established a strong 
degree of domestic political legitimacy for US engagement with 
the PRC, principally through the growing non-governmental 
aspect of the relationship. However, it also notes the impact 
on the China debate of the growing awareness of China, combined 
with the wider debate on the definition of US foreign policy in 
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the post-Cold War environment. Thus as the Administration's 
prerogative to act in foreign affairs diminished, domestic 
actors became concerned with issues such as human rights, the 
subjugation of Tibet, and access to China's market. 
Chapter Four then focuses upon the impact of Tiananmen on 
domestic America's attitude toward China and China policy. 
Almost overnight, the prevailing mood of optimism and 
enthusiasm was replaced by one of pessimism and antipathy, 
particularly amongst the Democratic majority in Congress The 
chapter explores the collapse of the domestic consensus on 
China by emphasising four specific factors. Firstly, it 
highlights growing frustration with China's lack of contrition 
for Tiananmen. Secondly, and concomitantly, the chapter 
explores Congress' growing frustration with the Bush 
Administration's reliance on conciliatory engagement of the 
PRC. Thirdly, it reflects upon Bush's elitist approach to China 
policy that led him to resist attempts by Congress to shape the 
post-Tiananmen debate. This factor in particular prompted 
Republicans as well as Democrats to protest against the 
Administration. Fourthly, the chapter explores in some detail 
the politicisation of China policy, and the emergence and 
significance of partisanship. By investigating the Democratic 
party's politically motivated assaults on Bush, this analysis 
establishes the specific context to Clinton's approach to China 
during the election and thereafter. Chapter Four draws the 
conclusion that, whatever the merits of the Bush 
Administration's attempt to engage China, it failed to balance 
its preoccupation with strategic relations with Beijing, with 
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acknowledgement of attitudes within the domestic political 
arena. Such an absence of domestic legitimacy undermined the 
Bush Administration's management of relations with Beijing. 
Part Two of the thesis explores the development of 
Clinton' s stance on China during the 1992 presidential 
campaign, and the formulation and implementation of China 
policy throughout his first term of office. 
Chapter Five explains how and why Clinton came to advocate 
a strategy of linkage during the 1992 election. Thus it 
illustrates how the pursuit of the Democratic Congressional 
initiatives on China benefited Cl in ton's fight for the 
Democratic candidacy nomination, and then his campaign for the 
White House. It also shows how the stance complemented his 
political objectives beyond the election, and in particular his 
desire to concentrate on his ambitious domestic policy agenda. 
Further, Chapter Five highlights the role and impact of senior 
policy advisors such as Winston Lord and Anthony Lake, who 
would become members of his first Administration. Finally, the 
chapter explores the expectations of Clinton•s China policy in 
line with his advocacy of such significant alteration in US 
strategy toward Beij ing. It notes the number of analysts who 
viewed the stance from a political rather than a bilateral 
strategic perspective. 
Chapter Six focuses upon the policy-making process behind 
Clinton' s implementation of linkage in the form of Executive 
Order 12850. It details how Administration and Congressional 
officials handled Clinton's three objectives for China policy; 
adherence to his campaign pledge to pursue a strategy of 
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linkage, the forging of consensus with Congress, and the 
retention of presidential flexibility in the conduct of China 
policy. Chapter Six asserts that the policy-making process in 
line with these objectives was flawed, and thus it led to a 
flawed policy. Specifically, it illustrates how Clinton carried 
his political impulses from the election into his 
Administration, and thus established a politically orientated 
pattern of policy-making. Accordingly the chapter establishes 
the essential problems with Clinton's approach to China, that 
would persist throughout his first term. These were Clinton's 
failure to define a hierarchy of US priorities in China, to 
articulate a specific vision of relations with China, and his 
reluctance to commit and lead on China policy unless prompted 
by political concerns. 
Chapter Seven analyses the Administration's pursuit of 
China policy in line with the Executive Order, from the May 
1993 MFN recommendation, to the May 1994 MFN recommendation. 
Employing the themes introduced in Chapter Six, this chapter 
demonstrates how the essential flaws in the Executive Order 
policy-making process manifest themselves in China policy-
making and implementation through 1993-94. In particular, 
Chapter Seven shows how the failure to define a hierarchy of 
US-China interests, to articulate a framework for China policy, 
and Clinton's neglect of commitment and leadership led to deep 
splits within the Administration, and the presentation of a 
contradictory, inconsistent and incoherent China policy. The 
chapter indicates how this undermined the Administration's 
credibility both in Beijing and in Congress, and contributed to 
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the failure of Clinton's linkage strategy. Further, it notes 
that in spite of the attempt to reassess strategy on China as 
early as September 1993, and the final abandonment of linkage 
and reversion to engagement in May 1994, Clinton still failed 
to address the major flaws in the policy-making process. 
Indeed, Clinton's predominant concern was to effect a climbdown 
on China policy along the route of minimum political cost. 
Chapter Eight gathers the themes and conclusions discussed 
in the preceding three chapters and highlights their 
implications for the Clinton Administration's China policy from 
delinkage in May 1994 to the end of his first term of office. 
Three phases within this time-frame are identified; initial 
uncertainty in 1994, the rapid deterioration of relations 
through 1995 to 1996, and the recovery of Sino-American 
relations following the Taiwan Strait crisis of spring 1996. 
The failure to address persistent and fundamental policy-making 
flaws had two clear consequences. Firstly, it contributed to a 
critical decline in bilateral relations that ended in nadir in 
spring 1996. Secondly, it unhinged the unstable Congressional 
consensus on China policy created with the decision to re-
embrace engagement with Beijing. Thus this period saw the 
return of partisan politics and inter-branch conflict following 
the Republican sweep of the mid-term Congressional elections in 
November 1994, to the further detriment of China policy-making. 
This vociferous domestic and bilateral environment also saw the 
return of the issue of Taiwan for the first time since the 
early 1980s. Chapter Eight concludes by noting that only with 
the critical Taiwan Strait crisis did the Administration 
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finally begin to seriously address the essential flaws in its 
China policy-making. It was assisted in this effort by greater 
moderation from Congress and the PRC government. The extent to 
which the reassessment was working is reflected in the 
improvement in bilateral relations through the rest of 1996, 
and the fact that Clinton prevented China policy becoming an 
issue in the 1996 presidential elections. 
The thesis concludes by contending that President 
Clinton' s preoccupation with domestic political calculations, 
to the detriment of the identification of America's long term 
strategic interests in China, resulted in a fundamentally 
flawed China policy-making process. Indeed, despite the 
presence within the Administration of officials with a more 
considered strategic view of US relations with China, Clinton's 
political sensitivities obstructed or overruled their counsel. 
The conclusion reiterates that the imbalance of domestic 
political imperatives and bilateral strategic imperatives led 
to the failure to define a clear hierarchy of US interests in 
China, the failure to articulate a coherent framework for US-
China relations, and Clinton's failure to commit himself to and 
lead on US China policy. Accordingly, this encouraged splits 
within the Administration whereby different agencies were able 
to pursue their own bureaucratic agendas with Beij ing. As a 
result the Administration's China policy appeared confused, 
incoherent and inconsonant. This served to seriously undermine 
both the US strategic relationship with Beij ing and domestic 
legitimacy for US China policy. 
Decision-making Theory and 
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The Clinton Administration's China Policy 
This thesis is essentially a historical investigation of the 
policy-making processes behind the Clinton Administration's 
China policy during its first term of office. Nevertheless, to 
understand the degree to which the Clinton Administration, and 
more specifically, President Clinton, was responsible for the 
defects in China policy-making through the period 1993 to 1996, 
it is important to examine various explanations of US foreign 
policy decision-making. 
Many theories have been developed regarding the nature of 
American foreign policy-making. Indeed a number of valuable 
studies have been written that attempt to compare and contrast 
different decision-making models with reference to empirical 
case studies. 2 The discussion below will consider four broad 
approaches; the rational actor model, the bureaucratic model, 
the inter-branch model, and the pluralistic 'shifting 
constellations' model. Each respective model considers a 
greater number of actors in the decision-making process, and 
therefore, it can be argued, offers a greater level of 
sophistication. It will be found that while the bureaucratic 
model highlights critical problems associated with the Clinton 
Administration's attempts to develop China policy, the 
pluralistic model articulated by James M. Scott presents the 
2 See for example Graham T. Allison, 'Conceptual Models and 
the Cuban Missile Crisis' ; American Political Science Review 
September 1969, Graham T. Allison, The Essence of Decision; 
Little, Brown (Boston, 1971) and Glen H. Snyder and Paul 
Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision-Making 
and System Structure in International Crises; Princeton 
University Press {Princeton, 1977) 
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most compelling conclusions. However, it will also be shown 
that Scott' s analysis does not adequately explain Clinton' s 
China policy-making deficiencies through 1993-1996, in that it 
fails to incorporate the President's persistent preoccupation 
with domestic political considerations. 
THE RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL OF DECISION-MAKING 
The rational actor model was, and perhaps is the dominant 
theory concerning foreign policy decision-making. The model's 
association with the classical international relations 
tradition of realism is reflected in its treatment of the state 
as a ~unitary actor', and its assertion that all policy-makers 
pursue the same processes in the development of foreign policy. 3 
Rational actor decision-making identifies four basic stages. 
Firstly, the foreign policy problem or goal must be identified, 
in the context of the state's wider objectives and values. This 
stage requires the policy-maker to define a hierarchy of goals 
to be achieved. Secondly, all possible options and alternative 
courses of action must be identified. Thirdly, the likely 
consequences of each option must be appreciated. Finally, the 
most effective and appropriate option must be chosen and 
pursued. 4 
As Theodore C. Sorensen, an aide close to President 
3 See Sydney Verba, ~Assumptions of Rationality and Non-
Rationality in Models of the International System'; in James N. 
Rosenau (ed), International Politics and Foreign Policy; Free 
Press (New York, 1969) p.225. 
4 John Spanier, Games Nations Play: Analyzing International 
Politics; Praeger Publishers (New York, 1978) pp.462-463. 
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Kennedy during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, has noted, the 
rational actor model presented in these terms is a somewhat 
idealized prescription for decision-making. 5 For example, 
policy-makers never have full knowledge of all relevant 
information, and a clear hierarchy of national interests, and 
of all possible options and likely consequences are almost 
always impossible to define absolutely. 6 Further, the way in 
which policy-makers, and specifically the president as the 
supreme policy-maker, perceive. the foreign policy challenge in 
hand must be affected by subjective rather than objective 
valuations to a greater or lesser degree. 7 
However, the general rule that policy-makers attempt to 
select and execute a particular policy, from various 
alternatives, with regard to the state's national interests, is 
a persuasive one. 8 It can be argued that various US presidents 
pursued initiatives with Beijing, in spite of domestic 
controversy, because they judged them to be in interests of the 
United States. Examples include Nixon's rapprochement with Mao, 
Carter's normalisation of US-China relations, and Bush's 
defence of the strategy of engagement following the Tiananmen 
5 Theodore c. Sorensen, Decision-Making in the White House; 
Columbia University Press (New York, 1963) pp.19-20. See also 
Tan Qingshan, The Making of US-China Policy From 
Normalisation to the Post-Cold War Era; Lynne Reinner (1992) 
pp.12-14 and 150-153. 
6 See Charles W. Kegley Jr and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American 
Foreign Policy: Patterns and Processes; Fourth Edition, St 
Martin's Press (New York, 1991) pp.459-462. 
7 See for 
Misperception in 
Press (Princeton, 
example Robert Jervis, Perception and 
International Politics; Princeton University 
1976). 
8 See Sydney Verba, 'Assumptions of Rationality and Non-
Rationality'; op cit p.231. 
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Square repression of 1989. 
Accordingly, it might also be argued that Clinton's 
adoption of a strategy of linkage in May 1993, and his 
subsequent reversal back to engagement with the PRC in May 1994 
were decisions taken in US national interests as perceived by 
the President at the time. 9 Such an argument would be wholly 
misleading. As this thesis will demonstrate, Cl in ton's China 
policy decisions reflected domestic political calculations and 
considerations more than they did perceptions of US national 
interests viz-a-viz the People's Republic. Even when crises 
arose in bilateral relations, an environment in which the 
rational actor model, it is argued, is most salient, the 
President continued to respond primarily to their repercussions 
on domestic US politics. 1° Further, this thesis also stresses 
the importance of domestic legitimacy to the successful pursuit 
of US China policy. Reflecting the examples given above, it 
must be noted that both Carter's normalisation of relations, 
and Bush's defence of engagement were controversial and less 
than successful partly because they lacked domestic 
legitimacy. 11 By contrast, the issue of opening relations with 
For a discussion of the consequences of 'non-rational' 
decision-making see Paul A. Anderson, 'What do Decision Makers 
Do when they Make a Foreign Policy Decision?' in Charles F. 
Hermann, Charles W. Kegley and James N. Rosenau (eds), New 
Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy; Allen and Unwin 
(Boston, 1987) . 
1° For crisis decision-making see, for example, Graham T. 
Allison, The Essence of Decision; op cit, and James E. 
Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr, Contending Theories of 
International Relations; Harper Collins Publishers (New York, 
1990) pp.482-499. 
11 See for example Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power: US 
Relations with China Since 1949; Clarendon Press (New York, 
1995), and Chapter Three of this thesis. 
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China had been debated in elite and societal circles within the 
US from the mid 1960's, providing stronger domestic foundations 
for Nixon's rapprochement with Beijing. 
Given that the object of this study is to contend that 
Clinton's policy-making approach through 1992/93-1996 was 
flawed, and thus detrimental to US-China relations, it might be 
argued that the rational actor model's validity is found 
precisely in these failures. In other words, because Clinton 
did not pursue the general prescriptions of the rational actor 
model, his China policy failed. This perception would also be 
misleading. It would, for example, ignore the critical role 
played by a highly partisan Democrat-controlled Congress in 
establishing a China policy stance Clinton would later pursue 
for political ends. It would ignore the fact that Clinton' s 
China policy-making strongly reflected the state of relations 
between the White House and Congress, particularly after the 
Republican sweep of the mid-term Congressional elections in 
1994. It would also ignore the devastating impact of a 
discordant and undisciplined Clinton Bureaucracy on bilateral 
relations. 
THE BUREAUCRATIC MODEL OF DECISION-MAKING 
The bureaucratic model dismisses the idea of the policy-maker 
as a unitary actor pursuing the interests of the state. 
Instead, it examines the roles and influence played by 
government agencies, such as the State Department, the 
Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency and other departments 
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with major or minor interests in foreign policy-making. 12 The 
model highlights the subjective realities held by bureaucratic 
actors or agencies in their approach to decision-making. 
Important works by Robert Jervis and Morton H. Halperin 
exemplify this approach. 13 
In The Essence of Decision, Allison recognised the appeal 
of the rational actor model, but argued that the complexity of 
US foreign policy processes require a more sophisticated 
explanation. 14 Allison started with a model of 'organizational 
process' in which bureaucratic actors, within the State 
Department for example, search for minimally acceptable 
solutions to the policy problems delegated to them. Their 
solutions closely reflect the interests, remit, and standard 
procedures of the specific department, rather than national 
interests or the prescriptions of the White House. From this 
framework, Allison developed a model of bureaucratic decision-
making. Like Halperin, Allison argued that the input of 
bureaucratic actors reflected the values, interests and stakes 
of the agency within which they worked. Thus policy developed 
by bureaucratic decision-making was a product not of rational 
assessment, but of bargaining, conflict and dynamics of power 
between different agencies and departments in competition. This 
kind of policy-making process, Allison noted, is less reliant 
12 For a comprehensive discussion on the difference between 
the rational actor and bureaucratic models of decision-making, 
see Graham T. Allison, 'Conceptual Models'; op cit. 
13 Robert Jervis, 'Perception and Misperception'; op cit and 
Mort on H. Halperin, Priscilla Cl a pp and Arnold Kantor, 
Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy; The Brookings 
Institution (Washington D.C., 1974). 
14 Graham T. Allison, The Essence of Decision; op cit p.5. 
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on, or even more resistant to, White House control. 15 
Authors such as Alexander L. George have argued that a 
comprehensive and competitive decision-making process of this 
kind could lead to better, more democratic and representative 
policy-making, if managed effectively by the Executive . 16 
Others, however, have suggested bureaucratic policy to be 
'dysfunctional, inefficient decision-making' . 17 Most obviously, 
unless carefully managed, bureaucratic decision-making can lead 
to inertia as agencies compete to promote their parochial 
interests and fiefdoms, to the detriment of 'national 
interest' . 18 If compromise between competing agencies is found, 
the result may be representative, but not necessarily good, 
policy. If compromise is not found, different agencies may 
pursue different, often contradictory policy agendas. The need 
for presidential management and control of inter-agency 
competition and parochialism is clear. 19 
Despite these problems, the bureaucratic model of 
decision-making raises valuable analytical questions, with 
clear applications to the Clinton Administration's policy on 
15 Kegley and Wit tkopf reason that it can lead to the 
sabotage of presidential initiatives. Charles W. Kegley and 
Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy; op cit pp.473-474. 
16 George referred to this process as the 'multiple advocacy 
model'. Alexander L. George, 'The Case for Multiple Advocacy in 
Making Foreign Policy'; American Political Science Review LXVI 
September 1972. 
17 Tan Qingshan, The Making of US-China Policy; op cit p .15. 
18 See for example Morton H. Halperin, 'Why Bureaucrats Play 
Games'; Foreign Policy Spring 1971. 
19 Kegley and Wittkopf discuss this point at length, citing 
problems encountered and tactics employed by different 
presidents facing these problems. Charles W. Kegley and Eugene 
R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy; op cit pp.473-480. 
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China. As will be shown in later chapters, China policy through 
1993-1996 was a highly pluralistic exercise. Thus, analysis 
through the bureaucratic lens highlights the interests, 
interplay and impact of agencies such as the Departments of 
State, Defence, Commerce, Agriculture and the Treasury, as well 
as their interaction with White House agencies such as the 
presidency, the National Security Council (NSC) and the newly 
formed National Economic Council (NEC) . Certainly the roles 
played by agencies such as Commerce, the Treasury, the NEC, and 
the Pentagon conform to the bureaucratic model proposition that 
'you stand where you sit'; that the actors' preferences reflect 
their particular policy responsibilities. 
Further, the fact that different agencies pursued 
different, often contradictory policy agendas, resulting in a 
confused, incoherent and discordant China policy, highlights 
President Clinton' s overall failure to manage and discipline 
the policy-making process. The model also helps the observer to 
ascertain which agencies possessed the greatest influence at 
various points in the policy-making process, and at which 
points the process was subject to competition, compromise, and 
presidential control. Accordingly, it can be seen that the 
State Department's initial lead on the Clinton Administration's 
China policy, with its focus on human rights and linkage, was 
ln time undermined by the growing influence of economic 
agencies such as Commerce and the NEC, and their preference for 
engagement. The latter's influence on the president proved 
crucial to this development. 
Despite its uses, however, the bureaucratic model of 
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decision-making omits critical elements of the China policy-
making processes during the Clinton Administration's first term 
of office. In its simpler forms, the model fails to acknowledge 
that individual actors do not necessarily reflect the 
organisational or traditional views of the department they 
represent. For example, both Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher and his Assistant Secretary for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs Winston Lord strongly supported the strategy of 
linking China's human rights progress to the renewal of MFN 
status. This contradicted the long-standing support for 
engagement with Beij ing held at lower levels of the State 
Department, as the thesis will demonstrate. Similarly, National 
Security Advisor Anthony Lake's 'missionary' zeal for human 
rights improvements in China contradicted the NSC's traditional 
defence of engagement. 
The bureaucratic model also neglects the influence of 
Congress, and of non-governmental actors such as the business 
community, on the China policy-making process, and in 
particular, Clinton's approach to the issue. In broader terms, 
it ignores both the importance of domestic political 
legitimacy, and the impact of Clinton's preoccupation with 
domestic political considerations on his Administration's 
treatment of China policy. Therefore, although bureaucratic 
politics had a significant bearing on the evolution of China 
policy through 1993-1996, it fails to recognise that the 
origins of Clinton's initial stance on China lay with Democrat-
led Congressional attacks on the Bush Administration's China 
policy, and that Clinton adopted this stance largely for 
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partisan political reasons. 
The bureaucratic model of decision-making offers valuable 
insights into the problems of the Clinton Administration's 
policy on China. Nevertheless, it cannot account for the 
original motives for, and defects of, the policy. Nor does it 
fully explain Clinton's subsequent failure to address 
persistent flaws in the policy and the policy-making process. 
THE INTER-BRANCH MODEL OF DECISION-MAKING 
The inter-branch model fills an analytical void left by the 
rational actor and bureaucratic models, by highlighting the 
policy-making role played by Congress. Thus, the inter-branch 
model in its basic form looks at the relationship between 
Congress and the Executive, treating each branch as a unitary 
actor. The model focuses upon a number of conceptual issues. 
Starting with the assumption that the two institutions possess 
and pursue their own respective interests and agendas, it 
attempts to determine the issues that stimulate Congressional 
input, and to what extent Congress influences the Executive in 
the policy-making process (and vice versa) . It also discerns 
whether the relationship is one of exclusion, competition, 
negotiation, consultation, or cooperation, and why this is so. 20 
Observers differ on the nature of inter-branch 
20 See for example Frans R. Bax, 'The Legislative-Executive 
Relationship in Foreign Policy: New Partnership or New 
Competition?'; Orbis vol.20 Winter 1977. 
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interaction. John Lehman, for example, argues that the policy-
making relationship can largely be viewed as a zero-sum game, 
in which both institutions attempt to limit the influence of 
the other. 21 Frans Bax, on the other hand, highlights the degree 
of compromise throughout the policy-making process. 22 More 
broadly, however, the product of Congressional-Executive inter-
active decision-making is reliant on institutional will, 
Executive leadership, Congressional unity, their respective 
bargaining skills, and the strength of the presidential party 
ln Congress. 23 
Given that the Office of the Presidency, and a wide 
variety of Executive departments have an explicit 
responsibility for foreign policy, it is essential, when 
considering the inter-branch model, to investigate the motives 
for Congressional action on the issue. Certainly, Congress 
holds a constitutional duty to oversee the actions of the 
Executive, exemplified most tangibly by committees such as the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee. Beyond scrutiny, however, Congress may also 
wish to lead on foreign policy issues, obstruct specific 
Executive initiatives, inform a foreign policy debate, or 
influence a policy's final outcome. In doing so, Congress may 
employ a wide range of tactics, including direct legislation, 
21 John Lehman, The Executive, Congress, and Foreign Policy: 
Studies of the Nixon Administration; Praeger (New York, 1976) 
pp.25-28. 
22 Frans R. Bax, 'The Legislative-Executive Relationship'; 
op cit. 
23 Robert Pastor, 'Inter-branch Politics and US 
Policy'; American Politics Group paper (unpublished) 
1990. 
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Foreign 
January 
the threat of legislation/ the manipulation of committee 
powersr linkage to other issuesr and consultation with the 
Executive. 24 
Traditionally/ it is assumed that members of Congress 
exhibit far greater interest in domestic affairs than foreign 
affairs. Accordingly/ if Congress turns its attention to 
foreign policy/ most members rely on key Congressional players 
(with whom they broadly respect) to lead them on the issue in 
hand. Furtherr it is assumed that members of Congress are 
primarily motivated by re-election/ and issues that might aid 
this course. 25 While these traditional assumptions contain 
strong elements of truthr they provide a misleading picture of 
the influence of Congress in foreign policy-making in the post-
Cold War environment. 
Clinton was correctr when campaigning for the presidency 
in 1992 1 when he asserted that many of the distinctions between 
'foreign policy' and 'domestic policy' had evaporated in the 
post-Cold War environment. For exampler economics and 
employment had become an issue of foreign policy r as well as 
domestic policy. Thus r in this emerging 'intermestic' arenar 
members of Congress have found that they have a stake in 
influencing foreign policy/ if only to protect constituency 
interests and aid their re-election. This provides a valuable 
24 Ralph G. Carterr 'Congress and Post-Cold War US Foreign 
Policy'i in James M. Scott (ed) 1 After the End: Making US 
Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Worldi Duke University 
Press (London 1 1998). See also James M. Lindsay, Congress and 
the Politics of US Foreign Policyi The John Hopkins University 
Press (London, 1994). 
25 Tan Qingshanr The Making of US-China Policyi op cit 
pp.18-19. 
33 
new dynamic to inter-branch theory, of great relevance to the 
Clinton Administration's China policy-making processes. Members 
of Congress were unwilling to accept Executive proposals on 
China policy if they were deemed detrimental to their own 
interestS. 26 For example, through May 1993 to May 1994, members 
of Congress of both parties became increasingly hostile to 
Clinton' s China policy. Not only were they dissatisfied with 
the Administration's handling of US China relations, but many 
viewed the strategy of linkage as harmful to their own, often 
economic, interests. 
Yet this point raises the first of a series of reasons the 
inter-branch model is incapable of explaining the China policy-
making processes of 1993-1996. Congressional support for 
linkage (and its subsequent opposition to the strategy) rested 
upon a complex and fluid coalition of forces on the Hill. Given 
this fact, Congress could not be regarded as a 'unitary' actor 
in the decision-making process. Rather, groups within Congress 
worked with like-minded groups within the Executive to advance 
their particular arguments, in competition with similarly 
structured groups holding different views. Although blocs 
within Congress had a very significant impact on China policy, 
this did not represent a Congress versus Executive 
institutional pattern. 
The role partisan politics played in the motivations of 
26 congressional deference to the president on China policy 
had been on the wane since the mid 1980s. See Steven I. Levine, 
'China and America: The Resilient Relationship'; Current 
History vol.91 no.566 September 1992 p.243. More generally, 
traditional Congressional deference on foreign policy came to a 
end with the Vietnam War. See James M. Lindsay, Congress and 
the Politics of US Foreign Policy; op cit pp.24-25. 
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both Congressional and Executive actors, and the way they 
interacted, also confounds the prospect of an inter-branch 
explanation of Clinton's China policy. Firstly, partisan 
politics fuelled divisions within both the Legislature and the 
Executive. Secondly, partisan politics, rather than 
institutionally defined opposition, played a pivotal role in 
Democrat-led criticism of the Bush Administration's China 
policy, a lead that Clinton would pursue for his own political 
objectives. Partisan loyalty (as opposed to policy consensus) 
also facilitated Clinton' s pursuit of a strategy of linkage 
through 1993-1994 and his potentially damaging reversal of 
policy in May 1994. 27 
Finally, the inter-branch model of decision-making also 
neglects the role played by non-governmental actors such as 
interest groups. At best, the model fails to appreciate the 
influence groups such as the business community had on the 
evolution of the Clinton Administration's China policy. 
Organisations such as the Emergency Committee on American Trade 
worked with members of Congress, Congressional staff, Executive 
officials, and even officials of the Chinese government, to 
influence the direction of Cl in ton's approach to China. The 
process of China policy decision-making during the Clinton 
Administration was a highly pluralistic exercise. The inter-
branch model of decision-making fails to take account of this 
fact. 
27 For example, Representative Lee Hamilton, a key figure on 
foreign policy within the Democratic Party, remained loyal to 
Clinton's policy of linkage despite his personal opposition to 
the strategy. 
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THE PLURALISTIC MODEL OF DECISION-MAKING 
Like the bureaucratic and inter-branch models, the pluralistic 
model of decision-making examines conflict and compromise 
between participants of the policy-making process, viewing the 
result not as 'policy' per se, but as the 'product of political 
processes' . However the pluralistic model offers a more 
accurate reflection of foreign policy decision-making than its 
bureaucratic and inter-branch counterparts. Not only does it 
recognise governmental actors such as the White House, the 
Bureaucracy, and Congress, it also recognises the roles played 
by non-governmental actors such as interest groups, the media, 
and public opinion. 28 
Although some pluralistic theorists defend the principle 
of organizational identity, the 'you stand where you sit' 
principle29 , other authors recognize that differences of opinion 
are manifest within organizations. 30 Thus conflict and 
bargaining will occur within the Oval Office, within the State 
Department, within Congress, and within the human rights 
community, as well as between these actors. 
The unfolding of the intermestic environment has served to 
fuel these inter-agency, and intra-agency, decision-making 
processes. More often than not, a myriad of different agencies 
28 John Spanier, Games Nations Play; op cit pp.470-472 and 
p.489. 
29 Ibid pp.472-473. 
30 See for example, Halperin in Morton 
Arnold Kanter (eds) , Readings in American 
Little, Brown (Boston, 1973). 
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H. Halperin and 
Foreign Policy; 
will feel that they have an interest, and thus a stake, in how 
a policy decision is reached. For example, when assuming the 
presidency, Clinton was determined to be seen to abide by his 
pledge to secure human rights improvements in China, and to 
place conditions on China's MFN status if necessary. The 
President delegated the lead role to the State Department, yet 
other agencies such as Defence, Commerce, Treasury and 
Agriculture felt that their interests in US-China relations 
necessitated an input on the China policy-making process. 
Further, members of Congress who claimed a moral, economic or 
other interest in China policy, also demanded a say. 
Furthermore, interest groups such as the business community, 
labour unions, and the human rights community, argued that 
their views and interests be recognised in the policy. The 
obligation to manage this web of interactive policy-making fell 
back to the President, given the fact that he was ultimately 
responsible for the development and conduct of US China policy. 
The pluralistic model offers many valid observations of 
the shifting nature of power between policy-makers. In certain 
circumstances, at certain times, particular actors or agencies 
may dominate the decision-making process. 31 Most decision-making 
theories broadly agree that the president possesses significant 
policy-making power when security crises arise, due to the 
presidency's constitutional position, not least the role as 
Commander in Chief. 32 The presidency holds a clear institutional 
31 See James M. Scott (ed), After the End; op cit pp.l0-18. 
32 See for example Graham . T. 
Decision; op cit and James E. 
Pfaltzgraff Jr, Contending Theories 
pp.482-499. 
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Allison, The Essence of 
Dougherty and Robert L. 
of International Relations 
advantage in the development of foreign policy, and it is the 
source of most foreign policy initiatives. However, the 
president also relies on the service of elite members of the 
Executive (hand-picked, of course, by the president), and must 
invest the level of commitment necessary to manage the 
decision-making process. Clinton's lack of commitment on China 
policy undermined the policy-making power of those in the 
Bureaucracy, such as Wins ton Lord, Warren Christopher, and 
Anthony Lake, who supported his strategy. 
The source of decision-making power for bureaucratic 
departments is found in their day to day responsibility for 
aspects of foreign policy. For example, bureaucrats often have 
the greatest access to information required for policy 
formulation, and are relied upon to implement policy. 
Nevertheless, the extent to which the Bureaucracy influences 
the decision-making process depends on the degree of conflict 
within and between departments. Hence, explicit competition 
between the State Department and economic agencies such as the 
Commerce D~partment over the direction of the Clinton 
Administration's China policy facilitated Congressional 
attempts to seize the initiative on the issue. 
Beyond its constitutional role of the scrutiny of the 
Executive, Congress, when united on an issue, can have an 
important impact upon foreign policy decision-making. For 
instance, the weight of Congressional support for the visit to 
the US of Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui in 1995, and the 
corresponding threat of legislation, persuaded the 
Administration to drop its opposition to the visit. Congress 
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can also take advantage of Executive vacillation, confusion, or 
disengagement on a policy, and assume leadership in the 
decision-making process. This is particularly the case when a 
strong consensus on a policy issue exists on the Hill, and when 
it is able to ally itself with powerful voices within the 
Executive and/or outside the government. Thus a powerful 
centrist bloc in Congress, cooperating with the business 
community and with the economic agencies within the Executive, 
heavily influenced Clinton's decision to drop MFN 
conditionality and the strategy of linkage in May 1994. 
The pluralistic model also stresses that non-government 
actors, particularly interest groups, can also find avenues of 
influence on foreign policy decision-making. Indeed, the 
evolution of an intermestic environment has promoted the roles 
of interest groups in two ways. Firstly, the erosion of 
traditional distinctions between foreign and domestic policy in 
areas such as economics, has encouraged entities such as the 
business community to promote their interests in the policy-
making arena. Secondly, the redefinition of post-Cold War US 
national interests has led to the promotion of issues such as 
human rights and the environment. This has induced 
organisations focusing on such issues, but previously excluded 
from foreign policy-making, to add their voice to the decision-
making process. 
As noted, interest groups can ally with and support like-
minded actors in the Executive and Congress. They can also 
attempt to promote their agendas through consultations with 
government officials, representations to Congressional 
39 
committees, and exercises focusing on the media and public 
opinion. Scott notes that interest groups can also exploit 
political opportunities arising from a lack of Executive 
fortitude and leadership on an issue. 33 For instance, major 
corporations reminded Clinton of their support for his 
ambitious domestic economic agenda, and moreover, their support 
for his presidency, when attempting to dissuade him from 
imposing conditionality on China's MFN status. Nevertheless, 
despite this acknowledgement of the political factor, the 
pluralistic model is rather weak on the impact of domestic 
political considerations on foreign policy decision-making. 34 
James M. Scott, in his edited work After the End: Making 
US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World, offers a model of 
pluralistic decision-making that addresses the impact of the 
post-Cold War, intermestic environment on US foreign policy. 35 
Specifically, Scott asserts that this environment has presented 
two significant challenges for US foreign policy-making. 
Firstly, he notes the struggle to define a hierarchy of US 
interests in an international arena that simultaneously appears 
to justify integration as well as competition, moralism as well 
as pragmatism, in the absence of the kind of guiding principles 
that governed US foreign policy throughout most of the Cold 
War. 36 Secondly, Scott observes how the evolution of intermestic 
policy has democratized the policy-making process. In other 
493. 
33 James M. Scott, After the Endi op cit p.403. 
34 See for example John Spanier, Games Nations Playi pp.492-
35 Op cit. 
36 See for example ibid pp. 389-341. 
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words, a process once dominated by the president and the 
bureaucracy has fragmented to the point where a large number of 
governmental and non-governmental actors, promoting a wide 
variety of interests, can influence policy-making. The author 
concludes that these challenges have resulted in foreign policy 
dissensus. 37 
As a consequence, Scott insists that US foreign policy-
making in the post-Cold War environment can be described as a 
process of 'shifting constellations'. It is argued that 
although the president remains central to the policy-making 
process in an institutional sense, he is no longer necessarily 
at the centre of decision-making. 38 Thus, Scott builds upon 
existing pluralistic theory in identifying the circumstances, 
the policy issues, and the points in the policy-making process 
where different actors, and coalitions of actors may have the 
greatest opportunity to influence policy outcome. 39 For example, 
the human rights communities responded to an invitation from 
the White House to participate in the development of China 
policy during the first few months of the Clinton 
Administration. However, as will be shown, they soon found 
their influence usurped by a business community aided and 
abetted by pro-business factions within Congress and the 
bureaucracy. 40 
37 Ibid p.19 and p.406. See also David Deese, 'Making 
American Foreign Policy in the 1990s', in David Deese (ed), The 
New Politics of American Foreign Policyi St Martin's Press (New 
York, 1994). 
38 Ibid pp.393-395. 
39 Ibid. see Part One, Actors and Influence. 
40 This form of 'sub-governmental leadership' 
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resists the 
This framework of ~shifting constellations' can have both 
positive and negative implications, according to Scott. On the 
positive side, a democratized decision-making process can 
result in a representative and ~legitimised' policy. In other 
words, the policy may reflect the opinions of all governmental 
and non-governmental actors with a stake in the final product 
of the decision-making process. However, this is somewhat 
idealistic, Given the complexities and uncertainties of the 
post-Cold War intermestic environment, the process is likely to 
reflect conflict, contradiction, and political horse-trading. 
Irresolute and equivocal policy can be the result. 41 
Scott maintains that the Clinton Administration has 
attempted to adapt to the new policy-making environment, citing 
the creation of the National Economic Council, its emphasis on 
democratization, assertive multilateralism, and its attempt to 
address rising powers such as China. 42 More generally, Scott 
identifies the progression towards ~shifting constellations' of 
decision-making as a response to the new environment. 43 
Nevertheless, Scott suggests that these adaptations are 
flawed and incomplete, and offers mitigating factors for their 
inadequacies. 44 Firstly, he notes the constraints imposed by the 
influence of foreign policy elites, often to powerful effect. 
Ibid p .11. This is exemplified by the business community's 
collusion with the centrist bloc in Congress through 1993-1994. 
41 David M. Scott, After the End' op cit p.406. 
42 Ibid pp.391-392. See also Jerel Rosati and Stephen Twing, 
'The Presidency and US Foreign Policy after the Cold War'; ibid 
pp. 51-52. 
43 Ibid pp. 405-406. 
44 See for example ibid pp.392-393. 
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uncertainty concerning US foreign policy interests in the post-
Cold War world. Secondly, the surge in posited interests has 
led to a multiplication of actors and voices in the foreign 
policy-making process. In particular, this has circumscribed 
the president's ability to manage and lead the development of 
policy. The third factor concerns public ambivalence towards 
foreign policy. This may be explained by the absence of a 
homogenizing threat to, 
in the post-Cold War 
and ambiguous nature of, US interests 
world, and the concomitant desire to 
concentrate on domestic issues after fifty years of gee-
strategic preoccupation. 
James M. Scott builds 
bureaucratic and pluralistic 
upon 
models 
valuable insights 
of decision-making 
of 
to 
create a compelling portrait of contemporary US foreign policy-
making. In defining a framework of 'shifting constellations', 
he highlights salient issues such as the fragmentation of 
interests, the democratization of policy processes, and the 
erosion of the ability to dominate or lead on policy. In doing 
so, Scott emphasises the complexities of the environment in 
which these decision-making structures function. Further, by 
stressing the importance of the domestic context, he 
incorporates the necessary ingredient of domestic legitimacy to 
US foreign policy. Scott's model appreciates crucial structural 
and environmental changes that necessitate transformations in 
the patterns of US foreign policy-making, but also continue to 
present the greatest challenges to it. 
Nevertheless, the model offered by Scott does not 
adequately explain the Clinton Administration's China policy-
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making_ deficiencies through 1993-1996. Although the mitigating 
factors for problematic foreign policy performance are valid, 
it fails to account for the impact of domestic political 
calculations. This is illustrated by the following examples. 
Scott, along with other theorists, notes that presidential 
dominance of the policy-process often comes to the fore during 
strategic and diplomatic crises. Clinton indeed committed 
himself to China policy during such crises, but he was 
motivated by their domestic political implications. Once 
Clinton was confident that he had resolved the domestic 
political element of the crisis, he disengaged himself from the 
policy process. Only with the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996, did 
the President finally commit himself to the long-term strategic 
perspective of China policy. Clearly, Clinton's failure to 
provide concerted leadership contributed to the existence of 
splits between and within bureaucracy agencies. 
Political calculations also underscored many Congressional 
attempts to influence China policy. Democrats in Congress waged 
a largely successful political assault against the Bush 
Administration's defence of engagement with China after 
Tiananmen, a lead Clinton adopted in the belief that it would 
aid his 1992 presidential campaign. Similarly, the erosion of 
Congressional deference to the White House on issues of foreign 
policy was informed by political interests on the Hill. 
Further, the growth in Congressional participation in China 
policy-making reflected not only members' specific interests in 
US relations with China, but more generally a bipartisan 
dissatisfaction with President and his Administration's 
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management of the relationship, particularly through 1993-1994. 
Finally, while Scott's contention that the US public 
remains broadly ambivalent about foreign policy, Cl in ton was 
able to exploit widespread antipathy towards human rights in 
China when contrasting his stance on China policy with that of 
Bush. In fact, Clinton did not interpret domestic legitimacy as 
participation in China policy-making debates, comprehension of 
the issues, and the creation of consensual policy. Rather, he 
viewed legitimacy in politically popularist terms (or at least 
politically expedient terms) . He may have noted how President 
Bush's neglect of domestic legitimacy had undermined his 
Administration's policy towards Beijing. 
This thesis explains the dynamics behind the Clinton 
Administration's approach to China policy-making throughout its 
first term of office. While not a primarily theoretical study, 
the thesis accommodates the levels of analysis employed by 
Scott's pluralistic model of decision-making. However, it 
provides a more accurate explication of the Clinton China 
policy by also incorporating the impact of domestic political 
calculations on the policy-making processes. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
AMERICAN CHINA POLICY FROM TRUMAN TO REAGAN 
THE EVOLUTION OF ENGAGEMENT 
This chapter traces the development of American foreign policy 
towards China, from the Truman Administration's reaction to the 
declaration of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, to 
the end of the Reagan Administration in 1988. Specifically, it 
explains the origins, rationales, and entrenchment of a 
strategy of engagement towards the People's Republic of China 
throughout this period. Thus, the chapter focuses upon a number 
of conceptual questions vital to understanding the formulation 
of US-China strategy. 
The first question highlights the impact of both the 
international and domestic environments on China policy-making. 
From the international perspective, China policy was, of 
course, heavily influenced by America's gee-strategic rivalry 
with the Soviet Union. Towards the end of the period in 
question, however, US China policy-making was increasingly 
predicated on bilateral interests and issues, especially as 
relations between Washington and Moscow improved. Thus, US 
interests in China became self -perpetuating rather than being 
driven by wider foreign policy concerns. 
On the domestic side, policy-makers had to pay attention 
to opinions expressed by members of Congress, the media, 
informed observers, and the general public. In other words, 
successive Administrations had to secure domestic legitimacy, 
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and therefore authority, from within the political arena. 
Presidents were required to demonstrate leadership on China 
policy, either in the form of maintaining a present policy 
stance (Eisenhower in the 1950s), or to promote new approaches 
to China strategy (Johnson and Nixon in the 1960s and early 
1970s) . This entailed the necessary though often complex tasks 
of socialising, moulding and courting domestic opinion. 1 
Further, presidents, and indeed other actors, pursued these 
tasks in an attempt to preserve jurisdiction, flexibility and 
prestige in the policy-making process. This became increasingly 
important as traditional deference to the president in the 
realm of foreign policy began to wane in the aftermath of the 
Vietnam conflict, and as bilateral issues replaced geo-
strategic issues at the centre of China policy-making. 
It must be noted that the US public often presented 
general moods and attitudes regarding the objectives of China 
policy (such as sympathy for the Nationalists on Taiwan) but 
offered very little in terms of specific recommendations. 2 These 
moods were often represented as either favourable of 
unfavourable views of China. As is often noted, the American 
public mood swung between optimism and fascination with China, 
See Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power; Oxford 
University Press (New York, 1995) pp.82-84, and James M. Scott 
(ed), After the End: Making US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold 
War World; Duke University Press (London, 1998) pp.2-4 and p.6. 
2 See for example Karlyn H. Bowman, ~Public Attitudes 
Towards the People's Republic of China'; in James R. Lilley and 
Wendell L. Willkie II (eds), Beyond MFN: Trade with China and 
American Interests; The AEI Press (Washington, 1994) Appendix, 
p.145 and p.151. 
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and pessimism and fear of China, depending on bilateral events, 
developments in the Cold War, stances adopted by the 
Administration and so on.' These moods either restrained 
progress in US-PRC relations (as it did in the 1960s and mid-
1970s) or stimulated progress (the 1980s) . 
Cognitive of the features and themes outlined above, the 
views held by successive Administrations were generally in step 
with views held within their domestic environments throughout 
the period in quest ion. When there was a divergence in their 
respective standpoints, as occurred during the Carter 
Administration, this proved detrimental to the legitimacy and 
authority of the Administration's pursuit of China policy. 
Following acceptance of the strategy of engagement in the mid 
to late 1960s, the domestic political environment generally 
favoured the further development of US-China ties. At the very 
least, there was no substantial domestic demand to reverse or 
dismantle the Sino-American relationship. 
An appreciation of the impact of the international and 
domestic environments on policy-making is therefore vital to 
understanding the evolution of US engagement with China. It 
highlights the need for policy-makers to balance their 
interpretations of US strategic interests in China, with their 
perceptions of domestic legitimacy, a balance that both 
3 This phenomenon persists to this day. Interview with 
Stephen Yates, November 5 1997, Heritage Foundation, Washington 
D.C., and Kenneth Lieberthal, 'Domestic Forces and Sino-US 
Relations'; in Ezra F. Vogel (ed), Living with China: US-China 
Relations in the Twenty-First Century; The American Assembly, 
W.W. Norton and Company (New York, 1997) pp.256-257. 
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President Bush and President Clinton failed to achieve. 
The second conceptual question relating to the development 
of engagement concerns the circumstances in which different 
actors proved to have an influential role on the policy-making 
process. The Cold War presidents obviously retained the 
greatest influence on China policy, due to their institutional 
position, unparalleled access to resources, and the deference 
they were shown. However, other actors proved to have a 
significant bearing on the development of engagement. In 
particular, members of Congress often demonstrated an ability 
to circumscribe, or indeed stimulate, developments in Sino-
American relations. Congressional influence was heavily 
dependent on how the president of the time approached the issue 
of domestic legitimacy. Hence, members of Congress would find 
themselves encouraged to take a lead role in the policy-making 
process, as occurred in the mid 1960s, or could be motivated to 
act when they felt excluded by the White House, as happened 
during the Carter Administration. The importance of domestic 
legitimacy ensured that the relationship between the president 
and Congress remained a vital ingredient of China policy-
making. 
Bureaucratic agencies, and indeed non-governmental 
interest groups also shaped the policy-making process. In fact, 
as US bilateral interests in the PRC expanded, both 
bureaucratic and non-governmental actors found that they had a 
greater stake in the design and pursuit of US relations with 
China. 
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The third conceptual question concerns the identification 
of a hierarchy of US-China interests, the articulation of that 
hierarchy, and the degree of commitment and leadership accorded 
to them. A clearly defined policy, to which the president was 
committed, strongly benefited both the pursuit of US interests 
in China, and the procurement of domestic legitimacy. However, 
when America's interests in China were unclear or 
insufficiently pronounced, or the president neglected China 
policy, problems arose in the bilateral and domestic spheres. 
This is illustrated by first term of the Reagan Administration. 
The absence of a clear hierarchy of US-China interests 
encouraged splits within the bureaucracy as different 
departments proposed conflicting objectives, a situation a 
disinterested Reagan failed to resolve. Beij ing became 
frustrated by the contradictory positions adopted by the 
Administration, and the Sino-American relationship went into 
free-fall. 
The fourth and final conceptual question concerns the 
impact of domestic political calculations on the development of 
policy. Distinct from the issue of domestic legitimacy, this 
perspective examines presidential and Congressional actions 
that were determined by partisan political and electoral 
motives. While there is clear evidence that domestic political 
calculations sometimes played a role in debate and development 
of China policy during the Cold War, it is also clear that 
Clinton pursued this determinant of policy to an extent 
unprecedented in the history of US-China relations. 
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Using the conceptual questions discussed above, this 
chapter will highlight the primary causal factors underpinning 
the evolution of China policy from Truman to Reagan, and 
explain how and why a strategy of engagement had become 
entrenched by 1988. 
The Isolation and Containment of China 
THE US REJECTS ACCOMMODATION WITH BEIJING 
By 1950, US fears of Soviet and Soviet-sponsored expansionism 
had become entrenched. The consolidation of US opposition to 
communism, and the strategy of Containment, informed President 
Truman' s support for Chiang Kai- shek' s nationalist Kuomintang 
(KMT) in its 1947-49 struggle with Mao Zedong's Communists. 
However, Truman had little regard for the defeated KMT's 
corrupt and often incompetent leadership. Further, he was 
initially sceptical of the likelihood of close Sino-Soviet 
ties, a view shared by other senior members of the 
Administration and extra-governmental sinologists. 4 Accordingly, 
the Administration flirted with the idea of accommodation with 
Mao's Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949-50. 5 Although an 
'anti-China' bloc was emerging within Congress, some non-
governmental actors supported the idea of accommodation, while 
4 Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power; op cit p.86. 
5 Harold. C. Hinton, 'Historical Overview of US-China 
Relations' ; Chapter One in Frederick Tse shyang Chen (ed) , 
China Policy and International Security; Transnational 
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the American general public were largely indifferent to the 
issue. 6 
Nevertheless, accommodation seemed at odds with maturing 
definition of Containment, especially in the light of 
developments such as the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 1950. 7 
The appointments of Dean Rusk and John Foster Dulles hardened 
the Administration's attitude towards China, and together with 
General MacArthur, they persuaded Truman of the strategic 
importance of South-East Asia and of Taiwan/Formosa in 
particular. 8 This geo-strategic perspective was complemented by 
the growth in the domestic arena of the anti-communist 
movement, and the protests of the vociferous anti-PRC bloc 
within Congress. 9 Accordingly, the Administration chose not to 
pursue accommodation with the People's Republic. 
THE KOREAN WAR AND THE ISOLATION AND CONTAINMENT OF BEIJING 
China's participation in the Korean War of 1950-1953, that 
Publishers Inc. (1984) p.1. 
6 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-
American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949-1950; 
Columbia University Press (New York, 1983) pp.156-159. 
7 Robert G. Sutter (with Seong-Eun Choi), 
Future In World Affairs: The Role of the 
Westview Press (Oxford, 1996) p.147. 
Shaping China 's 
United States; 
8 J.P.D. Dunbabin, The Cold War: The Great Powers and their 
Allies; Longman (New York, 1994) p.105. 
9 Despite its relatively small number, this anti-China bloc 
on the Hill would dominate the Congressional debate on China 
policy until well into the 1960s. 
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brought it into direct military conflict with the US, firmly 
established American hostility towards Beijing. In essence, it 
entrenched the Cold War blueprint on US China policy within 
both governmental policy-making and the domestic political 
environment. The Administration's overt denunciation of the 
Chinese regime reflected its conviction that China and the 
Soviet Union had formed an expansionist strategic alliance. 
Official recognition of the People's Republic was 
inconceivable. Further, the US was outspoken in its opposition 
to Beij ing' s membership of the United Nations (the KMT on 
Taiwan held China's seats in the Permanent Security Council and 
the General Assembly), and Western trade with 'Red China'. This 
stance received wholehearted support throughout the domestic 
political arena. 10 
Truman's advocacy of a strategy of isolation and 
containment of China, and it's commitment to defend the 
territorial integrity of Taiwan unified the Administration and 
secured domestic legitimacy. Nevertheless, those who accused 
Truman of being insufficiently resolute in opposing communism 
and of 'losing China', welcomed the victory in the 1953 
presidential election of Dwight Eisenhower, who made his 
antipathy for Beijing and his support for the Nationalists on 
Taiwan explicit . 11 
10 See for 
Foreign Policy: 
Press (Westport, 
example Leonard Kusnitz, 
America's China Policy 
1984) chapter four. 
Public Opinion and 
1949-1979; Greenwood 
11 Eisenhower was convinced his predecessor's presidential 
authority had been considerably undermined by the charge that 
he had been 'soft on communism'. Rosemary Foot, The Practice of 
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The Taiwan Strait crises of 1954 and 1958, when mainland 
launched limited military offensives against the island, tested 
Eisenhower's stance on China. While he wished to avoid direct 
US military intervention, particularly so soon after the Korean 
War, he was determined to prevent the collapse of the KMT 
regime on Taiwan and the possibility of further communist 
expansion in the region. 12 Indeed, the first crisis led to the 
United States-Republic of China Mutual Defence Treaty of 1954. 
The crises expedited Eisenhower's attempts to consolidate 
domestic support for the strategy of isolating China. To this 
end, the President appointed several known Beijing-critics to 
influential positions in the Administration, worked closely 
with Senator William F. Knowland and others in the influential 
anti-PRC bloc on the Hill, and solicited the support of non-
governmental interest groups such as the pro-Taiwan Committee 
of One Million. 13 
The Origins and Emergence of Engagement 
THE ORIGINS OF ENGAGEMENT 
Power; op cit p.89. 
12 In both cases, Mao aborted the offensives not least 
because he feared the United Nations would assume 
administration of the island, and because the Soviets refused 
to support his attempts to reunify the two Chinese entities. 
See J.P.D. Dunbabin, The Cold War; op cit pp.139-141. 
13 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, 'A House Divided'; op cit pp.35-
37, and James L. Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of US 
Foreign Policy; The John Hopkins University Press (London, 
1996) p.28. 
57 
Despite the Administration's espousal of a strategy of 
isolation, and strong support for the stance within a 
conservative domestic arena, crucial developments were 
occurring both at the policy-making level and within the 
domestic environment. 
In contradiction to the Administration's official 
strategy, US ambassadors in Geneva had in fact embarked upon a 
series of negotiations with their Chinese counterparts, a 
process stemming from the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China 
and Korea and consolidated by the 1954/55 Taiwan Strait 
crisis. 14 These were supplemented by ambassadorial talks in 
Warsaw following the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis. 15 Eisenhower had 
conceded to the Geneva and Warsaw talks in the hope of 
stabilizing the Taiwan situation, a hope that met with success 
on a number of occasions. 16 
The Administration's indulgence in direct negotiations 
with Chinese officials carried significant implications for 
overall us strategy towards Beijing, and indeed for the China 
policy-making process. Bilateral talks were in effect a form of 
recognition of the regime in Beij ing, and this represented a 
crucial shift in strategy. Not only were policy-makers 
14 Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power; op ci t p. 91. 
15 Arnold Xiangze Jiang, The United States and China; The 
University of Chicago Press (Chicago, 1988) pp.148-149. 
16 Michel Oksenberg, 'Taiwan, Tibet and Hong Kong in Sino-
American Relations' chapter one in Ezra F. Vogel (ed), Living 
with China; op cit p.65. 
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accepting the fact that the People's Republic was here to stay 
(and that the Nationalists were in no position to regain the 
sovereignty of the mainland) , but that US national interests 
could be pursued through diplomacy with the Chinese. The 
acceptance of this basic strategic principle brought to US 
China policy the potential for a vast range of bilateral 
contacts and procedures. These were the origins of Engagement, 
and the understanding that US China policy should be used to 
influence Beij ing' s values and behaviour in ways consistent 
with US interests, and that disputes should be resolved, if 
possible, through dialogue. 17 
Thus, the Eisenhower Administration appeared to be 
pursuing a Two Chinas' policy at this point in time. While the 
President remained opposed to official recognition of the 
People's Republic and protective of relations with Taiwan, the 
Administration had conferred de facto recognition on Beijing 
through the Geneva and Warsaw bilateral talks. Such a 
perception spread throughout the US domestic scene. There was 
the growing acceptance that China was here to stay, and the 
American public were encouraged to believe that a direct 
meeting between Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Secretary of 
State Dulles was a distinct possibility. 18 
17 Disagreement did exist as to the degree of flexibility to 
be adopted when engaging Beijing, and regarding the most 
appropriate form (politically, economically and societally) 
China should take. See Arthur Dean, 'The United States Foreign 
Policy and Formosa'; Foreign Affairs vol. 3 April 1955 pp. 360-
375. 
18 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years; Little, Brown and 
Company (Boston, 1979) p.742. 
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• 
Further, having played a leading role in fortifying the 
China strategy of isolation, Congress now played host to new 
thinking on China policy. Although the prevailing mood on the 
Hill remained highly suspicious of China, the influence of the 
anti-China bloc began to diminish, and dissatisfaction with the 
current isolationist strategy continued to grow. Influential 
members of Congress such as Senators John F. Kennedy and 
Theodore F. Green maintained that US China strategy was too 
inflexible . 19 Senior sinologists such as A. Doak Barnett, and 
members of the business community such as the US Chamber of 
Commerce and the Wall Street Journal, similarly called for a 
reassessment of the strategy of isolation. 20 
In spite of serious contemplation of engagement with 
Beijing in both policy-making and domestic circles, the 
popularity of Eisenhower and the conservative nature of 
domestic political opinion precluded any concrete development 
in the Sino-American relationship. 21 Indeed, domestic opinion 
prevented Eisenhower's presidential successor, John F. Kennedy, 
from fostering an improvement in US-PRC relations. Although 
19 A report on US China policy, commissioned by Congress and 
authored by Professor Robert Scalapino, criticised 
Eisenhowers's intransigent attitude towards Beijing. See 
Stanley D. Bachrack, The Committee of One Million: 'China 
Lobby' Politics, 1953-1971; Columbia University Press (New 
York, 1976) pp.133. 
20 A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and 
American Policy; Harper (New York, 1960), 
The Practice of Power; op cit p.91. 
Asia: Challenge to 
and Rosemary Foot, 
21 Moreover, Beijing's overtly anti-American attitude 
prohibited positive developments in Sino-American ties. 
Arnold Xiangze Jiang, The United States and China; op 
pp.145-153. 
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Kennedy was more concerned with relations with Moscow, he had 
advocated greater flexibility in US strategy towards Beijing in 
the 1960 presidential election campaign. Yet he was advised by 
his Special Counsel, Theodore Sorensen, that any initiative on 
China " ... would require a friendlier Congress and more public 
understanding. "22 Nevertheless, Kennedy oversaw structural and 
attitudinal refinements in his Administration that allowed more 
progressive thinkers on China greater access to decision-
making. 23 
RE-EVALUATION OF US STRATEGY TOWARDS CHINA 
The major breakthrough in the US debate on strategy towards 
China came in 1966, when the Senate held committee hearings of 
unprecedented depth and detail on China policy, with the 
findings attracting broad media coverage. 24 In effect, the 
Hearings called for a new strategy of 'containment without 
isolation' . The conclusions reached by the debate did not 
reflect any substantial change in sentiment towards China, nor 
complete disregard for the strategic importance of Taiwan. 
Rather, they confirmed what was now perhaps the prevailing 
belief in the US that China was indeed a dangerous and 
22 Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy; Pan Books Ltd (London, 
1966) pp.735-736. 
23 This included the creation of an independent 'mainland 
China' desk within the State Department. Ibid. 
24 Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, 1966, Washington D.C. 
(United States Government Printing Office, 1966). 
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destabilizing force in international politics and security, but 
that the best way to meet this challenge was through engagement 
with, not isolation of, the People's Republic. 25 
The Hearings confirmed that the need to engage Beijing had 
been established within domestic political circles, and that 
the balance of power on the Hill between those advocated 
isolation of China, and those advocating engagement had tipped 
in favour of the latter. A poll of American public opinion 
conducted by Harris in the June of 1966 corroborated this new 
consensus. 26 This breakthrough in the domestic debate allowed 
the Administration to publicly contemplate these new 
initiatives. In March 1966, Vice-President Hubert Humphrey 
endorsed the strategy of engagement without isolation in a 
television interview, while later in July, President Johnson 
himself spoke of reconciliation, and in favour of bilateral 
cultural, trade and travel exchanges. 27 
Two important obstacles to the development of Sino-
American relations remained, however. Firstly, internal power 
struggles, ideology and the Cultural Revolution prohibited 
China's concurrence with rapprochement with the United States. 
Secondly, America's growing involvement in the Vietnam conflict 
arrested enthusiasm for detente with a state that supported 
25 The Hearings' conclusions also proposed direct contacts 
with China, the liberalization of non-strategic trade, and 
Beijing's membership of the United Nations. 
26 Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power; op cit pp.100-101. 
27 Ibid. 
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North Vietnam's political and military campaign. 28 
US Engagement with China and the Gee-Strategic Rationale 
US RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE PEOPLE 1 S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
President Nixon' s decision to pursue rapprochement and 
engagement with China, a decision that culminated in the 
Shanghai Communique of 1972, was predicated on his perspective 
of the geo-strategic environment, and his re-evaluation of US 
strategic interests. Nixon was concerned with the growing 
intensity of America's Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union, 
and believed that the US no longer possessed the political will 
nor the resources to sustain its considerable strategic 
commitments overseas. 29 Further, Nixon was determined to 
withdraw from the Vietnam Conflict, albeit 'with honour'. He 
identified domestic turmoil, the surge in domestic anti-
internationalism, and the erosion of US foreign policy 
credibility as direct consequences of America 1 s participation 
in the war. 
The President was convinced that a Sino-American 
relationship based upon strategic cooperation, rather than 
hostility and suspicion, would be instrumental in resolving 
28 J. p. D. Dunbabin, The Cold War; op cit p. 285. 
29 Nixon accepted the presumption that Moscow had 
established atomic parity with the US, while enjoying 
conventional superiority in the European theatre, by the end of 
the 1960s. Harold C. Hinton, 'Historical Overview'; op cit p.3. 
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these challenges. Nixon reasoned that a Soviet Union confronted 
by nuclear-armed China to the south-east, and NATO forces in 
Europe, would persuade Moscow of the wisdom of accepting 
detente with Washington. 30 Indeed, while Nixon's official 
position was that an improvement in US-China ties would not 
lead to an alliance against the Soviets, the Administration 
understood that rapprochement would disconcert Moscow. 31 
Rapprochement would also facilitate the withdrawal of the US 
commitment to East Asia, as China would contribute to the 
efforts of other US allies in the region in acting to deter 
Soviet influence and expansionism. In addition, regional 
stability, ·and Beij ing' s relationship with the North Vietnamese 
could ease America' s withdrawal from the Vietnam War. 32 The 
Sino-Soviet split, manifest in the 1969 border clashes, helped 
to convince Mao, and Premier Zhou Enlai, of the appeal of a 
Sino-American strategic relationship. 
While specific preparations for rapprochement with Beijing 
were conducted largely in secret, including National Security 
Advisor (NSA) Kissinger' s first trip to China in July 197133 , 
30 Banning Garret t, 'China Policy and the Constraints of 
Triangular Logic'; Chapter Eight in Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. 
Lieber and Donald Rothchild (eds), Eagle Defiant: United States 
Foreign Policy in the 1980s; Little, Brown and Company (Boston, 
1983) p.240. 
31 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years; op cit pp.191-2. 
See also Richard M. Nixon, US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: The 
Emerging Structures of Peace; February 9 1972 (United States 
Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. 1972) 
32 Ibid (Kissinger) p.194. 
33 Kissinger' s second trip in October 1971 received an 
enormous degree of attention. 
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Nixon had socialised the domestic political environment in 
favour of the establishment of US-China ties. For example, in a 
1967 article in Foreign Affairs, Nixon first spoke in favour of 
engagement with an increasingly powerful and influential 
People's Republic, and he continued this theme into his 
presidency. 34 
His concerns for domestic attitudes regarding the 
potential threat of communist China, and US commitments to and 
the strategic and ideological appeal of Taiwan, did persuade 
Nixon to temper his public advocacy of engagement with elements 
of caution. 35 It also persuaded him to consult extensively with 
Congress, and thus Nixon went to great lengths to secure the 
support, or at least the acquiesence of leading critics of 
rapprochement, both before and after his February 1972 trip to 
China. 36 Despite enduring sympathies for Taiwan, the domestic 
environment strongly endorsed Nixon' s rapprochement with 
Beijing, the general public being captivated by the President's 
momentous mission to Beij ing. 37 
President Nixon's visit to China, February 21 to 28 1972, 
and the Shanghai Communique, achieved more symbolically than it 
34 Richard M. Nixon, ~Asia After Viet Nam'; Foreign Affairs 
vol.46 no.1 October 1967. See also Richard M. Nixon, US Foreign 
Policy for the 1970s: The Emerging Structures of Peace; op cit. 
35 Kissinger, The White House Years; op cit pp.1094-1095. 
See also Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation; The 
Brookings Institute (Washington D.C., 1985) p.215. 
36 Ibid (Kissinger) p.761 and pp.1093-1094. 
37 Richard Brooks, ~Nixon ~Sabotaged' Vietnam Peacetalks to 
Capture White House'; Observer January 4 1996 p.21. 
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did in terms of serious, specific policy developments. Yet it 
did confirm the existence of a 'strategic triangle' balance of 
power relationship between the US, the PRC and the Soviet 
Union, in line with Nixon and Kissinger' s broader strategic 
vision. 38 Kissinger has argued of rapprochement process and the 
Communique: 
"Its significance lay not only in words but in the 
assumptions underlying it ... the Communique was not 
about Taiwan or bilateral exchanges, but about 
international order. It brought together two 
previously hostile nations not because they desired 
to settle bilateral problems ... but to deal across the 
gulf of ideology with common security concerns. "39 
Moreover, rapprochement with the People's Republic 
confirmed the fundamental philosophical transformation of US 
strategy from one of isolation and containment to one 
predicated on engagement. It was the culmination of a China 
policy debate that had evolved cautiously at elite and non-
elite levels since the mid-1950s. Further, it established a 
framework of principles that would govern US China policy up 
until the present day. Nixon did not establish bilateral 
38 See Kissinger's memorandum to the President on his return 
from his second trip to China, having negotiated the detail of 
the Shanghai Communique with Zhou Enlai. Kissinger, The White 
House Years; op cit pp.754-755. Kissinger, in fact, engineered 
a strategic 'tilt' in favour of Beijing. !bid pp.l91-192, 
p.763, and p.1090. See also Martin Kettle, 'Kissinger Traded US 
Intelligence with Beijing'; Guardian January 11 1999 p.lO. 
39 !bid p.1086. 
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relations on the basis of a new-found affection and veneration 
for the Chinese communists. Rather rapprochement was founded on 
American concerns for a growing and increasingly confident 
China. Thus, in accordance with the conclusions of the Senate 
Hearings of 1966, the US considered it in its national 
interests to engage with Beijing, to attempt to influence the 
beliefs and activities of the Chinese Communist Party regime. 
Rapprochement also appeared to have the desired effect 
upon the Soviets, who moved quickly to consolidate detente with 
the US. 4° Further, it facilitated progress towards the American 
withdrawal from Vietnam, following the January 1973 ceasefire. 
It is important to note that Kissinger also acknowledged 
the need to engage the PRC for reasons in and of itself. He 
argued that China deserved engagement on the basis of its 
immense population, its ancient civilization, and the 
possibilities of economic and other exchanges. 41 This bilateral 
focus of engagement, a momentum for relations that fell outside 
the specific context of the Cold War, would grow in importance 
over the forthcoming years until it would become the defining 
rationale for engagement in the post-Cold War era. 
The rapprochement process also exhibited a number of 
important features concerning US China policy-making. Firstly, 
there was a strong awareness of a hierarchy of US interests viz 
a viz China. For example, the Administration indicated that it 
40 See for example Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation; op 
cit pp.240-243. 
41 Kissinger, The White House Years; op cit p.192 and 
pp.l092-1093. 
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was prepared to sacrifice commitments to Taiwan if it proved a 
necessary condition to establishing relations with Beijing. 
This is illustrated by the Administration's tacit acceptance of 
Beijing's usurpation of Taipei's seat at the UN. 42 Secondly, 
Nixon, and Kissinger, were prepared to lead on rapprochement. 
Indeed, had they not, there were actors within Congress willing 
to assume such leadership. 43 Thirdly, strong leadership on a 
clear hierarchy of interests facilitated bureaucratic cohesion 
on China policy. Kissinger's oversight of a series of National 
Security Study Memorandums and departmental review groups on 
China policy ensured that a pro-engagement stance became 
instilled within the bureaucracy.•• Fourthly, the President and 
his National Security Advisor established a process by which 
the presidency and the Executive retained as much control and 
flexibility for the design of China policy as possible. This 
was achieved both through strong leadership, and through the 
use of highly secret decision-making procedures. 45 
Lastly, domestic political calculations did have an impact 
on Nixon's decision-making process. He saw rapprochement with 
Beij ing not only as a way of stimulating confidence in his 
Administration, but also as a means of boosting his own 
prestige and popularity. Further, Nixon determined to prevent 
42 See for example Martin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger; 
Little, Brown and Company (Boston, 1974) pp.253-255. 
43 Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power; op cit p.104. 
44 Kissinger, The White House Years; op cit pp.693-694, and 
Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation; op cit p.216 and p.229. 
45 Ibid (Kissinger) pp. 719-721. 
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the opposing 'pro-engagement' wing in Congress from taking the 
lead on rapprochement with China. More precisely he wanted the 
presidency, rather than Congress to take the credit for the 
establishment of full unofficial Sino-American relations. 
Certain members of Congress, predominantly Democrats such as 
Senators Edward Kennedy, Muskie and McGovern had attempted to 
take the lead and push the boundaries of the engagement debate. 
Despite it being an election year (and therefore to the 
surprise even of Mao) Nixon was resolved to visiting China at 
the earliest possible opportunity, that is to say 1n February 
of 1972. Indeed, during the Kissinger-Zhou preparatory 
negotiations prior to Nixon's visit to Beijing, Nixon demanded 
of the Chinese a promise not to invite other US politicians or 
political rivals. 46 
THE IMPASSE IN RAPPROCHEMENT 
The Sino-American relationship stalled after the establishment 
of Liaison Offices in the respective capitals in 1973. Three 
causes stand out: Watergate and President Nixon' s resignation 
in 1973, the dissatisfactory conclusion to and humiliating 
final withdrawal from Vietnam, and the disintegration of 
detente with the Soviet Union. These developments left the US 
confused, insecure and self -critical, resulting in a domestic 
environment prohibitive to major advances in US relations with 
China. 
46 Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power; op ci t p. 10 6 . 
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While the Ford Administration deferred on such bilateral 
initiatives, it did attempt to consolidate engagement and the 
post-rapprochement relationship with China. Washington was 
aware of Beijing's growing frustration and scepticism regarding 
US commitment to the Sino-American strategic relationship. 
Accordingly, Ford, Kissinger, and former president Nixon paid 
visits to Beij ing. 47 Washington also implied possible military 
retaliation when Soviet hostility towards the People's Republic 
intensified in 1976, and considered, but ultimately rejected, 
the sale of military resources to China. 48 
Nevertheless, the political impact of Watergate, Vietnam, 
and the disintegration of detente with the Soviet Union had 
important implications for the domestic context to China 
policy. Watergate and America's humiliating withdrawal from the 
Vietnam Conflict severely undermined the authority of the 
presidency, and the deference traditionally deferred to the 
position. As a result, Congress resolved to play a much 
stronger, pro-active role in foreign policy-making. 49 This 
determination had a significant impact on US geo-strategic 
policy, and therefore, China policy. 
Widespread perceptions of American weakness and strategic 
inferiority led to the rise of right-wing, nee-conservative 
47 Robert G. Sut ter, Shaping China's Future in World 
Affairs; op cit p.153. China was experiencing its own political 
turmoil in the shape of the rise of the 'Gang of Four'. 
48 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval; Little, Brown and 
Company (Boston, 1982) pp.S0-53. 
49 see James L. Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of US 
Foreign Policy; op cit pp.24-25. 
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sentiments exemplified by the rebirth of the Committee on the 
Present Danger. 50 This environment facilitated the advent under 
Ford of the conservative backlash feared by Presidents Johnson 
and Nixon as they sought accommodation with Beij ing. Even 
strong proponents of engagement with Beijing became 
disillusioned, and Americans began to question the value of the 
US relationship with the PRC. The majority of public opinion, 
reflected in Congress, continued to support parallel links with 
both the People's Republic and Taiwan, though if anything their 
sympathies lay with the Nationalists. 51 In the face of such an 
environment, President Ford was too weak, and by this time 
Kissinger too discredited, to provide Executive leadership on 
China policy. Interestingly, however, in spite of American 
doubts about the benefits of the US-PRC relationship, domestic 
anxieties regarding the US strategic position did prevent a 
revocation of engagement. In other words, while there was no 
appetite for new initiatives in China policy, and although a 
clear majority of the American public viewed Beijing 
unfavourably52 , it appeared to make little sense to rescind the 
US strategic relationship with the PRC in the current strategic 
context. 
50 See for example Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation; op 
cit pp.538-540. 
51 Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power; op cit pp.108-109. 
52 Harry Harding, A Fragi 1 e Relationship: The United States 
and China Since 1972; The Brookings Institute (Washington D.C., 
1992) Appendix A, Table A-1 'US Public Opinion of China' p.363, 
and Karlyn H. Bowman, 'Public Attitudes Towards the People's 
Republic of China'; op cit Table A-1 'US Feeling Toward China, 
Selected Years, 1954-1993' p.147. 
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THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S FAILURES 
AND THE ENDURING IMPASSE IN US-CHINA RELATIONS 
Carter assumed the presidency in January 1977 convinced of the 
need to develop Sino-American relations. 53 Carter understood 
this to mean the normalisation of relations. However, the 
Administration encountered serious difficulties in its attempts 
to lead and legitimise China policy domestically. Although 
Carter faced complex and often volatile international and 
domestic political environments, many of the problems he 
encountered were of the Administration's own making. 
Firstly, despite his belief in the importance of 
normalisation, China policy initially did not feature highly on 
a foreign policy agenda designed by Carter and his Secretary of 
State Cyrus Vance. They shared a determination to reinvigorate 
us-soviet detente, conclude the SALT II treaty with Moscow, 
strengthen NATO, and to resolve other outstanding issues such 
as peace in the Middle East and sovereignty of the Panama 
Canal. On the broader front, Carter and Vance wished to 
diminish the degree to which us-soviet relations dominated all 
other aspects of US foreign policy-making. 54 
53 Carter was disconcerted by Beijing's frustration with the 
lack of Sino-American progress, fearing that it could lead to 
Sino-Soviet rapprochement. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and 
Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981; 
Farrar, Straus, Giroux (New York, 1985) p.196. 
54 Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power; op cit p.109, and 
Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation; op cit p.576. 
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This led to a second problem. Like President Clinton after 
him, Carter wanted to pursue all his foreign policy objectives 
simultaneously in the face of complex international challenges, 
but he neglected to define a framework through which this could 
be achieved. As a result through 1977 and into 1978, Carter 
failed to provide convincing leadership on any issue. This was 
reflected in China policy. The Administration's initial review 
of China policy revealed broad agreement on the need to pursue 
normalisation, but provided no clear framework or timetable for 
the process. 55 Carter's stance on China policy mirrored splits 
within his foreign policy team highlighted by the review. He 
wished to cooperate with Moscow, like Vance, but agreed with 
NSA Brzezinski in the need to confront and contain it as 
domestic pressure to do so grew. 56 As a consequence, Carter 
failed to resolve the split and neglected to commit himself, 
the Administration's China policy appeared discordant and 
inconsistent, and Sino-American relations deteriorated as a 
result. 
The third problem concerned the Administration's wider 
foreign policy problems. Detente was collapsing, and Carter 
struggled to define a response to Soviet and Cuban 
interventions in Africa. This fuelled deepening hostility 
55 Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) -24. Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Power and Principle; op cit pp.196-198, and Banning 
Garrett, 'China Policy'; op cit pp.245-246. 
56 Brzezinski argued that Washington should 
strategic relationship with Beijing, with 
normalisation, and that doing so would put Moscow 
foot. Ibid (Brzezinski) pp.197-199. 
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advance its 
or without 
on the back 
towards the Soviet Union with the US domestic arena, and 
undermined domestic confidence in the Administration. This 
dilemma related to the fourth problem. 
The President had a deep disdain for 
domestic politics on foreign policy-making, 
the impact 
and he 
of 
was 
reluctant to engage in political bargaining with Congress and 
interest groups. 57 Yet an awareness and concern for the likely 
domestic reaction to normalisation was a consistent factor in 
the Administration's China policy-making, either for its 
implications for the pursuit of China policy itself, or its 
impact on other aspects of Carter's foreign policy agenda. As a 
result, the Carter Administration neglected to sufficiently 
prepare and socialize the American public for normalisation and 
the development of US-PRC ties. Indeed, as Rosemary Foot notes, 
the Administration regarded Congress as " ... a hurdle to be 
surmounted, not as an important body to be wooed. "58 This helped 
to further undermine the authority of the President. 
Somewhat ironically, the further hardening of domestic 
attitudes towards US foreign policy, and the growing perception 
that Carter was weak on international affairs contributed to 
the revigoration of the pursuit of normalisation and the 
development of US-PRC relations. 
Redefining the Rationale for US Engagement with China 
57 Ibid p. 521. 
58 Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power; op cit p.llO. 
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NORMALISATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINA 
Carter's frustration with the growth in domestic neo-
conservative hostility, and the disintegration of his foreign 
policy agenda, persuaded him to back NSA Brzezinski' s desire 
for the pursuit of a stronger strategic relationship with 
China. 59 Clandestine bilateral negotiations, led by Brzezinski, 
resulted in the Joint Communique on the Establishment of 
Diplomatic Relations, January 1 1979. 60 The decision to 
normalise Sino-American relations represented a critical 
development in US China policy on a number of levels. 
Normalisation was motivated primarily by gee-strategic 
concerns and interests, and was a natural consequence of a 
decade of bilateral rapprochement. It confirmed the 
signatories' " ... common opposition to global or regional 
hegemony by any single power [the Soviet Union] ", and met 
Washington's desire to encourage China's greater participation 
in an international system dominated by the US. 61 Thus, the 
59 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation; op cit p.703, and 
Michael Oksenberg, 'A Decade of Sino-American Relations'; 
Foreign Affairs vol.61 Fall 1982 pp.185-185. 
60 Brzezinski, Power and Principle; op cit pp.408-414, and 
Robert G. Sutter, 'Shaping China's Future in World Affairs'; op 
cit p.154. 
61 
'President Carter's Instructions to Zbigniew Brzezinski 
for his Mission to China, May 17, 1978' reproduced Brzezinski, 
Power and Principle; op cit Annex I. It also reflected 
Washington's belief that a US-PRC relationship would benefit 
East Asian regional stability. Brzezinski, The Power and the 
Principle; op cit p.542. 
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Administration retained a key long-term principle of US 
engagement with China, that US strategic interests would be 
served by an expanding Sino-American relationship. 62 
Of far greater significance to the rationale underscoring 
engagement with China was the acknowledgement that long-term 
US-PRC relations now possessed their own internal logic. 
Revealing his thoughts prior to his visit to Beijing, 
Brzezinski explains: 
"Most important, I felt that normalisation of US-
Chinese relations gave us an opportunity to build a 
long-term, lasting relationship with one of the most 
important global powers, and that this ought to be 
pursued for its own sake, even if at some point the 
US-Soviet relationship were to improve. "63 
The establishment of Sino-American diplomatic relations 
paved the way for an enormous expansion in direct and indirect 
contacts and visits, and an explosion in bilateral economic and 
scientific agreements and geo-political cooperation. For 
example, the PRC played host to many senior members of · the 
Carter Administration, many members of Congress, and a large 
number of state and business delegations all within the first 
62 Brzezinski considered the strategic value of China so 
great that he established a clear tilt towards Beijing within 
the framework of the US-China-Soviet strategic triangle, with 
the result that a de facto Sino-American 'quasi-alliance' had 
been established by the end of the Carter Administration. !bid 
pp.424-425. 
63 Ibid (Brzezinski) p.404. 
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six months of 1979. 64 Further, a bilateral trade agreement 
signed on May 14 enabled the US to grant Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) trading status to the China, while the first joint 
business venture was signed in the October. 65 
The new bilateral sphere provided us businesses, 
scientists, academics, interest group activists, and indeed 
politicians, the opportunity to gain greater awareness and 
knowledge of China. Accordingly, as their interests in China 
developed, domestic actors found that they had a stake in 
influencing China policy-making. 
This aspect of the bilateral sphere also manifest itself 
within the bureaucracy. To sustain the momentum of the US-PRC 
relationship, Brzezinski established bureaucratic structures 
promoting inter-agency coordination on China policy, and 
encouraged departmental representatives to visit China for 
themselves. 66 This not only entrenched the philosophy of 
engagement with the PRC within US China policy-making, but also 
allowed different governmental agencies the opportunity to 
pursue their own conflicting interests in China. When, in 
subsequent years, this situation arose, it would severely 
64 For an indication of the number and nature 
China during this short period, see Garthoff, 
Confrontation; op cit p.748. 
of visits to 
Detente and 
65 Robert G. Sut ter, 'Shaping China 1 s Future 
Affairs 1 ; op cit p.154. It is important to note 
Administration also retained the practice of 
bilateral ties, both before and after normalisation, 
of consolidating and stimulating the wider 
relationship. 
in World 
that the 
promoting 
as a means 
strategic 
66 Brzezinski, The Power and the Principle; op cit pp.416-
417. 
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complicate the definition and implementation of a clear China 
policy framework. 
The normalisation of US-China relations also exposed 
important features of China policy-making. Firstly, once Carter 
had decided to turn his full attention to the issue, it 
demonstrated the value of presidential leadership, commitment, 
and management of the policy-making process. However, prior to 
that point, Carter's hesitancy and lack of interest had 
contributed to policy incoherence, a failure of resolve 
bureaucratic splits, and ultimately, a deterioration in Sino-
American relations. Further, Carter's disinclination to debate 
the issue of normalisation in public and to consult with 
Congress seriously undermined the authority of the president, 
and the domestic legitimacy of the project . 67 Although 
fascination with the diplomatic initiative resulted in opinion 
polls indicating favourable public opinion of the PRC, Carter 
encountered a virulent backlash from a conservative Congress. 
Accusing the Administration of betraying commitments to Taiwan, 
Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act in February 1979. 68 
It is interesting to note political calculations, stemming 
from a fear of domestic hostility to normalisation, influenced 
67 Ibid pp.543-545, and Rosemary Foot, The Practice of 
Power; op cit pp.l09-110. 
68 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; Appendix A Table 
A-1 op cit p.363, and Karlyn H. Bowman, ~Public Attitudes'; 
Table A-1 op cit p.147. The Act confirmed America's treatment 
of Taiwan as a de facto independent state, eligible for 
diplomatic, financial, and most controversially, military 
assistance. Ibid (Harding) pp.84-87, and Michael Oksenberg, ~A 
Decade of Sino-American Relations'; op cit p.l89. 
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carter's decision-making. This is illustrated most obviously by 
the President's adherence to State Department advice to delay 
the declaration of intent to normalise Sino-American relations 
until after the anticipated intensity of the 1978 mid-term 
Congressional elections. 69 
POLITICAL SENSITIVITY AND THE NADIR IN US-CHINA RELATIONS 
China policy under the Reagan Administration was 
characterised by two contrasting periods. From 1984/85, 
enhanced American knowledge of China led to a transformation 
both of China policy and of US-China relations. However, in the 
early years of the Administration, political sensitivities 
disabled US China policy-making, resulting in an unprecedented 
disintegration in bilateral relations. 
Reagan entered the White House with a mandate to right the 
perceived wrongs of his predecessor. 70 In the realm of foreign 
policy, Reagan rode a wave of prevailing opinion, pledging not 
only to roll back Soviet gee-strategic influence, but to 
restore America's role as leader of the 'free world' . Yet 
despite the apparent ideological clarity and resolution of this 
message, policy-makers failed to define a clear framework for 
69 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation; op cit p. 707, and 
Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power; op cit p.110. 
7
° For example, Carter's mishandling of the 19 8 0 Iranian 
hostage crisis contributed strongly to his presidential defeat. 
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China policy. 71 This failure reflected a split within Reagan's 
foreign policy-making team, and the fact that the balance of 
power favoured those who dismissed the strategic value of the 
PRC to US security and foreign policy interests. 72 
These contradictory perspectives were reflected in the 
President himself. While Reagan would sometimes speak of the 
importance of the People's Republic, and advocate policies such 
as US arms sales to the PRC, at other points he would declare 
his ideological enmity for the communist regime in Beijing, and 
express his support and commitment to relations with Taiwan. 
Senior policy-makers such as NSA Richard V. Allen, and other 
right-wing political appointees, robustly promoted this overtly 
pro-Taiwan stance, despite conflicting proposals from State 
Department officials. 73 
The prevailing attitude on China within the Administration 
through 1981-1984 represented a clear departure from the 
established rationale underpinning US engagement with Beijing 
since the late 1960s. In other words, it rejected the idea that 
the two states possessed enduring mutual strategic interests 
within the Cold War context, and that US interests benefited 
71 Banning Garrett, 'China Policy'; pp.251-252. Like Carter, 
China policy was low on the incoming Administration's list of 
foreign policy priorities. 
72 While Secretary of State Haig endorsed a strong strategic 
relationship with China, Defence Secretary Weinberger 
disagreed, arguing for an enormous unilateral military build-up 
to sustain an American 'go it alone' strategy. Ibid p.252 and 
p.260. 
73 Ibid p.254, Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation; op cit 
p.1038, and Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power; op cit p.227. 
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from a progressive relationship with the PRC. On closer 
inspection, however, Washington's position was not so clear. 
Paradoxical statements regarding US commitments to Beijing and 
to Taipei, for example, gave the impression of a 'two Chinas' 
policy at best, and policy incohesion and inconsistency at 
worst. This reality was due, to a large degree, to the 
Administration's sensitivity to domestic political 
calculations. 
Despite its fierce ideological anti-communism, and its 
projections of US idealism and normative values, the Reagan 
foreign policy platform was also designed to maximise political 
support. In this sense it was one of style over substance, one 
dependent on courting and responding to prevailing neo-
conservative domestic moods rather than one based in a clear 
strategic structure. 74 Domestic legitimacy, therefore, was 
founded on political popularism, rather than considered support 
for an articulated longer-term policy framework. The lack of 
framework for China resulted in a policy driven by events and 
political calculations. Beij ing began to doubt very seriously 
and very publicly America's value as a strategic partner, and 
bilateral relations on strategic, diplomatic, economic and 
other fronts deteriorated rapidly. 75 
74 For example, sympathies for Taiwan ran deep within the 
Republican right-wing, the bed-rock of Reaganite support, and 
among key members of Congress such as Senators Barry Goldwater 
and Jesse Helms. Interview with David Shambaugh, Director, 
Gas ton Sigur Centre of East Asian Studies, George Washington 
University, October 27 1997, Washington D.C. 
75 Banning Garrett, 'China Policy'; op cit p.252 and p.257, 
and Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation; op cit pp.l040-1041. 
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An apparent breakthrough came with the 1982 Joint 
Communique on United States Arms Sales to Taiwan. 76 From the 
gee-strategic perspective, the Soviet Union's imposition of 
martial law in Poland persuaded the Reagan Administration of 
the need to cultivate relations with Beijing. Indeed, it 
suggested that mutual strategic interests could still surmount 
mutual suspicions. Nevertheless, domestic political 
calculations played an influential role in the Administration's 
management of the Communique. Washington recognised the 
political value of confronting, and been seen to confront, 
Moscow, through its relationship with Beijing. Further, it felt 
compelled to court the sentiments of those key members of 
Congress who were bound to disparage such a bilateral 
agreement, by underplaying the significance of America's 
subsequent commitments to China. 77 Thus it did not represent a 
fundamental change in policy. The Communique failed to re-
establish a strong strategic basis for long-term US-PRC 
relation, nor did it persuade the Reagan Administration of the 
need to engage with Beijing over the long run. 
The Reagan Administration's greater dependency on 
responding to and courting prevailing domestic opinion had a 
76 The US agreed not to exceed current levels of arms sales 
to Taiwan, either in qualitative or quantitative terms, and to 
reduce such levels in line with the resolution of the Beijing-
Taipei dispute. The Communique also reaffirmed Beijing's desire 
for peaceful unification with the island, and Washington's 
disavowal of a 'two Chinas' policy. 'Documents on US Arms Sales 
to Taiwan' (August 17 1982), reproduced in Harry Harding, A 
Fragile Relationship; op cit Appendix D. 
77 See for example Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op 
cit pp.117-118. 
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number of implications for its formulation of China policy 
during the 1981-84 period. Firstly, it contributed to its 
failure to establish a clear long-term framework for China. 
While the most influential actors in the bureaucracy dismissed 
the strategic value of the PRC, the Administration rhetoric 
failed to reject this line of thinking entirely. However, the 
primacy of political calculations and the pursuit of domestic 
political support not only led to the neglect of comprehensive 
strategic assessments, it also failed to provide any 
consistency to the Administration 1 s China policy. Political 
popularity does not necessarily equate domestic legitimacy and 
authoritive policy. 
Secondly and correlatively, the Administration failed to 
resolve the bureaucratic split between those who continued to 
advocate the long-term strategic relationship with Beijing on 
the one hand, and those who dismissed this thinking allied with 
those offering politically motivated advice on the other. 
Thirdly, the Administration 1 s preference for style and 
imagery over substance, and its courting of highly dogmatised 
domestic opinion, instilled and deepened domestic opposition to 
US ties with Beijing. In the absence of a long-term vision and 
framework for us China policy, the manipulation and 
exploitation of domestic attitudes in pursuit of political 
support could be a hazardous game, both politically and 
strategically. 78 
78 As will be seen, Clinton reaped the 
manipulating and exploiting domestic opinion on 
for unrelated (political and electoral) reasons. 
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penalties of 
China policy 
Fourthly, these problems associated with the 
Administration's approach to China policy contributed to the 
most serious deterioration in Sino-American relations ever 
experienced, and threatened to bring to an end the strategy of 
US engagement with China. 
THE REDEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT AND THE PEAK IN US-PRC RELATIONS 
The period 1984/85 to 1988 provided a remarkable contrast to 
the preceding years of the Reagan Administration. The 
experience of direct contacts altered the image of China in the 
eyes of governmental policy-makers and domestic citizens alike, 
and in turn, led to the further expansion of bilateral ties. By 
1988, US Ambassador to Beijing, Winston Lord, felt compelled to 
describe the year as the ''most positive ever" in the history of 
Sino-American relations. 79 Moreover, the underlying rationale 
for engagement had evolved from the geo-strategic, to the 
bilateral. 
Three diplomatic exchanges were fundamental to the 
transformation of China ·policy, and the perception of China 
held by American policy-makers, politicians, observers, 
businesspeople, and public. 8° Firstly, Secretary of State 
79 Garson, The United States and China Since 1949: A 
Troubled Affair; Pinter (London, 1994) p.185. The Tiananmen 
Square massacre the following year greatly circumscribed Lord's 
enthusiasm for US-PRC relations, and had a large influence on 
his views on China policy. 
80 See for example ibid p .178, and Garthoff, Detente and 
Confrontation; op cit pp.1042-1043. 
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Shultz's greater enthusiasm for the exploration of deeper 
bilateral ties with the PRC resulted to a large extent from his 
trip in 1983, when he finally witnessed first hand the progress 
achieved by the reform and modernisation process. Premier Zhao 
Ziyang' s trip to Washington in January 1984 proved even more 
portentous. Zhao, perhaps the most reform-minded of Beijing's 
leaders engaged and stimulated his American audiences with his 
comments on the PRC' s economic achievements and objectives. 
Indeed, Zhao reflected Deng Xiaoping's implications that 
America provided the role model for Chinese economic 
development. The image of the People's Republic portrayed in 
such diplomatic initiatives proved pivotal. Rather than viewing 
the PRC with anti-communist antipathy and doubting its 
relevance, the Administration began to view the PRC with a 
certain fascination and optimism. The PRC appeared to be 
leading the way for the transition from communism to 
capitalism, offering the hope that it might also pave the way 
for the transformation of 'communist' authoritarianism to 
western democracy. Correspondingly, Reagan's own views of 
Beij ing were somewhat transformed by his visit to the PRC in 
April 1984. 81 Reagan was impressed by the PRC' s economic 
achievements, objectives and potential. Noting Beij ing' s 
embracement of capitalist principles, Reagan spoke 
enthusiastically of his experiences in "so-called Communist 
81 See for example Paul H.B. Godwin, 'The US and Asia: The 
Success of Continuity?'; chapter two in William P. Snyder and 
James Brown (eds), Defence Policy in the Reagan Administration; 
National Defence University Press (Washington, 1988) pp.51-53. 
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China". 82 And while he highlighted the essential differences in 
the ideologies and political societies of the two countries, 
Reagan argued that they need not eclipse fresh developments in 
the US-PRC relationship. 
Within this new environment US-PRC bilateral relations 
expanded at an unprecedented rate between 1985 and 1988, with 
economic and trading relations acting as the major catalyst to 
this progress. 83 The long anticipated development of military 
ties finally took off, with bilateral military negotiations and 
exchanges at the forefront of the developing official 
relations hip. 84 The two governments signed a wide range of 
agreements on issues such as trade and nuclear cooperation, and 
cultural, technical and scientific contacts. Further, many 
thousands of mainland Chinese entered the US on educational 
exchanges, and tourism and cultural exchanges boomed. 
The expansion of ties reflected a vital transformation of 
China policy and US engagement with China at both governmental 
and non-governmental levels. The Administration now recognised 
that US strategic interests could be pursued through a 
82 Robert G. Kaiser, 'Another Western 'Barbarian' Honours 
the Middle Kingdom'; Washington Post May 6 1984. 
83 During this period, for example, the US became the second 
largest direct investor in the PRC. Between 1981 and 1984 Deng 
Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang had liberalized the PRC' s economic 
system, establishing an economic growth strategy based on 
international trade. Robert Garson, The United States and China 
Since 1949; op cit pp.174-175 and pp.184-185, and Garthoff, 
Detente and Confrontation; op cit p.l044. 
84 Interview with Dr. Ronald N. Montaperto, Senior Fellow, 
National Defence University, November 12 1997, Washington D.C., 
and Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power; op cit pp.235-236. 
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relationship with China in a bilateral context, and that Sino-
American ties possessed their own internal logic. 85 Policy-
makers realized that a committed bilateral policy of 
'engagement' could induce economic, political and societal 
reform within the PRC, and that a deeper level of engagement 
could ensure that the reforms would be irreversible. Indeed, 
given the Administration's enduring enthusiasm for Cold War 
rhetoric, PRC liberalization would demonstrate the appeal and 
superiority of the western capitalist system. More practically, 
the Administration was determined not to lose out to its 
(Western European and East Asian) economic competitors in the 
race to exploit the opportunities presented by PRC 
modernisation and development. 
Of greater significance is the impact of the positive 
culture of engagement on the domestic non-governmental scene. 
Greater knowledge and awareness of China, and in particular its 
economic and market potential, meant that domestic actors 
developed their own interests in the PRC. As a consequence, 
they developed a growing stake in the definition and 
implementation of China policy. This not only helped to 
legitimise the Administration's policy of engagement, it 
actually contributed to the definition of that engagement. 96 In 
addition, as the Cold War faded and the gee-strategic element 
85 See for example, Garson, The United States and China 
Since 1949; op cit pp.173-174 and pp.178-182. 
86 Through the 1980s and into the 1990s, non-governmental 
ties and engagement would wholly outstrip the level of 
governmental contacts. 
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of engagement evaporated, the impulse of domestic actors to 
defer to the Administration on China policy-making diminished. 
In fact, as the nature and extent of bilateral engagement 
developed, an increasing number of domestic constituencies felt 
more able to voice protest at certain aspects of us China 
policy and the conduct of the regime in Beijing. 87 The issue of 
Taiwan continued to disconcert a ·section of conservative right-
wing opinion, while broader Congressional protest centred on 
allegations concerning Beij ing' s role in the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. Further, a notable level of 
public, interest group and Congressional criticism arose on the 
questions of human rights and self-determination, especially 
with respect to Tibet. 88 The Administration's defence of its 
China policy in the face of such protests revealed its belief 
in the importance of engagement with the PRC. 89 
At this stage in the relationship, the various protests 
possessed insufficient momentum and popular appeal to threaten 
the Administration's position. Indeed, the majority of domestic 
public, elite and media favoured further development of the 
Sino-American relationship. The Administration also benefited 
from the fact that while the relationship was no longer 
87 For example see Winston Lord, 'China and America: Beyond 
the Big Chill'; Foreign Affairs vol.68 no.4 Fall 1989 pp.22-23. 
88 See Robert S. Ross, 'National Security, Human Rights and 
Domestic Politics: The Bush Administration and China'; Chapter 
Ten in Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber and Donald Rothchild 
(eds), Eagle in a New World: American Grand Strategy in the 
Post-Cold War Era; Harper Collins (New York, 1992) p. 286 and 
Garson, The United States and China Since 1949; op cit p.185. 
89 Ibid (Ross) op cit p.286. 
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predicated on geo-strategic motives, its bilateral relationship 
with the PRC was still relatively novel and immature. The PRC's 
own transformations through the 1980s had encouraged the US to 
view it with increasing favour, while knowledge of aspects of 
Beijing's behaviour less acceptable to Americans had yet to be 
gathered and disseminated. Thus the Reagan Administration still 
held a significant balance of power in the formulation of 
foreign and China policy. 
Conclusion 
By the close of the Reagan Administration in 1988, a platform 
for US-PRC relations that would transcend the end of the Cold 
War had been established. While gee-strategic factors had yet 
to be dismissed, most China policy-makers were convinced that 
engagement could and should be sustained on a bilateral basis. 
America recognized a range of strategic interests in China in 
the broader sense of economics, diplomacy, culture, and 
academia, as well as regional and global security. What is 
more, the US recognized its normative interests in the PRC, 
according to its belief that engagement would foster economic, 
societal, and political reform in China. The Administration was 
able to define a clear hierarchy of positive US China policy 
interests, shared throughout the bureaucracy. 90 
90 This positive outlook was facilitated by a favourable 
international and bilateral context. D§tente with Gorbachev's 
Soviet Union freed the Administration from many of its Cold War 
gee-strategic obligations, while Beijing was a willing partner 
in the expansion of Sino-American ties. 
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The Reagan Administration's learning curve and commitment 
to engagement was complemented by growing fascination and 
interest in China exhibited within the domestic arena. A 
distinct consensus supported the expansion of the bilateral us-
China relationship. Moreover, flourishing domestic stakes in 
China policy meant that domestic legitimacy had become an even 
more vital ingredient to engagement with the PRC. 
However, the Bush and Clinton Administrations were unable, 
and incapable, of capitalizing upon this platform. The seeds of 
domestic protest at China policy had already been sown, but new 
bilateral and domestic circumstances arose that challenged the 
validity and legitimacy of the US strategy of bilateral 
engagement. Not only did Presidents Bush and Clinton struggle 
to define a hierarchy of US foreign policy, and China policy, 
interests in the post-Cold War world, but events such as the 
Tiananmen Square massacre of June 1989 precipitated the 
collapse of the domestic consensus concerning American 
relations with China. The task of balancing strategic bilateral 
interests with domestic legitimacy proved much harder to 
resolve. President Bush's management of China policy suffered 
due to his focus upon strategic concerns to the detriment of 
domestic legitimacy, while President Clinton's preoccupation 
with domestic political calculations undermined both the 
credibility of his strategic designs, and the domestic 
legitimacy of his China policy. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT 
LEARNING CURVES IN AN UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT 
Continuity was the byword of George Bush's approach to China 
policy when he entered office in January 1989. Although 
bilateral disputes on issues such as PRC proliferation and 
policy towards Tibet were drawing greater attention, this was 
counter-balanced by Bush's belief in the strategic importance 
of China. 1 Therefore in the mind of the new President, a very 
strong basis existed for the long-term development of the Sino-
American relationship. However, the Bush Administration 
encountered a number of serious challenges and changes of 
circumstance in its pursuit of China policy through. its four 
year term of office. 2 The most obvious challenge was presented 
by the need to reevaluate China policy in the light of the 
Tiananmen Square massacre of June 3/4 1989. The roots of the 
policy-making crisis prompted by Tiananmen were primarily 
domestic, and these will be discussed in the following chapter. 
1 Bush's thinking on China reflected that of Kissinger, 
Brzezinski and Haig, and thus reestablished an aspect of China 
policy dismissed by policy-makers such as Reagan, Weinberger 
and Shultz. Robert S. Ross, 'National Security, Human Rights 
and Domestic Politics: The Bush Administration and China'; 
Chapter Ten in Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber and Donald 
Rothchild (eds), Eagle in a New World: American Grand Strategy 
in the Post-Cold War Era; Harper Collins (New York, 1992) 
p.287. 
2 Perhaps the greatest specific challenges faced by the Bush 
Administration emanated from the domestic political 
environment. These challenges form the focus of the next 
chapter. 
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However, Tiananmen had a number of crucial implications for the 
strategy of engagement with the People's Republic. First and 
foremost, it tested the philosophy of engagement, and the 
notion that US governmental and non-governmental participation 
in China's development stimulated economic, societal and 
political reform in the PRC. The Bush Administration remained 
committed to this philosophy, in the face of posited 
alternatives, the most significant of which centred on the 
issue of leverage. Essentially, this impugnment of engagement 
insisted that the Administration should exploit China's 
economic and technological dependence on America by linking 
access to these resources to improvements in China's conduct on 
human rights and other issues. Nevertheless, the vociferous 
China policy debate provoked by Tiananmen also forced policy-
makers to focus their minds on vital US interests in China. In 
other words, they were required to recognise and justify a 
hierarchy of China policy interests, and determine the most 
effective way of pursuing them. 
This ends and means problem led to a second challenge 
facing the !;lush Administration, that concerning the need to 
redefine US national interests and foreign policy in light of 
diminishing Cold War tensions. Policy-makers had to determine 
the importance of China in the context of a new and uncertain 
international environment. The 1990-91 Gulf Conflict 
highlighted China's vital role within the reinvigorated United 
Nations. On the other hand, the PRC's proclivity for arms sales 
and the transfer of nuclear and military technology ran counter 
to the Bush Administration's embracement of anti-proliferation 
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policies. The need to address China policy in the context of a 
changing international environment, particularly after 
Tiananmen, highlighted Bush's limitations. While regarded as a 
safe patriarchal and often prudent leader, Bush was not a 
visionary. His Cold War experience and credentials left him 
vulnerable to accusations that he was incapable of adapting to 
the new international environment. 
Bush assumed office with a framework for engagement with 
the PRC that he largely adhered to in the face of significant 
bilateral and international challenges. His Administration's 
pursuit of China policy in these circumstances did much to 
refine and consolidate the strategy of engagement, though it 
did provoke a debate that in a similar vein cultivated 
alternative strategies such as the use of direct leverage and 
linkage. Indeed, while many of the realities of conducting a 
relationship with the PRC on a non-geostrategic basis were 
brought home to policy-makers during 1989-1993, these realities 
constantly called into question the wisdom of defending US 
interests through engagement. 
Tiananmen and the Challenge to Engagement with the PRC 
BUSH AND THE DESIGN FOR CONTINUITY 
The Bush Administration inherited a vibrant US relationship 
with the People's Republic. On a practical level, the last two 
to three years of the Reagan Administration had witnessed a 
massive expansion in contacts and ties, particularly in the 
93 
realm of . 3 econom1cs. The US benefited from highly promising 
export markets and investment opportunities, and cheap consumer 
imports, while the PRC reaped the benefits of the enormous US 
co:1sumer market, the supply of technology, and the financial 
stimulus of dollar investment. 4 On a philosophical level, US 
China policy-makers maintained that us engagement and 
participation in the PRC's development not only played a 
critical role in its economic modernisation and growth, but 
also stimulated political and societal reform. 5 The growing 
wealth of Chinese citizens, and the limited though significant 
degree of political and societal relaxation that had occurred 
particularly in the more prosperous south eastern coastal 
regions appeared to justify these assertions. Another 
longstanding objective of US engagement appeared to be 
vindicated by China's increasing participation in the 
international system. This seemed to suggest that Beijing was 
willing to accept international norms and principles, more 
often than not defined by the US. 
The relationship was not without its problems. The 
declining strategic rationale for engagement had focused 
3 Commercial and non-commercial military sales to China had 
taken off, academic exchanges and tourism was booming, US 
foreign investment was strong, and bilateral trade had reached 
an unprecedented figure of over $13.5 billion. See Harry 
Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China 
Since 1972i Brookings Institute (Washington D. C., 1992) 
Appendix A 'Tables and Figure' pp.363-372. 
4 Ibid p. 215. 
5 This was achieved, it was argued, through the creation of 
wealthier middle class PRC citizens who were more inclined to 
demand such reforms, and through the transmission of Western 
ideas and values along burgeoning bilateral ties. 
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increasing attention on areas of bilateral dispute. 6 Government 
officials and the US business community were frustrated by 
barriers to China's market, and by an onerous investment 
climate complicated by a immature and often chaotic economic 
infrastructure. In addition, issues such as China's respect for 
human rights, especially in Tibet, arms sales to volatile 
regions such as the Middle East (supplying both combatants in 
the Iran-Iraq war for example), allegations of the transfer of 
nuclear technology to states such as Pakistan, and Beij ing' s 
connections with groups such as the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia 
concerned policy-makers in Washington. 7 
Nevertheless, Bush was determined to reestablish the 
strategic importance of the PRC within US China policy-making, 
and in fact saw the many areas of bilateral dispute as further 
reason for engagement with Beijing. Bush had served as head of 
the Washington's Liaison Office in Beijing through 1974-75. 
This experience, according to his own frequent assertions, had 
endowed him with a deep and valuable knowledge of Chinese 
affairs. 8 That this experience came at a time when US-PRC 
relations were almost entirely rooted in mutual strategic 
interests, and when US China policy was dominated by Kissinger 
6 The strategic rationale had eroded due to diminishing Cold 
War tensions, and the Reagan Administration's dismissal of the 
importance of the PRC to US national security policy as it 
defined it. Robert S. Ross, 'National Security, Human Rights 
and National Security'; op cit pp.284-285. 
7 I bid p. 286 and Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power i 
Oxford University Press, (New York, 1995) p.243. 
8 See for example his toast at the Welcoming Banquet in 
Beijing, February 25 1989. Public Papers of the Presidents of 
the United States-George Bush 1989; Book I, January 20 to June 
30, 1989, Washington D.C. (United States Government Printing 
Office, 1990) pp.l39-140. 
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had a strong bearing on the President's outlook. 9 Similarly 
Bush's closest advisors on Foreign and China policy shared the 
President's tutelage under Nixon-Ford-Kissinger. As a 
consequence, Bush's confidence in the pertinence of his 
approach to China policy, and his determination to retain 
control of China policy-making throughout his term of office 
was consolidated by the support he received from National 
Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Secretary of State 
Lawrence Eagleberger and Secretary of Defence Richard Cheney. 10 
The Bush Administration believed that the long-term trends 
in China and in the US-PRC relationship were positive and 
strong in spite of certain specific bilateral disagreements. 
This view was critical to the framework for China policy 
established at the outset. Bush argued that China's size and 
population, location, strategic importance to world politics 
and stability, and economic potential, necessitated a US 
strategy of engagement with Beijing. US (and global) economic 
interaction with China's development, he urged, would 
inevitably encourage economic. political and human rights 
progress within the PRC. Unavoidable economic, political and 
normative disputes arising from respective differences in 
economic, political and societal systems could and should be 
resolved through quiet engagement and diplomacy. Thus 
9 Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power; op cit p.243, and 
same author, ~Neither Friends nor Enemies: Sino-American 
Relations After the Cold War'; The Oxford International Review 
vol.S no.2 Spring 1994 p.19. 
10 Robert D. Schulzinger, American Diplomacy in the 
Twentieth Century; Oxford University Press (Oxford, 1994) p.356 
and Robert S. Ross, ~National Security, Human Rights and 
Domestic Politics'; op cit p.287. 
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engagement served us strategic, economic and normative 
interests. 11 
Bush demonstrated his commitment to US ties with Beijing 
by including China on his first foreign trip in February 1989. 
Indeed he indicated an application to the issue of human rights 
by referring to the issue on a number of occasions during his 
trip, and more conspicuously, inviting a number of Chinese 
dissidents to a US Embassy Reception on February 26. The 
Beijing authorities reacted angrily to the invitation and 
prevented leading dissident Fang Lizhi from attending the 
reception. 12 Nonetheless, this diplomatic spat proved to be an 
exception in the early months of the Bush Administration's 
relations with the PRC, during which the President established 
a pattern of direct contacts with the Chinese leadership. 13 
TIANANMEN: ENGAGEMENT IN PRACTICE 
Through the spring of 1989, awareness of growing though 
peaceful demonstrations of protest in Beij ing and in other 
11 Robert G. Sutter, 'Tiananmen's Lingering Fallout on Sino-
American Relations'; Current History vol.90 no.557 September 
1991 p.248. See also George Bush, 'Toast at the Welcoming 
Banquet in Beijing'; op cit pp.139-140 and remarks at the 
President's News Conference, March 7, 1989, Public Papers of 
the Presidents of the United States-George Bush 1989; Book I op 
cit p.179. 
12 Kerry Dumbaugh, China's Future; 
Service (CRS) Issue Brief IB85108 March 
s. Ross, 'National Security, Human 
Politics'; op cit p.292. 
Congressional Research 
2 1989 p.lO and Robert 
Rights and Domestic 
13 Ibid (Ross) pp.291-292 and Rosemary Foot, The Practice of 
Power; op cit p.243. 
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Chinese towns and cities spread to Washington. 14 The timing of 
the demonstrations was significant. In part they were triggered 
by the death of leading reformer Hu Yaobong on April 15, but 
they also presaged a trip by the Soviet reformist President 
Gorbachev in the May. The publicity that would surround the 
trip promised to shed the global media spotlight on the 
protests. 15 The causes for the protests, like the composition of 
the demonstrators themselves, were many and varied. Essentially 
the demonstrations centred on the alienation of the Chinese 
regime from its citizens, and its lack of accountability 
particularly in the face of mounting economic and social 
problems prompted by a downturn in the Chinese economy. Through 
the filter of the American media, however, the protests 
represented a pro-democracy movement led by students. The 
building of an effigy called the 'Goddess of Democracy' bearing 
a slight resemblance to the Statue of Liberty in Tiananmen 
Square in Beijing confirmed this US perception. 16 
The demonstrations highlighted a fissure within the 
Chinese leadership. Pro-reform moderates and liberals led by 
Chinese Communist Part (CCP) General Secretary Zhao Ziyang 
14 For an excellent overview of causes behind the spring 
1989 protest movement, the Tiananmen Square massacre of June 
3/4, and the subsequent imposition of martial law and political 
repression by the PRC regime see Harry Harding, A Fragile 
Relationship; op cit pp.217-224. 
15 Also the Chinese National People's Congress convened in 
the March. 
16 For example Stephen Yates of the Heritage Foundation 
argues that by focusing on the student minority calling for 
democracy and the overthrow of the PRC regime, the vast 
majority of Americans wholly misunderstood the events of 
spring I summer 19 8 9 . Interview with Stephen Ya tes, November 5 
1997, Heritage Foundation, Washington D.C. 
98 
urged further economic liberalization accompanied by a process 
of limited political reform. Conservatives and hardliners such 
as Premier Li Peng rejected such proposals. They believed that 
further reform would increase China's economic dependence on 
foreign states, and also serve to undermine the power and 
authority of the CCP. 17 Their view was heavily influenced by the 
reform movements in the Soviet Union and East and Central 
Europe, and the political, societal and economic chaos they 
perceived as its consequence. 18 The imposition of martial law on 
May 20 (and the subsequent resignation of Zhao Ziyang who 
advocated dialogue with the protesters) indicated that the 
balance of power within the regime had swung the way of 
hardliners who wished to suppress the growing demonstrations. 
Still the repression of June 3/4 in and around Tiananmen Square 
surprised and shocked the watching world. 
The Bush Administration had reacted cautiously to the 
developing protest movements within the PRC. Bush was willing 
to identify the US with the protesters and their demands, and 
he urged further political and democratic reform in China. 19 
However, in counselling restraint from both the Chinese 
authorities and the protesters, the Administration emphasised 
17 Maintaining independence was and is a critical component 
of Chinese foreign policy decision-making. See Michael B. 
Yahuda, 'Sino-American Relations'; Chapter Nine in Gerald Segal 
(ed), Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy Reform; Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, Kegan Paul International 
(1990) especially pp.181-182. 
18 See Winston Lord, 'Misguided 
December 19 1989 and Rosemary Foot, 
cit p.243. 
Mission' ; Washington Post 
The Practice of Power; op 
19 Question and Answer session May 5 1989, Public Papers of 
the Presidents of the United States-George Bush 1989; Book I op 
cit p.519. 
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that the long-term trends in China were positive and that an 
imprudent US reaction to the protests could undermine the short 
and long-term stability of the PRC. 2° Further, he did not wish 
to provoke Beijing's anger by being seen to interfere in 
China's internal affairs. 21 
Bush and his close advisors were convinced of the need to 
find a delicate balance in their response to the Tiananmen 
Square suppression. Firstly, they had to demonstrate their 
repulsion at the use of force by the PRC authorities and convey 
their criticism and denunciation of the repression. To an 
important extent, the Administration had to weigh domestic 
horror and condemnation in formulating this response. On the 
other hand, Bush wanted to retain US ties with Beijing and was 
determined that this crisis would not derail the Sino-American 
relationship. 22 The President's initial statements on the 
incident reflected this balance. Thus while the President 
'deeply deplored' the use of force, he highlighted the long-
term "constructive relationship" between the US and the PRC and 
expressed his hope that " ... China will rapidly return to the 
path of political and economic reform and conditions for 
stability so that this relationship ... can continue its 
20 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit pp.224-225. 
21 Robert S. Ross, 'National Security, Human Rights and 
Domestic Politics'; op cit p.292. 
22 Winston Lord, 'China and America: Beyond the Big Chill'; 
Foreign Affairs vol.68 no.4 Fall 1989 p.10 and Robert G. 
Sutter, 'Sino-American Relations in Adversity'; Current History 
vol.89 no.548 September 1990 pp.241-242. See George Bush's 
remarks during the President's News Conference June 8 1989, 
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States-George 
Bush 1989; Book I op cit pp.695-699. 
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growth. "23 
The Bush Administration led the international reaction to 
Tiananmen. It immediately suspended all military sales to the 
PRC and suspended all military contacts. 24 Further, Bush offered 
to coordinate humanitarian assistance to the injured, met with 
Chinese scholars studying in the US and offered them sanctuary, 
and gave refuge to leading dissident Fang Lizhi in the US 
Embassy in Beij ing. 25 When it became clear by June 20 that 
Beijing would meet these measures not with contrition or 
concession but with defiance and justification for it actions, 
the Administration imposed a second wave of sanctions. These 
included the suspension of ceremonial governmental exchanges at 
Cabinet level, and measures to postpone lending and assistance 
to China from international financial institutions. 26 The ban on 
diplomatic contacts came as a response to growing misgivings in 
Congress about the Administration's relatively concessionary 
reaction to Tiananmen. However, responding in this way 
undermined the very essence of the Administration's strategy; 
Bush had curtailed high-level contacts in spite of the fact 
23 George Bush, 'Statement on the Chinese Government's 
Suppression of Student Demonstrations' June 3 1989, and see 
also remarks made at the President's News Conference June 5 
1989; Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States-
George Bush 1989; Book I op cit pp.669-670. 
24 These measures reflected the predominant role of the 
People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the Tiananmen repression. 
25 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit p.225. 
26 Other sanctions included the suspension of the 1985 
bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement, and of export licences 
for satellite technology. See ibid p.226 and 'Statement by 
Press Secretary Fitzwater on United States Sanctions Against 
the Chinese Government' June 20 1989; Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States-George Bush 1989; Book I op cit 
p.764. 
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highlighting the need to engage with the PRC. 31 A further reason 
for the Administration's caution and restraint from hostility 
was the inability to predict the political direction the CCP 
regime would adopt in the aftermath of Tiananmen. Policy-makers 
understood that Chinese leaders would be reluctant to show 
signs of weakness while they jockeyed for position in the post-
Deng secessionist struggle. Furthermore, Washington was aware 
of the hardline PRC attitude towards the reforms in the Soviet 
sphere, and their fears for the implications of domestic 
instability. 32 Thus the President refrained from personalised 
criticism of the PRC leadership. He did not wish to undermine 
the position of Deng, whom the President regarded as a moderate 
and a key figure to Bush's plans to resume full bilateral 
relations. 33 
Bush also emphasised other reasons for his 
Administration's diplomatic track following Tiananmen. On June 
8, he cited an argument central to the rationale for engagement 
in the post-Tiananmen era. Responding to calls for a tougher 
economic sanctions, Bush asserted: "I think that would be 
counterproductive and would hurt the people. " 34 This argument 
31 Bush referred not only to the global 
regional security issues such as Cambodia, 
Korean Peninsula. President's News Conference 
p. 815 0 
context, but to 
Vietnam and the 
June 27; op cit 
32 Ibid p.242 and Robert G. Sutter, 'Tiananmen's Lingering 
Fallout'; op cit p.248. These uncertainties were reflected by 
US China specialists. See for example Crisis in China: 
Prospects for US Policy; Conference Report of the Thirtieth 
Strategy for Peace, US Foreign Policy Conference 1989, The 
Stanley Foundation pp.4-6. 
33 Robert S. Ross, 'National Security, Human Rights and 
Domestic Politics'; op cit p.293. 
34 The President's News Conference June 8 
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1989; op cit 
insisted that the imposition of tough economic sanctions would 
hurt those sections of the Chinese community such as 
entrepreneurs who provided an essential dynamic for reform in 
China. In other words, it ran counter to the idea that US 
economic engagement in China's development would inevitably 
foster improvements in economic, political and societal 
conditions. 35 
Bush also maintained that a severe US response would 
threaten growing US economic interests in the PRC, and he even 
went as far as to note the value of bilateral cultural and 
educational ties. 36 Believing that Beijing shared his desire to 
reestablish normal US-PRC relations, he urged their observance 
of human rights and invited positive gestures and responses 
from the regime. 37 
The Bush Administration reinforced its rhetoric with 
significant diplomatic gestures and concessions of its own, 
some of which were designed to mitigate the effect of the 
p.697. 
35 This argument formed a central criticism of Congressional 
attempts to impose stringent sanctions on China through 1990-
1992, and indeed Congress refined their measures to take 
account of its central assertions. This is discussed in the 
following chapter. It also used by President Clinton in his 
decision to del ink China's Most-Favoured-Nation status (MFN) 
from human rights in 1994. 
36 Ibid and Robert G. Butter, 'Sino-American relations in 
Adversity'; op cit p.271. 
37 For example the Administration called for the lifting of 
martial law, flexibility towards the issue of Fang Lizhi, an 
end to the jamming of Voice of America broadcasts and 
permission for US Peace Corps to start a volunteer programme in 
the PRC. Robert G. Butter, 'Sino-American Relations in 
Adversity'; op cit p.271. 
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sanctions imposed in June. 38 As early as July 1989, Bush waived 
existing sanctions to allow the sale of four Boeing 747 
commercial aircraft to the PRC. He followed this up in October 
by allowing PLA military officers in the US to resume their 
cooperation with American engineers on Chinese fighter 
aircraft. 39 Further, on December 19, Bush waived restrictions to 
permit the export of three communications satellites to the 
PRC. Of equal salience were the measures taken by the President 
to ensure that the management of China policy remained in his 
hands. On November 30, Bush vetoed the Emergency Chinese 
Immigration Relief Act. While conceding that he agreed with its 
prescriptions, Bush maintained: "My Administration has opposed 
congressional micromanagement of foreign policy. Such 
legislation puts America in a straitjacket and can render us 
incapable of responding to changing circumstances. "40 
Similarly, on December 19 the President announced that he 
would not enact new Export- Import Bank funding restrictions 
passed by Congress. Bush's resistance to Congressional action 
on China policy facilitated his chosen strategy of concessions 
and positive though cautious diplomacy. In other words by 
38 See ibid and Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op 
cit pp.228-229. 
39 Though the ban on arms sales remained in place, this 
controversial measure appeared to disregard the ban on military 
exchanges. 
40 George Bush, 'Statement on the Disapproval of the Bill 
Providing Emergency Immigration Relief' November 30 1989; 
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States-George 
Bush 1989; Book II, July 1 to December 31, 1989, Washington 
D.C. (United States Government Printing Office, 1990) pp.1612-
1613. see also 'Memorandum of Disapproval for the Bill 
Providing Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief'; ibid pp.1611-
1612. 
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retaining control of policy, he could protect engagement with 
Beijing in the political aftermath of Tiananmen. However, Bush 
also justified his resistance to interference on the basis that 
he 'knew China', an argument he returned to constantly over the 
forthcoming months. 41 As will be discussed in greater depth in 
the following chapter, the President's elitist approach and his 
determination to exclude Congress from the policy-making 
process, even in cases such as the Immigration Relief Act where 
he agreed with the policy proposals, intensely annoyed members 
of Congress. This standoff stiffened Congressional resolve to 
play a leading role in defining US policy towards China, and 
contributed to the disintegration of the bipartisan consensus 
on China policy. 
To complement the series of concessions and mitigatory 
gestures, the Bush Administration also pursued direct contacts 
with the leadership in Beijing. As early as June 8, the 
President made an unsuccessful attempt to contact Deng Xiaoping 
directly by telephone. 42 Further, Secretary of State Baker 
embarked upon a series of negotiations with Chinese officials. 43 
On June 10 1989 Baker began talks with the Chinese Ambassador 
to Washington Han Xu, primarily on the issue of Fang Lizhi. 
Baker also met with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at the 
Paris Conference on Cambodia in July, and at the United Nations 
41 For example, Bush frequently made this point during the 
President's News Conference June 8 1989; op cit pp.695-701. 
42 The President's News Conference June 8 1989; op cit 
p. 698. Bush also sent a note to Deng via US Ambassador to 
Beij ing James Lilley. Robert S. Ross, 'National Security,· Human 
Rights and Domestic Politics'; op cit p.293. 
43 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit p.228. 
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in September. While these meetings were designed to convey US 
concern for human rights and the use of repression in China, 
they were also used to confirm the Bush Administration's 
commitment to US ties with the PRC. The Administration even 
participated in bilateral discussions regarding China's 
application to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) in September."' 
The US domestic political environment had initially given 
their broad approval for the President's post-Tiananmen 
strategy, responding to his request for patience in 
anticipating PRC reciprocation. Nevertheless domestic opinion, 
and in particular Congress and opinion leaders, began to get 
frustrated with the Adminstration's China policy for two main 
reasons. Firstly, Chinese progress was simply not forthcoming. 45 
Indeed, the Chinese blamed the US for the deterioration in 
bilateral relations. Through quiet diplomatic channels, 
however, Chinese leaders had declared their own desire to avoid 
a regression in Sino-American relations and suggested that US 
concessions would stimulate PRC reciprocation. 46 
The second catalyst for domestic hostility towards the 
Administration's China policy was the implications and 
interpretations of Bush's decision to engage in secret 
44 Robert s. Ross, 'National Security, Human Rights and 
Domestic Politics'; op cit p.297. 
45 See for example ibid pp.295-296. 
46 For example, such messages were conveyed by Nixon, 
Kissinger, and US academic Professor T. D. Lee on their return 
from private trips to the PRC, and to Secretary of State Baker 
in his meetings with Qian Qichen. Robert S. Ross, 'National 
Security, Human Rights and Domestic Politics'; op cit pp.297-
298 and pp.299-300. 
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diplomacy. The President sent a small delegation led by NSA 
Scowcroft to China December 9-10 1989, announcing the visit on 
its return. This led to the disclosure that Bush had sent the 
NSA and Assistant Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleberger to 
Beij ing as early as July 1-2. The rapid intensification of 
domestic criticism and doubt in the Administration's post-
Tiananmen strategy that resulted from these two factors 
presented the most serious challenge to engagement with the PRC 
since the establishment of relations in 1972. It also 
contributed strongly to the President's decision to reevaluate 
his China policy in 1990. 
THE CHALLENGE TO ENGAGEMENT 
Bush's decision to employ these secret diplomatic missions 
highlighted two aspects of the Administration's post-Tiananmen 
strategy. Firstly they demonstrated the President's commitment 
to engagement with Beijing. Secondly, and with particular 
regard to the December mission, they also reflected his 
optimism that the Chinese would reciprocate US gestures and 
retreat from its policy of repression. 47 Indeed the validity of 
Bush's concessionary strategy depended on evidence of 
improvements in China's conduct on human rights. Further, their 
secrecy highlighted the extent to which Bush had impeded his 
own strategy of engagement by responding to domestic reproof 
with the ban on high-level exchanges in late June. 
The secret missions triggered significant doubts as to the 
47 Ibid p.300. 
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wisdom of pursuing US interests through engagement with Beijing 
following the Tiananmen Square massacre. In defending the 
decision to send Scowcroft and Eagleberger to Beij ing, Bush 
attempted to justify his strategy towards China. In fact his 
first response was to place the December mission in the context 
of the strategic triangle, arguing that Scowcroft's visit was 
the latest in an established process of informing Beij ing of 
developments in US-Soviet relations. 48 In a wider vein, Bush 
reiterated his belief in the broad strategic importance of the 
PRC and his belief that US interests were best served through 
dialogue and the pursuit of common ground with the PRC. He 
expressed his commitment to human rights and his determination 
not to take action detrimental to Chinese citizens. Again, he 
emphasised his personal knowledge of China, suggesting that 
critics of his policy " ... simply do not know what they are 
talking about 0 1049 
The President's defence of the missions and of engagement 
was helped by a number of PRC concessions early in January 
1990, and a slight improvement of relations. Following a verbal 
promise not to export missiles to the Middle East, Beij ing 
lifted martial law on January 10, and released 573 political 
prisoners detained since spring 1989. 50 
48 George Bush, 'Remarks and a Question-And-Answer Session 
with Newspaper Editors' December 11 1989; Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States-George Bush 1989; Book II op 
cit pp.1682-1683 and Robert G. Sutter, 'Sino-American Relations 
in Adversity'; op cit p.243. 
49 Ibid (George Bush) p.1683. 
50 The US responded 
adopting a more flexible 
the PRC. Robert S. Ross, 
Domestic Politics'; op cit 
to the lifting of martial law by 
attitude towards World Bank loans to 
'National Security, Human Rights and 
pp.302-303. 
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Nevertheless, irrespective of whether Bush's justification 
of his strategy was legitimate or not, the rationale. for 
engagement with the PRC had been substantially undermined. In 
particular, revelations that Scowcroft had toasted his hosts in 
Beijing and that he had referred to "negative forces" within 
the US and PRC that "seek to redirect or frustrate our 
cooperation" provoked considerable domestic hostility. 
Scowcoft's comments appeared to condemn domestic critics of the 
Bush Administration's China policy, rather than Beijing's 
responsibility for severe human rights violations and the lack 
of progress, for the deterioration in bilateral relations. 51 
Indeed it also disregarded the possibility that the lack of PRC 
progress could have been due to the conciliatory approach taken 
by the Bush Administration. 52 
One of the most pertinent criticisms came from Winston 
Lord, a former fervent enthusiast of the Bush Administration's 
China policy. Indeed, Lord had served as US Ambassador to China 
from November 1985 to April 1989, and was a confirmed advocate 
of engagement with Beijing. However, having concluded that 
China was making satisfactory progress towards reform through 
51 Repeating a diplomatic tactic used by officials of 
previous Administrations, Scowcroft and Eagleberger told the 
PRC leadership that President Bush's room for manoeuvre was 
restricted by domestic political forces, and that the Chinese 
would have to demonstrate progress to prevent the US Congress 
from taking action that would destroy US-PRC relations. Ibid 
pp.300-301. 
52 Stephen Yates argues that while the second mission may 
have played a constructive role in improving relations between 
the two governments, this secretive and elitist style of 
diplomacy had been made obsolete by the decline in Cold War 
tensions. In the new environment, domestic actors expected 
greater transparency and greater influence in US foreign 
policy-making. Interview op cit. 
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the late 1980s he felt shocked and betrayed by the Tiananmen 
Square massacre. 53 As he indicated in an article for the 
Washington Post on December 19 1989, he had supported the 
Administration's strategy following Tiananmen believing that it 
had " ... struck the right balance between condemnation and 
connection ... " 54 Yet Lord insisted that the Scowcroft mission 
had destroyed the credibility of US China policy and forsaken 
DS values and principles. Castigating the Administration for 
siding with the Beij ing regime " ... against the Chinese and 
American people ... ", Lord disparaged the Bush policy rationale 
and rejected the President's defence of his post-Tiananmen 
policy. He stressed that the Administration's conciliatory 
approach fortified the hardline wing within the regime, at the 
expense of encouraging reform-minded figures. 55 
Lord restated many of his criticisms in an op-ed in the 
New York Times the following May. Further, he outlined his 
belief in an alternative policy framework for a more productive 
pursuit of US interests in China. 56 While explaining his 
opposition to an immediate revocation of China's Most-Favoured-
Nation (MFN) status, Lord proposed a one year renewal with 
further renewals conditional on human rights progress. 57 Such a 
53 susumu Awanohara, 'Caution to Peking'; Far Eastern 
Economic Review; February 4 1993 p.15. 
54 Winston Lord, 'Misguided Mission'; op cit. 
55 Ibid. Lord accused the Administration of double-standards 
and "cultural, if not racial, bias" in comparing its policy on 
human rights in China with that towards Eastern Europe. 
56 winston Lord, 'Bush's Second Chance on China'; New York 
Times May 9 1990 p.A31. 
57 Lord agreed with 
sanctions, in the form of 
the arguments that harsh economic 
immediate MFN revocation, would hurt 
111 
policy had two specific objectives according to the author. 
Firstly, it would reestablish the bipartisan consensus, and 
unity of purpose between the Executive and the Legislature that 
had underpinned US policy towards the PRC for most of the 
previous twenty years. This would boost the credibility and 
resolve of America's post-Tiananmen goals. 58 Secondly, it would 
promote Chinese human rights and serve and protect US long-term 
interests and engagement in the PRC. 
Two convictions supported Lord's proposals. Firstly he 
shared the Administration's belief that the Chinese wanted to 
restore and retain a full, long-term relationship with the 
United States. Indeed he reasoned that China's modernisation 
and development programmes were dependent on US resources, 
markets and economic engagement with the PRC. 59 However, he 
disagreed with Bush that this justified optimism behind a 
conciliatory approach to China policy. Rather, it provided the 
US with significant leverage in its relationship with Beijing. 
Lord's second conviction allowed the US to use this leverage in 
the pursuit of human rights and US interests. He argued that in 
pro-reform elements such as entrepreneurs, Hong Kong interests, 
US economic interests, and undermine long-term US objectives 
and engagement in China. He also advocated measures designed to 
increase the pressure on the regime such as working on common 
goals with Taiwan and Hong Kong, increasing Voice of America 
broadcasts into China, and reaffirming existing sanctions. 
58 Lord's belief in the value of unity between the 
Administration and Congress also relates to the efficient use 
of political capital and the importance of securing domestic 
legitimacy and support for foreign policy. Interview with 
Ambassador Winston Lord, November 7 1997, New York. Unity was 
the governing principle of the China policy-making of the 
Clinton Administration 1993-94, when Lord was Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 
59 see for example Robert G. Sutter, 'Sino-American 
Relations in Adversity'; op cit p.242 and pp.243-244. 
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the context of Soviet and East European reforms and global 
trends towards democratisation, the Chinese regime's adherence 
to authoritarianism was doomed to obsolescence. In other words 
the hardliners in Beijing were inevitably a transitional force, 
but Bush's conciliatory policy sustained their grip on power 
and fuelled their confidence. Instead, the use of leverage 
through linking China's MFN status to progress on human rights 
and other issues, would undermine their authority and stimulate 
the transition of power to a younger, more liberal-minded 
generation of leaders. 60 
Lord remained committed to engagement with Beijing and to 
the retention of the long established bilateral relationship. 61 
However, Lord's proposals reflected a wave of thinking that 
identified leverage and linkage as the most suitable way of 
pursuing US interests in the post-Tiananmen era. 62 While not a 
direct repudiation of engagement with the PRC, such as the 
strategy of isolation pursued (superficially at least) in the 
1940s to 1960s, linkage asserted that if conditions were not 
met engagement would in effect be terminated. At this time, 
little attention was given to the possibility that because of 
60 Lord emphasised the temporary nature of the current 
regime in his December Washington Post article; op cit, and 
expanded upon these views the following year. Winston Lord, 
'Will Bush Support the Chinese People?'; New York Times October 
6 1991 Section 4 p.17. The US-China Business Council estimated 
a cut in PRC exports of the US of 50 per cent if MFN was 
revoked. Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit p.260. 
61 Indeed he warned that any serious damage to US-PRC 
relations would not only be hard to repair, but would undermine 
America's relationship with China's progressive forces and 
potential leaders. 'Bush's Second Thoughts on China'; op cit. 
62 congress in particular played host to this growing 
advocacy of leverage and linkage, especially with regard to 
China's MFN status. 
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America's abundant economic interests, and its varied global 
and regional security concerns with the PRC, that Beijing might 
possess substantial leverage with Washington. 
To a great extent, advocates of linkage were not only 
frustrated with the lack of progress achieved by the Bush 
Administration's conciliatory engagement with Beijing, but they 
also doubted the President's commitment to human rights. 
Reflecting the wider debate on US foreign policy, this view 
maintained that human rights and democracy should be a central 
defining aspect of US foreign policy for a post-Cold War 
environment. Alluding to the accusation that Bush was a 'Cold 
War' president incapable to adapting to the new international 
picture, Lord himself argued that the Administration was 
" ... trapped in its own time warp ... " and had " ... forfeited 
moral reproof to seek improved bilateral ties." 63 
Thus by the early months of 1990 the Bush Administration's 
strategy of conciliatory engagement was in trouble. In spite of 
the limited concessions offered by Beijing in January, the Bush 
China policy appeared to be achieving little progress. Bush's 
refusal to 'get tough' with Beijing brought accusations that 
the President valued his personal relationship with the leaders 
in Beijing above the principle of human rights and the welfare 
of Chinese citizens. Further, the Scowcroft missions fuelled 
the perception of Administrative duplicity. 64 
63 Wins ton Lord, 'Misguided Mission'; op cit. Lord himself 
did note that the Administration had supported human rights and 
democracy in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa, but not 
in China thus exposing Bush to the accusation of double 
standards. 'Will Bush Support the Chinese People?'; op cit. 
64 Robert S. Ross, 
Domestic Politics'; op 
'National Security, Human Rights and 
c it p. 3 0 3 and Harry Harding, A Fragile 
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The President did have his supporters. Those sections of 
the business community with interests in China applauded his 
defence of engagement and his efforts to restore bilateral 
relations, especially in the face of the growing demand for 
linkage. Nixon and Kissinger also voiced their support, with 
the former president submitting a report to Congress explaining 
his security concerns and the need to take account of China's 
potential power. Further, the Administration's strategy was 
backed by key members of the China-watching community such as 
A. Doak Barnett and former China specialist in Carter's NSC, 
Michel Oksenberg. 65 Nevertheless, the public debate was swinging 
heavily against the Administration. Congress, informed media 
opinion, human rights interest groups and equally eminent China 
specialists such as Winston Lord supported a tougher approach 
to China, particularly on the issue of human rights. 66 This 
often took the form of calls for the use of leverage and 
linkage. 
BUSH DEFENDS ENGAGEMENT BUT REFINES HIS CHINA POLICY 
Encouraged by PRC concessions in January 1990, and in defiance 
of popular domestic criticism of his policy, Bush persisted 
with his conciliatory form of engagement into the spring. 
Knowing that a domestic battle was looming on the issue of 
Relationshipi op cit p.257. 
65 Ibid (Harding) p. 256. 
66 The State Department's publication of its annual human 
rights report in February appeared to back these claims, in its 
acknowledgement that widespread human rights violations were 
still occurring in China. Ibid p.258. 
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China's MFN status in anticipation of his recommendation 
(required before June 3 every year), Bush sought further 
concessionary gestures from Beij ing. As well as allowing the 
World Bank to provide its first loan to China since Tiananmen, 
the Administration announced the first export-import bank loan 
of it own. Further, it attempted to mitigate the pessimistic 
State Department human rights report on China by providing 
preliminary briefings. 
Bush also maintained his rhetorical expositions on the 
importance of remaining engaged with the PRC. Picking up on 
themes highlighted by Nixon and Kissinger, Bush stressed the 
geo-political and strategic weight China carried in the East 
Asian region. 67 He also argued that engagement induced further 
reform in the PRC, and linked this rationale with areas in 
which Beijing had provided progress. Thus on several occasions, 
the President emphasised that engagement in cultural and 
education spheres fostered democracy, and noted that Beij ing 
had resumed educational exchanges, lifted the ban on Voice of 
America broadcasts, and permitted entry to the US Peace Corps. 68 
Bush also provided his own explanations as to why PRC 
reciprocal progress had not been more forthcoming, citing for 
67 Bush cited China's key role in the Pacific, with 
particular regard to Japan, Cambodia and the Korean Peninsula. 
See ~Question and Answer Session at the Ann Dimer Dinner of the 
Business Council' January 24 1990; Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States-George Bush 1990; Book I, 
January 20 to June 30, 1990, Washington D.C. (United States 
Government Printing Office, 1991) p.81. 
68 See for example, ibid p.79; also ~Question and Answer 
Session for Newspaper Publishers' January 25 1990, and ~The 
President's News Conference' February 21 1990; Public Papers of 
the Presidents of the United States-George Bush 1990; Book I op 
cit pp.102-103 and p.254 respectively. 
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example the possibility of internal political strife in the 
contexts of the struggle between hardliners and reformers, and 
post-Deng secessionist manoeuvring. He also mused on how the 
regime would have interpreted the murder of the ruling 
Ceausescu family by protesters, arguing that there had been 
less progress since that incident. 69 
However, by February/March 1990, Bush was expressing his 
own frustrations with the lack of PRC progress. Although 
Beijing had lobbied their own strategic importance, and 
persisted in declaring their commitment to the US-PRC 
relationship while blaming the US for the breakdown, human 
rights violations and repression had continued into the 
spring. 70 Indeed, Beijing still proved resistant on the symbolic 
issue of allowing Fang Lizhi to leave the US Embassy and seek 
refuge in another country. Such a lack of progress would only 
fuel domestic condemnation of the Administration's policy, and 
bolster those demanding a strategy of linkage and the 
conditioning or immediate revocation of China's MFN status. 
Bush's form of engagement was experiencing problems in 
other areas also. Close US allies, led by Japan were wishing to 
resume their relationships with China. Further they were angry 
that America's demanded that the international community 
maintain sanctions against the PRC, while conducting direct 
69 See for example 'President's News Conference' February 21 
1990; ibid pp.253-254. Robert G. Sutter similarly argues that 
the PRC leadership were incapable of responding to the Bush 
Administration's overtures for a period after Tiananmen. 
'Tiananmen's Lingering Fallout'; op cit p.248. 
70 Robert s. Ross, 'National Security, Human Rights and 
Domestic Politics'; op cit pp.304-305. 
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diplomacy of its own with Beij ing. 71 Yet such direct diplomacy 
was in fact undermining domestic American legitimacy for the 
strategy too, contravening as it appeared to do the 
Administration's own sanctions. Furthermore, the uncertainty 
regarding China's political, economic and social stability 
deterred US business investment, undermining the economic 
aspect of US engagement in the PRC. 72 Similarly, given the PLA's 
role in the Tiananmen Square massacre plus reports of Chinese 
proliferation activities. the Administration was unable to 
reestablish one of the most productive areas of governmental 
engagement; military ties. 73 
Having expressed his frustration with PRC progress in the 
February, Bush toughened the Administration's stance in March. 74 
Specifically it revealed that it had not made up its mind on 
the question of China's MFN status, implying that it might not 
opt for unconditional renewal before the June 3 deadline. 75 
Following deliberations of the effects of MFN withdrawal, 
Beijing made a number of concessions in the spring and summer 
of 1990. While not offering a reassessment of repressive 
71 The European Community and G-7 states relaxed sanctions 
and resumed official relations with the PRC through 1990. Harry 
Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit pp.263-264 and Rosemary 
Foot, The Practice of Power; op cit pp.247-248. 
72 Robert s. Ross, 'National Security, Human Rights and 
Domestic Politics'; op cit p.307. 
73 Ibid pp. 307-308 and interview 
Specialist in Asian Affairs, November 
Research Service, Washington D.C. 
with Kerry Dumbaugh, 
5 1997, Congressional 
74 The President's News Conference February 21 
and Robert S. Ross, 'National Security, Human 
Domestic Politics'; op cit pp.304-305. 
1990; op cit 
Rights and 
75 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit pp. 260-261. 
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policies, the PRC released more dissidents in May and June, 
allowing Fang Lizhi to leave China on June 1990, and lifted 
martial law in Tibet on May 1. 76 Beij ing also announced a $2 
billion deal. with Boeing in early June, hinting that further 
deals of this kind were in the pipeline. 77 Ultimately, these 
gestures allowed the Administration to renew MFN without a 
critical challenge from within Congress. 78 
Although Bush had toughened his political stance to 
solicit progress from Beijing, he reiterated the need to remain 
engaged with Beij ing when justifying his renewal of MFN in 
1990. His defence was predicated on the need to encourage, not 
hurt, pro-reform elements within Chinese society and economy. 
He also pointed to the detrimental economic effects on Hong 
Kong of withdrawing China's MFN status. Further, he implied 
that the US would be isolated in taking such action, noting 
that America's European and East Asian allies had urged 
renewal. Finally, while insisting that existing sanctions would 
remain in place, he argued that revoking MFN would damage 
America's economic interests in that it would lead to the loss 
of jobs, rising consumer prices and the loss of investment and 
76 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit p.264, and 
Robert G. Butter (with Seong-Eun Choi), Shaping China's Future 
in World Affairs: The Role of the United States; Westview Press 
(Oxford, 1996) Chronology p.159. These gestures were aimed at 
both the Administration and Congress, to undermine the 
bargaining position of those advocating the conditioning or 
withdrawal of MFN. 
77 Ibid. This tactic of timing the announcement of major 
deals with US corporations to coincide with the annual decision 
of China's MFN status was repeated by Beijing over forthcoming 
years. 
78 Robert S. Ross, 'National Security, Human Rights and 
Domestic Politics'; op cit pp.305-306. 
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market opportunities to competitors. 79 Thus the President 
highlighted America's long-run interests in China in terms of 
economic and human rights, rather than regional and global 
security concerns. 80 
The Administration's decision to stiffen its stance 
towards China had prompted sufficient PRC progress for Bush to 
retain his strategy of engagement with Beijing. However, the 
fact that the PRC had responded to a tougher stance encouraged 
advocates of conditional MFN renewal to argue that a strategy 
of linkage rather than open engagement would be more 
productive. 81 
THE GULF CONFLICT, THE IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS, AND THE 
CONSOLIDATION OF ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PRC 
Despite reports of continued human rights violations in the 
PRC, Sino-American relations improved once the renewal of MFN 
was assured. Bush responded positively to the news of Fang 
Lizhi's release, further meeting were held between US and PRC 
officials, and the President went on an offensive praising 
Beij ing' s role in the UN' s peace programmes in Cambodia. 82 
79 The President's News Conference May 24 1990, and 
Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the Renewal of Most-
Favoured-Nation Trade Status for China May 24 1990; Public 
Papers of the Presidents of the United States-George Bush 1990; 
Book I op cit p.707 and pp.715-716 respectively. 
80 This clearly was an attempt to respond to the domestic 
political environment, and an effort demonstrate that the 
Administration shared their particular viz-a-viz China. 
81 Interview with Mike Jendrzejczyk, Human Rights Watch: 
Asia, November 4 1997, Washington D.C. 
82 Robert G. Sutter, 'Tiananmen's Lingering Fallout'; op cit 
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However, while a considerable challenge to US post-Cold War 
foreign policy-making, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in early 
August and the ensuing Gulf Crisis was fortuitous to Bush's 
strategy of engagement with Beijing. It was, however, even more 
beneficial to the PRC. 
China's political, diplomatic and military connections 
with states in the Middle East suggested that it could play a 
role in responding and challenging Iraqi actions. 83 Moreover, 
Beij ing' s possession of a veto in the UN Security Council 
presented a potential risk to the Bush Administration's efforts 
to lead an global alliance against Iraq through the mechanisms 
of the UN. Thus Beijing cooperated with the US in the 
implementation of diplomatic initiatives and economic 
sanctions. 84 Nevertheless, it stopped short of agreeing to 
military intervention, and used this issue as a bargaining chip 
with Washington. The Bush Administration, responding in kind, 
lobbied Beijing and offered further concessions as a means of 
securing at least Beij ing' s abstention on the UN resolution 
permitting the use of force. 85 China's decision to abstain 
p.248, Robert S. Ross, ~National Security, Human Rights and 
Domestic Politics'; op cit p.307 and ~Statement by Press 
Secretary Fitzwater on Fang Lizhi's Departure from China' June 
25 1990; Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States-
George Bush 1990; Book I op cit p.867. 
83 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit pp. 270-271. 
84 See ibid pp.271-272 for an explanation of Beijing's 
approach to this opportunity. 
85 Bush sent Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs Richard Solomon to Beij ing in early August, 
leading to a series of meetings between Secretary of State 
Baker and Foreign Minister Qian through the Autumn. See Robert 
Garson The United States and China Since 1949: A Troubles 
Affair; Pinter (London, 1994) p.197. 
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secured a highly symbolic visit to Washington for Qian Qichen, 
which precipitated a personal concession from Bush who 
consented to meeting the Foreign Minister. 86 
Despite subsequent PRC criticism of America's conduct of 
the Gulf Conflict, and Bush's insistence on Chinese progress in 
the areas of human rights and weapons proliferation in his 
meeting with Qian, US-PRC diplomacy regarding the Gulf crisis 
facilitated further official bilateral engagement. Assistant 
Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs 
Richard Schifter visited China in December 1990, Assistant 
Secretary of State Solomon visited in March 1991, and Under 
Secretary of State for Security Affairs and arms control 
specialist Reginald Bartholomew travelled in June 1991. 87 The 
Administration also softened it line on the Tiananmen 
sanctions, agreeing not to obstruct certain World Bank loans to 
the PRC. 88 
What is more significant is that the Gulf Conflict 
increased China's perceived importance to American interests 
within the US China debate. Although Beij ing had offered few 
concessions regarding issues such as human rights, China's 
strategic cooperation during the crisis stifled American 
criticisms of Beijing's activities and thus gave the Bush 
Administration's policy of engagement room to breathe. Moscow's 
positive contribution to the Bush Administration's Gulf 
86 Baker had informed Qian that he could meet Bush in the 
event of an affirmative vote on the UN use of force resolution. 
Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit p.272. 
87 Robert G. Sutter, 'Tiananmen's Lingering Fallout'; op cit 
p.249. 
88 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit p. 273. 
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Conflict initiatives, and the fact that it was experiencing 
domestic political and economic problems gave further reason 
for optimism. Beij ing risked being isolated in the face of 
world trends, and its cooperation with the US in the latter 
months of 1990 appeared to suggest a willingness to address 
this problem constructively. 89 Indeed by the end of 1990 US-PRC 
trade had continued to grow, and the number of Americans 
visiting China had recovered from its decline the previous 
year. 90 
BUSH DEFENDS ENGAGEMENT AGAIN BUT ALTERS HIS CHINA POLICY 
Bilateral tensions returned in 1991. Initially suspicious and 
fearful of Bush's designs for a 'New World Order' , and then 
conversely convinced that the US was a power in decline, 
Beijing increased its invective against Washington early in the 
year. 91 With the end of the Gulf Conflict, domestic attention 
began to focus on unacceptable Chinese activities in areas such 
as human rights, Tibet, the proliferation of technology weapons 
of weapons of mass destruction, its trade surplus with America, 
prison labour exports, its support for the Khmer Rouge and 
other issues. 92 Thus it was clear that another, more bitter 
89 Kerry Dumbaugh, China and Congress in 1992; Report for 
Congress 93-894 F, Congressional Research Service, Library of 
Congress, October 12 1993 p.3. 
90 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit Appendix A 
'Tables and Figure' p.364 and p.367. 
91 See ibid pp.274-275, and Rosemary Foot, The Practice of 
Power; op cit pp.248-249. 
92 Robert 
pp.249-250. 
G. Sutter, 'Tiananmen's Lingering Fallout'; op 
Kerry Dumbaugh attributes this expansion 
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cit 
of 
political battle was looming on the issue of China's MFN 
status. 
The Adminstration was sensitive to this impending domestic 
struggle, determined as it was to retain both MFN and 
engagement with the PRC. 93 Moreover it was beginning to doubt 
its strategy of concessionary engagement with the PRC. The fact 
that Beijing had appeared to gain a great deal in its relations 
with the US and the international system as a result of the 
Gulf Crisis, while continuing to criticise the US consolidated 
this view. 94 A perception grew within the Administration that 
the domestic political costs of current strategy outweighed any 
progress it secured from the PRC. 95 Consequentially, the 
Administration altered its China policy track in the spring of 
1991. 
Rather than make concessions in the hope of Chinese 
reciprocation, Bush decided that such gestures would come only 
as a result of clear improvements in Beij ing' s conduct. The 
Administration would still pursue engagement, but US officials 
would adopt a tough and uncompromising stance on the full range 
of issues of concern. Further, the Administration would still 
renew China's MFN status for 1991 (though it did not declare 
this position initially) , but would impose specific sanctions 
specific concerns to Congress diversifying its approach to 
China policy. China and Congress in 1992; op cit pp.3-4. 
93 Ibid (Dumbaugh) p. 4. 
94 Harding reports that Secretary of State Baker was 
particularly disillusioned with the existing China strategy. 
Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit p.273. 
95 Ibid pp.280-281. 
124 
if Chinese progress was not forthcoming in specific areas. 96 In 
fact this new strategy came as a result of the first 
substantive interagency review of policy towards China since 
June 1989, and from recommendations from Secretary of State 
Baker that a firmer stance was required. 97 
Thus through the spring of 1991, the Bush Administration 
launched initiatives in the three major areas of human rights 
and Tibet, trade and proliferation. In April, Bush made the 
symbolic gesture of meeting the Dalai Lama in Washington and 
expressed his support for human rights in Tibet. 98 That same 
month, the Administration took the first in a series of trade 
steps, when it launched an investigation under Section 301 (of 
the 1988 Trade Act) citing Chinese violations of US 
intellectual property rights. This investigation was expanded 
in the November on the conclusion that insufficient progress 
was being made on the issue. 99 Similarly in October, Bush 
established a Section 301 investigation of unfair Chinese trade 
barriers to US exports. Finally, late in 1991 in response to 
growing Congressional concern for the issue, the Administration 
imposed a ban on certain imports suspected of being produced by 
96 Ibid p.283 and Robert G. Sutter, 'Tiananmen's Lingering 
Fallout'; op cit pp.249-250. 
97 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit p.282. 
98 Bush was the first US president to meet with the Dalai 
Lama, and the meeting triggered a Congressional resolution 
supporting Tibetan independence, a measure denounced 1n 
Beijing. Ibid p.281 and Robert G. Sutter, 'Tiananmen's 
Lingering Fallout'; op cit p.249. 
99 This signalled America's intention to take retaliatory 
action on imports from the PRC if the problem was not resolved. 
Ibid (Harding) and Kerry Dumbaugh, China and Congress in 1992; 
op cit p.15. 
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prison and forced labour. 100 
The Administration also reacted to continued reports of 
Chinese arms sales and proliferatory activities; in particular 
the transfer of M-11 missiles and missile technology to 
Pakistan. Firstly in April 1991, the Administration prohibited 
the export of components for a PRC satellite. The following 
month it denied licences for high technology exports to the 
PRC, and sent Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs 
Robert Kimmet to Beij ing to press Chinese officials on the 
issues of nuclear and conventional proliferation, and human 
rights . 101 Further in June, Bush imposed Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR) sanctions on two Chinese arms 
companies. 102 Measures of this kind were complemented by the 
tougher rhetorical stances adopted by officials such as 
Schifter, Solomon and Bartholomew on their visits to Beijing. 103 
In the run up to the MFN for the decision of China's MFN 
status in June, Bush became increasingly concerned by the 
prospect of Congressional legislation threatening sanctions 
against the PRC. This spurred further act ion by the 
Administration. For example Bush also placed restrictions on 
the sale of high-performance computers to the PRC, and on the 
100 Ibid (Dumbaugh) p.16. 
101 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit p.281 and 
Robert G. Sutter, ~Tiananmen's Lingering Fallout'; op cit 
p. 250. 
102 The Chinese had refused to sign or abide by the MTCR. 
Kerry Dumbaugh, Congress and China in 1992; op cit p.13. 
103 The Office of the United 
(USTR) was particularly active 
negotiations through 1991-1992. 
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States Trade Representative 
in the area of direct 
launching of US satellites on Chinese rockets in May. 104 
Moreover, while continuing to proclaim on the need to maintain 
US engagement with Beijing, Bush again employed the tactic of 
suggesting that he had not made up his mind on the renewal of 
MFN status for China. 105 
The tougher platform pursued from the spring of 1991, and 
the adoption of a 'carrot and stick' approach of prudently 
targeted incentives and disincentives did achieve a certain 
amount of success. Although Beijing denounced America's 
demands, in the spring of 1991, it promised progress on nearly 
all the issues raised by Washington. 106 Further, over 1991-1992 
it made moves towards fulfilling these promises. In the area of 
intellectual property rights, the use of Section 301 and 
pressure from the USTR led to a bilateral Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) on January 16 1992. 107 Beij ing also agreed 
to increase access to US exports, and reduce barriers to trade, 
and under serious threat of retaliatory sanctions, it signed a 
MOU with Washington on October 10 1992, pledging to remove a 
104 Robert G. Sutter, 'Tiananmen's Lingering Fallout'; op 
cit p.250. 
105 See for example The President's News Conference April 29 
1991, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States-
George Bush 1990; Book I, January 20 to June 30, 1991, 
Washington D.C. (United States Government Printing Office, 
1992) p.442. 
range of 
a pamphlet 
A Fragile 
proved far 
and Tibet, 
106 Harding notes that concessions on a wide 
economic and proliferation concerns were promised in 
produced by the Chinese Embassy in Washington. 
Relationship; op cit p.279 (endnote 80). Beijing 
more resistant on the issues of human rights 
insisting they were sovereign concerns. 
107 Kerry Dumbaugh, China and Congress in 1992; op cit p.15. 
Rosemary Foot reports one Chinese analyst who claimed that the 
US promised to support China's application to GATT in return or 
this MOU. The Practice of Power; op cit p.252. 
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broad range of barriers within five years . 108 US-Chinese 
diplomacy led to another MOU, this time forbidding ~he export 
of products of prison or forced labour from the PRC to the US, 
on August 7 1992. 109 
Washington also secured verbal agreements with the PRC in 
the area of proliferation. Firstly it declared that it would 
join international efforts to curb arms sales, and 
proliferation to the Middle East. 110 Secretary of State Baker on 
a visit to Beijing in November 1991 then secured China's verbal 
assurances that it would abide by the MTCR, and sign the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which it did on March 9 the 
following year. 111 Beij ing also agreed to International Atomic 
Energy Authority (IAEA) inspections of an Algerian nuclear 
reactor it had helped to construct. 112 
Furthermore the PRC demonstrated closer interaction with 
the international community on the question of East Asian peace 
and stability. Beijing continued to support the UN peace 
process in Cambodia, and stepped up its interest in stability 
on the Korean Peninsula, establishing diplomatic relations with 
South Korea on August 24 1992. 113 
108 Ibid (Dumbaugh) pp.15-l6. 
109 Ibid p.16. 
110 Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power; op cit pp.252-253. 
111 In exchange for membership of the NPT, Beij ing wanted 
the US to lift sanctions on the two PRC arms companies. Bush 
lifted the sanctions on March 23 1992. Kerry Dumbaugh, China 
and Congress in 1992; op cit p.l3. 
112 Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power; op cit p. 253. 
113 I bid and Rosemary Foot, 'Neither Friends Nor Enemies'; 
op cit p.21, and Robert G. Sutter, Shaping China's Future in 
World Affairs; op cit p.160. 
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Both the Bush Administration and the regime in Beij ing 
worked to prevent Congress imposing legislative conditions on 
China's MFN status in 1991 and 1992. While Bush had hinted that 
he may not renew MFN in 1991, in 1992 he made an early defence 
of renewal. In a letter to the House of Representatives dated 
March 2 1992, the President reiterated the reasons why he 
favoured engagement, and why renewal rather than MFN revocation 
or conditionality would serve US strategic, economic and 
normative interests. However, he also asserted that: "Recent 
agreements by the Chinese are clear achievements of my 
Administration's policy of comprehensive engagement." 114 Indeed, 
the Chinese had responded to the Administration's tougher 
'carrot and stick' strategy. Yet the Chinese had also attempted 
to influence domestic political forces within the US directly. 
Thus Beij ing repeated the 1990 tactic of releasing political 
detainees, signing major investment and joint venture deals 
with US multinational corporations, and insisting it would 
abide by international trends in arms control, anti-
proliferation, global and regional stability. In fact, 
following a number of concessions and promises in the spring 
and summer of 1991, China intensified the political 
gamesmanship by insisting that it had done enough to preserve 
ll4 George Bush, 'China's MFN Status', Letter to the House 
of Representatives March 2 1992, US Department of State 
Dispatch; vol.3 no.10 March 9 1992 (United States Government 
Printing Office 1992) p.189. Bush lobbied Congress further with 
a report highlighting progress but indicating that more 
improvements would be sought. 'White House Report to Congress' 
June 2 1992, US Department of State Dispatch; vol.3. no.23. 
June 8 1992 (United States Government Printing Office 1992). 
129 
MFN status. 115 The degree of progress the Chinese appeared to be 
making, the toughening of the Administration's approach to 
China, and changing tactics within Congress led to the 
unconditional renewal of China's MFN status in 1991 and 1992. 116 
From mid-1991 Sino-American relations, at least at the 
inter-governmental level, began to improve, and by late 1991 
the relationship had broadly recovered. In spite of the ban on 
high-level exchanges, official bilateral diplomacy had resumed 
across all areas with the exception of military exchanges. 
Trade had reached unprecedented levels (increasing the PRC' s 
trade surplus with the US), while figures for features such as 
academic and cultural exchanges and tourism had returned to 
their pre-Tiananmen numbers. 117 The post-Tiananmen bilateral 
crisis had injected a greater sense of pragmatism into the 
relationship and, as Steven Levine observed, it led to 
" ... stripping away the accumulated layers of hopes and fears on 
both sides and paring excessive calculations of what each side 
can do for or to the other." 118 By September 1992, most of the 
115 Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power; op cit p. 253 and 
Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit p.279. 
116 A group of Senators led by Democrat Max Baucus were 
reluctant to condition MFN but concerned about PRC conduct. 
Correspondence with the White Hou'se shortly before the 1991 
Senate vote on Congressional bill to condition MFN proved vital 
to the Senate subsequently upholding the President's vetoes of 
MFN conditionality. Bush responded to the Senators' concerns, 
by justifying his tougher stance, and promising further 
pressure on Beijing, and thus persuaded this group to support 
MFN renewal. Ibid (Harding) pp.282-283. One Congressional 
staffer interprets this interaction as "conditionality by non-
legislative means." Interview with James McCormick, former 
professional staff on House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, November 7 1997, Washington D.C. 
117 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit p.289. 
118 Steven I Levine, 'China and America: 
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The Resilient 
sanctions imposed after Tiananmen were no longer operative, 
with the exception of the ban on military sales and exchanges. 
Indeed, Washington and Beijing were able to conduct tough but 
realistic dialogue across all the major issues of interest 
including, to a degree, human rights. 119 
Nevertheless, this did not mean that engagement with the 
PRC and the Sino-American relationship had managed to overcome 
the shock of Tiananmen. Governmental and non-governmental China 
observers were sceptical of Chinese assurances of responsible 
behaviour, and they urged constant vigilance on compliance with 
agreements. 120 Chinese conduct in the areas of non-
proliferation, intellectual copyright, trade barriers and 
trans-shipping remained particular targets of US concern. The 
revival of the PRC economy in 1992 did serve US economic and 
business interests, and Beijing's growing willingness to 
participate in international institutions such as the UN and 
GATT, and international regimes such as the NPT gratified 
America's long-term desire to see a more internationally 
interdependent China. However, Tiananmen had transformed the 
image of China in the eyes of US policy-makers and observers. 
Accordingly, while progress was welcomed, the Administration 
continued to press Beij ing on issues such as trade access, 
intellectual property, adherence to arms control and anti-
proliferation, and human rights. 
Relationship'; Current History; vol. 91 no. 566 September 1992 
p.243. 
119 Ibid p.241. 
120 Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power; op cit p.254. 
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Conclusion 
The Bush Administration entered office intent on keeping its 
eye on the long-term development of Sino-American relations. To 
a degree, and in spite of considerable bilateral, international 
and domestic challenges, it adhered to this idea. By the autumn 
of 1992, the bilateral and wider significance of US-PRC 
relations in the areas of trade, investment, economic 
development, the environment, arms control and proliferation, 
and political and human rights had grown. Indeed the revival 
after Tiananmen of US non-governmental interests in China, 
predominated by economic interests but including academic and 
cultural exchanges and tourism, had facilitated the 
consolidation of a relationship grounded in bilateral 
interests. Further Bush's determination of the strategic 
importance of China had been enhanced by Beijing's role in the 
Gulf Conflict, and Beijing's increasingly constructive role in 
issues such as Cambodia and the Korean Peninsula, arms control 
and anti-proliferation. 
The Tiananmen Square massacre led to two important 
developments in the strategy of US engagement with the PRC. 
Firstly it highlighted the realities and the challenges 
inherent in a relationship between two major powers with 
societal and cultural significantly different political, 
systems. Although policy-makers had become increasingly 
concerned with certain aspects of Beijing's behaviour prior to 
June 1989, on the issue of proliferation for example, Tiananmen 
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banished the overall feeling of optimism and expectation that 
had characterised US China policy. The Bush Administration had 
been left with a choice; either it could have severely 
curtailed the Sino-American relationship, in protest at the 
violent and repressive violation of human rights and in the 
hope that Beijing would regret its actions, or it could retain 
engagement with China. The Bush Administration had concluded 
that America's broad range of interests in China would be 
better served through engagement rather than isolation. Thus at 
least at the level of government, the Administration oversaw 
the continued evolution of the practical rationale for 
engagement with the PRC from one founded on a geo-strategic, 
Cold War platform, to one necessitated by mutual bilateral 
interests. 
This conclusion rested upon the second ramification for US 
engagement with China. Tiananmen, and the domestic protest in 
provoked, consolidated the Administration's belief that US 
engagement stimulated economic, societal and political reform 
in the PRC. In other words, it entrenched the philosophical 
rationale for engagement that had evolved relatively 
unchallenged in the latter years of the Reagan Administration. 
In resisting Congressional attempts to condition or revoke 
China's MFN status, the Administration had insisted that doing 
so would only hurt those Chinese citizens and officials whose 
activities, directly or indirectly, nourished reform. On a 
wider front it would also hurt entities such as Hong Kong and 
Taiwan that not only invested heavily in China but provided 
role models for the future of the mainland Chinese people. This 
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contention became the centrepiece of the argument to retain 
China 1 s MFN status. Perhaps of deeper significance was the 
entrenchment of the idea that bilateral disputes were better 
resolved through dialogue than through confrontation and 
isolation. Reassessments of the means and ends of US interests 
in the wake of Tiananmen, and particularly from 1990-1991 when 
a tougher stance was deemed necessary, consolidated this 
purpose of engagement. Beij ing' s decision to respond to. the 
Bush Administration's 'tough love' appeared to vindicate this 
rationale. 
However this does not tell the whole story. Bush was 
perhaps 'fortunate' in that the Gulf Conflict quelled domestic 
opposition to China and the Administration's China policy. It 
also helped him justify engagement on the basis of China 1 s 
importance to US strategic interests. Further it allowed the 
President to define his post-Cold War strategic vision of the 
'New World Order'. However, given the uncertainty as to China's 
economic, political and military future, and suspicions 
regarding its role in proliferation and the possibility of 
military adventurism in the region, Bush's China policy did not 
fit well with his vision for a 'New World Order'. 121 Indeed it 
initially provoked concerns within Beijing, which regarded the 
vision as a design for American hegemonism. A reassessment 
convinced China's leaders that was in fact an indication of 
America's decline as a major power, and thus inspired 
hardliners in particular to resist US pressure for reform even 
121 Interview with Shirley Kan, Analyst in Foreign Affairs, 
Congressional Research Service, November 5 1997, Washington 
D.C. 
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more vehemently. 122 Bush's at tempt to reconcile China policy 
with his wider strategic vision by emphasising China's regional 
and gee-strategic importance convinced many domestic observers 
that he was a Cold War president, incapable of defending issues 
such as human rights as a US foreign policy interest. 
Furthermore, the Bush Administration's decision to adopt 
a tougher stance with Beijing had as much if not more to do 
with the domestic political pressure as it did reevaluations of 
the bilateral relationship. Indeed, many domestic critics 
denounced the President's pursuit of engagement, however 
'tough'. Certainly, America could not ignore China's economic 
strength and potential, especially when this had implications 
for its political and military power. However critics, like 
Wins ton Lord, argued that Bush's concessionary interpretation 
of engagement served only to consolidate the current regime's 
hold on power. Indeed, the elder power brokers of the CCP 
believed that economic growth and success would satisfy the 
expectations and wants of its citizens, and thus consolidate 
their grip on political leadership. 123 
Bush's tougher stance with the PRC through 1991-1992 did 
not convince critics of the efficacy of engagement. Rather it 
demonstrated the potential of linkage. The fact that the PRC 
122 See for example Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; 
p.274 and Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power; op cit pp.249-
250. 
123 Steven Levine, 'China and America'; op cit p.244. One 
China analyst argues that Chinese citizens only recognise the 
leadership's consent to the economic development occurring in 
the PRC, they do not credit Beijing with responsibility for it. 
Interview with Jim Robb, former China specialist at the Asia 
Business Centre, US Department of Commerce, November 4 1997, 
Washington D.C. 
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only responded to the threat of harsher sanctions, and in 
particular to the possibility that Congress might revoke its 
MFN status convinced many, especially on the Hill, that US 
interests would be more effectively pursued through a policy of 
linkage, such as conditional MFN. 124 While China had issued its 
own threats to break-off trading relations with the US, to the 
concern of some business communities in America, reports from 
China suggested that Beij ing feared the economic costs of a 
revocation of MFN. 125 While critics of the Administration 
regarded Chinese concessions in the face of Bush's tougher 
stance to be cynical gestures, they believed that a strong and 
considered strategy of linkage, such as conditional MFN, would 
generate genuine progress. To some this appeared a particularly 
appealing argument 1n the context of the reforms in the 
reforming Soviet sphere. Although the Administration had 
resisted Congressional attempts to introduce linkage through 
legislation, it had not won the domestic China policy debate in 
favour of engagement. This was in spite of the fact that 
America's closest allies were anxious to expand their links, 
especially economically, with the PRC. However America's 
domestic political environment expected US foreign policy to 
reflect and project US ideals such as human rights and 
democracy, and critics were not convinced that the Bush 
124 Groups outside Congress such as Human Rights 
Asia, and certain Chinese student organisations in 
campaigned for linkage. 
Watch: 
the US 
125 For example see Ding Xinghao, ~Managing Sino-American 
Relations in a Changing World'; Asian Survey vol.31 no.12 
December 1991. 
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Administration's engagement strategy met this criteria. 126 
Bush insisted that it was the president's responsibility 
and indeed it was strategically necessary for him to· retain 
close control on the China policy-making process. The fact that 
he claimed a privileged knowledge of China further justified 
this view in the President's eyes. However, this elitist 
approach angered many members of Congress, including many 
Republicans, who believed that they had a legitimate role to 
play in the formulation of foreign policy. As will be explained 
in the following chapter, this basic tension between the White 
House and Congress fuelled the flames of partisan politics, 
with the result that Democrats used China policy as a political 
tool with which to undermine the Republican President. 
The Bush Administration's adherence to broad engagement 
with the PRC helped to salvage the established framework of 
Sino-American ties in the wake of Tiananmen. By the end of its 
term of office, basic governmental and non-governmental 
bilateral ties had largely recovered. However, the Bush 
Administration had lost a great deal of domestic credibility 
and legitimacy for US China policy. As Steven Levine observes, 
Bush worked hard to restore the substance of US-PRC relations, 
but neglected to respond to the change in the domestic mood 
towards China policy after Tiananmen. 127 The result was the 
breakdown in the traditional bipartisan consensus on China, and 
126 For example 
Dominate America's 
Wendell L. Willkie 
American Interests; 
pp.133-137. 
see Wendell L. Willkie II, ~Why Does MFN 
China Policy? 1 ; in James R. Lilley and 
II (eds), Beyond MFN: Trade with China and 
The AEI Press (Washington D.C., 1994) 
127 Steven Levine, ~China and America 1 ; op cit p. 243. 
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a severe weakening of US strategy of engagement with the PRC. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND BUSH'S CHINA POLICY: 
THE COLLAPSE OF CONSENSUS AND THE POLITICISATION OF POLICY 
Towards the end of the 1980s the strategy of expanding 
bilateral relations with the PRC enjoyed strong domestic 
legitimacy. Vibrant non-governmental interests such as trade 
and investment, cultural and academic exchanges, scientific and 
technological exchanges and tourism were flourishing, and in 
general the American public were fascinated and optimistic 
about US-PRC relations. 
However, the domestic seeds of protest regarding China and 
US China policy had already been sown. A number of reasons may 
be given for this. Firstly the growing participation of 
domestic actors in the PRC' s economic, political and societal 
development heightened awareness of the problems of dealing 
with China, and prompted these actors to demand governmental 
pursuit of their complaints and protection of their interests. 
Secondly, the dissemination of information on China by the 
media and interest groups provoked growing domestic opposition 
to China's conduct in areas such as human rights, Tibetan 
rights, and arms proliferation. Such opposition was especially 
prevalent within Congress. 1 Thirdly, the decline of Cold War 
tensions had stirred a debate on the definition of America's 
1 Robert s. Ross, 'National Security, 
Domestic Politics', Chapter Ten in Kenneth 
Lieber and Donald Rothchild (eds), Eagle 
American Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold 
Collins (New York, 1992) pp.286-287. 
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Human Rights and 
A. Oye, Robert J. 
in a New World: 
War Era; Harper 
post-Cold War foreign policy interests. The opinion that these 
core interests now included human rights, democracy and the 
pursuit of US economic concerns thus had strong implications 
for China policy-making premised on a bilateral rather than a 
gee-strategic rationale. Fourthly and correlatively, the 
decline in Cold War tensions eroded the president's prerogative 
in foreign policy-making. In other words, with the need to 
confront the Soviet Union diminishing, and in the absence of 
any other clear and significant threat to US security, domestic 
actors, and in particular Congress, felt that they had a 
greater role to play in foreign policy-making. 2 
Therefore although the Bush Administration's initial 
platform for continuity and engagement with China drew little 
significant criticism, the Tiananmen Square massacre of June 
3/4 1989 destroyed any sense of domestic consensus on the 
issue. Domestic attitudes towards China and US China policy 
underwent a pivotal mood change, especially as the massacre was 
seen in the context of the largely peaceful reform processes 
occurring in the Soviet Union and East and Central Europe. For 
example, media reporting on the PRC in the wake of Tiananmen 
focused primarily on negative aspects of Chinese conduct and 
US-PRC relations. 3 This contributed to the fact that the China 
debate became dominated by disputes and specific bilateral 
2 This reflected the dissolving distinction between 'high' 
policy such as geo-military strategy and 'low' policy such as 
economics in the definition of America's post-Cold War foreign 
policy priorities. ~ee Robert G. ~utter, 'Sino-American 
Relations in Advers~ty'; Current H~story; vol. 89 no. 548 
September 1990 p.272. 
3 see for example Crisis in China: Prospects for US Policy; 
Conference Report of the Thirtieth Strategy for Peace, US 
Foreign Policy Conference 1989, The Stanley Foundation p.9. 
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tensions to the detriment of a long-term perspective of Sino-
American relations. Television coverage of the repression of 
June 3/4 and subsequent media reporting shattered the general 
public's fascination with China, who interpreted Tiananmen as 
the suppression of US values. 4 However, the general public 
proved to have little influence on the domestic China policy 
debate and on policy-making through 1989-1992. 5 
The same can not be said of Congress. Tiananmen and· the 
subsequent style and substance of the Bush Administration's 
China policy led to the collapse of the bipartisan consensus on 
relations with China that had largely prevailed since the mid-
late 1960s. This in turn served to politically delegitimise 
Bush's China policy to a great extent, and placed Sino-American 
relations under enormous pressure. Four main motivations 
explain Congressional opposition to China and the 
Adminstration's China policy. Firstly members of Congress 
became extremely frustrated with China's lack of contrition and 
lack of progress following Tiananmen. Consequently many members 
of Congress, of both parties and especially in the House, 
became genuinely frustrated by Bush's strategy of conciliatory 
engagement with the PRC. Thirdly, Bush's elitist style, his 
• As Karlyn Bowman notes, in general the American public 
only become aware of foreign policy issues when they hit the 
headlines. Given the extent and nature of the media's coverage 
of the spring protest movement and the Tiananmen Square 
massacre, it is not surprising that it provoked such domestic 
hostility to the PRC. Karlyn H. Bowman, 'Public Attitudes 
Towards the People's Republic of China'; in James R. Lilley and 
Wendell L. Willkie (eds), Beyond MFN: Trade with China and 
American Interests; The AEI Press (Washington D.C., 1994) 
Appendix p .146. 
5 Richard Bush, The Evolution of US Policy Toward China 
Under the clinton Administration; unpublished speech to Chinese 
foreign policy community, Beijing, December 1993 p.S. 
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claim to possess a privileged knowledge of China and his 
resistance to Congressional attempts to influence US China 
policy aggravated members, again of both parties. Fourthly 
Bush's China policy became a highly partisan issue. After three 
terms of Republican presidents, Democrats were determined to 
take the White House in the 1992 presidential election. China 
policy became an Achilles heel for a President with high 
approval ratings and trusted on foreign affairs, especially in 
the wake of the Gulf Conflict. Democrats, particularly in the 
House, were resolute in exploiting this weakness, and the 
Clinton election campaign in 1992-1993 were quick to pursue 
their lead on this issue. 6 
BUSH'S CHINA POLICY AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
PRIOR TO TIANANMEN 
Bush's invitation of Fang Lizhi and other Chinese dissidents to 
a US Embassy banquet during his presidential visit to China, 
February 1989, was in part a message to his domestic audience. 
He had hoped to address concerns for China's poor human rights 
record that had arisen during the latter stages of the Reagan 
Administration. While the general public paid little attention 
to the ensuing diplomatic fracas, sections of informed opinion 
were critical. The press in particular accused Bush of failing 
to admonish the Chinese authorities for preventing Fang 
attending the banquet, and deprecated the President's decision 
not to raise the issue of human rights in his meetings with 
6 The development of Cl in ton's stance on China during the 
election is the subject of chapter four. 
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Chinese leaders. 7 Bush responded to criticisms by asserting that 
he was committed to human rights but would pursue the issue 
through private rather than public diplomacy. a However this 
episode aroused domestic suspicions regarding Bush's dedication 
to human rights, and this was revealed in assessments of the 
President's response to the spring 1989 protest movement in the 
PRC. 
As US public attention to and empathy with the protesters 
grew, the press began to question the Administration's cautious 
response to the rising tensions in the PRC. Critics in the 
media accused Bush of extending preferential and conciliatory 
treatment to the Chinese leadership. 9 Congress too began to 
voice its concern at the Administration's conservative 
response, and members such as Representative Stephen Solarz, 
the Democratic chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asian and 
Pacific Affairs urged a stronger demonstration of support for 
the protesters. 10 Thus the seeds of domestic dissatisfaction 
with the Bush Administration's China policy were established 
7 Robert s. Ross, ''National Security, Human 
Domestic Politics'; op cit p.292 and Robert 
'Tiananmen's Lingering Fallout on Sino-American 
Current History vol.90 no.557 September 1991 p.248. 
Rights and 
G. Sutter, 
Relations'; 
a See The President's News Conference March 7, 1989, Public 
Papers of the Presidents of the United Stat~s-George Bush 1~89; 
Book I, January 20 to June 30, 1989, Wash1ngton D.C. (Unlted 
States Government Printing Office, 1990) p.179. 
9 see Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, 'Bush's Beijing 
caution'; Washington Post May 24 1989 p.A25 and Question and 
Answer session May 5 1989, Public Papers of the Presidents of 
the United States-George Bush 1989; Book I op cit p.519. See 
also Harry Harding, A Fragil~ Relation.ship: The U?i ted States 
and China Since 1972; Brook1ngs Inst1tute (Wash1ngton D.C., 
1992) p.230 and Robert S. Ross, 'National Security, Human 
Rights and Domestic Politics'; op cit p.294. 
10 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit p.230. 
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prior to June 1989. 
TIANANMEN AND GROWING DOMESTIC 
ADMINISTRATION'S CHINA POLICY 
FRUSTRATION WITH THE 
The American public, which had closely followed media coverage 
of the spring protest movement, reacted with abhorrence to the 
pictures of the Tiananmen Square massacre June 3/4 1989. News 
reports of the demonstrations had given the heavily misleading 
impression that their purpose was to press for a US-style 
democratic system. 11 Indeed in the late 1980s the American 
public had come to believe that China's economic development 
had been modelled on the US capitalist system, as hinted by 
Deng Xiaoping. Further, the Reagan and Bush Administrations' 
espousal of us economic engagement with the PRC had suggested 
that political reform would be inevitable within China, and 
given America's participation in China's development, the US 
would provide a model for this too. 12 The fact that Tiananmen 
occurred against the backdrop of Soviet and East European 
reform only served to sharpen American dismay. Thus Tiananmen 
capsized the public mood on China from fascination and optimism 
to malevolence and fear. 13 
However, as Harding notes, while there was a consensus of 
revulsion at Tiananmen, the public were evenly split as to the 
11 Interview with Stephen Yates, November 5 1997, Heritage 
Foundation, Washington D.C. 
12 see steven Levine, 'China and America: The Resilient 
Relationship'; Current History vol. 91 no. 566 p. 241. 
13 Robert G. Sutter, 'Sino-American Relations in Adversity'; 
op cit p.272 and Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit 
pp.242-243. 
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correct course for US China policy. One body of opinion wanted 
the Administration to make a stand on the issue of human rights 
and issue a very tough response. The other body concurred with 
Bush on the need to maintain good relations with the PRC. 14 As 
stated above, the press reflected this mood swing, insisting 
upon a resolute US reaction to Tiananmen. This wave of opinion 
was informed by vocal human rights groups who had been given 
the platform to make their case. 15 
Public opinion and the press were relatively satisfied 
with the Bush Administration's first wave of sanctions, and 
welcomed the second. Members of Congress, however, were more 
agitated. The Administration managed to mollify Congressional 
anger with the sanctions imposed on June 5, and requested their 
patience. Although several members such as Senator George 
Mitchell were vocal in demanding further sanctions, Congress in 
general initially accepted the President's voting 
unanimously to endorse the President's action. 16 Nevertheless as 
Chinese repression continued, many members of Congress quickly 
lost their patience and moved to take a tougher lead of their 
own. 17 
In addition to criticising the Administration for its 
passivity in the face of PRC recalcitrance, members began to 
14 Ibid (Harding) p.243. 
15 Ibid pp.243-244. 
16 Robert s. Ross, 'National Security, Human Rights and 
Domestic Politics' i op cit p.294. 
1 7 As well as publicly warning against an over-emotional 
response to Tiananmen, the President met with Senators in an 
attempt to persuade of China's strategic . impo~tance and the 
efficacy of his policy o~ eng~gement _and qu~et d~plomacy. Harry 
Harding, A Fragile Relat~onsh~Pi op Clt p.227. 
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introduce legislation before the end of June. Measures proposed 
by conservative republicans and liberal democrats were finally 
condensed into one legislative amendment to the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, having passed both the House and 
the Senate. In effect, the measures placed the Administration's 
sanctions into law, and added several other sanctions relating 
to lending and finance. 18 However, the amendment did not adopt 
proposals to revoke China's MFN status, partly for fear of 
threatening the strong degree of consensus that had emerged in 
Congress in June. 19 
This legislation represented the first serious 
Congressional challenge to the Bush Administration's response 
to Tiananmen. Bush protested that it severely restricted his 
flexibility in the management of China policy. Nevertheless he 
accepted the legislation once he had negotiated wider grounds 
to waiver the sanctions. Yet despite the President's adamance 
that he had the responsibility and the insight to control 
policy toward China, the second wave of sanctions imposed by 
the Administration on June 30 1989 were to a significant degree 
a response to growing Congressional pressure, backed by the 
press, human rights organisations, public opinion and 
organisations representing Chinese scholars studying in the 
18 Ibid pp.232-233, and Kerry Dumbaugh, China and Congress 
in 1992; Report for Congress 93-894 F, Congressional Research 
Service, Library of Congress, October 12 1993 p.2. 
19 The legislation focused upon human rights, demanding 
progress in the areas such as the lifting of martial law, an 
end to executions, political repression and the detention of 
political detainees, an end to the jamming of Voice of America 
broadcasts, and greater obser~ance of.human rights, throughout 
the PRC including Tibet. Ib1d (Hard1ng) pp.232-233. Many of 
these measures became features of Congressional action on China 
policy over the next five or more years. 
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Us. 20 It l. s bl nota e that in consenting to calls from Congress to 
withdraw high-level diplomatic relations, the Administration 
removed the central plank to its policy of engagement with 
Beijing. 
Despite these domestic concessions, Congress grew 
increasingly frustrated and impatient through the autumn of 
1989 for three main reasons. Firstly, Beijing had remained 
resolute and unapologetic in the face of US and worldwide 
criticism. Secondly the Bush Administration's strategy of 
pursuing concessions in the hope of securing Chinese 
reciprocation not only seemed to be failing, but to many 
appeared weak and ingratiating. Thirdly, members of Congress 
were enraged at what they considered attempts by the President 
to exclude them from the China policy-making process. Bush 
maintained his argument that China policy required a flexible, 
non-legislative approach. Moreover, he refused to consult 
Congress, and made few attempts of any distinction to 
articulate his strategy to the domestic political environment 
whilst continuing to profess his privileged knowledge of China. 
Thus the substance, style and practice of the Bush 
Administration's response to Tiananmen drew criticism from all 
quarters of the political spectrum. Those on the left 
reproached Bush for inadequately standing up for human rights 
in China, and therefore being guilty of double standards in his 
20 In his testimony to the Senate Relations Committee on 
June 20, Secretary of State Baker attempted to pacify 
Congressional criticism by announcing that he had recommended 
further sanctions (implemented ten days later) . Baker's 
recommendations bore similarities to proposals brought before 
congress. Robert S. Ross, . 'National Security, Human Rig~ts and 
Domestic Politics' i op clt pp.294-295 and Harry Hardlng, A 
Fragile Relationship; op cit pp.231-232 and p.233. 
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policies towards China and the reforming Soviet sphere. 21 Right-
wing conservatives charged that China should not have been 
trusted anyway. 22 Republicans as well as Democrats were 
particularly angry at the Administration's elitist approach to 
policy-making. 23 For example Republican Toby Roth was scathing 
of the lack of communication from the State Department. 24 
Representations from former President Nixon on the strategic 
and economic long-term importance of the Sino-American 
relationship, and the wisdom of the Administration's policy had 
minimal effect. 25 The clear problem for the Bush 
Administration's strategy of concessions and quiet diplomacy 
was that domestic compliance with his China policy would 
continue to disintegrate in the absence of reciprocation and 
progress from the PRC. 
THE COLLAPSE OF CONSENSUS AND THE RISE OF PARTISANSHIP 
21 Interestingly, this criticism of the Administration is 
held by Republican former Ambassador to China Winston Lord. 
Interview with Ambassador Winston Lord, November 7 1997, New 
York. 
22 William McGurn, 'The United States and China: Sanctioning 
Tiananmen Square'; in G. Hicks, The Broken Mirror: China After 
Tiananmen; Longman (London, 1990) p.233. 
23 Interview with Shirley Kan, Analyst 
Congressional Research Service, November 
D.C. 
in Foreign Affairs, 
5 1997, Washington 
24 Robert S. Ross, 'National Security, Human Rights and 
Domestic Politics'; op cit p.298. 
25 Following a private visit to China, Nixon issued a report 
to a bipartisan group of Congressional leaders in the middle of 
November 1989. Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit 
p.251. 
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The President's veto of Representative Nancy Pelosi's Emergency 
Chinese Immigration Relief Act on November 30 1989 had a 
significant impact on Congress. 26 The bill had the overwhelming 
support of both Houses of Congress, and was backed by Chinese 
student organisations in the US and human rights interest 
groups. Bush's declaration that he would implement the 
provisions contained in the Act through Executive Order, 
included in the announcement of his veto, infuriated members of 
Congress, and in particular members of the Democratic party. 
Although the President was anxious not to promote further anti-
American antipathy in Beijing, his overwhelming reason for the 
veto was given as the need to maintain presidential 
flexibility. 27 As Kerry Dumbaugh observes, to many in Congress 
the veto illustrated Bush's determination to exclude the Hill 
from the China policy-making process, even when he had no real 
objections to the substance of their initiatives. 28 Indeed Harry 
Harding argues: "By vetoing the Pelosi bill, the president may 
have preserved goodwill with the Chinese, but he simultaneously 
lost much political capital at home. 29 
26 The bill allowed Chinese students 
in the US following the expiration 
therefore prevent them from being forced 
and scholars to remain 
of their visas, and 
to return to the PRC. 
27 
'Memorandum of Disapproval for the Bill Providing 
Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief' November 30 1989; Public 
Papers of the Presidents of the United States-George Bush 1989; 
Book II, July 1 to December 31, 1989, Washington D.C. (United 
States Government Printing Office, 1990) pp.1611-1612. See also 
'Statement on the Disapproval of the Bill Providing Emergency 
Chinese Immigration Relief'; ibid pp.1612-1613. 
28 Kerry Durnbaugh, China and Congress in 1992; op cit p.2. 
29 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit p.234. 
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Congress' attempt to overturn the veto in January 1990 
proved portentous. The vote in effect became a vote of no 
confidence on the Administration's China policy. The override 
received an overwhelming majority in the House, but following 
heavy White House lobbying, was narrowly defeated in the 
Senate. However, the vote established three important 
precedents for the subsequent battles over China policy between 
Bush and Congress over the next three years. Firstly it 
presaged the important role the Senate would play in sustaining 
presidential vetoes and keeping the major aspects of China 
policy largely in the President's hands. Secondly it marked the 
rise of partisan politics in the struggle over China policy, in 
that the Democrats were intent not only in passing the 
legislation but 1n inflicting a political defeat upon the 
President. 30 Therefore thirdly, and correlatively it established 
a pattern whereby the President would w1n the legislative 
battle, but lose the political war. 31 Bush, with his elitist 
style and self-proclaimed familiarity with the Chinese leaders, 
was seen to repel Congressional initiatives that appeared both 
to promote US values such as human rights and democracy, and 
convey the sense of outrage at repression in China felt by many 
Americans. 
The scene had been set for the showdown over the Chinese 
30 In fact partisan appeals to Republican Senators from 
White House lobbyists proved crucial to sustaining Bush's veto. 
Robert G. Sutter, 'Sino-American Relations in Adversity'; op 
cit p.272 and Robert S. Ross, 'National Security, Human Rights 
and Domestic Politics'; op cit p.303. 
31 Interview with Richard Bush, former professional staff, 
House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, October 29 
1989, Arlington, Virginia. 
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Immigration bill by the revelation of the secret Scowcroft 
mission to Beij ing in December the previous year. Although 
Scowcroft had raised the issue of human rights, Congress was 
irate at the tone and nature of the mission. The National 
Security Advisor's toast to the Chinese leadership drew 
accusations concerning Bush's disregard for human rights. 32 
Indeed cri tics argued that Bush had proved his contempt for 
domestic opinion on the issue. 33 Further Congress was incensed 
at Scowcroft's appeal to the Chinese that they overcome 
'negative forces' . This remark gave the impression that the 
Administration was siding with Beij ing, and blaming Congress 
for the crisis in Sino-American relations. 34 Bush also stood 
accused of deceit and duplicity, especially when details 
emerged of the Scowcroft-Eagleberger mission early in July. The 
Administration's attempt to distinguish between 'exchanges', 
which were subject to sanctions, and 'contacts', the word used 
to describe the missions, did little to assuage anger on the 
Hill. 35 Furthermore there was the implication that Bush had 
timed the December mission with the Congressional recess, to 
mitigate domestic criticism. 36 In this sense the dispatch of 
32 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit p. 257. 
33 Winston Lord suggested that the pursuit of 
would appear "callous" to the American public. 
'Misguided Mission' ; Washington Post December 
interview with Ambassador Winston Lord op cit. 
34 See for example ibid. 
such diplomacy 
Winston Lord, 
19 1989. Also 
35 Prior to the acknowledgement of the July mission, 
Secretary of State Baker had insisted that the December mission 
had been the only official visit since Tiananmen. Robert S. 
Ross, 'National Security, Human Rights and Domestic Politics'; 
op cit pp.301-302. 
36 Lord adds the suggestion that Bush was hoping for 
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Scowcroft in December was a decision predicated as much upon 
domestic politics as it was diplomacy. Thus whatever the merits 
of the missions in diplomatic bilateral terms, their handling 
by the Bush Administration proved fatal to the President's goal 
of minimising Congressional leverage on China policy-making. 37 
The Administration's attempts at justifying the secret 
missions and the conciliatory strategy pursued since June only 
served to incite Congress further. Bush highlighted the steps 
taken by Beij ing early in the new year, and again reiterated 
his knowledge of China and the need for presidential 
flexibility. 38 To Congress and in particular to Democrats, the 
Chinese had only provided cynical gestures in return for 
significant concessions from Washington. Critics of the 
Administration argued that Beij ing continued to commit grave 
violations of human rights, and the State Department annual 
human rights report appeared to justify their claims when it 
was published in February. 39 
reciprocal gestures from the Chinese before Congress reconvened 
in the new year. Winston Lord, 'Misguided Mission'; op cit. 
37 Interview with Stephen Yates, November 5 1997, Heritage 
Foundation, Washington D.C. 
38 The Chinese released a number of prisoners, lifted 
martial law, opened discussions on the Fulbright programme, and 
declared that it would no longer export missiles to the Middle 
East. See Robert S. Ross, 'National Security, Human Rights and 
Domestic Politics'; op cit p.302. See also Joint News 
Conference with President Mitterrand December 16 1989, Public 
Papers of the Presidents of the United States-George Bush 1989; 
Book II op cit p.1711 and Question and Answer Session at the 
Ann Dimer Dinner of the Business Council January 24 1990, 
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States-George 
Bush 1990; Book I, January 20 to June 30, 1990, Washington D.C. 
(United States Government Printing Office, 1991) pp.79-81. 
39 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit pp.257-258. 
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The press largely concurred with Congressional criticism 
of the Administration's China policy. Having voiced concern in 
the autumn of 1989 that Bush appeared to be conceding too much 
without progress, and lambasted the secret missions, the 
leading titles called for a significantly tougher stance in the 
new year. 40 The general public however were more split. While 
they were appalled at the events in Tiananmen, as many favoured 
the maintenance of good relations as did those who wanted a 
firmer stance on human rights. They were equally as split as to 
the wisdom of the secret missions. 41 
Although he promised to articulate better his China 
policies to his domestic audience, Bush faced significant 
Congressional pressure at the start of 1990. 42 The secret visits 
had shattered any remnants of consensus within Congress on 
China policy. Few members were willing to speak in favour of 
the Administration, and partisanship on China was now firmly 
established on the Hill. Further there were few prospects for 
substantial progress from Beijing. Attention turned to the need 
for the President to recommend a decision on China's Most-
Favoured-Nation (MFN) trading status before June 3 1990. 
40 Ibid p.256 and Robert G. Butter, 'Sino-American Relations 
in Adversity'; op cit pp.271-272. 
41 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit pp.293-294. 
Further, through 1990, those who held an unfavourable view of 
China only marginally outnumbered those with a favourable view. 
See Harry Harding, ibid Appendix A Table A-1 p.363 and Karlyn 
r-r. Bowman, 'Public Attitudes Toward the People's Republic of 
China'; op cit p.l47. 
'
2 President's New Conference January 25 1990, Public Papers 
of the Presidents of the United States-George Bush 1990; Book I 
op cit p.lOS. 
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MFN 19 9 0 AND THE GULF CONFLICT: 
THE DOMESTIC CHALLENGE TO BUSH'S CHINA POLICY RECEDES 
Genuine frustration with the Bush Administration's China 
policy, and the awareness amongst the Democrats that the 
President was politically vulnerable on the issue, meant that 
Congress was more confident and more determined to play a 
leading role in the policy-making process. 43 Having exercised, 
unsuccessfully, its legislative authority on US immigration 
laws with the Emigration Relief bill, Congress turned to the 
issue of MFN. •• 
As a result of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1974 
Trade Act, the president was required to certify that the state 
in question operated acceptable emigration controls before 
waiving prohibitions on normal (or 'MFN') trading status with 
the US. The amendment applied to communist states, and the 
waiver only lasted twelve months, meaning that the president 
had to make his recommendation before June 3 every year. 
Congress then had the option of overturning the president's 
recommendation by joint resolution within sixty days of the 
decision. Alternatively, Congress had the option of introducing 
legislation that would amend the 1974 Act, and therefore allow 
conditions to be placed on the annual renewal of MFN status. 45 
" See Crisis in China: Prospects for US Policy; The Stanley 
Foundation op cit p.lO. 
44 See Robert S. Ross, 'National Security, Human Rights and 
Domestic Politics'; op cit p.290-291. 
45 Congress had never acted upon the recommendation for the 
renewal of China's MFN status before. For a comprehensive 
explanation of China and MFN see Wayne M. Morrison, Vladimir N. 
Pregelj, Kerry Dumbaugh, and Jeanne Grimmett, Most-Favoured-
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To members of Congress dissatisfied with the Administration's 
performance in the spring of 1990, MFN offered a vehicle by 
which they could take the lead on China policy. 46 
While Bush himself was frustrated by the lack of PRC 
reciprocation, he persevered with his policy of concessions. 
The strategy simultaneously raised domestic expectations, 
because of Bush's insistence and determination that it would 
work, and dashed expectations because of the lack of progress. 47 
Further this was taking place in the context of the relatively 
peaceful reform in East and Central Europe and the Soviet 
Union. Growing domestic, and in particular Congressional 
agitation that pointed to a potentially costly political battle 
over MFN later in the spring, persuaded Bush to adopt a tougher 
stance from March. 
In addition to offering no new concessions, and stiffening 
his rhetoric regarding the PRC, the Administration implied that 
it would be unwilling to fight Congress to retain China's MFN 
status without clear progress from Beijing. 48 This tactic paid 
Nation Status and China: History, Current Law, Economic and 
Political Considerations, and Alternative Approaches; Report 
for Congress 96-923 E, Congressional Research Service, Library 
of Congress, November 19 1996. 
46 Richard Bush explains that this is because MFN provided 
an annual procedurally convenient route for Congress to pursue. 
Richard Bush, The Evolution of US Policy Toward China Under the 
Clinton Administration; op cit p.4. 
47 Robert S. Ross, 'National Security, Human Rights and 
Domestic Politics'; op cit 303. 
48 See Robert S. Ross, 'National Security, Human Rights and 
Domestic Politics'; op cit pp.304-305. Bush retained a strong 
grip on China policy within the Administration at this time, 
ensuring for example that State Department officials remained 
silent on the issue of MFN. Robert G. Sutter, 'Tiananmen's 
Lingering Fallout'; op cit p.247. 
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off for the President in two ways. Firstly, it prompted Beijing 
to make gestures such as releasing a number of political 
detainees, and permitting Fang Lizhi to leave Beijing for 
Britain. More significantly perhaps, Bush's stance on MFN 
persuaded Beijing to play the political game in Washington. 
Thus the Chinese announced major deals with Boeing, announced 
its decision to import a large delivery of US wheat, and went 
on a diplomatic offensive designed to remind the US business 
community of the costs of MFN revocation to their own economic 
interests. 49 
The second advantage of the Administration's tactics 
concerned the domestic debate on MFN. By indicating his 
unwillingness to expend political capital on a fight with those 
in Congress wanting to revoke or condition China's status, Bush 
impelled domestic advocates of unconditional renewal into 
taking on the fight themselves. While these advocates believed 
that they had the ultimate support of the Administration, they 
also realised that China's MFN status was seriously under 
threat for the first time. Therefore actors previously fearful 
of adopting public positions that appeared to support the PRC 
regime spoke out in favour of MFN renewal. Representatives of 
the US business community with interests in China led the 
campaign, supported in particular by representatives of the 
Hong Kong authorities and business communities. 50 However, they 
were joined by certain Chinese student groups in the US, 
revealing for the first time a profound split in this 
49 Ibid (Ross) pp.305-306. 
50 Richard Bush, 'The Evolution of US Policy Toward China 
Under the Clinton Administration'; op cit p.S. 
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community's views on US China policy. 51 A symbol of the success 
of the pro-MFN lobby came in the fact that the leading press 
titles such as the New York Times and Washington Post backed 
their .arguments. 52 Spurred on by the tactics employed by 
Beijing, the lobby echoed the arguments used by the President. 
Principally, and in an attempt to retake the moral high ground, 
they argued that the conditioning or revocation of MFN would 
hurt those citizens of China America was intending to 
encourage. However they were also quick to point out the 
economic costs (and the boost to competitors) such action would 
inflict on US and Hong Kong business interests. 53 
Strong evidence of Beijing's continued violation of human 
rights throughout the spring of 1990, and the perceived policy 
and political vulnerabilities of the Administrations' current 
China strategy inspired advocates of MFN conditionality and 
revocation. Democrats led the fight within Congress, while in 
the wider public arena they were supported by human rights 
organisations such as Human Rights Watch:Asia and Amnesty 
International, certain China experts and opinion leaders, and 
Chinese student bodies. 54 Further, growing frustration with the 
51 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit pp.266-267. 
Bush highlighted this latter fact in his defence of his 
decision to renew MFN. See for example The President's News 
Conference May 24 1990, Public Papers of the Presidents of the 
United States-George Bush 1990; Book I op cit p.707. 
52 Robert S. Ross, 'National Security, Human Rights and 
Domestic Politics'; op cit p.306. 
53 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit pp.266-267. 
54 Previous high-profile champions of engagement such as 
Zbigniew Brzezinski and Winston Lord added their significant 
support to those favouring conditions or outright revocation. 
See ibid p. 292, and Winston Lord, 'Bush's Second Chance on 
China'; New York Times; May 9 1990 p.A31. 
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problems of conducting business in China persuaded some members 
of the business community to support action on China's MFN 
status. 55 Deciding not to consider a relatively moderate bill 
introduced by Representative Dan Pease (D-Ohio), .Congress 
passed Representative Pelosi's stringent bill to condition 
China's MFN status by a veto-proof vote of 384-30 on October 18 
1990. Pelosi's bill established strong precedents for 
subsequent attempts by Congress to act upon China's MFN status. 
Firstly, it embodied a wide range of predominantly human rights 
related criteria by which Chinese progress could be assessed. 
This reflected the need to incorporate the many and varied 
concerns of a large number of members of Congress in an effort 
to maximise the support for the bill. Secondly, it required the 
President to certify that Beijing had made 'overall significant 
progress' in the criteria stipulated. Thus the President would 
be required by legislation to prove that China's conduct was 
acceptable in many more areas than simply emigration before he 
could recommend MFN renewal. However, the imprecise definition 
of 'overall significan~ progress', a phrase restated in 
subsequent legislation to condition MFN, appeared to allow the 
president room for manoeuvre when interpreting China's 
progress. 56 
Despite continuing unease at China's human rights conduct, 
and frustration with the achievement of the Administration's 
China policy, the Democrats were unable to organise a challenge 
55 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit p.392. 
56 Congress also voted to disapprove Bush's renewal of 
China's 1990 MFN status, but the size of the majority was 
insufficient to override the President's veto. Ibid pp.267-269 
and Kerry Dumbaugh, China and Congress in 1992; op cit p.3. 
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to Bush's renewal of MFN before Congress went into recess in 
late October. 57 The limited concessions and lobbying efforts of 
the PRC, and campaigns led by the business community had 
persuaded enough members of Congress, Democratic and 
Republican, that the conditioning or revocation of China's 
trading status was too severe a measure at that time. 58 However, 
the Hill was also influenced by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 
early August. The need to secure Beijing's acquiescence to the 
American-led response executed through the United Nations, and 
the domestic popularity of that response made a challenge to 
the President over MFN appear both strategically and 
politically unwise. 59 Indeed the Gulf conflict dominated US 
attention until the spring of 1991, paralysing the domestic 
challenge to the Administration's China policy. Ironically, 
however, the Gulf conflict actually served to undermine the 
President on China. Many Democrats became convinced that Bush's 
vulnerability on China policy could be exploited to undermine 
the domestic popularity he gleaned from his handling of the 
crisis. 60 
57 Thus Congress adjourned before the Senate had time to 
vote on Pelosi's bill (HR 4939}. Ibid (Dumbaugh}. 
58 Robert S. Ross, 'National Security, Human Rights and 
Domestic Politics'; op cit p.306. 
59 The American general public's divisions and ambiguity on 
China was of little direct political benefit to Congressional 
critics of the Administration's China policy, while Bush 
attracted strong approval ratings due to his handling of the 
Gulf crisis. 
6
° Kerry Dumbaugh argues that given the respect Bush 
commanded in the conduct of foreign policy following the Gulf 
conflict, it was inevitable that Democrats would look for a 
oolitical 'achilles heel'. China policy was the most obvious 
and promising option. Interview with Kerry Dumbaugh, Specialist 
in Asian Affairs, November 5 1997, Congressional Research 
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BUSH FIGHTS TO RETAIN CONTROL OF CHINA POLICY, 1991 
While the domestic debate on China policy had become 
considerably more partisan by the spring of 1991, the battle 
over that year's renewal of MFN status had wider motives. The 
President referred to China's cooperation and acquiescence 
during the Gulf crisis to make the case for China's geo-
strategic and geo-political importance, and the need to avoid 
the isolation of Beij ing. 61 However, Congressional and wider 
concern persisted on the issue of human rights in China, and in 
fact expanded to include Beijing's conduct in other bilateral, 
regional and global issues. 
Beijing had recommenced programmes of economic reform and 
liberalization (though at a more cautious rate), yet there had 
been no essential progress in China's political climate. For 
example, the authorities continued to arrest and sentence 
political detainees while simultaneously releasing prisoners in 
concessionary gestures to the US. 62 In other words, to many 
Service, Washington D.C. 
61 For example see The President's News Conference April 29 
1991, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States-
George Bush 1991; Book I, January 20 to June 30, 1991, 
Washington D.C. (United States Government Printing Office, 
1992) p.442. 
62 See for example the testimony of Holly J. Burkhalter of 
Asia Watch before a Joint Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, May 29 1991. Most-Favoured-Nation Status for the 
People's Republic of China; Joint Hearing before the 
Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations; 
Asian and Pacific Affairs; and International Economic Policy 
and Trade, of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 
Representatives, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, May 29 1991, 
Washington D.C. (United States Government Printing Office, 
1992) pp.124-143. 
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members of Congress and human rights-focused organizations, the 
Administration's post-Tiananmen strategy had secured virtually 
no progress in Beij ing' s human rights conduct. Concerns were 
also raised regarding the PRC's role in the sale and 
proliferation of nuclear and conventional technology, in 
contravention of Chinese assurances given to NSA Scowcroft in 
December 1989. 63 Evidence suggested that Beij ing had supplied 
chemical weapons to Iraq, military support to the Khmer Rouge, 
and helped Algeria to build a nuclear reactor. 64 The third major 
issue of concern in the spring of 1991 was bilateral trade. 
Figures revealed that China's surplus with the US had risen by 
approximately sixty per cent over one year to $10.4 billion in 
1990. Although economic recession with the US had contributed 
to the imbalance, the US accused Beij ing of restricting and 
complicating access to Chinese markets. 65 In addition, officials 
continued to cite unacceptable PRC conduct in the areas of 
intellectual property protection and transhipment of exports. 66 
Growing concerns for proliferation and trade issues in 
addition to human rights encouraged members of Congress to 
63 The Gulf conflict had in fact highlighted China's 
proliferation of weaponry to the Middle East and Pakistan. 
Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit p.277. 
64 Ibid and Robert G. Sutter, 'Tiananmen's Lingering 
Fallout'; op cit p.249. See also Shirley A. Kan, Chinese 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Background and 
Analysis; Report for Congress 96-767 F, Congressional Research 
Service, Library of Congress, September 13 1996. 
65 For example see Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, 1991 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign 
Trade Barriers; United States Government Printing Office 
(Washington D.C., 1991) pp.43-52. 
66 Robert G. Sutter, 'Tiananmen's Lingering Fallout'; op cit 
p.249. 
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investigate other areas of unacceptable Chinese behaviour. 
Consequently, other human rights issues were appended to the 
China policy debate, such as the export to the US of products 
made by Chinese prison labour, coercive family planning 
practices and the future of Hong Kong after the transfer to 
Chinese sovereignty in 1997. Further, Beijing's unwillingness 
to curb drug trafficking, its support for the repressive regime 
in Myanmar (Burma) and inadequate protection of the environment 
were cited as reasons to examine America's trade relationship 
with the PRC. 67 
While a small minority in Congress wished to revoke 
China's MFN status, legislative action focused upon making 
further renewal conditional on progress in the major areas of 
human rights, proliferation and trade. 68 Representative Pelosi 
and majority leader Senator George Mitchell (D-Maine) 
introduced similar legislation in the House and Senate 
respectively. Both pieces of legislation demanded progress on 
specific issues of human rights, such as an end to the export 
of prison labour and the release of all prisoners detained in 
connection with the 1989 demonstrations, and both required the 
president to provide an assessment of 'overall significant 
67 See Sino-American Relations: Current Policy Issues; 
hearings before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 
102nd Congress, 1st Session, June 13, 25 and 27 1991, 
Washington D.C. (United States Government Printing Office, 
1992) . 
68 Other legislative measures not related to China's MFN 
status were also introduced though very few received serious 
support. Kerry Dumbaugh, China and Congress in 1992; op cit 
p.4. 
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progress' on a range of issues. 69 The House of Representatives 
passed the Pelosi bill by a veto-proof 313-112, and the Senate 
passed the Mitchell bill by 55-44, insufficient to override a 
presidential veto. 70 The Administration's success in renewing 
China's 1991 MFN status and in defeating Congressional attempts 
to impose conditions resulted from a change in domestic 
political and bilateral tactics through the spring and summer 
of 1991. 
As explained in chapter two, the Administration quietly 
adopted a new, tougher strategy in the spring of 1991. It was 
motivated to do so by frustrations with the lack of progress 
achieved by the former concessionary China policy. But 
crucially, the Administration also anticipated a potentially 
politically damaging fight with determined and partisan 
Congress over China's 1991 MFN status. 
Initially, Bush repeated the tactic of proclaiming 
uncertainty as to whether he would renew MFN without conditions 
before the June 3 deadline. 71 However, having announced his 
intention to do so on May 15, the President and his supporters 
turned once again to justifying engagement with the PRC, 
69 Pelosi 's bill (HR 2212) required 'overall significant 
progress' on a range of human rights issues, while Mi tchell 
also included trade and proliferation issues. The Senate 
version (S 1367) also placed a greater and more specific 
emphasis on proliferation. See Robert G. Sutter, 'Congress and 
the Crisis in US-China Policy' in Congress and Foreign Policy, 
1991; prepared by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 
Representatives, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, Washington D.C. 
(United States Government Printing Office, 1992) pp.83-102. 
70 Only the House had time to act upon the subsequent 
Conference Report by the time Congress adjourned for 1991. 
Kerry Dumbaugh, China and Congress in 1992; op cit pp.5-6. 
71 See for example The President's News Conference April 29 
1991, op cit. 
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reiterating arguments employed and developed since June 1989. 72 
It became clear that appeals of this kind might not be 
sufficient to prevent a Congressional override of a 
presidential veto of legislation, given the lack of Chinese 
progress in the two years since Tiananmen, the increase in the 
number of issues subject to Congressional concern, the enduring 
propensity to view the PRC in an overwhelmingly negative light, 
and the growth in partisanship. 
As a consequence, Bush began to focus his arguments on the 
merits of his new, tougher strategy with the PRC. He was aided 
in this respect by the series of gestures and concessions 
offered by Beijing through the spring and early summer. 73 While 
Beij ing maintained its rhetoric of resistance, its desire to 
see a revival in Sino-American relations caused it to respond 
to the Bush Administration's new carrot and stick strategy. 
Further, it was concerned that Congress might be successful in 
imposing conditions on China's MFN status. Nevertheless, 
Premier Li Peng's insistence that his government had gone to 
great lengths to preserve MFN, and Beijing's concomitant threat 
of retaliatory action if conditionality was imposed convinced 
72 See for example Remarks to the Asian-Pacific Community, 
June 16 1991, Fountain Valley, California, Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States-George Bush 1991; Book I op cit 
pp.674-675 and Renewal of MFN Status tor the People's Republic 
of China; hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, June 26 
1991, Washington D.C. (United States Government Printing 
Office, 1991). 
73 For example, Beijing promised to cease exports of prison-
labour products, cease illegal transshipments, improvement its 
conduct in the areas of proliferation and arms sales, and join 
international security regimes. Harry Harding, A Fragile 
Relationship; op cit p.279. 
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some members of Congress of the need for prudence. 74 
The most decisive development came in June and July, with 
an exchange of correspondence between the White House and a 
bipartisan group of moderate Senators led by Senator Max Baucus 
(D-Montana) . While Baucus shared many of the concerns for human 
rights, trade and proliferation held by his Congressional 
colleagues, he also feared the repercussions of a revocation or 
stringent conditioning of China's MFN status. Accordingly, 
Baucus and fifteen like-minded Senators wrote a letter 
requesting the President to define his proposals for ensuring 
Chinese progress in the three major issue areas. Bush replied 
with a comprehensive explanation of the Administration's new 
strategy, noting recent initiatives and achievements, and 
specifying proposals for future action. For example, the 
President defended the importance of continued bilateral 
dialogue on human rights, and the achievements (past and 
potential) of tough and selective use of sanctions such as 
Section 301 of the 1988 Trade Act in the areas of trade and 
proliferation. He also declared an new policy initiative 
towards Taiwan that represented the first clear breach with 
Beijing over the island for almost a decade. 75 Critically, the 
74 Ibid and Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power; Oxford 
University Press (Oxford, 1995) p.253. One former State 
Department official argues that the Administration's tougher 
strategy and the Congressional threat to impose legislative 
conditionality acted as a form of conditionality on Beijing. He 
adds that more substantive Chinese progress beyond that offered 
at the time would have required intensive diplomacy over a much 
longer time frame. Interview with Robert M. Perito, former 
senior China analyst, US Department of State, December 10 1997, 
Washington D.C. 
75 
would 
than 
Ibid pp.282-283. Bush declared that the Administration 
support a separate Taiwanese accession to GATT, rather 
the previous position of simultaneous accession. Bush 
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Baucus group received Bush's response just as the Senate was 
preparing to vote on the Mitchell legislation. While the Senate 
passed the legislation, the President's exposition of the 
Administration's tougher strategy of engagement persuaded a 
sufficient number of dissenters to indicate that the Senate 
would uphold a presidential veto of legislative 
conditionality. 76 In an echo of Bush's veto of Pelosi's 
Emigration Relief Bill, the President found sufficient support 
within the Senate to ensure that he did not lose the lead on 
China policy to Congress. However, the degree to which he was 
forced to respond to Congressional pressure over China's 1991 
MFN status illustrated that Bush did not possess complete 
control of policy either. 
A largely ambivalent public generally sympathised with the 
Administration's objectives. While Tiananmen had prompted 
American citizens to view the PRC with distaste if not 
abhorrence, most felt that it was in US interests to maintain a 
long-term relationship with Beijing. Indeed, many favoured 
renewal of China's MFN status and the rejuvenation of full 
economic relations with the PRC. 77 However, as stated earlier, 
noted that while China lagged behind Taiwan in meeting Gatt 
criteria, he supported its membership once those conditions 
were satisfied. 
76 One Congressional staffer argues that the Baucus-Bush 
correspondence, and its consequences, represented MFN 
conditionality by "non-legislative means". Interview with James 
McCormick, former professional staff on House Subcommittee on 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, November 7 1997, Washington D.C. 
Kerry Dumbaugh notes that the bipartisan group of Senators 
represented farm states with strong agricultural trade links 
with the PRC. China and Congress in 1992; op cit p.4 (footnote 
4) . 
77 
States 
John Rielly (ed) , American Public 
Foreign Policy 1991; Council on 
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Opinion and United 
Foreign Relations 
public opinion had little direct influence on the development 
of the US China policy debate at this time, particularly in 
relation to China's MFN status. On the whole, informed opinion 
was more critical of the form of the Administration's China 
policy and its unconditional renewal of MFN. 
Although the Administration had won the battle over MFN, 
and retained control of China policy to a large degree, the 
political and partisan nature of the standoff between the White 
House and Congress meant that Bush had not won the domestic 
argument over the rationale for China policy. In other words, 
the President had not yet repudiated the case for a China 
strategy incorporating linkage. The survival of the incumbent 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime was heavily dependent on 
economic progress and success, a point conceded by senior 
members of the leadership. 78 In turn, the PRC's economic 
modernisation and development appeared heavily dependent on US 
investment, markets and participation. 79 Therefore, although a 
partial or full revocation of China's MFN status would hurt US 
businesses with economic links with China, it could also 
threaten to devastate China's economic development and thus 
undermine the regime's grip on power. Critics asserted that the 
Administration's current policy was too 'soft' and had secured 
only superficial improvements. Therefore proponents of a 
(Chicago, 1991) p.24. 
78 Rosemary Foot, 'Neither Friends Nor Enemies: 
American Relations after the Cold War'; The 
International Review vol.S no.2 Spring 1994 p.21. 
Sine-
Oxford 
79 Over 2 6 per cent of the PRC' s exports were absorbed by 
the US market in 1991, up from 24.5 per cent the year before. 
China Trade Figures; Overseas Trade Division, United Kingdom 
Department of Trade and Industry, May 1993 p.1. 
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strategy of linkage continued to argue that China would improve 
its conduct in the areas of human rights, trade and 
proliferation if its MFN status was made conditional on such 
progress. eo 
An example of the de-politicised advocacy of engagement 
was provided by Republican former US Ambassador to China 
Winston Lord in a testimony to Congress in May 1991. el Lord 
argued that China had enormous economic stakes in working to 
preserve MFN. While he acknowledged that the "cosmetic 
gestures" delivered by Beij ing up to that point had been 
''cynical tokens", he suggested that this proved that the 
Chinese were willing to make progress even when the 
conditioning of MFN was only a possibility. Further, in an echo 
of the President's references to his personal experience of 
China, Lord argued that Beijing would be unwilling to accept 
the loss of diplomatic 'face' associated with a revocation of 
MFN on the basis of insufficient progress. However, he 
maintained that whilst severe conditions might satisfy the 
American emotional mood, moderate conditions were more likely 
to achieve genuine improvements. He also insisted that MFN 
conditions should only refer to human rights because the 
inclusion of proliferation and trade issues would only render 
the policy tool unwieldy and provocative, and establish a 
eo This argument was opposed by advocates of unconditional 
MFN, who maintained that unfettered US economic engagement with 
the PRC encouraged reform in the PRC and in this way undermined 
the current regime's grip on power. 
0 Statement of Winston Lord before the Joint Hearing of 
Subcommittees of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Most 
Favoured Nation Status for the People's Republic of China; May 
29 1991 op cit pp.18-22. 
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dangerous precedent. 82 Moreover, Lord stressed the importance of 
pursuing a strategy that would restore the governmental and 
political consensus on China policy. He argued that a policy of 
conditional MFN should be implemented by a presidential 
executive order rather than Congressional legislation, so that 
flexibility in policy-making could be retained. 83 Finally, Lord 
contended that a linkage. strategy of this kind would preserve 
valuable long-term engagement with Beijing, whilst promoting US 
humanitarian, economic and geopolitical interests and conveying 
American revulsion at continuing human rights violations. a4 
Wins ton Lord's testimony represented a non-partisan 
recommendation of linkage. Interestingly, it also bore strong 
similarities to the Clinton Administration's Executive Order of 
May 1993, conceived under the stewardship of Lord who by then 
had become Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs. as 
THE EROSION OF BUSH'S CONTROL OF CHINA POLICY, 1991-1992 
a
2 I bid p. 2 0 . 
83 Ibid p.20 and pp.20-21. 
84 Ibid p.20. 
as In his testimony to the April 29 hearing, former 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
Richard Holbrooke, who served during the Carter Administration, 
urged unconditional renewal of MFN. Reiterating the argument 
that revoking MFN would hurt the wrong people in China, 
Holbrooke insisted that economic engagement and "international 
communication'' with Chinese citizens offered the best means of 
stimulating reform. Statement of Richard Holbrooke before the 
Joint Hearing of Subcommittees of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Most Favoured Nation Status for the People's 
Republic of China; May 29 1991 op cit pp.30-31. Holbrooke, like 
Lord, advised presidential candidate Clinton on China policy 
during the summer of 1992. 
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Broad governmental and non-governmental aspects of the Sino-
American relationship recovered after the unconditional renewal 
of China's MFN status had been confirmed in the autumn of 
1991. 86 However, the domestic governmental battle over China 
policy had not yet been settled. Chinese progress and promises 
of improved conduct, prompted in part by the Administration's 
tougher 'carrot and stick' policy and in part by the genuine 
prospect of conditions being imposed on China's 1991 MFN 
status, had not satisfied the President's critics in and 
outside Congress. 
Many members in Congress remained determined to take the 
lead on policy-making, and redefine US China policy in favour 
of a strategy of linkage. A number of factors underscored their 
conviction. 87 Firstly they maintained that the Administration's 
strategy was not working. In the light of persistent 
unacceptable Chinese conduct in the areas of proliferation, 
trade and in particular human rights, the President's policy 
appeared submissive. Critics argued that the economic recovery 
China was enjoying through 1991-1992 would only serve to 
bolster the present PRC regime and reinforce its 
intransigence. 88 This led to the conclusion that the 
Administration's China policy was inconsistent with world 
trends. In the context of reform, liberalization and 
86 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit p. 289. 
87 See Kerry Dumbaugh, China and Congress in 1992; op cit 
pp.4-5. 
88 Winston Lord had warned in May 1990 that an over-
concessionary Bush policy would have such implications. Winston 
Lord, 'Bush's Second Chance on China'; op cit. 
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democratization throughout the (former) Soviet sphere, the Bush 
Administration's China policy appeared to be sustaining a 
repressive, anti-democratic regime in China. 89 Further, many 
members of Congress, Democratic and Republican, were resentful 
of the President's refusal to accept their inclusion in the 
policy-making process. Finally, partisan politics fuelled the 
determination of many Democratic members of Congress to attack 
the President on China. Although the 1992 presidential election 
promised to be one dominated by domestic issues, political 
capital could be made by portraying the President's China 
policy as a betrayal of US values and principles. Given that 
domestic acceptance of Bush's China policy relied to a large 
extent on clear signs of progress within the PRC, and given the 
degree of scepticism within the US regarding Beijing's 
gestures, the President's position looked politically 
vulnerable. 90 
As the 1992 MFN debating season approached, Bush mounted a 
firm defence of his strategy for China. 91 Primarily he 
reiterated the assertion that US economic engagement promoted 
economic, and thus societal and political reform in China, 
while claiming credit for the progress and promises secured 
since he adopted a tougher strategy in the spring of 1991. 92 
89 The Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991. 
90 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit p.296, and 
Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power; op cit p.254. 
91 Although legislation imposing conditionality on China's 
MFN status could be introduced at any point on the 
Congressional calender, such initiatives were usually triggered 
by the impending presidential recommendation on China's MFN 
status. Kerry Dumbaugh, China and Congress in 1992; op cit p.S. 
92 For example see Bush's letter to the House of 
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Bush noted that further Chinese improvements were necessary, 
but he contended that China and the US-PRC relationship was 
moving in the right direction. 
In an effort to maximise support for the implementation of 
a more resolute strategy incorporating linkage, Democratic 
members of Congress refined their legislative proposals in late 
Spring 1992. The need to do so had been illustrated by the 
failure to pass legislation conditioning China's MFN status, 
previously interrupted by the adjournment of Congress in autumn 
1991. The Senate's failure to reach a veto-proof majority in 
February 1992 had hinged on the opposition of the moderate 
Baucus-led group of Senators. 93 Reflecting the case put by the 
Administration, Baucus had claimed that any revocation of MFN 
would be to the detriment of US economic interests, starve the 
reformist elements within Chinese society, and act against US 
interests by isolating Beijing. Advocates of linkage refined 
their proposals for the 1992 MFN debate to take account of 
these arguments. As a result, Congress's initiatives on China 
became more diverse and selective, making it harder for the 
Administration to resist influence from the Hill. 
A Joint Resolution disapproving the President's renewal of 
China's 1992 MFN status, in effect a measure of full 
Representatives, March 2 1992, in which he announced his 
intension to renew China's 1992 MFN status without conditions. 
George Bush, 'China's MFN Status'; US Department of State 
Dispatch vol.3 no.10 March 9 1992 (United States Government 
Printing Office, 1992) p.189. A White House report to Congress, 
June 2 1992, restated these arguments. 'Report to Congress'; US 
Department of State Dispatch vol.3 no.23 June 8 1992 (United 
States Government Printing Office, 1992) . 
53 Kerry Dumbaugh, China and Congress in 1992; op cit pp.6-
7. 
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revocation, was introduced. Although it passed the House of 
Representatives, it was not considered by the Senate. This 
reflected the appreciation that full revocation was too blunt 
an instrument, and would inevitably fail to gain the support in 
the Senate required to defeat a presidential veto. Further the 
joint resolution was a symbolic gesture of dissatisfaction with 
the Administration's China policy and the conduct of the 
Chinese government. 94 Real Congressional intent focused on two 
pieces of legislation imposing conditions on China's MFN 
status, and other bills with more specific prescriptions for US 
China policy. 
Following Bush's unconditional renewal of MFN on June 2 
1992, the House considered HR 5318, sponsored by Rep. Pelosi 
and Rep. Don Pease (D-Ohio). The bill bore strong similarities 
to its predecessor HR 2212, pledging to impose conditions on 
China's trading status for one year after June 3 1993 if 
Beijing had not provided satisfactory progress in several 
aspects of human rights, trade and proliferation. While 
demanding measurable progress in a number of specific areas, it 
also called for 'overall significant progress' on a longer list 
of issues. 95 Crucially, however, HR 5318 stipulated that MFN 
94 
'Two Bills Limiting 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac 
Session (CQ Press, 1992) p.160. 
Trade with China Vetoed'; 
vol.XLVIII 102nd Congress 2nd 
95 Specific progress was required in areas such as the 
release of Tiananmen-related political prisoners; the cessation 
of prison-labour exports; an end to religious persecution in 
China and Tibet; freedom of the press; an end to the 
intimidation of Chinese in the US; the protection of 
intellectual property rights; the removal on unfair trade 
barriers; adherence to international regimes and standards on 
nuclear, chemical and biological proliferation; and the 
prohibition of missile and nuclear technology to Syria or Iran. 
Ibid p.159 and p.l60. 
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status would only be revoked for state-owned enterprises. 96 This 
measure was designed to answer charges levied by the 
Administration, the business community and some members of 
Congress that revoking MFN would hurt reform-minded, Western-
orientated sectors of Chinese society, and damage those 
American businesses dependent on economic ties with the PRC. 97 
Proponents dismissed the value of the concessions presented by 
Beijing and cited by President Bush through 1991-1992, 
contrasting them unfavourably with the progress being made in 
Eastern Europe. They also insisted that conditional MFN offered 
the strongest instrument of linkage through which the US could 
execute leverage over the PRC. The intention, they claimed, was 
not to revoke MFN but to induce meaningful progress from 
Beij ing. 98 
In the most comprehensive and vociferous Congressional 
debate to date, opponents of HR 5318 maintained that it would 
subvert US economic and foreign policy interests. They 
highlighted the achievements secured by the Administration's 
tougher policy stance, Beijing's membership of the UN Security 
Council, and further, argued that the targeting of state-owned 
96 Accordingly, the bill required the Treasury Department to 
compile and maintain a list of state-owned enterprises that 
would be targeted if the conditions were not met. 
97 Kerry Dumbaugh, China and Congress in 1992; op cit p. 8 
and 'Two Bills Limiting Trade'; Congressional Quarterly Almanac 
op cit p.159. 
98 This was a point stressed by Winston Lord in his 
testimony to Congress in May. Statement of Winston Lord before 
the Joint Hearing of Subcommittees of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Most Favoured Nation Status for the People's 
Republic of China; May 29 1991 op cit p.19-20. 
174 
enterprise was impracticable. 99 Contestants also highlighted an 
argument attracting growing popularity. They held that while 
they had no quarrel with the objectives of the bill, they 
believed that linkage through conditional MFN was an entirely 
inappropriate way of pursuing them. 
Opponents also questioned why the bill to condition MFN 
had been introduced at all, suggesting that HR 5318 would only 
suffer the same fate as HR 2212 earlier in the year. 100 Two 
factors explain the reintroduction of such legislation. 
Firstly, advocates of linkage believed that the targeting of 
state enterprise presented a genuinely better policy, that 
consequentially, would attract wider support on the Hill. 101 
Secondly, the Democratic party stood to gain politically from 
another fight between Congress and the White House. Indeed many 
Democratic Congressional advocates of linkage had doubts 
concerning the effectiveness of MFN conditionality, or feared 
the repercussions such a policy would have for democratic 
forces within China, and for the economic interests of the US, 
Hong Kong, and Taiwan. However, they also believed that the 
Senate would uphold a presidential veto of legislation imposing 
99 Rep. Robert Mat sui (D-Calif) was particularly vocal on 
this matter. Doubting the possibility of differentiating 
between private and state-owned enterprise, he contended that 
the bill would not protect US economic interests and suggested 
that recent major deals with the PRC (a repeat of the Chinese 
lobbying tactic of previous years) would be put at serious 
risk. 'Two Bills Limiting Trade'; Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac op cit pp.159-160. 
100 Ibid p.160. 
101 This targeted, more subtle approach echoed proposals 
suggested by human rights interest groups such as Asia Watch. 
Steven Levine, 'China and America'; op cit p.245. 
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conditionality. 102 Therefore. although Bush would win the 
legislative battle, doing so would leave him vulnerable to 
accusations of being anti-democratic, anti-human rights, and 
inclined to place his friendship with a brutal regime above 
American normative values. The fact that 1992 was a 
presidential election year fuelled this motivation. 103 That Bush 
failed to retain the presidency owed more to his weakness on 
domestic issues and the American people's desire for a sense of 
change. Yet the incumbent was well respected in the area of 
foreign affairs, particularly in the wake of the Gulf Conflict, 
and the Democratic party had struggled to establish an 
alternative foreign policy platform. Maligning the Bush 
Administration's China policy helped them to do so. 104 
This tactic is illustrated by the degree to which 
Democratic Senators cooperated with their counterparts in the 
House on the Senate version of HR 5318, S 2808. 105 Although the 
Senate ultimately failed to override Bush's veto, the fact that 
it provided unanimous consent for the bill on its first reading 
in that chamber, and that the critical vote to override the 
veto coincided with the crucial latter stages of the election 
102 While the Senate was controlled by the Democratic Party, 
the balance of power was less disagreeable to the 
Administration than it was in the House. Further, the Senate 
had a greater reputation for erring on the side of prudence and 
the status quo. 
103 Interview with Richard Bush op cit. See also Richard 
Bush, ~Clinton and China: Scenarios for the Future'; The China 
Business Review vol.20 issue 1 January-February 1993 p.17. 
104 The political tactics and advantages of attacking Bush's 
China policy sought by Congressional Democrats and Democratic 
presidential candidate Bill Clinton are discussed in greater 
detail in chapter five. 
105 Kerry Dumbaugh, China and Congress in 1992; op cit p.10. 
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campaign placed a great deal political pressure on the 
incumbent . 106 
The Democratic Party's initiatives on China not only 
bruised the President politically, but also undercut his 
control of China policy through 1992. Rather than attach all 
their China policy concerns to legislation on MFN 
conditionality, members of Congress introduced bills that dealt 
with issues in a more specific manner. Thus those members who 
supported the objectives of resolutions such as HR 5318, but 
opposed the choice of MFN conditionality as a policy tool felt 
able to support the more targeted proposals. Accordingly, 
legislation allowing Chinese students to extend their stay in 
the US, supporting the stability, prosperity and further 
democratization of Hong Kong following its transfer of 
Sovereignty to Beijing in 1997, and requiring the imposition of 
sanctions on states engaged in proliferation was passed. 107 
Despite his determination to retain control of the policy-
making process and the format of his China policy, Bush had to 
cede to the level of bipartisan support for these measures. 
Indeed Chinese concessions secured by the Administration in the 
areas of trade, proliferation and prison-labour exports through 
106 The Bush re-election campaign was in trouble by the time 
the Senate took the second vote on October 1. Ibid and 
interview with Kerry Dumbaugh op cit. The criteria contained in 
HR 5318 established a strong framework for subsequent 
legislation, and indeed for President Clinton's Executive Order 
of May 1993, as chapter five will explain. 
107 The latter measure, an amendment to the FY 1993 Defence 
Authorization Act, required that in the event of proliferation 
to Iran or Iraq, sanctions be imposed on those states and the 
states proliferating the material. China's activities were a 
focal point of the debate on the amendment. Kerry Dumbaugh, 
China and Congress in 1992; op cit pp.14-15. 
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1991-1992 were to a significant degree also a product of 
Congressional pressure. On the one hand, the threat of 
legislation, particularly in the form of MFN conditionality, 
persuaded the Administration to adopt a more uncompromising 
stance in bilateral negotiations. Yet the Administration also 
employed the tactic of informing Chinese officials that the 
White House would be unable to prevent the introduction of 
legislation if progress was not forthcoming. 
Therefore, although Bush managed to resist the imposition 
of direct legislative linkage, China policy both from the 
domestic policy-making perspective, and from the bilateral 
implementation perspective was subject to indirect linkage. As 
Kerry Dumbaugh observes: 
" ... US China policy by 1992 had begun to operate on a 
number of fronts without coordination or reference to 
an overall goal. Although some supporters described 
the policy as a prudent, incremental approach to a 
changing situation, critics referred to it as a 
policy out of control, with no central guiding 
principle or point of reference. 11108 
Conclusion 
The Bush Administration was intent on emphasising continuity in 
its policy towards the PRC before and after the Tiananmen 
Square massacre of June 1989. The major obstacle to retaining a 
strategy of engagement based primarily on mutual bilateral 
lOB I bid p. 1. 
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strategic and economic interests came not from either 
government but from the domestic political environment within 
the United States. Three important factors exemplify this fact. 
Firstly, Tiananmen and Beij ing' s subsequent policies of 
repression altered the image of China in the eyes of most 
Americans. Rather than being viewed with fascination and 
optimism, feelings encouraged by the expansion of bilateral 
contacts and experiences through the mid to late 1980s, China 
was viewed with fear, concern and distaste. Indeed, the PRC had 
been lauded as an inspiration for the transition from communist 
authoritarianism to liberal capitalism and, hopefully, 
political pluralism during the second term of the Reagan 
Administration. In the light of Tiananmen, and especially in 
the context of the reforms occurring in the Soviet Union and 
East and Central Europe, however, the Chinese regime came to be 
seen as a regressive, brutal dictatorship. The predisposition 
to view China negatively was incited further by China's growing 
economic power, proliferatory conduct, military strength, 
regional aspirations and political confidence. 109 Even the PRC's 
established policies such as economic modernisation and 
development were interpreted in such a way as to suggest that 
China was becoming a major threat rather than asset to US 
national interests.no This fundamental change in the way 
Americans viewed the PRC did not necessarily undermine the 
109 For example, Beij ing' s claim to sovereignty of the South 
China Sea in early 1992 exacerbated American fears of a geo-
militarily expansionist China. Rosemary Foot, The Practice of 
Power; op cit pp.243-244. 
110 See Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit p. 290 
and p. 292. 
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Administration's defence of engagement. The economic and 
military power of China, realised and potential, convinced some 
that it was ln America's interests to remain engaged with 
Beijing. Nevertheless, linkage was seen by many others as 
presenting a constructive redefinition, if not alternative to 
the suggestion that US economic engagement offered the best way 
of stimulating reform within the PRC, especially to those who 
accused the Administration of weakness, callousness and 
failure. 
The second factor concerned the impact of the 
transformation from a Cold War to a post-Cold War environment. 
This had a number of important implications for China policy. 
As stated, political reforms in the former Soviet sphere and 
the growing detente between Washington and Moscow cast the PRC 
in a negative light from the domestic American perspective. 111 
Further, the decline in Cold War tensions and the erosion 
of the gee-strategic rationale for Sino-American relations 
exposed the relationship to new realities. On the one hand, the 
new emphasis on bilate~al ties of an economic, scientific and 
technological, academic and cultural nature helped to advance 
and integrate the relationship. It also aided US-PRC 
cooperation on regional questions such as Cambodia and the 
Korean Peninsula, and as the Gulf Conflict illustrated, 
amplified Beijing's importance to a reinvigorated United 
Nations. Yet as Americans became increasingly experienced and 
knowledgeable about the PRC, it also led to growing concern for 
111 Following Tiananmen, US citizens were more inclined to 
regard the Soviet Union/Russia as an ally or friend, then they 
were the PRC. See Karlyn H. Bowman, 'Public Attitudes Toward 
the People's Republic of China'; op cit Table A-2 p.l48. 
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Chinese conduct in such areas as human rights, trade and 
proliferation. Tiananmen cemented these concerns. As a 
consequence, the domestic China policy debate became 
increasingly dominated by issues such as PRC human rights 
violations, the PRC trade surplus, and China's proliferation of 
technology and weapons of mass destruction to the Middle East, 
North Africa and Pakistan. 
Furthermore, the Administration's privileged role in the 
design and formulation of foreign policy and China policy 
depreciated with the end of the Cold War. 112 With the passing of 
the overwhelming anti-Soviet strategic imperative, domestic 
actors no longer felt the need to defer to the White House. 
America's participation in the post-Cold War world gave a 
higher priority to economics and trade, and the promotion of 
traditional normative values such as political rights and 
democracy. This meant that domestic actors, including Congress, 
had a greater interest and a greater stake in influencing the 
principles and direction of US foreign policy. 
Thus President Bush's insistence that he retain a 
privileged role in the conduct of China policy bred bipartisan 
resentment within Congress, and frustration from non-
governmental interest groups. The annual review of China's MFN 
status provided a procedurally convenient mechanism for 
Congress to influence China policy. Bush's determination to 
maintain the positive evolution of Sino-American relations over 
the long-term may have been merited. At the very least, China's 
potential power, and its role in regional and international 
112 Robert G. Sutter, 
Adversity'; op cit p.272. 
'Sino-American 
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Relations in 
peace and stability suggested the wisdom of this course. Yet 
with the exception of the Gulf Conflict, the Administration's 
defence of its rationale for China policy failed to maintain a 
domestic consensus on China. 113 Indeed the President's apparent 
determination to rebuff domestic representations on China 
policy actually undermined his China policy objectives. 114 The 
fact that US China policy by 1992 had become uncoordinated, 
multi-directional, short-termist and politicised illustrates 
this point. In addition, the Administration's China policy drew 
criticism from fellow Republicans as well as Democrats, proving 
that the collapse of the domestic consensus on China was not 
simply due to partisan politics. 115 
The third factor relating to the domestic political 
environment concerns the question of identifying the leading 
opponents to the Bush Administration's China policy. Despite 
their distaste for the Beijing regime, the American public were 
generally supportive of long-term engagement with the PRC, and 
indeed a small majority favoured the unconditional renewal of 
China's MFN status. 116 However, public opinion proved to have 
little direct influence on either the Administration's China 
policy or the China policy debate. As Karlyn Bowman argues, US 
public opinion tends to offer general inclinations on issues of 
113 Robert S. Ross, 'National Security, Human Rights and 
Domestic Politics'; op cit pp.288-290. 
114 Ibid p.308. 
115 Interview with Edward B. Gresser, Policy Director, 
Senator Max Baucus (D-MT), October 31 1997, Washington D.C. 
116 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit pp.293-294 
and Karlyn H. Bowman, 'Public Attitudes Toward the People's 
Republic of China'; op cit pp.147-149. 
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foreign policy rather than specific proposals. Thus while, by 
1990, a significant proportion favoured the restoration of full 
diplomatic and economic Sino-American relations, a clear 
majority also wished to see an improvement in China's human 
rights record as a qualification for improved relations. 117 To a 
large degree, opinion leaders reflected this schism. Thus while 
many understood and upheld the value of long-term Sino-American 
ties and US engagement with China, many also were critical of 
the Administration's China policy strategy founded on these 
assumptions. 118 In essence, this reflected the fact that 
although most Americans were agreed on the objectives of US 
China policy (to encourage Beijing's adherence to international 
norms of behaviour across a wide range of issues) , considerable 
disagreement existed as to the best ways of pursuing them. 119 
This meant that members of Congress were able to utilize 
general domestic inclinations on China in their attempts to 
take the lead on China policy, without having to respond to 
specific recommendations or demands. In other words Congress, 
better able to influence policy by virtue of its institutional, 
constitutional, and political position, moulded general 
sentiments into specific policy initiatives. This proved to be 
true for those members motivated by genuine policy concerns, 
though perhaps moreso for those motivated, in addition or 
independently, by partisan political ends. 
117 Ibid (Bowman) pp .150-151. 
118 Wins ton Lord's recommendations reflect this duality. 
119 Robert G. Sutter (with Seong-Eun Choi), 
Future in World Affairs: The Role of the 
westview Press (Oxford, 1996) pp.74-75. 
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Shaping China 's 
United States i 
Overall, the Bush Administration's China policy can be 
said to have failed in two important respects. Firstly both the 
initial strategy of concessions and bilateral assurances and 
the second tougher strategy of inducements and punishments were 
heavily dependent on Chinese progress on the issues of trade, 
proliferation and, in particular, human rights. Domestic 
scepticism regarding China's concessions on these issues left 
the Administration vulnerable to accusations of weakness, 
duplicity and insensitivity to US normative values. 120 This 
correlates with the second, more significant failing. By 
pursuing an elitist approach to China policy-making more 
conducive to Cold War US foreign policy, Bush neglected to take 
account of the domestic political mood towards China. This 
failure substantially undermined the domestic legitimacy of his 
policy, a crucial factor in post-Cold War foreign policy-
making. Thus Congress was often able to fill this political 
vacuum by taking the lead on China policy initiatives. Speaking 
of US-PRC relations after Tiananmen, Steven Levine observes: 
11 It has been rather the mood than the substance of 
the relationship that has changed. More than anything 
else, it was George Bush's characteristic failure to 
understand this change and to give adequate voice to 
widespread public feelings of disappointment and 
outrage that precipitated the breakdown in the 
bipartisan congressional consensus on China policy in 
the 1980s. 11121 
120 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; op cit p. 296. 
121 Steven Levine, 
breakdown of domestic 
'China and America'; op cit p.243. The 
consensus and governmental unity on China 
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With neither the White House nor Congress in complete 
control of policy-making, China policy had disintegrated into a 
state of confusion and contradiction by the end of 1992. Bush 
was not immune to domestic political calculations and 
motivations that might confute his China policy objectives. His 
espousal of a tougher strategy in 1991, his correspondence with 
the group of moderate Senators led by Senator Baucus, and his 
decision in August 1992 to approve the sale of one hundred and 
fifty F-16 aircraft to Taiwan indicate this point. 122 
The domestic struggle over China policy 1989-1992 did have 
its benefits both for the domestic legitimisation of China 
policy and for the policy itself. 123 Firstly, it took the China 
policy debate into the post-Cold War era, and helped to 
concentrate participants' minds on salient realities and 
issues. It also contributed to the wider debate on the role of 
normative issues in post-Cold War foreign policy. Secondly, it 
allowed new interest groups to participate in the China policy 
debate. This included those advocating a tough strategy such as 
human rights organisations, or those advocating unconditional 
engagement such as the business community. Thirdly, the battle 
between the Administration and Congress undermined Beijing' s 
ability to resist us pressure for reform in certain ways. The 
policy was a focal point of Wins ton Lord's criticism of the 
Administration. 
122 While this decision angered Beijing, Bush hoped the sale 
would boost his re-election campaign the vital state of Texas, 
where the aircraft were manufactured. Richard Bush, 'Clinton 
and China'; op cit p.17. 
123 Steven Levine, 'China and America'; op cit p.243. 
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PRC could not rely on the Administration to protect its 
interests, and thus felt compelled to offer concessions in an 
effort to deter Congressional actions that could threaten those 
interests. To figures such as Winston Lord, this appeared to 
justify the potential of a strategy of linkage such as MFN 
conditionality. 
A number of reasons combined to prevent Congress from 
attaining the two thirds majorities in the House and the Senate 
sufficient to override the presidential veto and impose 
conditionality. 124 The concessions offered by the Chinese 
certainly convinced some moderate members of Congress to allow 
the Administration more time to pursue a tougher strategy with 
Beijing. Indeed, the Administration was perhaps fortuitous in 
that moderates in the Chinese leadership were able and willing 
to offer concessions (however cynical) both in an effort to 
retain important US participation in its drive for economic 
development and success, and in an attempt to regain 
international respect following Tiananmen. 125 Further, the Gulf 
Conflict served to remind Americans of China's role in the UN 
Security Council, and in the maintenance of international 
stability. The President's declaration that he would endeavour 
to consult more widely with Congress bought him the sympathies 
of certain Republicans, even when he fell somewhat short on 
this promise. Partisan politics also played a role; either for 
124 Steven Levine, ~ Sino-American Relations: Testing the 
Limits of Discord'; in Samuel S. Kim (ed), China and the World; 
Westview Press (Oxford, 1994) p.86. 
125 Beij ing' s warning that it had offered sufficient 
progress to preserve MFN in 1991 proved ominous for the Clinton 
Administration's attempts to secure more substantial progress. 
Interview with Robert M. Perito op cit. 
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Democrats who only wished to gain politically by supporting 
conditional MFN (believing that Bush would veto such 
legislation) , or for Republicans who felt obliged to support 
the President under seige. Finally, there was the growing 
concern amongst a significant number of Representatives and 
Senators that MFN was not an appropriate tool with which to 
pursue US China policy objectives. This complexity and fluidity 
of partisan and bipartisan coalitions on the Hill, reflecting 
the complexity of China policy-making in the post-Cold War and 
post-Tiananmen era, would continue under the Clinton 
Administration. 
By the end of the Bush Administration's term of office, 
many aspects of the Sino-American relationship had largely 
recovered, if not exceeded, their pre-Tiananmen levels. Despite 
the apparent ban on high-level exchanges, diplomatic relations 
were largely restored, with the exception of significant 
military ties. Many non-governmental exchanges and ties, 
particularly in the area of economics, were flourishing. 
However, the domestic political environment for US China policy 
had been transformed in four vital areas. 126 Firstly, the 
positive domestic bipartisan consensus on China had collapsed. 
Secondly, Congress had taken the initiative on China policy, 
even if it did not possess complete control of policy-making. 
Thirdly, many members of Congress and in particular Democrats 
believed that China policy should be pursued through 
legislation. This included a significant number who still 
advocated a strategy of linkage expressed through MFN 
126 Richard Bush, The Evolution of US Policy Toward China 
Under the Clinton Administration; op cit p.S. 
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conditionality. Finally, China policy had become a highly 
politicized, partisan issue. The nature of this environment had 
important implications f.or the incoming Clinton Administration, 
especially given the fact that its president was motivated more 
by domestic political calculations than by strategic bilateral 
considerations. The following chapter will explain how 
presidential candidate Clinton adopted the lead on China policy 
established by Democrats in Congress, and demonstrate the 
degree to which his campaign stance on China was politically 
motivated. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE 1992 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S CHINA POLICY 
The debates within the US, and the angry standoffs between the 
White House and the Legislature in 1991 and 1992 that followed 
the Tiananmen Square massacre represented three highly 
significant political developments. Firstly, it ended the bi-
partisan consensus, and ended the unified Executive-Legislature 
approach to US China policy that had evolved throughout the 
1970s and 1980s. Secondly, it symbolised the increasing 
politicisation of US trade policy, and established the issue of 
China's MFN status at the heart of the China policy debate. 1 It 
is probable that the predominantly pro-MFN business community 
had become rather complacent under the Bush Administration, 
knowing that it had, in the President, the most influential 
advocate in the political debate about China policy. Thirdly, 
it elevated, and politicised the controversial issue of human 
rights in the debate concerning America's search for post-Cold 
War foreign policy vision. In particular, the reports and the 
media coverage of the Tiananmen Square massacre, and the 
subsequent Beltway debate on China policy had a significant 
impact on the image of China in the mind of the 'average' 
1 Spencer S. Griffith, 'Trade and Political Tensions Cloud 
MFN Renewal of China' i East Asian Executive Reports June 1991 
p.ll. 
189 
189 
American. 2 The fascination and curiosity in China that had 
evolved through the 1970s and 1980s was replaced by an image of 
China as the oppressor. The popular perception was that of the 
solitary student, defiant in his defence of American values of 
democracy and freedom, as he obstructed the tanks of the 
violently repressive (and of cours~, Communist) Chinese 
government. 3 
One would expect that a thorough assessment of America 1 s 
strategic and normative interests in one of if not the most 
challenging post-Cold War bilateral relationships would 
determine the development of Cl in ton 1 s proposals on China. 
However, the assessment made by Clinton and his advisors of 
contextual domestic political factors proved to be far more 
influential in the design of his Administration 1 s first China 
policy. 
Five (interrelated) political factors are crucial to this 
explanation, two of which have already been the subject of 
earlier discussion. The first is the political resonance of 
2 Of course, the views of the average American also informed 
media coverage of China, and were reflected by their political 
representatives. 
3 Clinton conformed to this popular perception of China in 
an campaign address to the Foreign Policy Association on New 
York, April 1 1992. Highlighting the "irresistible power of 
ideas" shaped by a modern age of global communications, he 
referred to the "defining" image of " ... Chinese Students 
marching in Tiananmen Square; .. " Further, in an address to the 
World Affairs Council in Los Angeles, August 13 1992, Clinton 
criticised an Administration that had " ... stood by as 
courageous Chinese students were attacked with tanks in 
Tiananmen Square." Speeches reproduced in Paul Averwald (ed), 
'President-Elect Clinton 1 S Foreign Policy Statements, December 
12 1991 November 4 1992 1 ; Foreign Policy Bulletin 
November/December 1992 (United States Government Printing 
Office, Washington D.C.) 
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the issue of human rights in China, in the aftermath of the 
Tiananmen Square massacre. The second political factor already 
discussed is the Democratic party's use of the issue of China 
policy and human rights with respect to the partisan battle 
over US foreign policy. Criticism of the Bush Administration's 
China policy and its treatment of human rights helped the 
Democrats to define for themselves a distinctly different 
foreign policy agenda, whilst undermining Bush's apparently 
strong foreign policy record. This was an important aspect of 
the Clinton campaign strategy. 
The three remaining political factors that had a 
significant impact on Clinton's China policy will be introduced 
and discussed in this chapter. Briefly, these are Clinton's 
determination to establish a policy that would unite the White 
House and Congress (and offer something to the range of non-
governmental actors with an interest in US China policy) . The 
principles and substance behind Clinton's eventual China policy 
was also influenced by the views of individuals and bodies 
courted by Clinton as he fought to secure both the Democratic 
nomination and the US presidency. Finally, Clinton hoped to 
establish a China policy that would complement his desire to 
focus on domestic themes. Clinton hoped that the establishment 
of a clear strategy backed by Congress, that reflected his 
campaign pronouncements on China, and that could be handled by 
a likeminded and respected bureaucracy would allow him to 
commit himself to his ambitious domestic agenda. 4 Put another 
' The appointment of Winston Lord to Assistant Secretary of 
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs would reflect this 
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way, Cl in ton hoped to establish a China policy that could be 
implemented with the minimum use of political resources. This 
would free valuable political resources for the prospective 
battles in Washington over the issues that concerned Clinton 
most; the economy, health care, welfare, education and so on. 5 
Nevertheless, it cannot be overstated that the development of 
China policy, and indeed all policy, was a secondary 
consideration to the Clinton campaign and to many Democratic 
Party members and voters. Their principle goal was to ensure 
that the next president of the United States was a Democrat; 
namely Bill Clinton. 6 
Clinton's Use of China Policy During the Campaign 
The contexts in which Clinton spoke on China policy during the 
campaign reveal his intention to use it as an example of his 
wider foreign policy platform; and indeed the new Democratic 
vision of US foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. The 
candidate's pronouncements on China represented the strong 
assertion, reflected in his views on Bosnia for example, of the 
importance of morality and normative interests in US foreign 
objective. 
5 Clinton understood the need to address the process of 
coalition building in securing the passage of his domestic 
agenda. For example, Clinton would have to be aware of the 
views of the members of the House Ways and Means Committee. 
This body not only had a voice in the debate regarding the 
federal budget, but through its Trade Subcommittee had a strong 
role to play in the annual debate on China's MFN status. 
6 Interview with Ted Galen Carpenter, November 6 1997, CATO 
Institute, Washington D.C. 
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policy. 7 However the rhetoric that characterised many of 
Clinton's views of China, and the ambiguities and 
inconsistencies in his proposals for China policy point to his 
use of this issue predominantly as a means to political and 
electoral ends. 8 
One Democratic Congressional Staff member, who had an 
influential role to play in the China debate in the 1993-1994 
period reflected: 
" ... you' re in a campaign at the time; you don't have 
time to think through what the consequences are going 
to be. You don't have time to consult a wide range of 
China experts to get the other side of the 
issue ... and part of the game is to accept that people 
will make commitments and try to shake them 
afterwards. " 9 
The political nature of the development of Clinton's 
proposals on China is a factor not lost on lobbyists 
representing both human rights (pro-Linkage) and business 
(anti-Linkage) interests. Mike Jendrzejczyk, the Washington 
Director of Human Rights Watch: Asia acknowledges that 
political expediency may have had a role in Clinton's decision 
7 Interview, Ted Galen Carpenter, op cit. 
8 There were members of the Clinton campaign team who do 
appear to have been genuine advocates of a tough policy on 
China. The roles and views of these advisors will be discussed 
later in the chapter. 
' Interview with Richard Bush, former staff member of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, October 29 1997, Washington 
D.C. 
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to adopt a policy of Linkage for China. 1° Cal Cohen, the 
President of the Emergency Committee on American Trade (ECAT) 
echoes the view that in adopting linkage, Cl in ton espoused a 
stance with strong political appeal to the domestic audience. 11 
The embrace of a tough, human rights focused attitude 
towards China, popular with the American public, was also 
employed more specifically against the incumbent, President 
Bush. This tactic built upon the political success enjoyed by 
Democrat members of Congress in challenging the Bush 
Administration on its China policy in the wake of the Tiananmen 
Square massacre. 
As has been explained earlier, the standoff between the 
Bush Administration and the Democrat controlled Congress on the 
issue of China policy, and China's MFN status in particular, 
came to a head in 1992 for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
although Bush had pursued agreements with China on a range of 
issues including proliferation and the export of products of 
prison labour, an increasing number in both Houses were 
unconvinced by the Administration's claims that its initiatives 
were prompting progress in China on human rights and other 
issues. Secondly, there was greater confidence amongst the 
proponents of legislation imposing MFN conditionality, that a 
veto-proof majority in the Senate was possible. 12 Thirdly, 
10 Interview 
Washington Bureau 
Washington D.C. 
with Mike Jendrzejczyk, Director Of the 
of Human Rights Watch: Asia, November 4 1997, 
11 Interview with Cal Cohen, President of the Emergency 
Committee on American Trade, November 13 1997, Washington D.C. 
12 A corresponding lack of confidence had prevented the 
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certain members of Congress resented the President's 
determination to reject Congressional initiatives even if he 
agreed with their purpose. This was most clearly exemplified by 
his rejection of the Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act 
of 1989 (HR 2712), that preceded his implementation of 
Executive Order 12711 in 1990 that possessed very similar 
objectives. 13 A fourth reason for the heightened voracity of the 
China debate at this time, was that 1992 was a presidential 
election year and to the Democrats in Congress, China policy 
was a clear chink in the incumbent's foreign policy record. 14 
In the wake of the bipartisan support afforded to Bush 
during the Gulf War, and ln the context of the high approval 
ratings for his practice of foreign policy, Democrats seized 
upon China policy as an issue on which they could attack the 
President. 15 Bush had led the global response to the Tiananmen 
Square massacre, and indeed the sanctions he imposed upon China 
had initially satisfied most members of Congress. 16 However from 
late 1989, endorsement of the President's line turned to anger 
Senate voting on the compromise bill HR 
in 1991. 'Two Bills Limiting Trade 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac 102nd 
vol.XLVIII (CQ Press, 1992) p.157. 
2212 before the recess 
with China Vetoed'; 
Congress 2nd session 
13 Kerry Dumbaugh, China and Congress in 1992; Report for 
Congress 93-894 F, Congressional Research Service, Library of 
Congress, October 12 1993 p.2. 
14 Ibid pp.4-5. 
15 Spencer S. Griffith, 'Trade and Political Tensions Cloud 
MFN Renewal of China'; op cit p.11. Also interview with Shirley 
Kan, Analyst in Foreign Affairs at the Foreign Affairs and 
National Defence Division of the Congressional Research 
Service, November 5 1997, Washington D.C. 
16 Kerry Dumbaugh, China and Congress in 1992; op cit p.2. 
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and condemnation, with Democrats leading the protests. They 
argued that the Administration's adherence to the strategy of 
'Constructive Engagement' not only did little to address issues 
such as human rights and weapons proliferation, but sustained 
China's economic boom, and thus in effect, reinforced the 
Chinese regime's grip on power. 17 
The Democrats' distrust of the President was fuelled by 
his attitude towards the China policy-making process. It was 
perceived that Bush, as a former US Ambassador to China, was 
convinced that he knew how to deal with the Chinese and felt no 
need to explain or justify his policy either to Congress or to 
America at large. Indeed, many in Congress argued that the 
President's decision to send his National Security Advisor 
Brent Scowcroft and Assistant Secretary of State Lawrence 
Eagleburger to Beij ing on secret diplomatic missions in the 
July and December of 1989 exemplified this attitude. 18 China 
analyst Shirley Kan notes this weakness on China policy: 
" ... The voices of the critics were able to make a lot of 
headway in their criticism because Bush took a more elitist 
view of his approach to foreign policy, particularly in China 
17 James McGregor, Adi Ignatuis, Masayoshi Kanabayashi and 
Jacob M. Schlesinger, 'Major Powers Ponder Change in the US'; 
Wall Street Journal November 5 1992 p.9. 
18 Kerry Dumbaugh, China and Congress in 1992; op cit p.2. 
Stephen Yates of the Heritage Foundation argues that while the 
purpose of the missions (to maintain the long-term development 
of Sino-US relations) may have been correct, it may have been 
unwise in a post-Cold War world where the impact of global 
communications has heightened awareness of issues such as human 
rights. Interview with Stephen Yates, November 5 1997, Heritage 
Foundation, Washington D.C. 
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policy ... "19 
On the surface, President Bush prevailed in his battles 
with Congress on the issue of MFN conditionality by twice 
vetoing legislation in 1992. 20 It is interesting to note that 
the Senate sustained Bush's second veto following certain 
negotiations with the Administration. Democratic Senator Baucus 
(chair of the Trade Subcommittee) led a group of ten Senators 
in securing an agreement from the Administration to adopt a 
more aggressive stance in pursuing US interests in China. 21 In 
return, they tipped the balance in the Senate in favour of 
sustaining the Presidential veto. As one Republican 
Congressional staff member notes, this in effect represented 
"non-legislative conditionali ty" of MFN. 22 
While they failed in their attempt to impose legislative 
conditions on China's MFN status, the pro-linkage majority in 
Congress (principally the Democrats) won an important symbolic 
victory. The Bush vetoes allowed them to portray the President 
as insensitive to the issue of human rights in China; a highly 
19 Interview with Shirley Kan, op cit. By contrast, the 
developing stance of the Clinton China policy could be seen as 
popularist, though as will be explained in later chapters, the 
failure to articulate motives and objectives would become a 
critical flaw in his own China policy. 
20 Bush vetoed HR 2212 on March 2, and HR 5318 on September 
28 1992. 
21 The group of ten, which included three Democrats, 
communicated their position in a letter to the President on 
July 30 1992. ~Two Bills Limiting Trade with China Vetoed'; op 
cit pp.160-161. Kerry Dumbaugh cites the number of this group 
as fifteen. Kerry Dumbaugh, China and Congress in 1992; op cit 
p.4. 
22 Interview with James McCormick, 
Congressional staff member, November 10 1997, 
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senior Republican 
Washington D.C. 
damaging depiction in the context of the US China debate in the 
wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre. 23 As one senior 
Democratic Congressional staff member observes: "It was a very 
clever and deliberate strategy ... whereby Democrats lost 
legislatively but won politically, because they forced Bush to 
fight on ground which he didn't really choose to fight on. "24 
It must be noted that many members of Congress advocated a 
strategy of linkage and the application of conditions to 
China's MFN status not (simply) because of the political 
advantage of doing so, but because they possessed a genuine 
concern for issues such as human rights, weapons proliferation, 
trade, and so on. 25 These members of Congress may not have 
shared exactly the same concerns regarding China, but they were 
effectively united in their belief that US interests in China 
should be pursued with greater determination, and by their 
frustration with the efforts of the Bush Administration. 26 One 
Democrat Congressional staff member points to the degree of 
bipartisan cooperation on the linkage legislation of 1990-1992, 
23 Richard Bush, 'Cl in ton and China: 
Future' ; The China Business Review vol. 20 
February 1993 pp.17-18. 
Scenarios 
issue 1 
for the 
January-
24 Interview with Richard Bush, op cit. This observation is 
also made by Ambassador Richard Armacost. Interview, November 
12 1997, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C. 
25 This point is stressed by a Policy Director to a senior 
Democrat Senator. Interview with Edward B Gresser, Policy 
Director to Senator Max Baucus, October 31 1997, Washington 
D.C. 
26 Dumbaugh argues that a perception of a duplicitous, and 
'drifting' Bush China policy prompted in part the 
diversification and intensification of Congressional interests 
in China policy. Kerry Dumbaugh, China and Congress in 1992; op 
cit 'Summary' and pp.2-3. 
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and the size of the majorities in their passing. 27 Nevertheless 
David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on US-
China Relations, identifies a degree of cynicism amongst this 
Congressional coalition. Acknowledging Nancy Pelosi's 
commitment to the issue of human rights, for example, he argues 
that this commitment also reflected her desire to attain a 
higher political and media profile, on an issue that would not 
offend her domestic constituents. 28 
The Development of Clinton•s Campaign Stance on China 
CLINTON PICKS UP THE POLITICAL TORCH 
The political lessons provided by the Congressional challenge 
to the Bush Administration's China policy were not lost on the 
presidential hopeful Bill Clinton. Indeed, at times he would 
raise the issue of China during his campaign as a reflection of 
the on-going conflict between the two branches of government 
over the issue of MFN conditionality. 29 The incumbent was the 
only major contender for the 1992 Presidential election that 
favoured unconditional extension of China's MFN status. All the 
27 Interview with Ed Gresser op cit. 
28 Interview 
National Committee 
14 1997, New York. 
with David M. Lampton, President of the 
on United States - China Relations, November 
29 Stephen Yates points out that, as an indication of their 
credibility, presidential candidates must respond to issues as 
they arise as if they are the President, though without the 
complexities of having to implement their proposals. Interview 
with Stephen Yates, op cit. 
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senior Democratic challengers reflected the nature of 
Congressional legislation introduced by Representative Pelosi 
and Senator Mitchell. Tsongas and Brown, for example, demanded 
clear human rights improvements. Both highlighted China's 
export of products of prison labour, while Tsongas also 
emphasised political detention and political and religious 
repression in Tibet. 30 The Republican challenger Patrick 
Buchanan went further, demanding the immediate revocation of 
China's MFN status on the basis of the Tiananmen Square 
massacre and the Bush Administration's subsequent engagement 
with the Chinese regime. 31 
Thus Bill Clinton echoed Congressional criticism of the 
Bush Administration's China policy, and the call for conditions 
to be placed on its MFN status. Nevertheless, his statements 
were often highly rhetorical, and offered little specific 
detail. 32 Of greater importance to the Clinton campaign, 
certainly with regard to China policy, was the impression or 
image suggested by his statements. In other words, Clinton 
reflected the prevalent mood within Congress and the populace 
in what he appeared to say, rather than the specific detail of 
his proposals. 
Kerry Dumbaugh argues that any Democratic candidate, and 
30 Norman Kempster, 'US Candidates' Stands on Foreign 
Issues'; Los Angeles Times March 17 1992 p.C7. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Don Oberdorfer, 'Where Bush and Clinton Veer: Adjusting 
to Post-Cold War Realities'; International Herald Tribune 
September 30 1997, and James McGregor et al, 'Major Powers 
Ponder Change in the US'; op cit p.9. 
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Clinton in particular, would be compelled to adopt this 
strategy and this policy stance. 33 clinton had few foreign 
policy credentials while Bush had a highly respected foreign 
policy record. However, despite drawing support for his post-
Tiananmen China policy from many ~China watchers' and foreign 
policy observers, it was recognised that this issue presented a 
political and electoral weakness due to its wider unpopularity. 
It is no surprise therefore that Clinton exploited this 
particular weakness, in an attempt both to sabotage Bush's 
foreign policy strengths and to refine his own foreign policy 
platform. 
China policy became perhaps the foreign policy issue on 
which Bush and Cl in ton appeared to differ the most. 34 
Furthermore, the issue did undermine the incumbent's propriety 
and political credibility on foreign policy. For example, 
significant criticism of the Bush stance on China arose at the 
Republican Convention in the summer of 1992 reflecting, in 
part, the party's discomfort at their Presidential candidate's 
political vulnerability on this issue. 35 As has been discussed 
in an earlier chapter, while Cl in ton was quick to praise the 
most popular and respected facets of the Bush international 
record, he was determined to portray the incumbent as a 
realpolitik relic of the Cold War, out of touch with America's 
33 Interview 
Affairs, November 
Washington D.C. 
with Kerry Dumbaugh, Specialist 
5 1997, Congressional Research 
in Asian 
Service, 
34 William Drozdiak, ~Clinton to Allies: Continuity is the 
Key'; International Herald Tribune October 8 1997 p.6. 
35 Ted Galen Carpenter, interview op cit. 
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Post-Cold War interests. Clinton's assault on the Bush 
Administration's China policy clearly served this objective, 
and indeed it was a feature of his first major foreign policy 
address of the campaign, at Georgetown University School of 
Foreign Service, Washington, December 12 1991. Referring to 
Bush's decision to maintain relations with the Chinese 
Government after the Tiananmen Square massacre, Clinton 
insisted: 
"Such forbearance on our part might have made sense 
during the Cold War, when China was a counterweight 
to Soviet power. But it makes no sense to play the 
China card now, when our opponents have thrown in 
their hand. "36 
Furtherstill Clinton's statements on China allowed him to 
portray Bush as being out of touch with the mood of the 
American people, and indifferent to American normative values. 37 
Clinton pursued this strategy in an address to the World 
Affairs Council in Los Angeles on August 13 1992: 
·"When China cracked down on pro-democracy 
demonstrators, exported advanced weapons to radical 
36 Bill Clinton ~A New Covenant for American Security' i 
speech reproduced in Paul Averwald (ed) , ~President-Elect 
Clinton' s Foreign Policy Statements' i op cit. A more detailed 
version of this speech appears as an article in Harvard 
International Review Summer 1992. 
37 Clinton first presented this argument in his Georgetown 
University address, December 12 1991. The candidate argued that 
Bush's preference for close personal ties with foreign leaders 
had" ... led him to side with China's communist rulers after the 
democratic uprising of students." Ibid. 
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regimes, and suppressed Tibet, Mr Bush failed to 
stand up for our values. Instead, he sent secret 
emissaries to China, signalling that we would do 
business as usual with those who murdered freedom in 
Tiananmen Square." 
Clinton continued: 
"From the Baltics to Beij ing, from Sarajevo to South 
Africa, time after time, George Bush had sided with 
the status quo rather than democratic change - with 
familiar tyrants rather than those who would 
overthrow them and with the old geography of 
repression rather than the new map of freedom. "38 
Thus Bill Clinton highlighted the issue of China to 
undercut Bush's strong foreign policy representations, and to 
define Bush as incapable of adapting and leading America into 
the Post-Cold War era. Concomitantly, it was intended that 
China policy would further define a Clinton foreign policy 
platform that stressed the importance of democracy, human 
rights, new security threats and trade. 39 Moreover, it would 
38 Address to the World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, 
August 13 1992: reproduced ibid. Clinton repeated this charge 
in a speech in Milwaukee on October 1 1992. He chastised Bush 
for not " ... supporting democracy around the world in a manner 
worthy of our heritage, our ideals, and our name ... ", 
continuing, "There is no more striking example of President 
Bush's indifference to democracy than his policy towards 
China."; Edward Walsh, 'Clinton Indicts Bush's World 
Leadership'; Washington Post October 2 1992. 
39 The inconsistencies 
China policy, and his wider 
between 
foreign 
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Clinton's proposals for 
and domestic mandate will 
appear to demonstrate to the public that Clinton was in touch 
with American values and interests, and committed to 
implementing a foreign policy defined by them. 40 
Clinton's Campaign Statements on China Policy and MFN 
Before a more thorough examination of Clinton's campaign 
statements on China policy and China's MFN status can be made, 
two broad and important observations must be highlighted. The 
first concerns the implications of the robust and often 
condemnatory rhetoric employed by Clinton. The second concerns 
the variety of inconsistencies that arose in his statements and 
proposals on China policy. In essence, these observations 
reflect the degree to which political and electoral interests 
influenced the evolution of Clinton' s stance on China. One 
important consequence of this approach to policy development 
was the measure of uncertainty and ambiguity that characterised 
the President-Elect's policy by January 1993. 41 
be discussed later in the chapter. 
4
° Following the election, Leslie H. Gelb noted that 
Clinton was more suited to the practice of normative interests 
than realpolitik. Specifying Clinton as a "moderate", Gelb 
argued that moderates" ... feel awkward wielding raw power. They 
prefer using it only on behalf of high principles such as human 
rights." Leslie H. Gelb, 'Clinton Should Play Hardball in the 
Transition Game'; International Herald Tribune November 9 1992. 
This statement may have reflected a level of expectancy 
prompted by Clinton's promotion of the issue during the 
election campaign. 
41 This ambiguity is noted by Martin Walker and Hella Pick, 
'Democrats See Finance as Linchpin of New Order'; The Guardian 
November 5 1992. 
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Clinton did not shy away from confrontational and 
reproachful language when expressing his views on China and the 
Bush Administration's China policy. Indeed his terminology and 
style echoed the majority of American views of China at the 
time/ and reflected the voices of the critics of US China 
policy. Typical of this tactic was Clinton's description of the 
President's post-Tiananmen relationship with Beijing. Speaking 
in December 1991 1 Clinton argued that: 
"The Administration continues to coddle 
despite its continuing crackdown on democratic 
reforms/ its brutal subjugation of Tibet/ its 
irresponsible exports of nuclear and missile 
technology/ its support for the homicidal Khmer Rouge 
in Cambodia 1 and its abusive trade practices. "42 
Clinton resumed this theme in his April 1 speech to the 
Foreign Policy Association/ protesting that " ... the President 
continues to coddle aging rulers ... "43 1 while in his August 
13 speech in Los Angeles he referred to Bush's patronage of 
" ... familiar tyrants rather than those who would overthrow 
them ... "44 
As stated/ Clinton's style of rhetoric suited the 
prevalent mood within America with regard to China/ and thus he 
42 Bill Clinton 1 ~A New Covenant for American Security'; op 
cit. 
43 Speech reproduced in Paul Averwald 1 ~President-Elect 
Clinton's Foreign Policy Statements'; op cit. 
44 Ibid. 
205 
205 
could expect to profit politically from its use. This is not to 
suggest that such judgements were without legitimate 
foundation, or that Clinton may not have held such views 
himself. 45 However, this style of rhetoric carried a number of 
implications that would prove detrimental to the 
Administration's implementation of China policy later on. 
One clear problem was that it perpetuated a simplistic and 
flawed view of China and of US-China relations. Clinton either 
neglected or chose not to identify and articulate a clear 
hierarchy of US interests in China, explain the objectives 
behind a Clinton Administration's China policy (a criticism 
levelled at the Bush Administration), or identify the positive 
as well as the negative trends within China. Thus the public 
and political debate on the complex and multi-dimensional us-
China relationship continued to be dominated by post-Tiananmen 
parochialism and misperception. Put another way, it would take 
the experience of a number of significant policy and political 
crises, prompted in part by this simplistic approach to China, 
before the elite within the Clinton Administration would 
proceed to gain a more comprehensive and beneficial 
appreciation of US-China relations. 
Clinton' s China rhetoric carried the risk of failing to 
distinguish in the eyes of America, the nature and intentions 
of the Chinese government from those of ordinary Chinese 
45 Having observed Cl in ton's handling of China policy, 
including his navigation of the Sino-US Summit in Washington in 
late October 1997, Stephen Yates of the Heritage Foundation is 
convinced that human rights possess a strong personal appeal to 
the President. Thus Bill Clinton sustains a genuine, personal 
distaste for the Chinese government. Interview op cit. 
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citizens. This type of opacity may have been fuelled by Anthony 
Lake's inclusion of China in a list of 'rogue states' whose 
behaviour demanded specific responses from US foreign and 
security policy. When combined with America's proclivity to 
oscillate between viewing China and the Chinese either with 
fascination or with fear and distaste (the latter being in 
ascendence at the time), such portrayals of 'China' did little 
to inform the China debate. It must be noted that Clinton did 
occasionally contrast the Chinese government and Chinese 
citizens in his campaign speeches. However, in doing so, he 
clung to the simplified imagery that fed US parochialism. For 
example, in his April 1 address, Clinton referred to the 
" ... brave men and women [who] fight for freedom in China ... "46 
Later, in his August 13 speech, the candidate spoke of the 
"pro-democracy demonstrators" and the "freedom-loving people" 
of China. 47 While these descriptions of the citizens of China 
were not wholly inaccurate, they perpetuated an incomplete and 
thus misleading interpretation of the events of May-June 1989, 
and the subsequent political and social development in China 
ever since. In essence, Cl in ton retained the idea that the 
Tiananmen protesters were driven solely by the demand for and 
defence of American normative values such as democracy. 
One China analyst working in the State Department during 
the campaign notes the problems associated with the use of such 
46 Speech reproduced in Paul Averwald, 'President-Elect 
Clinton's Foreign Policy Statements'; op cit. 
47 Ibid. 
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imagery in the Cl in ton campaign. 48 He argues that such a 
simplification of the US view of China continued to prevent a 
much needed comprehensive China policy debate from taking 
place. 49 Moreover, in describing China and specifically the 
Chinese government in such terms, Clinton created a self-
fulfilling prophecy. That is to say, the analyst seriously 
questioned the wisdom of a campaign strategy in which Clinton 
vilified Beijing and promised a confrontational and 
uncompromising US China policy, while forecasting that such an 
approach would secure concessions, progress and cooperation 
from his Chinese counterparts. 
A related implication of Clinton's rhetoric on China 
concerned America's expectations of a Clinton Administration 
China policy. The alliance of Clinton's rhetoric and his 
proposals for the conditioning of China's MFN status (examined 
below) raised the hopes of human rights advocates and those 
demanding Chinese progress in other areas of US interest. This 
anticipation elevated the political pressure on the prospective 
Clinton Administration, particularly in the wake of the 
unpopularity of the Bush Administration's China policy. 50 The 
nature and level of expectation, in turn, would compound the 
48 Interview with Frank Jannuzi Professional Staff Member 
to Senator Biden and former Asia and Pacific (China) Analyst in 
the State Department, November 12 1997, Washington D.C. 
49 In particular the 'dehumanising' effects of Clinton' s 
terminology. 
50 See for example David M. Lampton, 'China Policy in 
Clinton's First Year'; in James R. Lilley and Wendell L. 
Willkie II (eds) , Beyond MFN: Trade with China and American 
Interests; AEI Press (Washington, 1994) p.15. 
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Administration's difficulties in handling China policy through 
1993 and 1994. 
Nevertheless, Clinton did not abide exclusively to 
confrontational rhetoric on China. He acknowledged that China 
would become an ever more significant actor in Asian and global 
affairs as it developed economically, politically and 
militarily. Thus he repeated the opinion that it would be 
imprudent to isolate China through the conduct of China 
policy. 51 This opinion was no doubt related to a further vision 
of China. This concerned the growing awareness in the US of the 
burgeoning economic opportunities offered by the growth and 
development of the Chinese economy. 52 Cl in ton specific 
references to this theme were rare; for example noting that 
China's high economic growth could 11 ••• generate jobs in this 
country and real opportunity ... 11 • 53 In fact, in December the 
President-Elect spoke of 11 ••• our obligation to continue trade 
51 For example see Clinton's comments in his October 1 1992 
speech in Milwaukee; the first presidential debate on October 
11; remarks to the press on November 19; and a statement 
following his 'Economic Summit' at Little Rock, December 15. 
'In His Own Words: Cl in ton on China MFN' ; The China Business 
Review vol. 20 issue 1 January/February 1993 pp .18-19. The 
desire not to isolate China would be one proposal of China 
policy Clinton would keep. Indeed, it would contribute to the 
lack of credibility and logic behind the Administration's MFN 
1993 linkage strategy. 
52 For example see Harry Harding, 'The Emergence of Greater 
China: How US Policy Will Have to Change'; The American 
Enterprise May/June 1992, and James R. Lilley, 'Trade and the 
Waking Giant', and Claude E. Barfield, 'US-China Trade and 
Investment in the 1990s', in James R. Lilley and Wendell L. 
Willkie II (eds), Beyond MFN; op cit. 
53 Statement following 'Economic Summit' at Little Rock, 
December 15 1992. 'In His Own Words: Clinton on China MFN'; op 
cit p.19. 
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with the Chinese. "54 However, this issue assumes far greater 
importance in the context of Clinton's promulgations concerning 
trade policy, US competitiveness in the global economy, and the 
assertion that there was no higher foreign and domestic 
priority than reviving the domestic economy. The candidate 
often stressed the need to irradicate trade barriers, and 
expand and promote market economics (and democracy) in Asia and 
elsewhere, as a cornerstone of American post-Cold War foreign 
policy. Given these stated priorities, and the influence of 
advisors such as the strongly pro-business Ron Brown, it is 
naive to think that the potential of trade and investment in 
China did not inform Clinton's preparations for the presidency 
to some degree. 
However, although Cl in ton did raise issues such as the 
importance of not isolating China and China's economic 
opportunities, they did not set the tone for his statements on 
US China policy. Rather it was his insistence of improvements 
in China's conduct in areas such as human rights, weapons 
proliferation, and international trade, and his support for the 
strategy of linking China's MFN status to these concerns. 
Bill Clinton's statements on China policy and China's MFN 
status reveal certain consistencies and inconsistencies. As the 
presidential campaign developed, Clinton constantly redefined 
the issues and conditions on which MFN linkage would be based 
under his Administration. He remodified his specifications of 
54 Ibid. Clinton spoke of 
"other obligations" (presumably 
proliferation, market access etc) 
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the possibility of pursuing 
the issues of human rights, 
alongside this obligation. 
the sectors of the Chinese economy to which linkage would be 
applied. Moreover, there were clear inconsistencies and 
ambiguity in the degree to which Clinton appeared to commit 
himself to the strategy of MFN linkage. Nevertheless, Clinton 
ensured that the issue of China's MFN status and the strategy 
of linkage remained the defining feature of his proposals on 
China policy. 
Both the inconsistencies and the consistencies of 
Clinton's proposals can be explained by the fact that political 
and electoral motives outweighed strategic considerations in 
the development of his stance. Put another way, Clinton's 
stance on China retained sufficient flexibility to ensure it 
remained responsive to, and associated with the most popular 
view at the time, if not strategic consistency and 
credibility. 55 
Lampton highlights three issues on which Clinton's views 
changed, and three phases running through the campaign and into 
the new Administration that broadly demonstrate when these 
changes occurred. 56 In the first phase, concluding in September 
1992 57 , Lampton notes that Clinton supported the implementation 
55 It is important to reiterate that opinion in America 
remained divided as to whether China would become a friend or 
foe to the US as it developed. As James McGregor et al note at 
the time, post-Cold War analysts are '' ... uncertain whether to 
view China from a geo-political Cold War angle or to focus on 
the increasingly important bilateral trade relationship." 
'Major Powers Ponder Change in the US'; op cit. 
56 David M. Lampton, 'China Policy in Cl in ton's First 
Year'; op cit pp.13-15. 
57 Lampton begins his analysis in June 1992, shortly before 
Clinton secured his party's presidential nomination. 
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of legislation that would condition China's MFN status on 
improvements in human rights and other issues, applied to the 
whole Chinese economy. The second phase, from September to the 
election on November 4 features a similar stance with the 
exception that Clinton promised to target specific sectors of 
the Chinese economy rather than impose across-the-board 
tariffs. In the third phase, running from a November 19 press 
statement into his Administration in 1993, Lampton argues that 
Clinton backed away from the apparent commitment of his 
previous pronouncements. However, the President-Elect appeared 
to retain his support for some form of conditionality premised 
on human rights improvements. Indeed, Lampton stresses that 
Clinton did in fact adhere to this latter, rather vague 
commitment throughout. 58 
Clinton announced his advocacy of conditionality in his 
first foreign policy address of the campaign on December 12 
1991. In a relatively non-specific proposal in support of his 
pledge to promote democracy world-wide, Clinton argued: 
''In extreme cases, such as that of China, we should 
condition favourable trade terms on political 
liberalization and responsible international 
conduct . "59 
58 David M. Lampton, ~China Policy in Clinton's First 
Year'; op cit p.l3. 
59 Address to Georgetown University School of Foreign 
Service, Washington; reproduced in Paul Averwald ( ed) , 
'President-Elect Clinton's Foreign Policy Statements, December 
12 1991- November 4 1992'; op cit. 
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The candidate also announced his intention to create a Radio 
Free Asia, a pledge his eventually fulfilled. 
Establishing a trend sustained throughout the presidential 
campaign, Clinton's stance reflected initiatives in the 
Democrat-controlled Congress to implement legislation 
conditioning China's MFN status. Late November 1991 had 
witnessed the presentation of a compromise House-Senate bill 
(HR 2122) designed to withdraw MFN in 1992, unless China 
demonstrated progress in specific areas of human rights, 
international security and trade relations. 60 
It is possible that the vague nature of Clinton's 
statement reflected the protean approach to such legislation 
in Congress at the time. Earlier versions of HR 2212 revealed 
Congress' enthusiasm for an expanding list of US interests in 
China. For example, the Gulf Conflict had prompted interest in 
weapons proliferation (to the Middle East) , there was 
increasing awareness of China's unfair trade practices, and 
frustration was growing at the lack of progress on human 
rights. 61 However, given the wide variety of protests and 
demands, Congress (particularly the House) found it difficult 
to agree on a specific set of conditions. The price of this 
complexity was Congress' inability to pass a bill with a 
60 Wayne M. Morris on, Vladimir N. Pregelj, Kerry Dumbaugh 
and Jeanne Grimmett, Most-Favoured-Nation Status and China; op 
cit p.15, and Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 'Two Bills 
Limiting Trade with China Vetoed'; op cit p.157. 
61 Kerry Dumbaugh, China and Congress in 1992; op cit pp.4-
50 
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majority sufficient to overcome President Bush' s . veto. 62 In 
effect, Congress offered no clear, ready-made China policy that 
Clinton could adopt. Moreover, at this early stage of the 
campaign, it served Clinton's electoral interests simply to be 
associated with this general attitude towards China. 
Given the traditional focus on domestic issues during the 
Primaries season, it is unsurprising that Clinton did little to 
substantiate his China policy for some time. Rather, he 
preferred to stick to his rhetorical condemnation of the Bush 
Administration's China policy. However, he did refine his 
position on MFN in the spring, arguing that it should become 
subject to human rights progress and an end to China's 
11 irresponsible 11 export of arms. 63 This statement did entrench 
his commitment to a linkage strategy, in that it prefaced the 
final Senate vote on HR 2212, on March 18 1992. The House had 
voted to override Bush's veto of HR 2212 seven days earlier, 
but the Senate's approval of the bill fell short of the two 
thirds required to sustain the override, and thereby extended 
China's MFN status from July 1992 to June 1993. 64 
In June, Clinton responded directly to the standoff 
between the Bush Administration and Congress over MFN. He 
allied himself explicitly with new Congressional initiatives to 
62 Bush vetoed HR 2212 in March 1992, and a second bill the 
following September. 
63 Norman Kempster, 'US Candidates' Stands on Foreign 
Issues' ; op cit. 
64 Centre for Strategic and International Studies: US-China 
Policy Task Force, Developing a Consensus for the Future: Panel 
Report; 1996 Appendix I 'Chronology of Key Issues in Sino-US 
Relations' p. 65. 
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condition China's trade status, and in doing so, defined his 
stance further. Congress, correctly anticipating Bush's renewal 
of China's MFN status on June 2 1992, had instigated a fresh 
wave of legislation, with the intention of overriding both the 
MFN renewal and the inevitable Bush veto. 65 On June 3 Clinton 
urged: 
"It is time to put America back on the side of 
democracy and freedom. I hope the Congress will move 
quickly to enact legislation and that the President 
will allow it to become the law of this land. 66 
Although he did not declare it explicitly, in endorsing 
Congressional legislation (in effect HR 5318) Clinton adopted a 
particular stance. HR 5318 bore strong similarities its 
predecessor HR 2212, to which Clinton had implied his support. 
HR 5318 also made China's MFN conditional on progress in the 
areas of human rights, international security and trade 
relations. However, in a concession to concerns for the 
consequences of a complete revocation of China's MFN status, HR 
5318 promised to target state-owned enterprises. 67 
65 While a number of bills were introduced in the House and 
the Senate (many similar, but some reflecting the particular 
concerns of particular members of Congress) , this new attempt 
was spearheaded by HR 5318. Wayne M. Morrison, Vladimir N. 
Pregelj, Kerry Dumbaugh and Jeanne Grimmet, Most-Favoured-
Nation Status and China; op cit p.15. 
66 
'In His Own Words: Clinton on China MFN'; The China 
Business Review op cit p.18. 
67 Concerns were raised for the economic consequences for 
the US and China's Asian neighbours, and the political 
consequences for liberalising forces within China, of a 
complete revocation of China's MFN. 
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This vital feature of the latest attempt at legislation 
was missing from Clinton/Gore position paper published in the 
June. Also missing was any reference to issues of international 
security. The position paper argued: 
"We should not reward China with improved trade 
status when it has continued to trade goods made by 
prison labour and has failed to make sufficient 
progress on human rights since the Tiananmen Square 
massacre. " 68 
Nevertheless, Clinton reinserted the issue of security in 
an address at the Democratic Party convention on July 14 1992. 
He advocated conditionality of China's trade status on 
" ... respect for human rights in China and Tibet, greater market 
access for US goods, and responsible conduct on weapons 
proliferation.'' 69 The unprecedented inclusion of Tibet probably 
reflected a specific reference to it in HR 5318. In his foreign 
policy address to the World Affairs Council on August 13, 
Clinton retained his commitment to the same three baskets of US 
concerns in promising: ''We will link China's trading privileges 
to its human rights record and its conduct on trade and weapons 
sales. "70 While the brevity of this statement is unsurprising 
given that the address covered a wide range of foreign policy 
68 
'In His Own Words: Clinton on China MFN'; The China 
Business Review op cit p.18. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Address reproduced in Paul Averwald (ed), 'President-
Elect Clinton's Foreign Policy Statements, December 12 1991 -
November 4 1992'; op cit. 
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issues, it is interesting to note one significant omission in 
this commitment. Clinton neglected the question of whether the 
whole of the Chinese economy or just the state-owned sector 
should be subject to conditionality. This question was a 
dominant feature of the China policy debate at the time, and 
indeed, Clinton had already appeared to endorse the latter 
approach in his advocacy of the ongoing initiatives in 
Congress. 
However, just over a month later, Clinton offered a much 
clearer articulation of his China policy stance. Once again he 
was responding to developments within Congress. On September 
14, the Senate followed the earlier approval of HR 5318 in the 
House by voicing their own support. 71 Clinton backed this 
decision: 
"The legislation passed today in the Senate proposes 
a reasonable and carefully designed mix of carrots 
and sticks to move China in the right direction. I 
believe this legislation will advance our interests 
in the region and hasten the dawn of freedom and 
democracy in America ... For years, the Administration 
has argued that even conditioning let alone 
revoking - China's trading privileges would hurt both 
American business and the reformers and entrepreneurs 
we seek to help. But the bill just passed in the 
Senate meets that argument by targeting only 
71 
'Two Bills Limiting Trade with 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac op cit p.157. 
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China Vetoed'; 
government -owned enterprises. 1172 
By endorsing HR 5318 so explicitly, Clinton clarified his 
stance in three important areas. Firstly, he adhered to his 
recommendation that MFN be linked to human rights, trade and 
proliferation. Secondly, he endorsed the legislative 
enforcement of linkage. Thirdly, Clinton advocated the 
proposition that only state-owned enterprises should be 
targeted. Thus in shadowing the evolution of Congressional 
legislation on this matter, Cl in ton's own stance had evolved 
into a clear, itemized commitment to conditionality of China's 
MFN status. 
Clinton's September 14 declaration also revealed a 
significant aspect to this stance. Cl in ton argued: "One day 
[China] too will go the way of the communist regimes in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union. The United States must do 
what it can to encourage that process. " 73 
Clinton's acceptance of this argument was illuminated 
further by David Aaron, former National Security Advisor to 
Carter and member of Clinton's campaign team. 74 Aaron indicated 
that the candidate was prepared to wait for a new generation of 
72 
'In His Own Words: Cl in ton on China MFN' ; The China 
Business Review op cit p.18. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Aaron visited Germany and France in the June and October 
respectively on Cl in ton's behalf to advise European officials 
on Clinton's foreign policy proposals. William Drozdiak, 
'Clinton to Allies: Continuity is the Key'; op cit. 
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Chinese leaders that respected democracy and human rights. 75 
This view was prevalent in the US China debate at the time. 76 
Moreover, one of its strongest proponents was respected former 
US Ambassador to China Wins ton Lord. It is unclear at which 
point Lord joined the Clinton campaign team as an advisor, but 
it certainly informed Lord's advocacy of the strategy of 
linkage. Lord in effect presented a ready-made China policy 
that would be adopted by Clinton when he appointed him 
Secretary of State for the East Asia and Pacific region. 
In the first presidential campaign debate on October 11 
1992, Clinton appeared to redefine his position again. 
Acknowledging the positive effect of Congress on US China 
policy, he went on to insist: 
" ... I would be firm. I would say, ~If you want to 
continue Most Favoured Nation Status through your 
government-owned industries, as well as your private 
ones, observe human rights in the future." 77 
Thus Clinton appeared to alter his position on the question of 
whether linkage should be applied to specific sectors, or to 
all of the Chinese economy. It is also worth noting that ten 
days earlier the George Mitchell camp in the Senate had failed 
75 Ibid p. 6. 
76 This statement of intent acquired the label ~peaceful 
evolution', and was repeated in Warren Christopher's address to 
the Secretary of State confirmation hearings. It also provoked 
great resentment in Beijing. 
77 ~In His own Words: Clinton on China MFN' ; The China 
Business Review op cit p.19. 
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to override the Bush veto of HR 5318, thus ending that phase of 
Congressional attempts to impose conditionality legislation. 78 
In the absence of a clear Congressional lead on the linkage 
strategy, the Clinton team inherited greater freedom in the 
definition of their China policy stance. Moreover, polls 
suggested that Clinton would win the Presidential election. 
There was no further need to define a China policy in line with 
Clinton's political and electoral objectives. 
These considerations are reflected in Clinton's statements 
on China policy and China's MFN status following the election. 
As Lampton observes, Clinton retreated from the condemnational 
rhetoric (aimed both at China and the Bush Administration) that 
had characterised his earlier pronouncements. Similarly, his 
statements on China's MFN status lost some of the clarity and 
apparent strength of commitment demonstrated, for example, in 
his September 14 and October 11 statements. In comments to the 
press following discussions with President Bush on November 19, 
the President-Elect retained his concern for human rights 
progress, but forsook any clear commitment to linkage of MFN. 
He did argue that China had a strong interest in its trade with 
the US (and its $15 billion surplus), and that the US had a 
strong interest in not isolating China. 79 However, acknowledging 
recent indications of Chinese moderation on important bilateral 
78 
'Two Bills Limiting Trade With 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac op cit p.157. 
China Vetoed'; 
79 
'In His own Words: Cl in ton on China MFN'; The China 
Business Review op ci t p. 19. The view that China was heavily 
dependent on its trade with America, and thus would make 
concessions on other issues to maintain that trade was central 
to the pro-linkage argument. 
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issues, Cl in ton suggested only that 11 ••• a firm hand by our 
government can help to achieve [human rights progress] 11 BC 
Clinton continued to back away in December 1992. Convening 
an 'Economic Summit' of advisors at Little Rock, Arkansas, he 
appeared to dilute both his rhetoric and his commitment to 
linkage further: 
11 
••• I don't think we' 11 have to revoke MFN status. 
And I don't favour revocation of [MFN for] the 
market-orientated private sector companies; and I 
don't favour revocation of the State-owned 
industries' MFN status if we can achieve continued 
progress. I don't want to do it economically, and I 
don't want to do it politically, but I think we've 
got to stick up for ourselves and for the things we 
believe in and how those people are treated in that 
country ... The last thing in the world I want to do is 
isolate them but I think that our country has other 
obligations that I believe we can pursue in concert 
with our obligation to continue to trade with the 
Chinese. 1181 
REVIEWING CLINTON'S CAMPAIGN STATEMENTS ON CHINA 
80 Ibid. 
81 Statement, December 15 1992. Ibid. Similarly, asked how 
he would deal with China at a press conference on December 22, 
he responded, 11 I will do my best to negotiate and to be firm 
and [move] forward" . He did however express some concern over 
human rights, weapons proliferation and trade. 'Hong Kong: 
Clinton Speaks'; Far Eastern Economic Review January 7 1993 
p.l2. 
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The withdrawal from the stridency shown in his earlier 
pronouncements created an air of uncertainty regarding the 
prospective Cl in ton Administration China policy. Sus an 
Awanohara, writing in the Far Eastern Economic Review, argued 
that: "Divided counsel and confusing signals are increasingly 
evident on the subject of promoting democracy and human 
rights ... " adding that Cl in ton had weakened his promise to 
promote democracy through " ... numerous pragmatic caveats and 
qualifiers. "82 
It had been suggested that Clinton's withdrawal from his 
earlier more explicit declarations may have reflected the 
sobering prospect of securing the presidency and actually 
having to implement a China policy. 83 This is of course a 
recognition of the political and electoral motives, rather than 
strategic concerns, that lay behind Clinton's campaign stance 
on China. It is also true to say that given the level of 
expectation created by Clinton' s earlier commitments on China 
policy, his post-election statements appeared rather less 
defined. In turn, this triggered doubts about the nature of the 
forthcoming policy. 84 Indeed, one Congressional Democratic party 
aide argues that Clinton' s statements on conditionality of 
China's MFN status were generally misinterpreted. He asserts 
82 Susan Awanohara, 'President Clinton'; Far Eastern 
Economic Review November 12 1992 p.11. 
83 Interview with Ted Galen Carpenter op cit and David M. 
Lampton, 'China Policy in Clinton's First Year'; op cit p.14. 
84 This theme is discussed later in the chapter. 
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that Clinton in fact retained a flexible approach to dealing 
with China, in contrast to the approach proposed by Senator 
George Mitchell. 85 Wins ton Lord, Cl in ton campaign advisor, and 
more importantly the person appointed by Clinton to implement 
China policy also asserts that the stance was far more balanced 
and considered than a simple threat to withdraw China's trade 
status. 86 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from Clinton's post-
election praise for China policy achievements in the latter 
months of the Bush Administration. In November 1991, Secretary 
of State Baker had been given assurances by Beij ing that it 
would comply with the parameters of the Missile Technology 
Control Regime, while the Administration had persuaded China to 
accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in March 1992. 87 
In addition Bush had reacted to protests concerning China's 
trade practices, and a tougher diplomatic approach secured a 
number of Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) in 1992. 88 In 
recommending these achievements, Clinton attributed them to the 
pressure exerted on the Bush Administration by the Democrat-
85 The aide argues that Clinton campaign officials were 
amongst those who misinterpreted Clinton's statements. 
Interview with Edward B. Gresser, Policy Director to Senator 
Max Baucus, op cit. 
86 Interview with former Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asia and Pacific Affairs Ambassador Winston Lord, November 
7 1997, New York. 
87 Kerry Dumbaugh, China and Congress in 1992; op ci t p .13. 
88 These included an MOU on the protection of intellectual 
property on January 16 1992, a much welcomed MOU prohibiting 
the export of prison labour products to the US on August 7, and 
an MOU on the elimination of Chinese trade barriers on October 
10. Ibid pp.15-16. 
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controlled Congress: 
" ... I noted with satisfaction in the last several 
months, when the Bush Administration, for whatever 
reasons 
climate 
maybe because of the changing political 
took a tougher line on goods made with 
prison labour, on unfair trade practices, we began to 
have more moderation. 1189 
It is interesting to note that Clinton's approval of this 
tougher diplomatic approach and the concessions it secured did 
not prevent Clinton's support (often hinted, sometimes 
explicit) of Congressional attempts to impose conditionality 
legislation. Thus by the end of the presidential campaign, 
Cl in ton appeared to be supportive of the results of Bush's 
Constructive Engagement China strategy on the one hand, while 
advocating the contrasting strategy of linkage and 
conditionality on the other. This echoed the wider tension in 
Clinton's foreign policy, that of articulating a framework of 
engagement and the promotion of democracy and market economies 
(in line with America's domestic renewal), that seemed at odds 
with his pledge to condition China's MFN status. 90 
It is probable that the candidate paid little attention to 
these apparent contradictions, as they did not affect his 
89 Press comments 
Bush, November 19 1992. 
MFN'; The China Business 
following discussions with 
~In His Own Words: Cl in ton 
Review op cit p.l9. 
President 
on China 
90 The foreign policy tensions created by Clinton's 
advocacy of conditionality for China's trading status are 
discussed later in the chapter. 
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prospects for electoral success. 91 Given the fact that once at 
the White House, Clinton only concerned himself with China 
policy when domestic political interests or crises demanded it, 
it is not unreasonable to conclude that he pursued the same 
approach prior to his presidency. Moreover, Clinton's political 
sensibilities would often lead him to adopt the most popular 
response to any given China question or issue, so it is no 
surprise that his stance on China contained these ambiguities 
and contradictions. 
As one former State Department official notes, China 
policy (particularly at that time) was a problematic issue to 
handle, politically. 92 He argues that engagement with the 
Chinese was not a ~feel-good' policy behind which the average 
American citizen could rally. Engagement required a 
comprehensive explanation of a complex, multi-faceted 
relationship built on long-term rather than short-term gains 
(irrespective of the actual success of the strategy) . Thus 
engagement with the Chinese was not an issue on which any 
politician could expect to derive easy credit or popularity. 
Clinton was a popularist politician; moreover, he was a 
politician running for the US presidency against the only 
candidate to advocate engagement. The interviewee concludes 
that given the fact that Clinton valued the presidency above 
almost any other objective, it was obvious that he would appear 
91 They would however return to haunt him following his 
inauguration. 
92 Interview with Frank Jannuzi, op cit. These views are 
also reflected by Shirley Kan, senior Congressional Research 
Service analyst; interview op cit. 
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to side with the 'China-bashers' 1 rather than those supporting 
engagement. 
Ted Galen Carpenter reasons that all presidential 
... 
candidates look no further than the election and that those 
that possess and articulate a genuine long-term vision tend not 
to get elected. 93 This suggests that once in office/ a president 
may pursue a programme of policies that differs significantly 
from those proposed during the election. Therefore/ while 
Clinton' s campaign statements had led popular US opinion and 
indeed many US-China interest groups (particularly elements 
within the human rights community) to expect a resolute and 
confrontational Clinton China policy/ many on the inside of the 
Beltway held different views. 94 
This awareness informed some of the conjecture on the 
likely Clinton China policy. Some Chinese officials were 
reportedly optimistic about the incoming Administration, basing 
their views on the sobering effect of actually governing, and 
Clinton's greater devotion to the importance of economics and 
trade. 95 Another reaction to the presidential election argued 
the likelihood of Clinton retaining a tough rhetorical approach 
to China, but choosing not to impose tough conditions on US-
China trade. 96 
93 Interview with Ted Galen Carpenter, op cit. 
94 Interview with Frank Jannuzi, op cit. 
95 The officials belonged to the Economic and Trade Office 
and the Special Economic Zone Office. 'Attack of Nerves'; Far 
Eastern Economic Review November 19 1992 p.20. 
96 Amy Borrus, Paul Magnussen, 
Lindorff, Gail E. Schares and bureau 
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Karen Lowry Miller, Dave 
reports, 'The World Sizes 
However, alternative arguments were also founded on the 
political nature of the campaign and the realities of 
governing. Clinton's statements on China had represented one of 
his clearest and most specific foreign policy proposals. 97 
Clinton' s political credibility would suffer if he failed to 
adhere to his campaign stance and commitments. This point is 
made by sinologist and Congressional staff member Richard Bush, 
with particular regard to Administration fears of likely 
Republican criticism in the event of a U-turn. 98 Therefore, from 
this perspective Clinton had no choice but to pursue a 
confrontational China policy founded on linkage and 
conditionality of China's MFN status, in accordance with his 
campaign statements. 99 
A third, more nuanced assessment combines a little of both 
of the above views. Mike Jendrzejczyk, Washington Director of 
Human Rights Watch: Asia believes in retrospect that Clinton 
had to appear to adhere to his campaign commitments, but ln 
fact was looking for a way out from a very early stage. 100 This 
argument recognises that political interests and concerns drove 
Clinton' s approach to China both during the campaign, and 
Up Clinton'; Business Week issue 3294 November 23 1992 p.31. 
97 In a rather vague and incidental foreign policy 
campaign. 
98 Richard Bush, ~Clinton and China: Scenarios for the 
Future'; op cit p.20. 
99 Interview with Richard Bush, op cit. Bush was commenting 
upon not his own expectations, but those in the wider political 
arena. 
100 Interview with Mike Jendrzejczyk, November 4 1997, 
Washington D.C. 
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during his Administration, and underplays the 'sobriety of 
governing' perspective. Jendrzejczyk argues: 
"I think there are some indications that there was at 
least some ambivalence, if not a deliberate decision 
made at some level, at some point to start backing 
away from the policy [of MFN linkage] . 11101 
Jendrzejczyk asserts that Clinton was less than committed to 
his promises to condition China's MFN status by the time he 
convened the 'Economic Summit' in Little Rock, in December 
1992: 
"Looking at Clinton's first comment in Little Rock on 
the 14th August [sic] how much of this was already on 
his mind, and the minds of some of his closest 
advisors ... who were much more coming from the 
economic and trade perspective; and it was just a 
question of time that he had to find a way to get 
around a Democratic Congress ... without looking like 
he was abandoning his own principles that he 
enunciated so clearly when he was running for 
president. " 102 
The inconsistencies of intent, and of strength of 
commitment revealed in Clinton' s campaign statements on China 
policy and China's MFN status highlight a crucial question: was 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
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Clinton a genuine advocate of a confrontational policy on 
China, and in favour of imposing some form of conditionality on 
China's MFN status? The existence of three differing 
perspectives on Clinton's commitment to his campaign proposals 
suggests that no proven answer is, as yet, available. Stephen 
Yates of the Heritage Foundation is persuaded that Clinton was 
a genuine advocate of human rights progress in China, even if 
he was less certain about the most appropriate way to pursue 
this objective in bilateral policy. 103 Similarly, Stephen 
Solarz, a Clinton advisor and Democratic Congressman during the 
campaign, believes that Clinton's public position was genuine, 
rather than one founded in cynical politics. 104 It is possible 
to conclude therefore that the 'softening' of Clinton' s 
statements on China policy, particularly after the election, 
and his praise of the latter achievements of the Bush 
Administration reflect an appreciation that conditionality did 
not offer the only route by which US interests could be pursued 
with China. Ted Galen Carpenter dismisses this idea: 
"I' m sceptical that Bill Cl in ton feels passionately 
about much of anything. I think he has an inclination 
to show concern about human rights issues generally, 
and particularly in the China context, but he's not 
above putting that concern on the backburner if other 
politically relevant factors intrude; and that has 
been the case with Bill Clinton on a host of issues 
103 Interview, op cit. 
104 Interview with Stephen Solarz, 
Washington D.C. 
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November 4 1997, 
throughout his political career. "105 
It is very probably true to say that Clinton was (and is) 
genuinely concerned by Chinese progress on human rights (as 
well as proliferation and trade), but was more concerned by 
political and electoral success. It is also true to say that 
Clinton' s personal engagement on the issue of China policy 
throughout the campaign can be strongly doubted, except for 
those instances where it would reap electoral benefits. 
Therefore it is necessary to examine the role of Clinton' s 
foreign policy advisors in order to understand the rationale 
behind Clinton's campaign stance on China. 
Clinton's Policy Advisors and the Stance on China 
Clinton's utilisation of a large number of foreign policy 
advisors during the campaign has been discussed earlier. 
However, it is clear that certain figures contributed 
specifically to the candidate's pronouncements on, and 
proposals, for China. The roles, backgrounds and possible 
impact of these advisors will now be examined, but two 
observations can be made in advance. Firstly, Cl in ton's 
advisors on China did not share the same views either on China 
itself or the pursuit of an appropriate China policy. Indeed, 
given the uncertainty as to China's political future and the 
1os I · · t ntervlew, op Cl . 
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contentious nature of the debate concerning US China policy, 
the lack of consensus on this issue comes as no surprise. 
Secondly, it is important to note that political/electoral 
factors, as well as strategic and philosophical factors, will 
have informed the perspectives offered by Cl in ton's advisors. 
Their appreciation of Cl in ton's ultimate objective (to secure 
the presidency) , and further, an appreciation of their own 
political ambitions may have coloured the advice offered to 
Clinton. 
While it is clear that Clinton took his lead on China 
policy from developments within Congress (particularly Senator 
Mitchell and Representative Pelosi), the evolving definition of 
his stance also reflected wider consultation from within and 
without Congress. 
Representative Lee Hamilton and Senator Sam Nunn offered 
their experience and foreign policy knowledge at an early stage 
in the Cl in ton campaign. 106 Nunn was well known for his interest 
in issues of proliferation, and thus will have pressed this 
concern with the candidate. Hamilton was respected for his 
commitment to, and sober view of, issues of foreign policy. 
Further, he was recognised for his consistent advocacy of a 
long-term, pro-engagement vision of US China policy. Indeed, 
his support for Democratic assaults upon the Bush policy of 
Constructive Engagement are understood to have been founded in 
his frustration with the President's apparent 'policy of drift' 
106 Leslie H. Gelb, 'Cl in ton: For A Centrist Foreign 
Policy'; International Herald Tribune December 12 1991. 
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and his loyalty to the Democratic party. 107 Hamilton was 
consistent in his insistence that US China policy be vigorous 
in its pursuit of improvements in Chinese conduct in the areas 
of human rights, proliferation and trade, but not at the 
expense of a collapse in the bilateral relationship, nor 
America's wider strategic interests. 108 'The US required a long-
term, realistic and contemplative approach to this 
relationship. 109 
Clinton employed advisors with credentials in the fields 
of democracy and human rights, to consolidate both his wider 
foreign policy platform and his China policy stance. Penn 
Kemble, David Shepherd and Richard Schifter were added to the 
wide circle of consultants following Cl in ton's nomination as 
the Democrat's presidential candidate. 11° Kemble was a senior 
associate at the human rights institution Freedom House and 
considered a hawkish conservative member of the Democrats, 
107 Interview with Richard Bush, op cit. He may also have 
been aware of the partisan and political advantages of 
undermining one of Bush's apparent foreign policy weaknesses. 
Loyalty to the President and to the Party would influence 
Hamilton's participation in the China policy debate throughout 
the first year and a half of the Administration. It must be 
noted, however, that Hamilton, who became Chair of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee in January 1993, was recognised for 
his values and independence of mind: see Leslie H. Gelb, 'Watch 
Him Shake Up us Policy'; International Herald Tribune July 3 
1992. 
108 Ibid. 
109 See, for example, his comments to the Business 
Coalition for US-China Trade on April 1 1993, almost two months 
before President Clinton issued Executive Order 12850. David M. 
Lampton, 'China Policy in Clinton's First Year'; op cit p.26. 
uo Christopher Madison, 
Journal August 15 1992 p.1890. 
'Issue in Waiting'; National 
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while Shepherd was at the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace and Democracy. 111 Richard Schifter, a 'Reagan Democrat' , 
had served as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs under both the Reagan and Bush 
Administrations. Considered a hawk, Schifter is recognised to 
have played an important part in informing Clinton' s tough 
stance on China's human rights record. 112 
Further, the candidate employed veterans of the Carter 
Administration to counter his perceived inexperience and 
weakness on international affairs. While this carried the risk 
of associating the Clinton platform with a foreign policy team 
portrayed in many quarters as inconsistent, indecisive and 
dichotomised, it also served to reinforce Clinton' s declared 
commitment to democracy. Active participation was provided by 
Madeleine Albright and John Holum in particular. 113 Albright had 
served as a foreign policy assistant to Vice-President Walter 
Mondale, and from 1978 to 1981, as a staff member of the 
National Security Council while directing foreign policy 
legislation in the White House. 114 According to Ted Galen 
111 Respectively, ibid, and interview with Ted Galen 
Carpenter, op cit. Carpenter highlights the influence of 
Shepherd on the development of Clinton's commitment to linkage. 
112 Susumu Awanohara, 'Spreading the Word' ; Far Eastern 
Economic Review January 21 1993 p.23. 
113 
'A who • s Who of the Old and New of Clinton' s Foreign 
Policy Advisors •; International Herald Tribune September 30 
1992. 
114 At the time of the campaign, Albright was a Research 
Professor of International Affairs and Director of Women in 
Foreign Service at Georgetown University's School of Foreign 
Service. Previously, she had presided over the Centre for 
National Policy, a non-profit research organisation. Biography 
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Carpenter, the question of human rights ~n China had always 
been " ... at least a significant issue with her. "115 Holum, a 
Washington Lawyer and old acquaintance of Clinton's, had served 
the State Department's Policy Planning staff under Director 
Anthony Lake. 116 
Strong contributions were also provided by former Carter 
Administration officials David Aaron and Robert E. Hunter. 
Aaron had been Deputy National Security Advisor and Hunter a 
staff member of the National Security Council. 117 Perhaps the 
counsel of former Assistant Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher provided the strongest symbol concerning the 
Clinton foreign policy campaign. Christopher had departed 
office, with the defeat of Carter, with the reputation of being 
committed to the issue of human rights. 118 Indeed, Ambassador 
Michael Armacost highlights Christopher's largest contribution 
to the Carter Administration as being the institutionalisation 
of human rights in foreign policy. 119 Further, Stephen Yates 
argues that Christopher's background complemented Clinton's 
(previously declared) advocacy of a policy of linkage towards 
- Madeleine Korbel Albright; US Department of State (United 
States Government Printing Office, 1997) . Clinton would appoint 
Albright as Ambassador to the UN, and later as Secretary of 
State. 
115 Interview, op cit. 
116 
'A Who's Who'; International Herald Tribune op cit. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Interview with Mike Jendrzejczyk, op cit, and interview 
with Ambassador Michael Armacost, November 12 1997, Brookings 
Institution, Washington D.C. 
119 Ibid. 
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China; in other words, Christopher is likely to have urged 
conditionality of China's MFN status on human rights 
progress. 120 
SENIOR FOREIGN POLICY AND CHINA POLICY ADVISORS 
However, two other veterans of the Carter Administration played 
far larger parts in the development of Cl in ton's campaign 
stance on foreign policy, and in particular, China policy. From 
the preparation of Clinton•s first foreign policy address on 
December 12 1991, the development of the candidates's stance on 
international issues had been handled by Anthony Lake and 
Samuel R. Berger, with Lake acting as Clinton's personal 
consultant on foreign affairs. 121 Lake was a Professor of 
International Relations at Mount Holyoke College, while Berger 
was on leave from his position as a Washington-based trade 
lawyer. Anthony Lake had in fact served two spells in 
government: firstly, he had been a member of Henry Kissinger's 
National Security Council staff, and later had joined the 
Carter Administration as Director of Policy Planning in the 
State Department where he became a close aide to foreign policy 
dove Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. 122 Sandy Berger had served 
120 Interview with Stephen Yates, op cit. 
121 See Christopher Madison, 'Issue in Waiting'; op cit, 
International Herald Tribune, 'A Who's Who'; op cit, and John 
Lichfield, 'Clinton to Place Foreign Affairs in Safe Hands'; 
Independent October 23 1992. 
122 Richard Reeves, 'Foreign Policy: the Education of 
Governor Clinton'; International Herald Tribune March 25 1992. 
Lake had in fact resigned from his role under Kissinger in 
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as Lake's deputy in the Carter Administration, and enjoyed a 
longer and more personal relationship with Clinton than his 
former boss. 123 Further, at the time of the 1992 election, 
Berger was a board member of the International Human Rights Law 
Group and a member of the influential Council on Foreign 
Relations. 124 
Both senior advisors were instrumental to the candidate's 
emphasis on democratisation. Specifically, Anthony Lake was 
widely seen as the "key architect of Cl in ton's pro-democracy 
position and generally idealistic stance", and spoke often on 
these issues during the campaign. 125 For example. in an 
interview with the International Herald Tribune on October 12 
1992, Lake highlighted the importance of the support of 
democratisation as a priority of US foreign policy, alongside 
strategies to promote economic competitiveness and domestic 
economic renewal. 126 Berger reinforced this stance, arguing for 
protest at the US bombing of Cambodia in 1970. Susumu 
Awanohara, 'Spreading the Word'; op cit. 
123 David M. Lampton, 'America's China Policy in the Age of 
the Finance Minister'; The China Quarterly no .139 September 
1994 p.617. 
124 Confirmation Statements and background of Clinton 
Administration designees; Office of the President-Elect, 
December 22 1992, United States Information Service. Berger had 
also acted as an advisor and speech-writer to previous 
Democratic presidential and vice-presidential candidates. 
125 Susumu Awanohara, 'Spreading the Word' ; op cit. 
126 Paul F. Horvi tz, interview with Anthony Lake; 
'Clinton's World View: Sticking to Basics'; International 
Herald Tribune October 12 1992. When later appointed Clinton's 
National Security Advisor, Lake demonstrated his vision for 
post-Cold War US Foreign Policy in a speech to the John Hopkins 
School of Advanced International Studies on September 21 1993. 
'From Containment to Enlargement'; reproduced in Wyn Q. Bowen 
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example that in contrast to President Bush, Clinton would be 
'' ... a lot more aggressive in recognising the force and vitality 
of democratic movements. "127 
Advisory responsibility for Clinton' s commitment to 
linkage, conditionality of China's MFN status, and his overall 
stance on China appears to lie with Anthony Lake. Lake was 
perceived to possess a 'missionary' view of US China policy, as 
a relatively forceful advocate of human rights issues. 128 
Indeed, one senior defence expert identified Lake as someone 
who saw China as an ''evil or bad place"; as someone who wanted 
to change China and in fact was "determined to change China". 129 
Interestingly, corroboration of these interpretations of Lake's 
views on China are provided by a former Senior State Official 
with considerable experience of China policy-making. Reflecting 
upon the formulation of China policy in the early months of the 
Clinton Administration, he suggested: "It was kind of a 
and David H.Dunn, American Security Policy in the 1990s; 
Dartmouth Press (1996) Appendix 2 pp.158-160, and Anthony Lake, 
'The Logic of a US Strategy of Engagement'; International 
Herald Tribune September 23 1993. His strategy of 'Engagement 
and Enlargement' would be published as an official strategy 
paper ten months later. A National Security Strategy of 
Engagement and Enlargement; The White House July 1994 (US 
Government Printing Office, Washington D.C.). 
127 Margaret Garrard Warner, 'A Governor vs a Globe 
Trotter'; Newsweek March 30 1992 p.28. 
128 David M. Lampton, 'America's China Policy in the Age of 
the Finance Minister'; op cit p.617, and David M. Lampton, 
'china Policy in Clinton's First Year'; op cit p.18. 
129 Interview with Dr. Ronald N. Montaperto, Senior Fellow 
for National Strategic Studies at the National Defence 
University, November 12 1997, Washington D.C. 
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missionary period, I suppose. "130 
The probability that Lake was the prime catalyst behind 
Clinton's stance on China is also reinforced by various 
interpretations of his philosophy towards international 
relations. Lake was generally considered to be "an old-line 
liberal" and dove; he had even been described as a 'Carterite 
bleeding heart ' . 131 However, a former governmental colleague of 
the Nixon Administration argued that alongside Lake's 
idealistic streak, he was a "practical, pragmatic 
man ... [who] ... wants positive results." 132 Nevertheless, Lampton 
suggests that Lake entered the Administration with a certain 
moral arrogance concerning the degree to which the US should 
and could change China. Lamp ton notes that this 
presumptuousness was punctured only after Lake had visited and 
experienced China for the first time later in the 
Administration. 133 Berger, by contrast was seen as essentially 
the more pragmatically minded of the two. 134 
While the lead on a linkage strategy towards China was 
provided by Congress, it would appear that Lake sustained this 
130 Inte~view with Robert Perito, former Chief of China and 
Mongolia Desk, State Department, November 10 1997, Washington 
D.C. 
131 Christopher Madison, 'Issue in Waiting'; op cit p.1892, 
and Susumu Awanohara, 'Spreading the Word'; op cit. 
132 William Watts in Susumu Awanohara, ibid. See also John 
Lichfield, 'Clinton to Place Foreign Affairs in Safe Hands'; op 
cit. 
133 ' • Intervlew, op Clt. 
134 See for example, David M. Lampton, 'America's China 
Policy in the Age of the Finance Minister'; op cit p.617. 
238 
238 
position in his capacity as primary foreign policy consultant 
to candidate Clinton. Lake's philosophy towards foreign affairs 
complemented this proposition. Furthermore, Lake's National 
Security role within a White House that to a considerable 
degree would dictate the conduct and direction of China policy 
particularly throughout the first two years of the Clinton 
Administration, also implies Lake's support for conditionality 
of MFN. 135 Certainly Lake seemed in tune with Clinton' s 
condemnatory rhetoric on China, exemplified by his association 
of China with other anti-democratic states such as Iran and 
Iraq. 136 Interestingly, one commentator argues that Berger might 
not have shared Lake's enthusiasm for linkage. He bases this 
conjecture on the fact that Berger's law firm represented 
considerable business interests that were "very much in favour 
of MFN". 137 
Yet Lake's advocacy of linkage cannot be wholly separated 
from the political and electoral arguments for adopting the 
policy as a campaign stance. This is reflected in the widely 
held view that Lake and Berger were highly responsive to 
135 Interviews 
Carpenter, op cit, 
Yates, op cit. 
with 
Mike 
Kerry Dumbaugh, op cit, Ted Galen 
Jendrzejczyk, op cit, and Stephen 
136 In September 1993, Lake argued "We cannot impose 
democracy on reglmes that appear to be opting for 
liberalisation, but we may be able to help steer some of them 
down that path by providing penal ties that raise the cost of 
repression and aggressive behaviour. These efforts have special 
meaning for our relations with China." Lake, 'The Logic of a US 
Strategy of Engagement. '; op cit. Lake had retracted this 
association of China with other 'rogue states' by the early 
months of the following year: Anthony Lake, 'Confronting 
Backlash States'; Foreign Affairs vol.73 no.2 March/April 1994. 
137 Interview with Mike Jendrzejczyk op cit. 
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political concerns expressed in the White House, both as 
campaign advisors and as senior members of Clinton' s National 
Security Council. 138 
An influential campaign advisor who avoided such 
association with the political grounds for Clinton's stance on 
foreign policy and China policy was Richard C. Holbrooke. 
Holbrooke was another veteran of the Carter Administration, 
having served as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs. Where Holbrooke stood on the issue of 
linkage and conditionality of MFN is not clear, though it is 
known that he opposed any policy that would isolate China. 139 
However, it is certain that he played a key role in the 
consolidation of the candidate's China policy stance. For 
example, Holbrooke travelled to Beij ing in the September of 
1992, to advise Chinese officials on the prospective Clinton 
China policy. As William Drozdiak noted in the International 
Herald Tribune, "They presumably were not pleased by what they 
heard. "140 Holbrooke also participated in an hour long 
discussion of China policy with the candidate on September 8, a 
meeting that probably facilitated his trip to Beijing . 141 The 
third discussant at that meeting was former Ambassador to China 
Winston Lord, one of the most significant actors in the 
138 Interviews with Dr. Ronald N. Montaperto op cit, Mike 
Jendrzejczyk op cit, Kerry Dumbaugh op cit. 
139 Amy Borrus et al, ~The World Sizes Up Clinton' ; op cit. 
140 William Drozdiak, ~Clinton to Allies: Continuity is the 
Key•; op cit p.6. 
141 Don Oberdorfer, ~Preparing a President'; International 
Herald Tribune November 8 1992. 
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formulation and implementation of the Clinton China policy from 
the 1992 presidential election through Clinton's first term of 
office. 
Lord possessed considerable experience of China and US 
China policy as a result of his governmental and non-
governmental career. A life-long Republican, Lord had acted as 
an aide to Henry Kissinger, assisting him at the opening of us-
China Cold War relations in 1971. 142 He was retained in the 
Nixon and Ford Administrations as Director of the State 
Department's Policy Planning Staff from 1973-1977, and further, 
served as US Ambassador to China from November 1985 to April 
1989 (thus ending his tenure shortly before the Tiananmen 
Square massacre in the June) . 143 Lord had also held prestigious 
and influential positions outside government. Between 1977 and 
1985, he had been president of the Council on Foreign 
Relations, and at the time of the 1992 presidential election 
campaign was Chair of the National Endowment for Democracy. 144 
Two crucial factors help to explain why the former 
Ambassador became an advisor to the Clinton campaign, and 
later, Cl in ton's Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
142 Interview with Ambassador Winston Lord, November 7 
1997, New York, Susumu Awanohara, 'Caution to Peking'; Far 
Eastern Economic Review vol.156 issue 5 February 4 1993 p.15, 
Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict With 
China; Knopf (New York, 1997) p. 94, and Christopher Madison, 
'Issue in Waiting'; op cit pp.1889-1890. 
143 Winston Lord, 'China and America: Beyond the Big 
Chill'; FOREIGN AFFAIRS Fall 1989 vol.68 no.4 p.1. Earlier in 
his career Lord had also served within the Department of 
Defence. Susumu Awanohara, 'Caution to Peking'; op cit p.15. 
w Susumu Awanohara, ibid. 
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and Pacific Affairs. Firstly, he felt acutely disillusioned 
with Beijing in the wake of the events of the Spring of 1989. 
Secondly, he became angry and frustrated with the Bush China 
policy when the full details of its response to the Tiananmen 
Square were finally revealed. 
Throughout the 1980s, Lord as Ambassador to China had 
played an significant role in informing US governmental and 
academic specialists as to developments within China. 145 
Highlighting the remarkable degree of modernisation and reform 
occurring in China, Lord argued that China would evolve away 
from its Communist and authoritarian past towards a system of 
market economics and political liberalism. This seemed a 
reasonable proposition in the context of political trends 
evident in the Soviet Union and East and Central Europe, and 
areas of East Asia. Indeed, Lord's beliefs both propagated and 
reflected a period of positive American attitudes towards the 
People's Republic; a period of fascination. The Tiananmen 
Square massacre crushed Winston Lord's optimism, and he became 
a virulent and public critic of the Beij ing government. 146 
Initially, Lord praised the Bush Administration's response 
to the massacre. 147 However, Bush's acknowledgement of secret 
visits to Beijing of NSC Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Assistant 
Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger later in 1989 enraged 
145 Bernstein and Munro, op cit pp.94-95. 
146 Ibid p.95. 
147 See for example, Wins ton 
Beyond the Big Chill'; op cit. 
'Misguided Mission' i Washington Post 
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Lord, 'China and America: 
See also Winston Lord, 
December 19 1989. 
Lord. He rejected the Bush Administration's view that these 
efforts at behind-the-scenes old style diplomacy were necessary 
to keep the longer-term bilateral relationship on track. In an 
article in the Washington Post in December 1989, Lord justified 
his own reappraisal of the Bush China policy. He argued that 
the President's initial response to Tiananmen " ... struck the 
right balance between condemnation and connection ... 11 but that 
the visits " ... erased any pretence of official indignation and 
weakened the true foundations of Sino-American relations. "148 
Prompted by what he perceived to be an unprincipled and 
directionless China policy, Lord distanced himself from both 
the Bush government and the Republicans. In doing so, he placed 
a strong emphasis on the Administration's handling of the issue 
of human rights with respect to China: "What we have here is 
not just a double standard but cultural, if not racial, 
bias ... that they never had freedom and cannot afford it. "149 
Nevertheless, the Chinese government ' s repression of the 
protesters in June 1989 did not prompt Lord to alter his view 
of China's future completely. Indeed, he argued for the greater 
likelihood of the regime's demise and a change of system in the 
wake of Tiananmen, highlighting that the death of paramount 
leader Deng Xiaoping might trigger a move towards democracy. 150 
148 Winston Lord, ~Misguided Mission' ; op cit. 
149 Ibid. Lord maintains this view of the Bush 
Administration, arguing that Clinton and the Clinton 
Administration possessed a more genuine and committed concern 
for human rights, and would not have engaged in such secret 
diplomacy one week after Tiananmen. Interview with Ambassador 
Winston Lord op cit. 
1SC Wins ton Lord, ~China and America: 
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Beyond the Big 
Further, he maintained the belief that US China policy should 
retain a long-term, ~business-like', engaged perspective that 
reflected a considered balance of US interests viz-a-viz 
China. 151 Like Holbrooke, he insisted that China should not be 
isolated, as this would only cause China to turn inwards, to 
the detriment of human rights and the reform process. 
Significantly, however, Lord called for a tougher and more 
proactive US China policy. In particular, and in spite of the 
need to recognize and balance the variety of US bilateral 
interests, he argued for a more assertive pursuit of human 
rights, especially where it would encourage those facilitating 
reform in China. 152 For example, Lord argued for US engagement 
and diplomacy to press Beijing towards the cessation of 
repression, detention for political or religious beliefs, 
martial law and other abuses. 153 
Chill'; op cit pp.3-7, and Bernstein and Munro, op cit pp.95-
96. Lord was not alone in asserting this perspective, the 
appeal of which must be understood in the context of the 
concurrent transformations occurring in the Soviet Union and 
East and Central Europe. 
151 Interview with Ambassador Winston Lord op cit. See also 
Statement of Winston Lord before a Joint Hearing of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, May 29 1991. Most-Favoured-Nation 
Status for the People's Republic of China; Joint Hearing before 
the Subcommittees on Human Rights and International 
Organizations; Asian and Pacific Affairs; and International 
Economic Policy and Trade, of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, May 29 
1991, Washington D. C. (United States Government Printing 
Office, 1992) pp.lB-30. 
152 This is reflected in Lord's article ~China and 
Beyond the Big Chill'; op cit, written before 
Scowcroft's visit to Beijing was leaked. 
153 Ibid p.l2. pp.20-21, and pp.23-25. 
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America: 
news of 
Initially, Lord appeared to reject the use of linkage, or 
the use of China's MFN as a policy tool to these ends. In the 
autumn of 1989, Lord recognised the limited number of policy 
choices available to the US at that time, but reasoned: 
"Many areas, however, pose complex choices. We cannot 
expect American businesses to write off years of hard 
work and hard cash when they are playing for the long 
run in any event. If, in principle, the US government 
forgoes extending any special help to its private 
sector's efforts in China, what if foreign 
competitors were to exploit this restraint to their 
advantage? "154 
Thus in recognition of the range of strategic, economic 
and political interests America valued in its relationship with 
China, Lord appeared to reject a simplistic and confrontational 
US China policy. While convinced that the Administration should 
prosecute issues of human rights more vigorously, he argued 
that this should be achieved through open and determined 
diplomacy coordinated with allies, with an emphasis on the fact 
that it was in China's interests to make progress in this 
area. 155 Accordingly, Lord suggested that the US could assist 
China in the development of legal institutions and a 
154 Ibid p .11. 
155 Interview with Ambassador Lord op cit. Lord reasoned 
that America's concern for natural and universal human rights 
stemmed from its origins and experiences as a nation of 
immigrants, adding that the US " ... had never singled out China" 
in this regard. Winston Lord, 'China and America: Beyond the 
Big Chill"; op cit p.23. 
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responsible press, for example. Unilaterally, Lord argued 
vociferously for the creation of a Radio Free Asia, as an 
illustration of a committed but non-confrontational policy 
option. 156 
A crucial aspect of Wins ton Lord's approach to US China 
policy concerned the management of the US China debate. Though 
he acknowledged the significant roles played both by the public 
and members of Congress, 157 Lord was consistent in his appeal 
for a balanced and more considered debate on China. In other 
words, Lord argued that hyperbole, emotion and 
oversimplification could distort the debate, and be detrimental 
to policy-making. 158 By the same logic, the exploitation of the 
China policy debate for other means (political and/or 
electoral, for example), could also be injurious to this 
crucial bilateral relationship. Consequently, Lord insisted 
that the debate should be rational and longsighted, and in 
particular should recognise and articulate both the problems 
facing China and the progress and improvements made there. 159 
However, the former Ambassador's understanding of US-China 
relations did not preclude the possibility of his support for 
the application of conditions to America's trade with China. 
While Lord rejected any strategy that would endanger engagement 
156 See for example, Susumu Awanohara, 'Caution to Peking' i 
op cit. 
157 Interview with Ambassador Lord, op cit. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid, and Wins ton Lord, 'China and America: Beyond the 
Big Chill' i op cit. 
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with China or drive it into isolation, he believed that the US 
possessed a degree of leverage through which it could advance 
its interests. In his article in Foreign Affairs in the autumn 
of 1989, Lord identified a number of areas (pertaining 
predominantly to human rights, regional security and 
proliferation) in which demonstrable Chinese progress could 
illicit a more positive US attitude to the bilateral 
relationship. 160 Lord went on to note China's " ... desperate need 
for foreign capital, technology and markets .. " which required 
it to open up to the world community. 161 Lord concluded that 
"Americans in turn have every incentive to resume progress with 
China when conditions allow. " 162 Although Lord placed this 
argument in the context of the need to engage in a long-term 
relationship with China, and certainly stopped well short of a 
call for MFN conditionality, his views revealed a belief that 
the US held the greater leverage within the relationship: that 
China needed America far more than America needed China. This 
perspective would become a significant feature of the Clinton 
Administration's China policy as presented in May 1993. 
In fact, Lord went further in explicitly advocating some 
form of conditionality of China's MFN status in a testimony to 
Congress in the spring of 1990. As part of the escalating 
Congressional debate of the Bush Administration's China policy, 
three subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee held 
160 Winston Lord, 
Chill'; op cit p.12. 
161 Ibid p. 13. 
'China and America: Beyond the Big 
162 Ibid pp.13-14. Emphasis added. 
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joint hearings on the question of China's MFN status in May. 163 
The subcommittees were interested to hear Lord's suggestion 
that America's extension of China's MFN status should form part 
of a framework of measures designed to encourage greater reform 
in China. The former Ambassador called for a policy: 
" ... that blends condemnation and connection, features 
diverse approaches to various constituencies, 
suspends certain programmes while preserving 
foundations for better times, and encourages China in 
the direction of greater economic reform and 
political pluralism. 164 
One commentator noted: 
"While a number of members of Congress are likely to 
go along with a one-year extension of MFN for China, 
talk of attaching various conditions to such an 
extension had been increasing, no doubt partly 
because of Ambassador Lord's idea of enveloping 
extension with a package of measures. "165 
163 Lucille A. Barale, 'US MFN Renewal for China: The 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment'; East Asian Executive Reports vol.12 
issue 6 June 1990 pp.9-12, and Statement of Winston Lord before 
the Subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, May 
16 1990. Most-Favoured-Nation Status for the People's Republic 
of China; Hearings before the Subcommittees on Human Rights and 
International Organizations; Asian and Pacific Affairs; and 
International Economic Policy and Trade, of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 101st Congress, 2nd 
Session, May 16 and May 24 1990, Washington D.C. (United States 
Government Printing Office, 1990) pp.7-20. 
164 Statement of Winston Lord before the Subcommittees of 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, May 16 1990 op cit p.11. 
165 Lucille A. Bar ale, ibid. Lord advocated an approach 
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Lord reiterated his support for some form of MFN 
conditionality two years later. Again providing testimony to a 
Congressional hearing in the summer of 1992, Lord revealed a 
tougher approach to the issue. This time, he advocated the 
implementation of legislation that would establish limited 
conditions on the renewal of China's MFN status. 166 
Proposals of this kind appeared to reflect a toughening of 
Lord's attitude regarding US China policy. He clearly believed 
that the US could, and now should challenge China in areas of 
national interest without detriment to the long-term 
relationship. That Lord increasingly emphasised the importance 
of human rights progress (albeit within a range of US-China 
interests) was significant. 
In fact, the former Ambassador had established a 
reputation for supporting human rights concerns, and as Ted 
Galen Carpenter notes, he had been sensitive to the issue 
that incorporated a far greater degree of flexibility than that 
promised by legislative options proposed by members of Congress 
such as Representatives Pelosi and Pease. The need to retain 
flexibility in the management of China policy would be an 
important ingredient of the Clinton's first China policy. 
166 statement of Winston Lord before the Subcommittee on 
Trade of the House Commit tee on Ways and Means. Additional 
Requirements in the Extension of China's Most-Favoured-Nation 
Trade Status in 1993; Hearing before the Subcommittee on Trade 
of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 102nd Congress, 2nd 
Session, June 29 1992, Washington D. C. (United States 
Government Printing Office, 1993) and Susumu Awanohara, 
'Caution to Peking'; op cit. Lord also suggested that the US 
should pursue bilateral dialogue at sub-cabinet level (thus 
avoiding rewarding the Chinese with high-level, prestigious 
contacts), retain close unofficial contacts with Taiwan, and 
pay greater attention to the issues facing Hong Kong, prior to 
its transfer to Chinese sovereignty in June 1997. 
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throughout his career. 167 Diverse opinions are offered to 
explain Lord's commitment to the issue, particularly in the 
wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre. For example, Lord's 
optimistic confidence in human rights progress in China 
throughout the 1980s was shattered by the events of June 4 
1989. Thus it is highly probable that he was convinced that the 
issue of human rights should provide one clear and defining 
principle of US China policy, one that was lacking in the Bush 
Administration's policy formulation. Certainly, he argued that 
in the new post- Cold War era, the US should 11 ••• promote our 
interests and project our values ... 11 and that 11 ••• supporting 
the spread of freedom around the globe does both. 11168 An 
alternative explanation highlighted his marriage to his Chinese 
wife Bette Bao Lord, herself a prominent figure of the Chinese 
cultural world, and strong advocate of the protection of human 
rights in China. 169 Former colleagues dismissed this argument. 170 
Whatever the explanation, Lord's commitment to the issue, 
his belief in the symbiotic relationship between US values and 
US interests, his evolving support for conditionality of MFN, 
and the emphasis he lay on not isolating China but remaining 
167 David M. Lampton, ~America's China Policy in the Age of 
the Finance Minister'; op cit p. 617, and interview with Ted 
Galen Carpenter op cit. 
168 Susumu Awanohara, ~Caution to Peking'; op cit. 
169 Interview with David M. Lampton op cit. 
170 An official who worked with Lord during his time as 
Ambassador reasoned that Lord was 11 ••• a man of high 
intelligence and moral standards ... 11 capable of determining his 
own mind regarding China. Susumu Awanohara, 'Caution to 
Peking'; op cit. 
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committed to the relationship reflected many aspects of the 
Clinton campaign stance on China policy. 171 It is not surprising 
therefore that Lord met with Clinton and Richard Holbrooke to 
discuss China policy on September 8. Nevertheless, Lord had 
previously been critical of the candidate's handling of foreign 
policy during the presidential campaign. Describing Cl in ton's 
marginalisation of the issue as 11 ••• somewhere between 
disturbing and appalling ... 11 , Lord highlighted Clinton's 
performance in accepting the Democratic Party's nomination for 
the presidency. Clinton's acceptance speech at the convention 
was 11 ••• the most important speech of his life ... 11 Lord argued, 
yet he had 11 ••• devoted less than one minute out of fifty four 
to foreign policy ... Let's hope the candidates will change their 
ways and start talking sense ... 11172 
Despite such comments, and indeed Lord's long association 
with the Republican party, Lord met with Clinton in September, 
and not only became a campaign advisor but President Clinton's 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs. This begs the simple question; why? 
Lampton notes that Clinton' s stance on China policy was 
established prior to Lord's participation as advisor. 173 This 
does not suggest that Lord may not have informed the 
171 Lord also echoed Clinton in asserting that ''You cannot 
separate domestic and foreign policy. 11 Christopher Madison, 
'Issue in Waiting'; op cit p.1890. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Interview with David M. Lampton, op cit. 
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candidate's thinking on China. For example, in the first 
presidential debate in St. Louis, Missouri on October 11, 
Clinton contended that a tough China policy would produce 
results.•~ While this did not contradict earlier statements, it 
did resemble the kind of rationale and rhetoric employed by 
Winston Lord. 175 Similarly, Cl in ton advisor David Aaron 
explained that the candidate was prepared to wait for a new, 
more enlightened generation of Chinese leaders. 176 Such patience 
was a logical conclusion from Lord's prescriptions for the 
future of the Chinese regime. 177 However, it is clear that Lord 
was not the inspiration or architect of Clinton's China policy 
proposals. 
Lord did speak in favour of Clinton's proposals on China, 
in contrast to the Bush Administration's China policy. 178 
Certainly, Cl in ton's proposals persuaded Lord that he could 
switch his allegiance to the Democratic Party and their 
174 
'In His Own Words: Clinton on China MFN'; The China 
Business Review op cit p.19. 
175 Bernstein and Munro argue that this rationale reflected 
Lord's philosophy regarding the future of the Chinese regime. 
The logic underpinning this approach suggested that a 
confrontational style such as threatening to or ln fact 
imposing conditions on China's MFN status carried no risk 
because the present regime was in decline, and thus would not 
endanger the bilateral relationship in the long run. Indeed, 
according to Bernstein and Munro; " ... it would encourage the 
reform forces in China waiting to take power, who would then be 
grateful to the United States for its unfriendliness towards 
the old regime". The Coming Conflict with China; op cit p.96. 
176 William Drozdiak, 
Key ' ; op c it p . 6 . 
'Clinton to Allies: Continuity is the 
177 Clinton' s proposals to create a Radio Free Asia also 
echoed Lord's thinking. 
178 Ibid. 
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presidential candidate. 179 Moreover, Cl in ton had strong 
political grounds for employing the services of the former 
Ambassador. Lord was highly respected for knowledge and 
experience of Chinese and East Asian affairs across the 
political spectrum, within Congress, and within Chinese 
political circles. 180 Thus Lord's association with the Clinton 
campaign (and later his appointment to Assistant Secretary for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs) brought a great deal of 
credibility to the Clinton China policy platform. As Ted Galen 
Carpenter notes: 11 The fact that his views, more or less, 
corresponded with those articulated by President Clinton during 
the 1992 campaign made it easier for Clinton to bring him into 
the foreign policy team. 11181 
Further, his inclusion in the development of Cl in ton's 
China policy (up to and including the policy-making process in 
the spring of 1993) allowed Lord to add substance to Clinton's 
campaign statements, and provide an authoritative rationale to 
the threat to make China's MFN status subject to certain 
conditions. 182 It can be argued that placing China policy in the 
hands of Winston Lord allow Clinton to concentrate on issues of 
greater importance to him, such as his ambitious domestic 
179 Interview with Shirley Kan, op cit. 
180 Interview with Shirley Kan op cit, and David M. 
Lampton, 'China Policy in Clinton's First Year'; op cit p.617. 
181 Interview with Ted Gal en Carpenter op cit. This view is 
corroborated by Stephen Yates, interview op cit. 
182 Interview with Frank Jannuzi, op cit. 
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platform and his economic proposals 1n particular. 183 This would 
certainly be a significant factor in the China policy-making 
process from the January to the May the following year. 
Lord's role also brought the promise of a 'unified' 
American China policy; a clear policy goal that would be 
articulated by Cl in ton after his inauguration. 184 The Bush 
Administration's post-Tiananmen China policy had been widely 
blamed for the collapse of the broad Executive-Legislature and 
bipartisan consensus on the issue. 185 The prospective Clinton 
Administration did not wish to encounter the legislative 
battles and controversies experienced by the Bush 
Administration over China policy and China's MFN status, 
especially in view of the foreign policy divisions and splits 
associated with the last Democratic Administration. 186 Therefore 
the degree to which Clinton's China policy proposals reflected 
popular views within Congress, and the inclusion and 
appointment of the respected Winston Lord offered the 
expectation of a return to consensus. 187 
183 Interview with James McCormick, op cit. 
184 David M. Lamp ton, 'China Policy in Cl in ton's First 
Year'; op cit p.l9. 
185 See for example Spencer S. Griffith, 'Trade and 
Political Tensions Cloud MFN Renewal for China'; op cit, and 
William Drozdiak, 'Clinton to Allies: Continuity is the Key'; 
op cit. The Bush Administration placed the blame on Congress 
and the Democrats in particular. 
186 Interview with Edward Gresser op ci t, and interview 
with Dr. Ronald Montaperto op cit. 
187 The importance of a 'unified' China policy to the 
Clinton Administration will be discussed in greater detail at a 
later stage. 
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Another related explanation for Lord's collaboration with 
the Cl in ton team is provided by Lampton. 188 He suggests that 
Lord had a strong ambition to serve in the higher levels of 
government, and that a Clinton election would provide him with 
that opportunity. Lord's outspoken criticism of the Bush 
Administration's China policy, and his dissociation from the 
Republicans meant that Lord would have to serve in a Democratic 
Administration if he was to fulfil his desire. The fact that 
the Clinton campaign's stance on China reflected many of his 
own views obviously facilitated Lord's ambition. This argument 
is echoed by an experienced China analyst who reasoned: "When 
he joined their side, he was probably rewarded with an 
Assistant Secretaryship. "189 Lampton notes that Cl in ton will 
have welcomed the support and participation of Lord. Lord was a 
respected figure, in both diplomatic and literary arenas, who 
was recognised for his commitment to human rights and a 
measured US China policy. His post-1989 rhetoric on China 
complemented Clinton's campaign statements, and Lord's 
political background would embellish Clinton' s intentions to 
govern from the centre and to establish a bipartisan, 
consensual China policy. 190 
188 Interview op cit. 
189 Interview with Shirley Kan op cit. 
190 Lampton also emphasises the pernicious consequences of 
Clinton's employment of Lord, arguing that in joining the 
Democrats, Lord effectively put himself into a political limbo. 
He was distrusted by the Republicans due to his service to the 
Democrats while he was distrusted by the Democrats because of 
his Republican pedigree. This ~isolation' would weaken his 
position in the Clinton State Department. Interview with David 
M. Lampton op cit. 
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The broad coalition that supported Cl in ton's stance on 
China, that favoured conditionality of China's MFN status, and 
that argued for the promotion of human rights in US China 
policy welcomed the participation of Lord. As stated, his role 
as advisor consolidated Clinton's promise of a tougher US China 
policy (particularly in the area of human rights), and his 
appointment in the New Year as Assistant Secretary for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs heralded the implementation of this 
new policy. Mike Jendrzej czyk of Human Rights Watch: Asia 
appreciated news of Lord's nomination to the State Department: 
"He certainly brings to the job knowledge of China which 
Clinton will need. u191 Indeed, Lord's testimony at his 
nomination hearing was regarded as a significant breakthrough 
for the pro-linkage lobby. They were enormously encouraged to 
hear someone with Lord's experience, with direct responsibility 
for US China policy, provide a powerful argument for linkage 
and the conditioning of China's MFN status. 192 
Lampton highlights the new Assistant Secretary of State's 
leading role in the formulation of the Clinton Administration's 
decision to renew China's 1993 MFN status, but make its 1994 
extension subject predominantly to human rights concerns. 193 
However, attention must be brought to the fact that 
Winston Lord rejects the view that Clinton committed himself to 
191 Susumu Awanohara, 'Caution to Peking'; op cit. 
192 Interview with Mike Jendrzejczyk op cit. Lord's role in 
the China policy-making process is discussed in the next 
chapter. 
193 David M. Lampton, 
Year'; op cit p.17. 
" 
'China Policy in Clinton' s First 
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conditioning China's MFN status during the campaign, while 
acknowledging the existence of a linkage strategy. 194 In other 
words, Lord argues that Clinton wanted to establish conditions 
for the renewal of MFN status (the 1994 decision), but at a 
modest level that the Chinese could meet so as not to 
realistically threaten its MFN status. This perhaps reveals 
more about Lord's view of conditionality, and the true meaning 
behind Clinton's statements regarding linkage, certainly 
towards the end of the campaign. This is understood in the 
context of Lord's advisory role during the latter stages of the 
campaign, his predominant role 1n the formulation of the 
Executive Order of May 26 1993, and Clinton's lack of 
involvement in the China policy-making process until the very 
last. From another angle, Lampton describing the spring 1993 
policy-making process suggests: "Lord, who had briefed 
candidate Clinton during the campaign, was presumed to be fully 
acquainted with the president's orientation. "195 
This is not to suggest that Winston Lord, like Clinton, 
was motivated more by political factors in advocating linkage 
and MFN conditionality. Lord had been consistent in insisting 
upon the pursuit of a long-term, progressive relationship with 
China, working both on the areas of contention and the areas of 
mutual interest simultaneously. 196 He had advocated some form of 
194 Interview with Ambassador Wins ton Lord op cit. 
195 David M. Lampton, 'China Policy in Clinton' s First 
Year'; op cit p.19. 
196 Lord is explicit in defending this point. Interview 
with Ambassador Winston Lord op cit. 
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linkage in US China policy (his proposals evolving as the China 
debate and the US-China circumstances evolved) long before the 
opportunity to join the Clinton campaign arose. He had also 
stuck by his belief that the days of the current Chinese 
Communist Party regime were numbered; and that a more assertive 
US China policy, incorporating a strategy of linkage could 
promote the protection of human rights, the process of reform, 
and greater Chinese responsibility in international affairs. 
While Clinton recognised the value in acquiring the 
services of Winston Lord, he did not necessarily share Lord's 
perspectives and commitments. Clinton' s deeper sensitivity to 
political and electoral factors in overseeing the overall 
direction of China policy would undermine Lord's role as 
Assistant Secretary of State, particularly in the first two 
years of the Administration. Retrospective views of Lord's 
performance regarding China policy are mixed, but it is widely 
recognised that the White House was following a different, more 
politically inspired agenda. 
The Political Implications of Clinton's Wider Consultations 
Clinton understood the political appeal of adopting 
Congressional initiatives on China policy, of contributing his 
stance on China to the definition of his foreign policy 
platform (especially viz-a-viz President Bush), and of inviting 
the participation of advisors such as Winston Lord. Clinton's 
desire to court certain advisors, individuals and institutions 
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that could assist ln his fight for the presidency also 
highlight the importance of political motivations, and their 
implications for his proposals on China policy. These 
implications take two forms. Firstly, Clinton might be 
persuaded to appear to adopt a certain stance if it would 
secure him critical support. Secondly, and more significantly, 
Clinton would not feel obliged to adhere to this stance (or 
commit himself too strongly to this stance) if doing so would 
discourage critical support. 
An illustration of the former calculation is Clinton' s 
ingratiation with the American Federation of Labour 
Confederation of Industrial Organisations. The AFL-CIO were 
explicit in their opposition to the renewal of China's MFN 
status. As Rudolf A. Oswald, Director of their Department of 
Economic Research explains: 
"We strongly believe that this privilege should be 
revoked at the earliest possible moment because it is 
harmful to both China and the United States ... Our 
central concern ... is that MFN status contributes 
directly to the Chinese government's brutal 
repression of China's working men, women and 
children." 197 
197 Pamela Baldinger, ~MFN: Sorting Out the Issues' ; The 
China Business Review vol.18 issue 4 July-August 1991 p.13. One 
senior China analyst explains the CIO-AFLs opposition as both 
economic realism (the threat of Chinese manufacturers) and 
ideological (illustrated by its history as one of the most 
anti-Soviet institutions in the US). Interview with Richard 
Bush op cit. 
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The former president of the AFL-CIO was senior Democrat 
and leader of the Senate George Mitchell, a key actor of 
attempts in Congress to revoke or condition China's MFN status. 
Clinton not only required the support of Mitchell to secure the 
Democratic nomination (and Mitchell's cooperation if and when 
Clinton secured the presidency) , but he also required the 
support of the AFL-CIO. Elaine Sciolino observes of Clinton 
that; 
"··.his views on China were shaped as much by 
immediate political needs as by geopolitical 
strategy. The Senate majority leader, George Mitchell 
of Maine, and the AFL-CIO favoured using the threat 
of withdrawing 'most-favoured-nation' benefits for 
China if it did not improve its human rights record. 
Candidate Clinton, who needed their support to win 
the Democratic Party nomination, was not about to 
contradict them. "198 
In a similar vein, the espousal of a strongly human 
rights-focused policy such as conditionality of China's MFN 
would appeal to the traditional liberals who dominated the 
Democrat's presidential campaign primaries. It must be 
acknowledged that Clinton' s political philosophy appeared to 
include the assertion that traditional liberal issues could be 
defended and implemented from a centrist platform. 199 However, 
198 Elaine Sciolino, 'Cl in ton and China: How the Promise 
Self-Destructed'; New York Times May 29 1994 Sec. 1 p.1. 
199 See for example Leslie 
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H. Gelb, 'Clinton: For a 
as Ted Gal en Carpenter argues, the liberal voters ln the 
Democratic primaries would not be inclined to vote for someone 
like Cl in ton, who they would regard as " ... another bland, 
moderate, Southern, Democratic governor, certainly not a true 
believing liberal. "20° Cl in ton's China policy, amongst other 
foreign and domestic proposals, would help to convince such 
voters that he was a candidate worth backing. Indeed, such a 
strategy would elicit the support and the confidence of those 
at the other end of the political scale, the Democratic Party 
establishment in Washington. The Clinton campaign portrayed an 
image of a man outside the politics of Washington, who was 
directly responsive to voters' needs. Nevertheless, Clinton 
needed the approval of the establishment if he was to win both 
the nomination and the presidency. 201 
The political utility of Clinton's stance on China, namely 
the threat to condition China's MFN status, is clear. This 
perspective in itself does not prove that Clinton did not have 
genuine strategic and philosophical reasons for declaring such 
a stance. However, this must be weighed against Clinton's 
greater interest in the geo-economic pillar of US foreign 
policy, and indeed his overriding desire to clinch the 
presidency. Put another way, this raises the question of 
whether Cl in ton would commit himself entirely to a 
Centrist Foreign Policy'; op cit. 
200 Interview with Ted Galen Carpenter, op cit. 
201 See for example, Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman 
(eds), The Clinton Presidency: First Appraisals; Chatham House 
Publishers (New Jersey) 1996 p.329, and Howard Fineman and Ann 
McDaniel, 'Can He Beat Bush?'; Newsweek March 30 1992 pp.22-23. 
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confrontational China policy if doing so would lose him 
valuable friends and support. 
The candidate reiterated time and again his commitment to 
a new gee-economic strategy for America, that would stress the 
importance of US competitivity in an expanding global market 
place. Cl in ton promised that his Administration would raise 
awareness and consideration of US economic interests in all 
policy areas. 202 Naturally, this was welcomed by many in the 
business community and won him many influential friends; Bill 
Gates of Microsoft amongst them. Furthermore, this redefinition 
of US foreign policy reflected the thinking of Clinton's 
confidant, Ran Brown. 
Ran Brown played a critical role in Clinton's victorious 
presidential campaign, and was appointed Secretary of the 
Department of Commerce in the Clinton Administration. Stephen 
Yates goes as far as to say: 
"Bill Clinton owed his presidency to no one other 
person than Ran Brown. He would never have been 
elected were it not for Ran Brown ... I think that you 
can't underestimate Ron Brown's personal influence 
over Bill Clinton; much more than any lobbyist, much 
202 For example Clinton promised to establish an economic 
equivalent of the National Security Council, the National 
Economic Council, whilst also establishing a Council of 
Economic Advisors. For an in depth study of this aspect of the 
early stages of the Clinton presidency, see Michael Cox, US 
Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Superpower Without a 
Mission?; The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham 
House Papers, Pinter (1995), Chapter Three, ·From Geopolitics 
to Geoeconomics? Competing in a Global Economy'. 
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more than any potential contributor. "203 
Ted Galen Carpenter agrees with this view, and highlights 
Brown's political skill and sensitivity: 
"I've always described Ran Brown as Bill Cl in ton's 
permanent campaign manager, who happened to be 
Secretary of Commerce; and Brown was always aware of 
the political requirements ... 11204 
Brown also possessed a clear vision of post-Cold War US 
foreign policy, that is explicitly evident in Clinton's 
campaign platform. Stephen Yates observes: 
"He saw pushing commercial diplomacy as a 
breakthrough. It was a break with the past, its not 
this old Cold War diplomacy. We' re in a new age, 
we'll put commercial diplomacy out there. "205 
Clinton's threat to condition, and thus revoke China's MFN 
status appeared to contradict this gee-economic strategy, in 
that it threatened to sacrifice US economic interests and a 
wider foreign policy agenda for the pursuit of human rights and 
other areas of progress in China. China offered unparalleled 
203 Interview with Stephen Yates op cit, (emphasis 
original) . Praising the political qualities of Ron Brown, Yates 
explained; "He is the epitome of a politician who could shake 
your hand and stick his foot up your rear-end at the same 
time ... ". 
204 Interview with Ted Galen Carpenter op cit. 
205 Interview with Stephen Yates op ci t. 
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market opportunities for the US, and was fertile ground both 
for US economic interest and commercial diplomacy. Brown, as 
Secretary of Commerce, would later stress this line of 
thinking. 206 This raises the question of why Clinton adopted a 
China policy that appeared to contradict the thinking of his 
closest political advisor. It is likely that Brown understood 
the political and electoral benefits to be accrued from 
appearing to advocate such a stance, while arguing that it 
would not be in US interests to implement the corresponding 
policy in an absolute and inflexible manner. In other words, 
Clinton could appear to promise such a policy during the 
election, but find a way out of it once in the White House. 
This had led to the suspicion that Clinton was never 
sincerely committed to the threat to condition and thus revoke 
China's MFN status. Indeed, having advocated such an approach, 
he was simultaneously looking at ways to avoid implementing 
such a policy without appearing to break manifesto promises. 
Politics was all. 
As will be seen later, proponents of this view point to 
the contradictions between Clinton's China policy and his wider 
foreign policy agenda, the ambiguity and flexibility contained 
in the Executive Order of May 28, the Administration's conduct 
of China policy up to delinkage of human rights from China's 
MFN status on May 26 1994, and the degree to which the Clinton 
206 Michael Cox notes that as Secretary of Commerce, Brown 
adopted a pro-business community, pro-MFN position on the issue 
of China's MFN status. Michael Cox, US Foreign Policy After the 
Cold War;. op cit Chapter Seven, 'The United States Meets the 
Pacific Century' p.92. 
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White House responded to polls and political calculations in 
general. 207 There is now a widespread consensus regarding the 
extent to which China policy under Clinton, at least for the 
first two years of his Administration, was run from the White 
House rather than the State Department. Therefore, while the 
pro-linkage stance was electorally advantageous, the political 
(and strategic) costs of the Administration's handling of a 
linkage-based China policy through 1993-1994 convinced 
Clinton's political advisors that delinkage and engagement with 
the Chinese was indeed the best option. 208 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that Clinton's campaign proposals for 
China policy, and thus the stance he carried into his 
Administration, were defined primarily according to political 
calculations. The threat to condition China's MFN status, the 
promise to establish a Radio Free Asia, and the pledge to 
elevate the issue of human rights in the pursuit of a broad 
207 Mike Jendrzej czyk is convinced that the Administration 
(or more specifically the White House at least) had already 
decided to de link China's MFN status from human rights and 
other conditions before issuing Executive Order 125890, the 
policy document that established such linkage. Interview with 
Mike Jendrzejczyk op cit. 
208 For example, David M. Lampton reports that prior to the 
1994 MFN decision to delink, Clinton's longtime personal 
political advisor George Stephanopoulos argued for delinkage. 
While Stephanopoulos personally favoured a tough China policy 
(the implication being that he favoured linkage) , he advised 
the President to delink for political reasons. David M. 
Lampton, 'America's China Policy in the Age of the Finance 
Minister'; op cit p.617. 
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range of US interests in China brought Clinton several 
electoral advantages. This stance aided Clinton 1 s nomination as 
the Democratic candidate for the presidency, with regard to the 
voters in the primaries, the support of influential individuals 
and institutions, and the backing of the Democratic 
establishment in Washington. It helped to define the normative 
foundations of Clinton 1 s wider foreign policy agenda, and more 
specifically, established significant symbolic and political 
differences between himself and the incumbent George Bush. The 
stance was popular with the Democratic majority in the House of 
Representatives, popular with influential Senators, and popular 
with the American public. Further, to offset accusations that 
Clinton was ignorant of international affairs, his stance had 
the backing of influential, respected and high-profile 
individuals and groups. 
The fact that a certain policy stance is popular, or that 
it brings with it electoral advantages, does not make it ill-
conceived. There were many, including Winston Lord, who on the 
basis of their expertise in US-Chinese affairs, US foreign 
policy and their ethical concerns believed that some form of 
linkage could work. Indeed, some experts argued that the US 
possessed a greater degree of leverage over China than the Bush 
Administration was willing to use. 209 
One commentator cited three reasons to be optimistic about 
Cl in ton 1 s China policy proposals. 210 The first, as Lampton had 
p.31. 
209 Amy Borrus et al, 'The World Sizes Up Cl in ton 1 ; op cit 
210 Gerald F. Seib, 'Clinton May Have Edge in China Policy: 
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pointed out, concerned the fact that Clinton was consistent in 
both his tough rhetoric and his general approach to China 
(though his specific proposals evolved throughout the campaign 
and were ambiguously framed) . According to this logic, the 
Chinese were more likely to take Clinton's threats more 
seriously than Bush who had made public his determination to 
preserve a good bilateral relationship; that is to say the 
Chinese did not necessarily feel the need to make improvements 
in their human rights performance. Secondly, it was in China's 
economic and national interests to maintain the development of 
its trade and economic relationship with America, an argument 
presented by Winston Lord amongst others. Thirdly, Clinton 
could enjoy the prospect of a Democratic majority in both 
Houses of Congress, who in the case of the lower House boasted 
a majority of members generally in favour of Cl in ton's China 
policy stance. This presumably would give the President the 
political will, trust and flexibility with which to pursue his 
declared policy. A correlatory advantage was the fact that the 
majority of American citizens favoured Clinton's tougher 
approach to China. Whilst tradition suggested that the average 
US citizen had little interest in foreign affairs, this is a 
good news for any politician, particularly one that devoted so 
much attention to the poll ratings. This positive appreciation 
of Clinton's proposals also reflected the degree to which his 
China stance contributed to the redefinition of US foreign 
policy in the post-Cold War world. Clinton's China policy and 
President-Elect's Tough Stance Could Make Beij ing More 
Cooperative'; Asian Wall Street Journal November 18 1992 p.1. 
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wider foreign policy platform provided a normative momentum to 
the debate concerning US global interests in this new era. 211 
However, a note of caution was added to the reasons for 
optimism: 
"The test for Mr. Cl in ton is to show that deft 
diplomacy can bring changes in Chinese behaviour not 
only in world affairs, but on human-rights matters 
that hit far closer to home for the Chinese 
leadership. "212 
This would prove to be a prophetic warning. The Clinton 
Administration's (mis)handling of China policy, especially May 
1993 to May 1994, would create splits within the Executive, 
incur derision from within Congress, and facilitate the 
collapse of credibility in the policy. 213 The fact that Clinton 
established a policy primarily according to political rather 
than strategic calculations provides a highly significant 
explanation for the Administration's errors in implementing the 
policy. 
While a logical rationale could be provided for the 
strategy of linkage itself, the threat to place conditions on 
211 Interview with Shirley Kan op cit. 
212 Gerald F. Seib, ~Clinton May Have Edge in China 
Policy'; op cit. 
213 Explaining the rationale behind a China policy founded 
on a strategy of linkage, Bernstein and Munro argue: "It was a 
logical assumption, and it might even have proved to be true 
had China not played the game more skilfully and with far 
greater clarity of purpose than Clinton did." The Coming 
Conflict with China; op cit p.96. 
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China's MFN status appeared to contradict Clinton' s economic 
proposals and US economic interests. 214 A president (-elect) 
with such a strong commitment to trade and market-orientated 
growth would not fail to notice the scale of US-China trade 
when the figures were announced in January 1993. 215 Furthermore, 
and despite the on-going debate concerning America's post-Cold 
War interests, Clinton had to weigh the pursuit of human rights 
with the broad range of other US interests in China, security 
chief amongst them. The candidate's threat to condition and 
revoke China's MFN status implied an overwhelming concern for 
human rights in US China policy-making, although Clinton's 
statements by the autumn of 1992 suggested an intention to link 
MFN renewal to issues of trade and proliferation also. While 
opinions differed as to the most appropriate way to protect US 
security interests in China and the East Asian region, a 
significant body of thought argued that this aspect of foreign 
policy remained the most important consideration in the post-
Cold War world. Analysts highlighted China's role in the UN 
Security Council, the regional security balance, and the 
214 This argument is an important feature of the wider 
debate on engagement with China. It differs from the assertion 
that the pursuit of human rights can be compatible with pursuit 
of trade, depending on the nature and the measure of human 
rights progress. Interestingly, Lord does not share this view 
exactly, arguing that the pursuit of human rights must often be 
weighed against not only trade but security, the environment, 
global politics and other issues. Interview with Winston Lord, 
Assistant Sec~etary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
1993-1996, November 7 1993, New York. 
215 One Washington official is reported as saying that the 
figures might focus Clinton's mind on China's expanding trade 
surplus with the US. Nayan Chanda, 'Distant Thunder'; Far 
Eastern Economic Review November 19 1992 p.15. 
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proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, while noting the 
growing capabilities of the People's Liberation Army. 216 In fact 
in the latter stages of the campaign as his statements on China 
became a little more ambiguous, Clinton acknowledged the 
broader range of US interests in China. Clinton qualified his 
promotion of human rights and democracy in foreign policy 
arguing: 
"That does not mean we can force every ideal ... on 
other people. Our actions must be tempered with 
prudence and common sense ... [for example 
when] ... security needs or economic 
interests ... diverge from our commitment to democracy 
and human rights. 11217 
Although Clinton insisted that he did not want to isolate 
China, opponents of linkage insisted that China's stature and 
influence in regional and global security negated the wisdom of 
the candidate's proposals. One former China analyst at the 
Department of State went further, insisting that linkage could 
216 There is a wealth of material on these issues but see 
for example Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, 'China Versus 
America: A War Game' and 'Coping with China', Chapter Eight and 
Conclusion in The Coming Conflict with China; op cit, Harry 
Harding, 'Redesigning American China Policy', Chapter ten in A 
Fragile Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972; 
Brookings Institution (Washington D.C.) 1992, Martin L. 
Lasater, 'An American Strategy for Asia in the 1990s'; The 
World and I March 1992, Dorinda Elliott, Melinda Liu, Kari Huus 
and Charles H. Lef, 'Pssst! Wanna Buy a Missile?'; Newsweek 
September 6 1992 p.20, and Gerald Segal, 'Take Care in 
Reworking Asia Policy'; International Herald Tribune November 6 
1992. 
217 Susumu Awanohara, 'President Clinton'; op cit p.11. 
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never succeed given the breadth and importance of US interests 
in China. 218 Stephen Yates explains the existence (and Cl in ton's 
tolerance) of this tension, arguing: 
''He doesn't set priorities, he writes lists; and he 
wants it all ... It is not a question of needing human 
rights, or national security, or economic 
competitiveness; we should have it all right now. "219 
This perception of Clinton's attitude towards China policy 
(and foreign policy in general) concerned many in the foreign 
policy community. Although Clinton had attempted to redefine US 
national interests in the post-Cold War world, he had neglected 
to define a clear hierarchy of interests. 220 The failure to 
articulate a clear hierarchy of US interests in China would 
serve to undermine his China policy, particularly in its first 
year of implementation. It is also worth noting that despite 
the domestic popularity of the policy of conditional MFN, no 
other state (nor even Taiwan) advocated such a strategy towards 
China. Despite Clinton's assertion that America would provide 
global leadership on the issues of democracy and human rights, 
the international context suggested that in the event of a 
revocation of China's MFN status, the US rather than China 
would find itself in isolation. 
218 Interview with Frank Jannuzi op cit. 
219 Interview with Stephen Yates op cit. 
220 Susumu Awanohara notes that Clinton failed to present 
an 'Asia doctrine' during the campaign, to the surprise and 
frustration of some, leaving the prospects for his policies 
towards Asia uncertain. 'President Clinton'; op cit. 
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Nevertheless, domestic politics rather than national and 
international strategic factors remained the driving force 
behind Clinton's stance on China. As stated, the popular 
political climate in America remained very negative towards 
China. Hence any proposals recommending positive engagement 
with Beijing would not attract support, and Clinton was not the 
only presidential contender to recognize this fact. 
Furtherstill, what may be generally afforded the term 
'China bashing' was also attracting growing support within 
Congress, itself somewhat responsive to voters' attitudes. 
Given his ambitious domestic and foreign policy agenda, the 
difficulties experienced by the Bush Administration over China 
policy, and the lessons provided by the dichotomous Carter 
Administration, Clinton highlighted the need for unity and 
consensus within government. It is not surprising therefore 
that he pursued the lead on China policy provided by Congress 
in his attempt to satisfy his many political objectives. 
Yet the degree to which Clinton was motivated by political 
factors caused concern in and outside America, not simply 
because such a process of policy formulation appeared to 
neglect crucial strategic factors. Reflecting upon the Clinton 
Administration's handling of China policy, and making the 
criticism that it was high on rhetoric and low on substance, 
Bernstein and Munro note: "The reason for this has to do in 
part with the ebb and flow of the pressure of public 
opinion ... 11221 
221 Richard Bernstein 
Conflict with China; op cit 
and Ross 
p.211. 
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H. Munro, The Coming 
Clinton ran for president at a time when the predominant 
American view of China, within Congress and society at large, 
was very negative. The prospect of a president like Clinton 
formulating China policy (and foreign policy) within such a 
highly charged political atmosphere caused consternation in 
Asia. Given Clinton's rhetoric on China, human rights and free 
and fair trade, and given his failure to enunciate a strategy 
for Asia during the campaign, Asian officials feared that his 
Administration would only pay attention to Asia in the event of 
a crisis. 222 In other words, there was a clear perception that a 
Clinton China policy would be crisis-driven, and vulnerable to 
popularist and political demands. The fact that the American 
public only become interested in foreign affairs in the event 
of a crisis, with the result that the public debate often lacks 
due sophistication and consideration, only made this point more 
significant. 223 
A policy driven by politics, popularism, and crisis was 
bound to be detrimental to US-China relations, and problemental 
for the Chinese themselves. Irrespective of whether they 
represented the government, the business community or the 
reform movement, the Chinese did not know what to expect from 
the Cl in ton Administration. Despite his harsh rhetoric (and 
Holbrooke's briefing mission), Clinton had given greater 
attention in his campaign to his commitment to trade and 
222 Nayan Chanda, ~Distant Thunder'; op cit p.lS. 
223 Interview with James L. Robb, Official with the Trade 
Information Centre and Official with the Asia Business Centre 
(China Desk), Department of Commerce during the period in 
question, November 4 1997, Washington D.C. 
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economic expansion. The rate of growth and volume of US-China 
trade lent credence to the view that Clinton would not be able 
to turn his back on the opportunities provided by the Chinese 
market by revoking its MFN status. 224 In addition, Clinton had 
declared his determination not to isolate China, and 
acknowledged the enduring importance of America's security 
interests in the region. 
Considerations of this kind suggested a critical flaw in 
the linkage strategy endorsed by Clinton and others. A 
successful linkage strategy required leverage in the bilateral 
relationship. In other words, America's capacity to prompt 
change in Chinese behaviour relied upon China's dependence on 
the US, and China's capacity to resist or ignore America's 
demands. Who held the greater leverage over who? Clinton' s 
failure to articulate a hierarchy of US interests in China, and 
the apparent tensions between his China policy and his 
commitments to economics and security would prompt doubts as to 
the extent of America's leverage over China. 225 
Suspicions that the Clinton China policy would be driven 
by politics and crisis, and doubts about the credibility of his 
declared strategy, provoked uncertainty about the future of 
224 The Chinese business community were also divided as to 
whether Clinton would pursue free trade or protectionism with 
China. See for example, Susumu Awanohara, 'President Clinton'; 
op cit. 
225 Wins ton Lord, for example, believed that the US did 
possess leverage over China. He believed that the Bush 
Administration had been negligent in not employing this 
advantage, instead allowing China policy to drift, with no 
clear hierarchy or purpose. See Winston Lord, 'Will Bush 
Support the Chinese People?'; New York Times October 6 1991 
Section 4 p.17. 
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China policy and the US-China relationship. Yet Clinton had 
been explicit in his support for linkage and his threat to 
condition China's MFN status if certain, most obviously human 
rights, progress was not made. Indeed it had been one of his 
clearest and most specific pledges on foreign policy. Moreover, 
while he had qualified his stance with a recognition of China's 
strategic and economic importance, his rhetoric left no doubt 
as to his opinions of the Chinese regime. Clinton appeared to 
have no option but to condition China's MFN status as promised. 
A failure to do so would tarnish his political credibility in 
the early months of his presidency. As Richard Bush noted, 
prior to the spring 1993 China policy-making process, Congress 
would also restrict Clinton's room for manoeuvre to some 
extent. 226 Democrats in the House of Representatives had 
established an aggressive agenda on China policy, which had 
attracted the support not only of a growing bipartisan group of 
members, but all the 1992 presidential candidates with the 
exception of their chief antagonist, President Bush. Having 
witnessed the election of a candidate who appeared to share 
their view on an issue of importance to them, the 'Pelosi-
Mitchell' camp could cause trouble if Clinton backtracked from 
his promises. He had vowed to undertake an ambitious programme 
of domestic initiatives, and would not relish investing 
valuable political capital in fighting his own party over 
China. 227 A backtrack would also give the Republican members the 
226 Richard Bush, 'Clinton and China: Scenarios for the 
Future; op cit. 
227 Ibid p. 20. This factor was 
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reflected in Clinton's 
opportunity to accuse the new President of reneging on his 
campaign commitments. 228 In Clinton' s favour was the fact that 
he would be faced by a Congress controlled by his own party. 
Party loyalty, the experiences of the Carter Administration, 
and the realisation that a Democrat inhabited the White House 
for the first time in twelve years would bestow Clinton an 
atmosphere of trust, optimism and flexibility. 
The ambiguity in Cl in ton's China stance also provided a 
degree of flexibility. Clinton had not outlined in detail the 
definition of 'progress' he required to renew China's MFN 
status, nor had he indicated exactly when he would impose 
conditionality. This of course allowed the possibility that in 
the five months preceding the deadline for the President's 
decision on China's trading status, he could be sufficiently 
convinced of China's progress in the relevant areas that he 
could decide not to condition or revoke MFN. Again, given the 
political atmosphere, this would be a brave decision. 
Nevertheless, Clinton's standing commitment to MFN 
conditionality (implying that he would be prepared to revoke 
it) and the rhetoric in which he framed the commitment could 
pose enormous problems for America's interests in China. Not 
only did it contradict his economic proposals (not an 
impediment to revocation), but it could provoke a highly 
undesirable reaction from Beijing. China could become 
uncooperative across a range of areas of US interest, including 
determination to establish a consensual, unifying China policy. 
228 Ibid. 
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global and regional security. 229 Cl in ton's rhetoric on China, 
including his description of the Chinese regime as 'brutal 
thugs' could incite such a reaction anyway230 , despite playing 
well to an American audience. In this sense, Cl in ton's China 
rhetoric could effect a self-fulfilling prophecy, on the back 
of political motivations. 
As Lampton notes, it is not uncommon for highly charged 
rhetoric to give way to the sobriety of governing, and Clinton 
was not expected to pursue this form of diplomacy. 231 From 
another perspective, it is natural for issues in an election 
campaign to be dominated by political and electoral 
calculations, but it is expected that these would be replaced 
by strategic considerations once the victor is rewarded with 
the responsibility of power. This raised a very significant 
question for China policy, that is illustrated by the degree of 
confusion concerning expectations of Clinton's likely track. As 
a former State Department official explains, expectations 
outside Washington's beltway were of a tough attitude towards 
China, one that included a readiness to revoke China's MFN 
status if human rights there did not improve. However, there 
was an altogether different expectation evident within the 
beltway, within the State Department and to an extent within 
229 Gerald Segal also warns that MFN revocation would hurt 
Hong Kong far more than China itself. 'Take Care in Reworking 
Asia Policy'; International Herald Tribune November 6 1992. 
230 Interview with Frank Jannuzi op cit, and Gerald F. Seib 
and Robert s. Greenberger, 'Foreign Affairs Will Demand Quick 
Attention From Clinton'; Wall Street Journal November 5 1992. 
231 David M. Lamp ton, 'China Policy in Cl in ton' s First 
Year'; op cit p.lO. 
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Congress. He notes: 
"There was a confidence, or maybe a resignation, that 
in the end Clinton would discover that he was bounded 
by the same kind of limits on influence that 
President Bush had had, in trying to affect change 
through the blunt instrument of MFN. 11232 
The question raised was how Clinton could drop his 
commitment to condition China's MFN status (if the above proved 
to be true) given both its clarity and the political 
implications of taking such a decision. 233 Experienced China 
analysts and commentators were of the opinion that Clinton 
would indeed be faced with this dilemma at some point, 
predicting that his rhetoric would be tougher, but his China 
policy would ultimately reflect the approach taken by its 
predecessors. 234 The fact that Chinese government officials also 
held this view would prove to undermine the credibility of 
Clinton's linkage strategy, and certainly affect the balance of 
perceived leverage once the policy was in place. 
There were precedents for wholesale reversals in China 
policy. One Asian diplomat serves the reminder in the Far 
232 Interview with Frank Jannuzi op cit. 
233 As outlined earlier, Mike Jendrzejczyk believes that 
Clinton was already wrestling with this question during the 
campaign. 
234 This was certainly the view expressed in Beij ing by 
government officials, and by indigenous and foreign analysts 
and businesspeople. James McGregor, 'Clinton Prepares to Set 
Backdrop for Change: Making Sense of China Policy Will Test 
Victor'; Asian Wall Street Journal November 5 1992 p.l. 
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Eastern Economic Review that Reagan was elected as a pro-Taiwan 
president, yet he strengthened ties with the mainland while 
signing the 1982 US-China communique restricting the sale of 
arms to Taipei. Equally, Bush was recognised for his 
relationship with the Beijing regime, yet he agreed to sell 150 
F16 fighters to Taiwan towards the end of his presidency. 235 
The experienced commentator Richard Bush provided an acute 
prediction of the China policy to be announced in May 1993. 
Highlighting this scenario from three possible alternatives, 
Bush argued that Clinton could choose to impose non-legislative 
conditionality, with the focus on progress in human rights. 
This would allow Clinton greater flexibility in the conduct of 
China policy than might be afforded by legislation; for example 
in allowing the President to assess for himself the 
satisfactory level of human rights progress. This approach 
would probably receive the support of the Congress that would 
be willing to trust a Democrat President promising to get tough 
with China. 236 Further, a non-legislative approach that required 
235 Nayan Chanda, ~Distant Thunder'; op cit p.16. The sale 
possessed strong electoral appeal for Bush. It pleased the 
vocal (predominantly conservative Republican) pro-Taiwan lobby 
in Congress, and brought positive employment news to the key 
state of Texas. While appearing to contravene the 1982 
communique, the agreement met the terms of the 1979 Taiwan 
Relations Act. See Richard Bush, ~Clinton and China: Scenarios 
for the Future'; op cit p.l7, and Washington Post editorial, 
~Two Sides to ~One China' Policy'; Los Angeles Times August 26 
1992 p.lO. 
236 Richard Bush. ~Clinton and China: Scenarios for the 
Future'; op cit pp.19-20. Bush was close to the China policy 
debate at this time and in fact acted as Representative Lee 
Hamilton's advisor in the MFN 1993 policy-making process in 
which Hamilton played an influential role. The scenario 
highlighted by Bush, and adopted by Clinton in the May, 
reflected his own thinking on the subject, and his own doubts 
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greater diplomatic subtlety might be less offensive to Beijing 
and be less of a risk to the bilateral relationship. Finally, 
and most significantly, this scenario was probably the most 
politically astute direction to follow. Clinton could adhere to 
his campaign commitment, forge a consensus with Congress and 
respond to public sentiment. He would, however, retain control 
of China policy and the bilateral relationship giving him a 
clearer opportunity to change tack if he so wished. Of course, 
Clinton's determination to retain this flexibility would lead 
to accusations, following his decision to delink MFN from human 
rights in 1994, that the President had never, genuinely, 
committed himself to conditionality. 
Those governmental agencies and interest groups most 
closely associated with US China policy and the US-China 
relationship generally understood Clinton' s pledge from the 
political standpoint. A former State Department official close 
to the policy-making process explained his agency's view of the 
commitment:"I think it was pretty much understood that this was 
for domestic political reasons. "237 Despite his own doubts about 
implementing a linkage strategy upon such foundations, the 
official recognised the potential dilemma facing the 
Administration; 
" ... nobody who worked on China ... in the State 
Department, or the other government agencies could be 
certain that when the Clinton Administration came in, 
about the credibility of linkage. Interview with Richard Bush 
op cit. 
237 Interview with Robert M. Perito op cit. 
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they wouldn't 
promises. "238 
really carry out their campaign 
Indeed, in spite of the various political pressures on Clinton 
to adhere to his commitments, the official did perceive an 
with the incoming Administration. He 'attitude 
attributed 
change' 
this, in part, to the change in Executive-
Legislature relations, namely a shift away from the partisan 
confrontation of the Bush years. 239 
The Defence Agencies similarly recognised the political 
foundations to Clinton' s stance on China. In the view of an 
experienced defence analyst, China policy throughout the 
campaign and for some time into the Administration, was 
effectively controlled by Clinton's political advisors. As he 
notes: 
''The linkage, in my view, was never really accepted 
at the working level ... either in D. 0. D. [Department 
of Defence] , or the intelligence services as well. "240 
The views held by the officials of these governmental 
agencies raise a vital concern. It was clear that whatever the 
efforts of the new Administration to forge a unifying, 
consensual China policy, principally amongst top Administration 
officials and between the Administration and Congress, Clinton 
238 Ibid. 
239 Ibid. 
2
'
0 Interview with Dr. Ronald Montaperto op cit. 
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faced underlying opposition from within his own bureaucracy. 
Interestingly, however, it would be divisions at the elite 
level of the Administration, and opposition from Congress, that 
would contribute to the collapse of Clinton 1 s policy of 
linkage. 
The business community also understood the political 
implications of the Clinton China policy. For those in favour 
of the renewal of China 1 s MFN status, this was not only an 
unwise way to formulate policy, but it had resulted in an 
unworkable policy stance. Cal Cohen of the pro-MFN Emergency 
Committee on American Trade (E.C.A.T.) argues that it is one 
thing to espouse a politically appealing stance to a domestic 
audience, but it is another to base the entirety of the us-
China relationship on one issue; the issue of human rights. Of 
course, whatever the attributes of the human rights-focused 
linkage strategy, the revocation of China 1 s MFN status (or 
indeed the threat to do so) would not be in the narrow economic 
interests of a large sector of the US business community. 
Nevertheless, Cohen 1 s concern arose also from the realisation 
that China policy appeared to be in the hands of those with 
political and electoral, rather than strategic responsibility. 
Through 1993-94, these concerns became genuine fears for the 
revocation of MFN. Understanding the political dilemmas facing 
the President in the run up to the 1994 MFN decision, the 
business community, led by E.C.A.T., initiated an unprecedented 
lobbying offensive designed to convince Clinton that he could 
not afford to revoke MFN, either economically nor politically. 
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As mentioned, Mike Jendrzej czyk of Human Rights Watch: 
Asia doubts the degree to which Clinton and his political 
advisors were ever committed to a genuine strategy of linkage. 
However, he does not attribute this lack of commitment to all 
members of the Cl in ton campaign team, and later, his 
Administration. Despite his own investigations, and meetings 
with members of the Clinton Administration, Jendrzejczyk 
remains unsure whether Cl in ton's campaign stance was one of 
political expediency or one of principle. He is confident that 
certain members of the Administration were committed to 
implementing a policy of linkage, but their efforts were 
frustrated by the extent to which China policy was influenced 
by political advice and political motivations. 241 
At this point, it is worth noting Richard Bush's comments 
regarding the factors that would influence the President's 1993 
MFN decision. 242 While some concern strategic and diplomatic 
considerations, most are vulnerable to political 
considerations. This poses the question of whether political 
expediency or strategic principle would determine the nature 
and conduct of the Administration's China policy, and what 
their respective implications would be for US-China relations. 
Bush notes that Chinese behaviour prior to the decision in the 
areas of human rights, trade, proliferation, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan could be of influence. This of course depended upon 
Clinton's yet to be articulated definition of 'progress'. Bush 
241 Interview with Mike Jendrzej czyk op cit. 
242 Richard Bush, 'Cl in ton and China: Scenarios for the 
Future'; op cit p.20. 
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highlights the problem of establishing a coherent and credible 
set of conditions that would be deemed appropriate for linkage. 
This problem related not only to the debate concerning the 
wisdom of conditionality, but also weight the Administration 
would place on the political importance of consensus and unity. 
The views presented by the professional civil service, another 
factor identified by Bush, could either exacerbate or help to 
resolve this problem. A related ingredient was the individuals 
appointed by Clinton to his Administration. This too could 
reflect Clinton's political objectives in a way detrimental to 
an effective China policy. 
The three remaining factors can be interpreted as the most 
political. These concerned Clinton's personal preferences, the 
expectations created by his campaign statements, and the 
approach taken by Congress to China policy (particularly the 
Democrat-led pro-linkage coalition) under the new 
Administration. 
As this chapter has shown, Clinton' s stance on China 
evolved through the campaign as a response to a variety of 
domestic political considerations. This is not to suggest that 
principle did not play role, or that the Clinton team did not 
include advisors with a genuine commitment to linkage. It must 
also be remembered that China policy provoked a highly 
vociferous debate within America. There was little consensus as 
to China's future, nor to the most appropriate ways for the US 
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to influence that future. 243 However, Clinton's preoccupation 
with political and electoral considerations during the campaign 
would establish a pattern for the formulation and conduct of 
China policy in the future. From one angle, it might be argued 
that political expediency had led Clinton to adopt an 
unworkable and destructive policy. What is clear, is that in 
building a policy on political foundations, Clinton had created 
a number of strategic and political tensions that would have to 
be overcome. 
For example, he had committed himself to a policy that 
appeared incongruous with other domestic and foreign policy 
priorities. Further, China policy had been one of Clinton's 
clearest foreign policy commitments. Irrespective of the 
reason, any deviation from linkage would bring political and 
diplomatic costs. 
As a consequence of his method of policy-making, Clinton 
had established a China policy in accordance with the political 
circumstances of the time. A shift in public opinion, or more 
probably, a shift in Congressional thinking would give the 
Clinton White House a political headache. Indeed, Clinton' s 
decision to delink in 1994 would bring a heavy political blow 
to his presidency, despite the fact that he recognised the 
strategic and political benefits of doing so, and despite the 
fact that a majority in Congress supported this decision. It is 
also true tensions could arise between Clinton's political 
243 See Robert G. Sutter, Shaping China's Future in World 
Affairs; Westview Press, Oxford, 1996, Chapter One, ~Shaping 
China's Future in World Affairs: The Role of the United 
States'. 
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preferences. As the 1994 MFN policy-making process would 
demonstrate, 
implications 
status, with 
trade reliant 
Clinton would have to balance the political 
of renewing, revoking or de linking China's MFN 
the consequences of this decision on US-China 
jobs in the state of California. Cl in ton had 
promised domestic economic expansion and a corresponding boost 
to employment, and was aware that California was key to his 
reelection prospects. 
In achieving his ultimate objective, to be elected 
president of the United States, Clinton was now faced with the 
responsibilities of power and governing. However, he remained 
acutely vulnerable to political and electoral considerations. 
The following chapters will illustrate how these factors came 
into conflict, and how they led, both directly or indirectly, 
to the collapse of his first China policy. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION ESTABLISHES LINKAGE IN CHINA POLICY 
THE 1993 MFN DECISION AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12850 
Clinton entered the White House with three primary objectives 
for China policy. He had determined that his policy toward 
China would be founded on a strategy of linkage, would be built 
upon a platform of unity and consensus, particularly with 
Congress, and that the Administration would retain some degree 
of flexibility in the conduct of foreign policy. 
It was not hard to justify the pursuit of these 
objectives. Firstly, many senior sinologists, including former 
Ambassador to Beij ing and new Assistant Secretary of State 
Winston Lord, advocated a strategy of linkage tied to China's 
MFN status. Further, the greater resolve shown by the Bush in 
the latter months of his Administration had demonstrated that a 
'carrot and stick' approach using targeted sanctions could 
secure progress from Beij ing. 1 China's dependency on American 
trade and investment suggested that linkage, through MFN 
conditionality, could be a productive policy tool. 
Secondly, the experiences of the Carter and Bush 
Administrations highlighted the· detrimental effects of 
disunity. A number of Cl in ton's senior appointees, including 
1 David Zweig argues that Bush's carrot and stick approach 
had worked because economic sanctions had been threatened on 
economic, rather than normative issues. David Zweig, 'Clinton 
and China: Creating a Policy Agenda That Works'; Current 
History vol.92 no.575 September 1993. 
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new Secretary of State Warren Christopher, had witnessed the 
impact of bureaucratic divisions on both the strategic and 
political aspects of Carter's presidency. China policy under 
Bush had endured critical political standoffs between the 
Administration and Congress. There was a feeling in Washington 
that with the election of a president who had pledged his 
support to the prevailing view in Congress, led by members of 
his own party, that consensus on China policy would return. 2 
Indeed, one senior China analyst at the State Department's 
China Desk recounts that there was an attitude change with the 
incoming Administration, that indicated a desire to move beyond 
partisan politics. 3 Moreover, the establishment of unity and 
consensus would serve the domestic legitimisation of China 
policy. This would bolster Washington's credibility and 
bargaining power with Beij ing, and afford the Administration 
greater trust and flexibility in the management of Sino-
American relations. 4 Ted Galen Carpenter notes that all 
presidents wish to maximise their flexibility to control 
policy, and in particula_r foreign policy. 5 Cl in ton, like Bush, 
2 Interview with Richard Bush, former professional staff, 
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee, October 29 1997, Washington D.C. 
3 Interview with Robert M. Perito, November 10 1997, 
Washington D.C. 
4 For example see Rosemary Foot, The 
Clarendon Press (Oxford, 1995) p.84 and 
Making of US China Policy; Lynne Rienner 
1992) p.18. 
Practice of Power; 
Tan Qingshan, The 
Publishers (London, 
5 Interview with Ted Galen Carpenter, Vice-President, 
Foreign Policy and Defence Studies, CATO Institute, November 6 
1997, Washington D.C. 
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did not want to be restricted by legislative imperatives 
imposed by Congress. 6 
Nevertheless, while Clinton' s underlying objectives for 
China policy appeared prudent, they were primarily motivated by 
political rather than strategic considerations. As this chapter 
will explain, this led to a flawed policy-making process. As a 
consequence, Cl in ton's first China policy, as defined by his 
May 1993 recommendation on China's 1993 MFN status, and the 
accompanying Executive Order 12850 and other documents, was 
also flawed. The Cl in ton presidential election campaign had 
overwhelmingly suggested that the candidate's impetus came from 
politics not principle. 7 This chapter will show how Clinton 
carried this impulse over from his election campaign into the 
White House, and the implications this had for China policy. 
This it will also show how, in the spring of 1993, Clinton 
established a politically-orientated pattern of China policy-
making that would undermine US relations with the People's 
Republic of China over the subsequent three and more years. 
MFN 1993: Policy-Makers and the Policy-Making Process 
The three key objectives of the policy-making process toward 
the necessary MFN 1993 recommendation were, as stated, the 
adoption of linkage, the forging of consensus, and the 
6 Interview with Richard Bush op cit. 
7 The fact that an election campaign is dominated by 
political calculations is hardly surprising. However, Clinton 
had based one of his most explicit foreign policy pledges on 
short-term political rather than strategic considerations. 
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retention of Executive flexibility. Despite Clinton's explicit 
pledges on linkage and conditionality, most officials and 
analysts understood that this had been a politically-informed 
promise. 8 However, it was by no means certain whether Clinton 
would impose conditionality immediately on MFN 1993, or target 
MFN 1994 for sanctions if certain progress had not been made. 9 
What became clear was that given the President's less than 
convincing performance in both foreign and domestic policy at 
the start of his term of office, he could not afford to retreat 
from his commitment to linkage. The president's political 
advisors were clear on this point. 10 
The appointment of Winston Lord as Assistant Secretary of 
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs appeared to suit 
Clinton's objectives perfectly. 11 Lord, a highly experienced US-
China diplomat, was well respected in Congress and Beijing. 12 He 
was a renowned advocate of linkage and MFN conditionality who 
placed enormous stress on the value of presidential leadership 
and domestic consensus on China policy. As one Congressional 
staff member working on China policy at this time observes, 
8 This is a point on which most commentators, in and outside 
government, representing all sides of the argument, agreed. 
9 Interview with Frank S. Jannuzi, former China specialist, 
US Department of State, November 12 1997, Washington D.C., and 
interview with Robert M. Perito op cit. 
10 Interview with Richard Bush op ci t. 
11 See previous chapter for Lord's role in Clinton's 
election campaign, and the benefit to both of his appointment. 
12 Interview with Shirley Kan, Analyst 
Congressional Research Service, November 
D.C. 
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in Foreign Affairs, 
5 1997, Washington 
Lord provided the outline of a ready made policy that suited 
Clinton's election pledges, and allowed the President to 
concentrate on issues that really mattered to him, such as the 
economy. The staff member argues: 
''Lord tried to make intellectually credible a policy 
that would appeal at one and the same time to the 
President in the White House, and Capitol Hill; a 
'magic bullet I • nl) 
The National Security Council (NSC) initiated the China 
policy-making process towards the end of January, by 
instigating a Presidential Review Directive ( PRD) . 14 !I'his 
process established an inter-agency working group, led by the 
State Department, which in the case of the PDR on China 
included the NSC, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
Departments of Defence, Treasury, and Commerce, the Office of 
the US Trade Representative, and the Office of the Vice 
President. The first draft China policy produced by the working 
group was completed by the third week in February. For the 
next three months the working draft was subject to consultation 
13 Interview with James W. McCormick, former professional 
staff on the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
House International Affairs Committee, November 7 1997, 
Washington D. C. Ted Gal en Carpenter concludes that Lord was 
appointed to provide credibility, rather than inspiration. 
Interview with Ted Galen Carpenter op cit. 
14 David M. Lampton provides an excellent description of the 
policy-making process toward MFN 1993 and the presentation of 
the Executive Order in David M. Lampton, 'China Policy in 
Cl in ton's First Year' , Chapter Two in James R. Lilley and 
Wendell L. Willkie II (eds), Beyond MFN: Trade with China and 
American Interests; The American Enterprise Institute Press 
(Washington D.C., 1994). 
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amongst the participating agencies, often at principal and 
deputy principal level. The draft also received amendments 
pursuant of State Department talks with Beijing representatives 
and consultations with Congress (discussed below), a feature of 
the policy-making process that improved on that of Bush 
according to Lampton. 15 Through this wider consultation the PRD 
aimed to maximise consensus with Congress and to design a 
policy with which the People's Republic could realistically 
comply. It is also through this wider consultation that the 
decisions were made to retain the President's authority in 
China policy through the use of an Executive Order, and to drop 
the issues of trade and weapons proliferation from the Order's 
conditionality. 
Although Clinton's criticism of the Bush Administration's 
China policy had been one of his most clear and consistent 
foreign policy platforms during the presidential election, the 
Presidential Review Directive on China received a relatively 
low priority on the Clinton foreign policy agenda. There were 
perhaps at least ninety PRDs on foreign policy in progress 
during the first four to five months of the new 
Administration. 16 The PRD on China only received significant 
attention at broad senior levels around mid-May, as the 
deadline for the MFN decision approached. This was an early 
indication of the Administration's lack of commitment to China 
policy at the highest levels, and the lack of support 
15 Ibid pp.l7-18. 
16 I bid p. 17 . 
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subsequently given to the Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs. 
Winston Lord was not confirmed in his position as 
Assistant Secretary of State until April 9, with hold-over 
Assistant Secretary William Clarke assuming the chair of the 
PRD in the meantime. However, it is clear that Lord provided 
the overwhelming policy thrust behind the policy-making 
process. 17 This was candidly revealed by Warren Christopher on 
March 30, when he stated: 
"The general approach that Wins ton Lord is 
recommending is the one that we'll be 
following ... That is to try to use MFN to encourage 
better performance, better conduct in China. "1 " 
THE THREE-TRACK CONSULTATION PROCESS 
Lord pursued three tracks of consultations in the policy-making 
process; inter-agency discussions primarily within the 
framework of the PRD, consultations with Congress, and 
negotiations with the Chinese. There is little doubt that Lord 
and senior officials at the State Department dominated the 
process within the Administration, backed by political advisors 
in the White House. 19 Two main reasons suggest why this was the 
17 Interviews with Robert M. Perito and James W. McCormick 
op cit. 
'" Hearing before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of 
the Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington D.C., March 30 
1993. 
19 Interview with Richard Bush op cit. 
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case. Firstly, Lord had the role of transforming Cl in ton's 
election pledges, and his own recommendations, into policy. 
Given the political necessity of adopting a policy of linkage, 
Lord possessed the political power to govern the process at 
this time. Secondly, other senior officials and departments had 
their own priorities and agendas. The Secretary of State was 
preoccupied with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, 
Somalia, and Haiti, as well as his own priorities. 20 The NSC 
also had its hands full with the imperatives of the former 
Yugoslavia, North Korea and so on, and as a consequence, 
National Security Advisor (NSA) Anthony Lake was not closely 
involved in the policy-making process until May. Lake had to 
delegate responsibility for China to his Deputy, Sandy Berger, 
and assistants Nancy Soderberg and Kent Wiedemann. Wiedemann 
had strong experience of China while Soderberg was known to be 
very sympathetic to the human rights issue. 21 
The newly augmented Department of Commerce, under the 
dynamic leadership of Ron Brown, was known to oppose linking 
China's trade status to conditions. 22 However, the Department 
had its own task list, implementing Clinton' s geo-economic 
vision of foreign policy. Similarly, the new National Economic 
Council (NEC) under the stewardship of Robert Rubin, and 
2
° For example the Middle East 
Korean nuclear programme, and the 
Cambodia. 
Peace 
civil 
Process, the North 
reconstruction of 
21 David M. Lampton, 'China Policy In Clinton's First Year'; 
op cit p.lB. 
22 Interview with Stephen Yates, China Policy Analyst, The 
Heritage Foundation, November 5 1997, Washington D. C. Yates 
served as an assistant to Secretary Ron Brown. 
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assistants Bowman ~Bo' Cutter and Michael Punke, and the 
Treasury Department under Lloyd Bentsen had large domestic 
economic agendas. 
The political imperative of establishing a China policy 
based upon linkage and consensus naturally awarded its 
advocates the balance of power within the policy-making 
process. Lord, Christopher and other senior state officials 
favouring these objectives also held the institutional reigns 
of the PRD process. They were supported by NSC officials, with 
the blessing of Anthony Lake who was known to possess an almost 
missionary-like zeal to challenge and change China. 23 This camp 
was shadowed by Clinton's political advisors in the White 
House, many of whose personal beliefs as well as political 
sensitivities led them to press strongly for linkage. 24 
While making their representations heard, officials that 
favoured a different approach to the PRC had little influence 
on the policy outcome. The economic agencies, backed by the 
powerful business lobby, warned that MFN conditionality would 
harm US and bilateral commercial interests. 25 The subsequent 
complaints of the business community that their views received 
insufficient attention within the policy-making process reflect 
23 Interviews with David M. Lampton 
Montaperto, Senior Fellow, National 
November 12 1997, Washington D.C. 
op cit and Ronald N. 
Defence University, 
24 Ibid (Montaperto) . One of the leading figures 
respect was George Stephanopoulos. See for example 
George'; Economist April 2 1994 p.52. 
in this 
~Curious 
25 Interview with James L. Robb, former China Specialist at 
the Asia Business Centre, US Department of Commerce, November 4 
1997, Washington D.C. 
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the impact of their arguments. 
Perhaps the most frustrated officials belonged to the 
Defence and Intelligence agencies. To begin with, their 
influence in the China policy-making process had been 
circumscribed since the June 1989. It was not yet thought 
acceptable for Pentagon officials to restore their links with 
the Chinese military, given the latter's role in the 
Tiananmen's violent repression. Nevertheless, Defence 
Intelligence Agency (DIA) and CIA contentions that attention 
ought to be drawn to China's continuing proliferation of 
nuclear and conventional weapons and technology were resisted 
by others within the Administration. In particular, 
intelligence experts in the State Department disputed evidence 
presented by their defence colleagues. 26 Further, the Department 
of Defence felt that its arguments regarding China's importance 
to regional and global security fell on deaf ears. 27 While such 
officials took hardheaded and often cynical view of the PRC, 
most believed that engagement with Beijing, and with the 
Chinese military was necessary and America's national 
interests, and they concluded that MFN conditionality would be 
to the detriment of that objective. However, their advice was 
overruled by political advisors in the White House. One senior 
defence analyst recalls: 
"There certainly was the feeling that they weren't 
listened to. There was a feeling that they were 
26 David M. Lampton, 'China Policy in Clinton's First Year'; 
op cit p .19. 
27 Interview with Ronald Montaperto op cit. 
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Simply disregarded. 1128 
The defence agencies would remain frustrated by their lack of 
influence on China policy for some time. A policy conceived of 
short-term political determinants, lacking vision and 
leadership, was not amenable to more long-term, strategic 
proposals from defence officials. William Perry's replacement 
of Les Aspin as Secretary of Defence helped to address these 
frustrations at a later stage. 29 It must be noted that more 
junior permanent officials within the State Department also 
tended to disapprove of linkage in favour of engagement. This 
basic split within the State Department, coupled with the 
Secretary of State's lack of commitment and discipline on China 
policy, encouraged the early impression of a Department in 
confusion and disarray. 30 
Thus while bureaucratic unity was sought for the new China 
policy, in essence it was not driven by consultation and 
coalescence of strategic opinion. Rather, it was imposed by the 
dictates of political considerations and election pledges. 31 
Moreover, Cl in ton's own apparent indifference to China policy 
would continue through his first term of office. Rather than 
28 Ibid. 
29 Perry's approach to and role in China policy-making is 
discussed in later chapters, and in particular chapter seven. 
30 Interviews with Ronald M. Montaperto and David M. Lampton 
op cit. 
31 This is not to say that officials such as Winston Lord 
did not believe that some form of linkage and conditionality 
was viable. 
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provide strategic leadership on China, or provide sufficient 
support to a delegate such as Winston Lord, the President only 
focused on China policy in the event of bilateral, or more 
usually a domestic political crisis. His late arrival in the 
policy-making process in spring 1993, when the deadline for 
annual MFN renewal was imminent and lobbying with Congress 
required, established a pattern for Clinton's subsequent 
handling of US-China relations. 
A far more crucial area of the policy-making process was 
Lord's consultations with Congress. This addressed the key 
aspect of Clinton's designs for China policy. Indeed, Lord was 
a consistent advocate of the value of domestic consensus, 
before and throughout his tenure as Assistant Secretary. He 
recognised that members of Congress, as well as extra-
governmental interest groups and lobbies, would desire an 
influence on China policy. This reflected not only the merging 
of high and low politics in US post-Cold War foreign policy-
making, but the growing bilateral dimension of Sino-American 
ties. 32 Therefore the weight he gave to this aspect of China 
policy-making complemented the President's desire for unity. As 
Clinton declared in the President's Statement, accompanying the 
May 28 Executive Order: 
"Starting today, the United States will speak with 
one voice on China policy. We no longer have an 
executive branch policy and a congressional policy; 
32 Interviews with Winston Lord op cit and David M. Lampton 
op cit. 
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we have an American policy. "33 
Cl in ton's desire for domestic unity on China policy, lay 
less with concerns for Washington's leverage with Beijing than 
with his domestic political preferences. Certainly, he 
appreciated the importance of unity and domestic legitimacy for 
the effective conduct of policy. Criticising implicitly the 
Bush Administration's resistance to the attempts by 
Congressional Democrats to establish MFN conditionality, 
Clinton maintained: 
"The annual battles between Congress and the 
Executive divided our foreign policy and weakened our 
approach over China. It is time that a unified 
American policy recognize the value of China and the 
values of the America. "34 
Nevertheless his primary motives for consensus related to 
his domestic policy and political objectives. Firstly, he had 
pursued the prevailing, Democratic-led view in Congress during 
the presidential election, and committed himself to a policy 
founded on that view. Given that the main protagonists of 
linkage now had a member of the Democratic Party in the White 
33 
'President Clinton's Statement on China/MFN' May 28 1993; 
US Department of State Dispatch vol.4 no.24 June 14 1993 p.425. 
See also Statement of Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of. 
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs before the 
Subcommittee on Trade of the House Ways and Means Commit tee, 
Washington D. C., June 8 1993; reproduced in US Department of 
State Dispatch vol.4 no.24. June 14 1993. 
34 
'President Clinton's Statement on China/MFN' May 28 1993; 
op cit p.425. Emphasis original. 
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House, Cl in ton expected to find consensus. He also wished to 
find sufficient consensus to prevent the imposition of 
legislation qualifying China's MFN status, and so retain 
flexibility in the management of China policy. 35 
Secondly, Clinton wanted to reserve both his attention and 
domestic political capital for his real priorities. He knew 
that his ambitious budget and healthcare plans, and his 
proposals for education and investment, would require a great 
deal of horse trading with Congress. 36 The key task of forging 
consensus on China policy served his domestic agenda in a 
number of ways. It would allow him to commit less time to the 
issue. Clearly the alleviation of Congressional agitation on 
China would prevent the revival of domestic political protest 
and popularist demands, to which the President was so 
sensitive. 37 
By gaining the support of members of Congress, with vital 
roles to play in the pursuit of his domestic agenda, Clinton 
also conserved political capital and favour. For example, a 
number of important chairs of committees had strong views on 
China. 38 The powerful Senate Committee on Finance, which would 
have to rule on Clinton's budget proposals, was chaired by the 
35 Interview with Richard Bush op cit. 
36 Interview with David M. Lamp ton. See also David M. 
Lampton, ~China Policy in Clinton's First Year'; op cit p.25. 
37 Lampton insists that the Clinton Administration, 
especially in its early stages, continued to treat China policy 
like a campaign issue. Interview op cit. 
38 Interview with Kerry Dumbaugh, Foreign 
Specialist, Congressional Research Service, November 
Washington D.C and interview with James W. McCormick op 
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Affairs 
5 1997, 
cit. 
experienced Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Moynihan was a strong 
advocate of Tibetan independence. Acknowledging these views 1 
the Executive Order cited the religious and cultural heritage 
of Tibet as an area in which 'overall significant progress' 
would have to be made for MFN to be renewed in 1994. Further 1 
in the documents accompanying the Executive Order 1 the 
Administration promised to pursue the issue by other means. 39 
The Administration was reliant upon 1 and successful in 1 
procuring the backing of other influential committees. 40 It was 
critical that the new China policy be accepted by the House of 
Representatives Ways and Means Committee/ chaired by Dan 
Rostenkowski 1 a moderate on China. As the MFN decision/ the 
vehicle for the new policy/ was a tariff issue it had to start 
its Congressional journey in Ways and Means/ another committee 
that could have a pivotal say on Clinton's budget 1 health and 
investment plans. Similarly 1 the MFN decision would have to 
pass through the Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade/ headed 
by committed free trader Sam Gibbons. The House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs 1 an important arena for the now traditional 
foreign policy battles between the executive and Congress/ was 
another potentially influential actor. Interestingly I Foreign 
Affairs was chaired by Lee H. Hamilton/ who not only favoured 
presidential freedom of decision-making in foreign policy/ but 
also strongly advocated a strong/ pragmatic and patient 
engagement with China. These House committees and subcommittees 
39 David M. Lampton 1 'China Policy in Clinton's First Year'i 
op cit p. 3 0. 
40 I bid p. 2 5. 
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influenced the Administration's decision to retain assured bi-
lateral ties with China in the MFN decision in May 1993 as well 
as throughout the subsequent twelve months, despite the 
dictates of the Executive Order's MFN conditions and China's 
poor human rights progress. 
Of greater importance to the foundation of consensus were 
negotiations with Congressional China policy kingpins Rep. 
Nancy Pelosi and Senator Majority Leader George Mitchell. 
Pelosi and Mitchell, who had led the assault on the Bush 
Administration's China policy, had intimated that they would 
introduce legislation placing conditions on China's MFN 1993 
status, despite the President's campaign pledges. Policy-makers 
concluded that if Pelosi and Mitchell's support for the 
Administration's China policy was secured, Congressional 
concurrence would be assured. Pelosi and Mitchell' s 
consultations with Lord, and with a bloc of members moderate on 
China proved, crucial in achieving this end. 41 
Firstly, Lord persuaded Pelosi and Mitchell to postpone 
the introduction of legislation until the Administration had 
reached firm conclusions as to the shape of its 1993 MFN 
recommendation. Lord did not want to see political momentum 
develop behind restrictive China policy legislation. 42 Secondly 
Lord persuaded Pelosi and Mitchell to accept the 
Administration's commitment to a human rights-led China policy, 
41 Interview with Richard Bush op cit. 
42 Interview with Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 1993-1996, November 7 1993, 
New York. 
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though with the freedom to act pragmatically in bilateral 
relations. In other words, he persuaded them to accept the new 
China policy in the form of an executive order. This followed a 
diplomatic trip by Lord to Beij ing, during which he discussed 
the forthcoming MFN decision, and negotiated areas of possible 
progress in bi-lateral issues mutually acceptable to both 
sides, predominantly in the area of human rights. Inevitably, 
the bi-lateral consultations strengthened Lord's hand in his 
discussions with Pelosi, Mitchell, and others in Congress. 43 
Pelosi and Mitchell's negotiations with a moderate 
coalition of Representatives also proved important. The 
coalition, led by senior Democrats such as Lee Hamilton, Dan 
Rostenkowski, Robert Mat sui and Jim McDermott, had emerged 
early in 1993 for a number of reasons. 44 Firstly, they were 
disillusioned with the political discord associated with the 
annual battles over MFN. Secondly, they considered that given 
the partisan nature of the 1990-1992 debates, and the election 
of Democrat Bill Clinton, that a legislative approach to China 
policy was now obsolete. 45 Thirdly, they were committed to 
43 Ibid and David M. Lampton, 'China Policy in Clinton' s 
First Year'; op cit pp.26-27. 
44 Interview with Richard Bush op cit. Richard Bush, in his 
capacity as a professional staff member on the House Asian and 
Pacific Affairs Committee and aide to Lee Hamilton, is 
acknowledged to have played a vital role in the moderate 
coalition's impact on this policy-making process. See David M. 
Lampton, 'China Policy in Clinton' s First Year'; op cit p.25 
(note 43). 
45 Hamilton had supported initiatives 
MFN status out of loyalty to his party, 
that such legislation would be vetoed by 
(Bush) . 
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to condition China's 
and in the knowledge 
President Bush. Ibid 
engagement with the PRC. While they recognised that important 
US interests had to defended, these members insisted that a 
considered approach be adopted that would not threaten 
diplomacy with Beijing. This moderate coalition, led by 
Hamilton and Rostenkowski, was successful in persuading Pelosi 
and Mitchell to support an executive order that limited 
conditionality to the issue of human rights. In other words, 
they, with Winston Lord, encouraged Pelosi and Mitchell to 
trust the new President on China policy. Pelosi accepted their 
word, and campaigned for the President 1 s stance on the Hill. 
The subsequent policy reversal a year later left Pelosi feeling 
infuriated and betrayed. 46 
Hamilton and other moderates also influenced the debate 
within the Administration. They understood that Clinton 1 s 
political advisors would insist that some form of linkage be 
implemented ln line with the President 1 s campaign promises. 
Indeed, it was for this reason that Hamilton disagreed with 
some of his Democratic colleagues on the Hill who argued for a 
cynical abandonment of Clinton 1 s commitment to conditionality. 47 
However, he was insistent that the conditions be limited, 
targeted and realistic. Thus he advocated restricting 
conditionality to certain human rights, allowing other issues 
such as trade and proliferation to be governed by existing 
legislation, executive orders and agreements. 48 Further, human 
46 Interview with Mike Jendrzejczyk, Washington Director of 
Human Rights Watch: Asia, November 4 1997, Washington D.C. 
47 Interview with Richard Bush op cit. 
48 The moderates agreed with Lord that minimising the number 
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rights above any other US-China issue had ignited the general 
American public's interest in China. This fact had been 
reflected in Clinton' s campaign rhetoric and pledges, and in 
Pelosi and Mitchell' s earlier initiatives on China. 49 Like-
minded colleagues in the Senate, led by Senator Max Baucus, 
also advised the President to address trade and proliferation 
issues through existing measures. 50 
Hamilton also urged that the policy be implemented by 
executive order. This would retain the President's ability to 
react to changes in the bilateral relationship, and avoid the 
ordeal of having to overturn unnecessary and inappropriate 
legislation. 51 Hamilton and other moderates, mindful of the 
political context, advised the President to adopt a centrist 
strategy on China. As one key player explains: 
"This was deliberate ... There was a hope that we could 
get the President to back off from his campaign 
commitment, at least as many understood it, and to 
of conditions would make the policy more effective. They feared 
the recent tendency in Congress to over-burden the issue with a 
wide variety of specific issues and concerns. Interview with 
Edward B. Gresser, Policy Director, Senator Max Baucus (D-MT), 
October 31 1997, Washington D.C. 
49 Interview with Shirley Kan op cit. 
50 Baucus in fact argued against the imposition of any 
conditions on MFN. Interview with Edward B. Gresser op cit. 
51 Recommendations presented by Hamilton in a speech in 
April, bore a close resemblance to the policy adopted by 
Clinton almost two months later. Lee Hamilton, A New US Policy 
for China; address to the Business Coalition for US-China 
Trade, April 1 1993. Similarly, Hamilton's aide, Richard Bush 
predicted the components of the Executive Order with remarkable 
accuracy in an article in January 1993. Richard Bush, 'Clinton 
and China: Scenarios for the Future'; The China Business Review 
vol.20 no.1 January-February 1993. 
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preserve some flexibility with respect to our 
relationship with China; and not create a set of 
circumstances that would, in our view, guarantee the 
collapse of US-China relations. 1152 
In the wider context, therefore, the moderate bloc worked with 
the Administration, and China-critics in Congress, to establish 
a flexible and limited policy and; 
" ... to create the appearance at least, of a fairly 
broad coalition of people who supported this. "53 
Nonetheless, the consultative process with and within 
Congress was not that simple. Winston Lord had to determine a 
flexible design for linkage, but moreover, establish a 
consensus on this approach. Yet in feeling out members' views 
on the subject toward this end, Lord was swamped by a multitude 
of specific demands. This kind of deference to Congressional 
opinion provided little guidance for policy. At a meeting with 
members of the House Ways and Means Committee, amongst others, 
angry Representatives voiced their frustration at the 
Administration's failure to establish a stance with which they 
could work. 54 One senior Republican remonstrated that it was the 
52 Interview with Richard Bush op cit. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Lord was accompanied at the meeting by National Economic 
Advisor Robert Rubin and Charlene Barshefski of the Office of 
the United States Trade Representative (USTR). Interview with 
Bruce Wilson, former senior professional staff, House Ways and 
Means Committee, November 12 1997, Washington D.C. 
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responsibility of the Executive branch to lead on foreign 
policy, and that it was ceding policy-making to Congress in a 
way that was dangerous to US national interests. 55 While broad 
consultation was thought valuable to policy-making, the 
Administration's fear of making a clear stand on China policy 
made the whole process highly unwieldy. Rubin, who had little 
experience either of China policy or Congressional politics, 
was taken aback by the voracity of the Ways and Means meeting, 
and said very little. 56 
Assistant Secretary of State Lord also undertook a trip to 
Beijing May 3 to 5 1993 to consult Chinese officials. His 
objective in this regard was two-fold. Firstly, to encourage as 
much progress as possible in the areas of human rights, 
proliferation and trade before the June 3 deadline for the MFN 
recommendation. 57 Secondly, to establish areas on which 
bilateral progress was possible, particularly with regard to 
human rights. His visit followed that of fellow campaign 
advisor Richard Holbrooke in September 1992, and 
representations made by US Ambassador to Beijing Stapleton Ray 
early in 1993. Other discussions 1n the spring included 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Under Secretary Peter 
Tarnoff. 58 
55 Interview with James W. McCormick op cit. 
56 Interview with Bruce Wilson op cit. 
57 Lord also did not want to compromise ongoing Chinese 
cooperation on the issues of North Korea's nuclear programme 
and the peace process in Cambodia. 
58 David M. Lampton, ~China Policy 1n Clinton's First Year'; 
op cit p. 21. 
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The Chinese had not responded well to the talks with 
either Holbrooke or Roy, and Wins ton Lord also met with 
resistance. 59 Not surprisingly, Beijing once again refused 
appeals for human rights progress. Neither was it accommodating 
on the issue of proliferation or arms control, having stiffened 
its stance in response to President Bush's agreement to sell F-
16s to Taiwan in 1992. 60 The PRC did effect a number of familiar 
gestures designed to court American opinion. As in earlier 
years, Beijing looked to sign valuable commercial deals with US 
multinationals such as Boeing, Coca-Cola, Motorola and General 
Electric. 61 Also, as the Administration acknowledged in 
announcing its policy on China on May 28, Beijing released a 
number of prominent political dissidents. 62 However, the more 
substantial progress sought by Wins ton Lord was not 
forthcoming. 63 
Lord appears to have been more optimistic about his 
59 William Drozdiak, 'Clinton to Allies: Continuity is the 
Key'; International Herald Tribune October 8 1993 and Don 
Oberdorfer, 'How Washington and Beijing Avoided Diplomatic 
Disaster'; Washington Post November 7 1993. 
60 Beij ing' s muted response at the time to the decision 
reflected their desire to see Bush re-elected. See Edward 
Friedman, 'The Challenge of a Rising China: Another Germany?', 
Chapter Ten in Robert J. Lieber (ed), Eagle Adrift: American 
Foreign Policy at the End of the Century; Longman (New York, 
1997) p.227. 
61 Interview with Calman J. Cohen, President of the 
Emergency Committee on American Trade (ECAT), November 13 1997, 
Washington D.C. 
62 
'Report to Congress Concerning Extension of Waiver 
Authority for the People's Republic of China' May 28 1993; The 
Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Washington D.C. 
63 Interview with Winston Lord op cit. 
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conversations with the Chinese regarding areas of progress in 
the future. While having publicly advocated MFN conditionality 
and linkage, he had also defended strong engagement with 
Beij ing. 64 Accordingly, Lord wanted to establish realistic and 
reasonable conditions for human rights progress. Lord explains 
that it was his goal to; 
" ... make the bar low enough so that the Chinese 
should be able, in good faith and with incentives to 
improve the relationship, jump over it. "65 
His discussions in this area appear to have been influential on 
the issues subject to 'overall significant progress' in the 
Executive Order. 
THE RESPONSE TO MFN 1993 RENEWAL AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12850 
Clinton announced his recommendation to renew China's 1993 MFN 
trading status in Presidential Determination 93-23 on May 28 
1993. He also announced the implementation of Executive Order 
12850, that made China's 1994 MFN status subject to two 
64 See for example statement of Winston Lord before the 
Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations; 
Asian and Pacific Affairs; and International Economic Policy 
and Trade, of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 29 
1991; Most-Favoured-Nation Status for the People's Republic of 
China; Joint Hearing before the Subcommittees on Human Rights 
and International Organizations; Asian and Pacific Affairs; and 
International Economic Policy and Trade, of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, 1st 
Session, May 29 1991, Washington D.C. (United States Government 
Printing Office, 1992) 
65 Interview with Wins ton Lord op cit. 
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specific and five broad demands for human rights improvements. 66 
Of the two specific demands, one was required by the Jackson-
Vanik amendment of the 1974 Trade Act. This demanded that 
renewal of MFN status substantially promote the freedom of 
emigration, The second specified condition required China to 
comply with the 1992 bilateral Memorandum of Understanding 
prohibiting the export of prison labour goods to the United 
States. 
In addition, the Executive Order required 'overall 
significant progress' in the following areas: adherence to the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights; releasing and accounting 
for prisoners detained for their political and religious 
beliefs; the human treatment of prisoners and consenting to 
prison inspections by international humanitarian and human 
rights organisations; the protection of Tibet's religious and 
cultural heritage; and permitting international radio and 
television broadcasts into China. 67 
66 The Executive Order was accompanied by two documents 
addressing the broader aspects of the Administration's China 
policy: 'Report to Congress concerning Extension of Waiver 
Authority for the People's Republic of China' and 'President 
Clinton's Statement on China/MFN' May 28 1993. 
67 Executive Order Conditions for Renewal of Most-
Favoured-Nation Status for the People's Republic of China in 
1994 May 28 1993, The Office of the Press Secretary, The White 
House, Washington D. C. ; reproduced in US Department of State 
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Flanked by members of Congress, representatives of the 
business community and human rights activists, the President 
highlighted the degree of consensus on the policy. Explaining 
his decision on MFN, he warned: 
Dispatch vol.4 no.24 June 14 1993. 
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"Whether I extend MFN next year, however, will depend 
upon whether China makes significant progress in 
improving its human rights record. " 68 
In testimony to Congress ln June, Winston Lord went into 
greater detail explaining the policy defined by the Executive 
Order, accompanying documents, and unconditional renewal of 
China 1 s MFN status. 69 Acknowledging that progress offered by 
Beijing in the spring had been welcome but insufficient, Lord 
presented Cl in ton 1 s decision to set conditions, evaluated by 
the Secretary of State, on the renewal of China 1 s 19 94 MFN 
status. The Assistant Secretary emphasised the wide 
consultation process that had contributed both to the design of 
the policy, and to the consensus of opinion supporting it. 
Nevertheless, Lord also stressed the importance of China to US 
interests across a broad range of areas, as he had done in his 
confirmation hearing. 70 Moreover, he expressed that it was the 
Administration 1 s desire to seek deeper engagement with China, 
so that the bilateral relationship and the domestic China 
policy debate could be taken to another level. 
68 ~President Clinton's Statement on China/MFN' May 28 1993; 
op cit p.425. 
69 Statement of Winston Lord before the Subcommittee on 
Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee June 8 1993; op 
cit. 
70 Statement of Winston Lord before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Washington D.C. March 31 1993; 
Confirmation Hearing: Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary-
designate for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Washington D. C., March 31 1993 (United 
States Government Printing Office, 1993) 
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''The Clinton Administration's China policy looks 
beyond the annual debate on MFN and seeks to broaden 
the framework for bilateral ties. It defines an 
effective course which will advance US goals and 
balance US interests ... we will strive to resolve our 
serious differences with Beij ing while building on 
areas of agreement. We will engage the Chinese in a 
variety of ways to make progress during the coming 
year and beyond. "71 
Lord believed that engagement with Beij ing was a necessary 
aspect of the policy of linkage, as progress relied upon 
diplomacy with, not isolation of Beijing. 72 Thus he argued that 
the Administration's pursuit of linkage through the use of an 
executive order was realistic: 
"We believe that the conditions set out in the 
executive order are firm and credible. We also 
believe they are achievable in the coming year. "73 
The two documents released alongside the Executive Order, 
the 'Report to Congress concerning Extension of Waiver 
Authority for the People's Republic of China', and Clinton' s 
71 Statement of Wins ton Lord before the Subcommittee on 
Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee June 8 1993; op cit 
p.428. 
72 Interview with Winston Lord op cit. 
73 Ibid. 
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White House speech of May 28 sought to confirm the existence of 
a China policy consensus. 74 In fact, the documents broached 
issues not carried by the Executive Order, such as 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and in the former 
document, coercive birth control practices, and direct though 
unofficial relations with Tibetan representatives. 
In doing so, Clinton hoped to placate those anxious that 
their particular concerns were not addressed by the Executive 
Order, and reassure them that such issues remained crucial to 
US China policy. Of course, the Executive Order reiterated that 
concerns such as proliferation and trade would be managed by 
existing legislation. Given the restrictive nature of 
legislation, this indicated a tough US stance on these issues 
and provided clear standards to which the People's Republic 
were expected to comply. 75 
The Administration's stance on China was broadly 
welcomed. 76 Senator Mitchell called the policy "fair, 
reasonable, responsible. "77 Speaking in Congress on June 10 
1993, Rep. Pelosi praised the Executive Order and recommended 
74 David M. Lampton, ~China Policy in Clinton's First Year'; 
op ci t p. 30. 
75 Shirley A. Kan, ~Clinton' s China Syndrome'; Far Eastern 
Economic Review vol.156 issue 26 p.23. 
76 Vincent A. Augur, Human Rights and Trade: The Clinton 
Administration and China; Pew Case Studies In International 
Affairs, Case 168, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 
Georgetown University, Washington D.C. 1995 p.6. 
77 John R. Cranford, ~Clinton 
Rights Gains'; Congressional 
vol.55.no.22 May 29 1993 p.1349. 
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Ties MFN for China to Human 
Quarterly Weekly Report 
it the House. 78 She also warned however: 
11 Certainly within the next year, if China does not 
comply with the President's executive order ... there 
will be through Congress, like wildfire, a vote to 
deny MFN. 1179 
As predicted, the Houses of Congress backed Pelosi and 
Mitchell in supporting the Executive Order. This was affirmed 
with the House rejecting Representative Gerald B H Solomon's 
bid to overturn the MFN decision by 318 votes to 105 on July 20 
1993. Solomon's attempts to revoke MFN to China had attracted 
significant though insufficient support in the past. The Ways 
and Means Committee had voted to support Solomon's bill, so 
that it would be debated by the full House, but strongly 
recommended its rejection. 80 No such challenge arose in the 
Senate. Thus Congress and the Administration appeared united on 
China policy. Crucially, committees integral to Clinton's wider 
political agenda, Ways and Means, the Trade Subcommittee, and 
Foreign Affairs also backed the Administration. 
78 
'Renewal of Most-Favoured-Nation Status to the 
Republic of China' , House of Representatives June 
Congressional Record June 10, 103rd Congress 1st 
Washington D.C. (United States Government Printing 
pp.H3437-H3438. 
People's 
10 1993; 
Session, 
Office) 
79 John R. Cranford, 'Clinton Ties MFN for China to Human 
Rights Gains' ; op ci t. Pelosi led a demand that the 
Administration report on China's compliance with the conditions 
in six months time. Vincent A. Augur, Human Rights and Trade; 
op cit p.6. 
8° Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1993; vol. XLIX, 103rd 
Congress 1st Session p.184. 
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Some commentators identified the reason for Congressional 
concurrence as partisan politics. 61 Typically, the most vehement 
Congressional critics of China policy were Democrats, but it 
appeared that, for 1993 at least, the new President would 
receive an easier ride. 62 However, it is likely that agreement 
with the Administration followed a shift in perspective, 
especially among Democrats. A new coalition evolved that 
balanced a desire to respond to issues of contention in the US-
China relationship (particularly human rights), with an 
acknowledgement of the importance and potential of that 
relationship. 63 Under the Mitchell/Pelosi stewardship this 
coalition backed the Executive Order. Certainly, Clinton was 
able to use this coalition to his advantage in creating a 
relatively popular policy. 
As a whole, Republicans found little to object to in the 
substance of the Order. Criticism from this quarter centred 
upon a partisan view of Clinton's evolution from his campaign 
rhetoric against the Bush policy to his 1993 MFN decision, and 
questioned the difference between the two Administrations' 
policies. 64 Those whose scrutiny of China concerned areas 
outside the Executive Order were less satisfied. Senator Joseph 
Biden, anxious about Chinese proliferation of nuclear material 
61 Interview with Mike Jendrzejczyk op cit. 
62 Interview with Richard Bush op cit. 
63 Ibid and Lampton, ~China Policy in Clinton's First Year'; 
op cit p. 25. 
64 susumu Awanohara, ~Breathing Space'; Far Eastern Economic 
Review June 10 1993 p.l3. 
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and technology, was not convinced that the Administration would 
pursue an acceptably tough line through existing legislation, 
particularly given Clinton's 'softening' on China policy. 85 
A general overview of the responses of the variety of 
lobby groups outside government concludes that neither the 
human rights lobby, nor the business lobby were entirely 
satisfied with the Executive Order and MFN decision. Despite 
Clinton's desire to minimise opposition.from interested lobby 
groups, especially the business community, the term 'unified' 
China policy had less meaning from this perspective. 
Certainly, in lobbying a President apparently interested 
in both human rights, and business and trade, the human rights 
lobby were the most successful. While both lobbies had access 
to the policy-making process, the sympathies of the most 
influential actors within that process lay with human rights. 86 
Agencies such as the National Economic Council, and the US 
Trade Representative, who inclined towards unconditional MFN 
renewal had less impact. Even Congress, where the business 
lobby could be most effective, was settling towards limited 
conditions for a policy controlled by the Executive. 87 
85 Interview with Frank S Jannuzi op cit and Lampton, 'China 
Policy in Clinton's First Year'; op cit p.27. 
86 Winston Lord reacted to the lobbying by business 
coalitions in the run up to the MFN decision by stating: ''It 
would be very helpful if the business community lobbied the 
Chinese Government to make progress ... as effectively as they 
are lobbying the Congress and the President''. Susumu 
Awanohara, 'Breathing Space'; op cit. He repeated this point in 
his testimony to Congress in June. Statement of Winston Lord 
before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Ways and Means 
Committee June 8 1993; op cit p.428. 
87 Lampton, 'China policy in Clinton's First Year'; op cit 
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One factor in the success of the human rights lobby was a 
degree of concurrence on the means of China policy with the 
protectionists within the US. ss The protectionists, fuelled by 
reports of copyright piracy in the People's Republic, barriers 
to US imports and the large US-China trade imbalance, were 
willing to support measures that demanded Chinese conformity to 
international (or more cynically, US) standards of state 
behaviour. They were unconvinced by the ~engagement' rationale 
for improving the Chinese human rights performance. s9 On the 
other hand, some pro-democracy advocates were anxious not to 
impose excessive pressure upon the People's Republic. They 
feared enormous and dangerous instability would result if the 
elites of the Chinese regime were toppled without a mature 
indigenous political system ready to replace it. 90 Nevertheless, 
the human rights groups were perhaps the most heartened in the 
Spring of 1993. While the human rights conditions fell short of 
those demanded of the Administration, at least a breakthrough 
pp.18-19. 
ss The voice for US trade protectionism had grown louder 
with the end of the Cold War and with the popularised 
perception that the US should now look after its own. Fierce 
debates within the United States concerning proposals for the 
North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) and GATT, and 
increasingly vociferous trade disputes with the European Union 
and more specifically Japan had given the protectionists' 
arguments greater exposure. The explosion of bilateral 
commercial ties had taken the protectionism argument to the 
heart of Sino-American relations. 
89 Susumu Awanohara et al, ~Vienna Showdown'; Far Eastern 
Economic Review June 17 1993 p.17-18. 
90 Interview with Mike Jendrzejczyk op cit and David Zweig, 
~Clinton and China: Creating a Policy Agenda That Works'; op 
cit p.252. 
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had been achieved, and Clinton foreign policy rhetoric 
heightened the salience of the issue. Human Rights campaigner 
Mike Jendrzejczyk recalls the significance felt by the 
appointment and leading role of Winston Lord. Jendrzejczyk 
notes that, following the battles with the Bush Administration, 
Lord appeared to add enormous credibility and power to the MFN 
conditionality platform. 91 
Despite the apparent breakthrough, many in the human 
rights lobby remained wary. For example, there was a suspicion 
that the Clinton Administration's citing of wider human rights 
concerns in the ~Report to Congress' and Cl in ton's statement 
were an appeasement of single issue groups rather than genuine 
commitments. 92 Moreover, campaigners voiced concerns regarding 
the degree of flexibility and ambiguity in the Executive Order 
and accompanying documents. 
Of course the Administration, and members of the moderate 
coalition in Congress argued that China's importance to US 
interests, and uncertainty concerning its future necessitated 
that the President retain flexibility in the conduct of China 
policy. This correlates with the suggestion that the 
Administration was attempting to generate political and 
diplomatic time for the US-China relationship, though different 
interpretations exist as to why. The gathering strength of the 
human rights lobby, together with Cl in ton's campaign vitriol 
against Bush's China policy, had somewhat destabilized the us-
91 Interview with Mike Jendrzejczyk op cit. 
92 Susumu Awanohara, 'Breathing Space'; op cit. 
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China relationship, particularly after the presidential 
election. This was set against a background that included the 
North Korean crisis, imbalances of bi-lateral trade and other 
trade related disputes, and continuing repression within the 
People's Republic. In setting such parameters for the 1994 MFN 
decision in the Executive Order, and negotiating with 
interested parties including the Chinese beforehand, it was 
argued that the Administration established time for the 
relationship to recover. 93 The People's Republic had another 
year to adjust to US demands. 
Mike Jendrzejczyk of Human Rights Watch:Asia agrees that 
the use of an executive order, and the ambiguity of the 
documents, allowed the President flexibility and the US-PRC 
relationship a grace period of one year. However, with 
retrospect, he takes the view that important figures in the 
Administration were already manoeuvring to delink human rights 
from trade with the PRC. While he believes that Cl in ton did 
care about human rights, Jendrzejczyk maintains that the 
President also cared about trade and jobs, and the political 
implications of those issues. Therefore, Clinton was vulnerable 
to arguments presented by advocates of delinkage. Jendrzejczyk 
concludes that the Executive Order was designed to give the 
impression of fulfilling campaign pledges and to keep Congress 
off the President's back. It also provided time in which to 
press Beijing for gestures on human rights, to interpret them 
93 Ibid. 
307 
307 
as acceptable, and to drop the policy in 1994. 94 
This interpretation rests in part on the Executive Order's 
use of the phrase 'overall significant progress', and the 
conditions it identified. Jendrzejczyk insists that the 
conditions as defined represented the technical minimum 
requirement. Contrasting it with the specific conditions 
proposed by Pelosi, he argues that the conditions in the 
Executive Order were devised for open invitation. 95 Further, 
Jendrzejczyk suggests that the Administration adopted the 
expression 'overall significant progress' in an attempt to 
reflect the terminology of bills introduced by Pelosi and 
others to condition MFN. In other words, it was an attempt to 
solicit Congressional trust and political backing on China 
policy. 96 The nature of the conditions, however, did echo those 
proposed by Pelosi et al. This reflected Lord's consultations 
with this group. 
While the business lobby was relieved that MFN had been 
granted without restrictions, and indeed that it had not been 
revoked, it was anxious about the effects of qualifying renewal 
in 1994 upon human rights improvements. The Administration 
appeared to accept many of the arguments it had advanced 
against restricting or revoking MFN. 97 The possible detrimental 
94 Interview with Mike Jendrzej czyk op cit. 
95 Ibid. This point is also made by Robert L. Bernstein and 
Richard Dicker, 'Human Rights First' ; Foreign Policy no. 94 
Spring 1994 p.43 and pp.45-46. Bernstein and Dicker were also 
members of Human Rights Watch. 
96 Interview with Mike Jendrzejczyk op cit. 
97 Bernstein and Dicker argue 
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that the Administration's 
effect of such action upon American jobs, the competition for 
markets in China and East Asia, and on the interests of close 
allies Taiwan and Hong Kong ran counter to principles upon 
which the Clinton Presidency stood. 
Still, they insisted that the Executive Order's conditions 
would undermine growing bi-lateral trade and economic relations 
in the longer term. The development of business links, trade 
and joint ventures could be impeded by uncertainty as to 
whether MFN would be revoked in 1994 if the conditions were not 
met. 98 Chinese officials had not been slow in pushing this 
bandwagon themselves in bi-lateral consultations prior to the 
1993 decision. 
Members of the business community also questioned the 
rationale upon which the Executive Order was based. In essence, 
their criticisms related to the argument that economic 
engagement provided the most effective way of promoting human 
rights in China, an argument used by the previous 
Administration, and one also employed at times by members of 
the Cl in ton Administration. 99 In other words, they doubted the 
wisdom of the Executive Order as a means of promoting human 
rights. Cal Cohen, of the highly influential Emergency 
Committee on American Trade asserts: 
insistence only upon ~overall significant progress' was a 
direct result of the open letter from the coalition of 300 
bus_inesses, and the large Chinese orders for US manufactures 
and technology in the run up to the MFN decision. Robert L. 
Bernstein and Richard Dicker, ~Human Rights First'; op cit 
pp.44-45. 
98 Interview with Calman J. Cohen op cit. 
99 Especially officials in the economic agencies. 
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"In particular, it appeared to us, that Secretary 
Lord and his colleagues were over-emphasising one 
aspect, and this is very important, one aspect of 
human rights ... which was ... political dissent. "100 
Cohen argues that the Administration made a critical 
mistake in reducing the US-China relationship, with its broad 
range of interests, down to a narrow set of human rights 
issues. He maintains that this effectively placed this crucial 
bilateral relationship in the hands of the Chinese, who would 
decided how they would respond to the Executive Order's 
ambiguous demands. Thus, Cohen concludes, the Administration 
was " ... putting, in a sense, a gun to their own heads." 101 
The business lobby were also resentful of their lack 
influence on the policy-making process toward the Executive 
Order. While many recognised that Clinton would be likely to 
adhere to his campaign pledge on linkage, they felt strongly 
that their interests had not been recognised by a President who 
had declared ~its the economy, stupid' . 102 Given the President's 
proactive economic mandate, and given the fact that the 
business community enjoyed an influential and successful role 
in the China policy debate during the Bush Administration, it 
appears that the business community had been somewhat 
complacent relative to the powerful voice for human rights that 
100 Interview with Calman J. Cohen op cit op cit. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
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existed in the Congress, the Administration, and the White 
House in the spring of 1993. 
Conclusion 
In a strict sense, the China policy announced on May 28 1993 
met Clinton 1 S three key objectives. Firstly, it established a 
strategy of linkage. Secondly and concomitantly, it meant that 
Clinton had adhered to his campaign pledge on China policy. 
Thirdly, it appeared to establish a consensus with Congress on 
China. 103 This was not an easy task. While there was agreement 
on the broad objectives of China policy, to encourage a stable 
China that participated responsibly in the international system 
while moving toward economic, political and societal 
liberalisation, there was little agreement as to the best way 
to promote these objectives. America wanted both to change 
China and participate in its development. This required a 
careful balancing of sometimes conflictual normative and 
realist US interests. Winston Lord argues of Clinton 1 s 
Executive Order: 
"He came up with a solution which he wanted of very 
modest conditions which hopefully wouldn 1 t threaten 
it [MFN] , and felt that with the mood in Congress and 
103 with the presidential election over, Cl in ton 1 s political 
sensitivities related to Congress rather than public opinion. 
As Richard Bush notes, public opinion had little substantive 
influence on either the Cl in ton Administration 1 s or Congress 1 
handling of China policy. Richard Bush, The Evolution of US 
Policy Toward China Under the Clinton Administration; speech to 
Chinese foreign policy community, Beijing, December 1993 p.S. 
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his own statements in the campaign, that he had to 
sort of thread the needle here. "104 
The adoption of MFN conditionality, of explicit linkage, 
did represent a new strategy toward China. In other words it 
did represent a clear departure from the path of ever greater 
engagement with Beijing, accepted in the late 1960s and pursued 
officially since the establishment of informal relations in 
1972. Moreover, this new China strategy appeared to possess a 
strong degree of domestic legitimacy, given the political value 
of Clinton's pledge during the presidential election and 
Congress's support for the Executive Order of May 28. 
However, the new strategy toward China and the domestic 
legitimacy that appeared to underpin it was not based on a 
considered, long-term strategic view of the Sino-American 
relationship. Rather, it was founded more on the President's 
short-term domestic political calculations. Similarly, 
Congress' support for the policy had strong political 
connotations. Democrats on the Hill clearly disagreed amongst 
themselves as to the most appropriate China strategy. However, 
the likes of Pelosi and Hamilton did concur on the need to 
support a new Democratic president, the first for twelve years, 
and one experiencing problems at home and abroad early in his 
term of office. 105 Democrats of divergent views on China found 
enough in the ambiguous Executive Order to feel able to offer 
104 Interview with Winston Lord op cit. 
105 Interviews with 
Jendrzejczyk op cit. 
Richard 
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Bush op cit and Mike 
Clinton their backing. 
The predominantly political motivations behind the 
Executive Order demonstrated that the Clinton Administration 
had not addressed the inherent problems associated with the 
stance adopted during the presidential campaign. 106 The result 
was a flawed China policy-making process and a flawed China 
policy. 
One of the most obvious problems was the tension between 
the promotion of human rights in China, and Clinton's focus on 
economic revitalisation. Clinton was determined to pursue an 
ambitious geo-economic agenda, promoting free and fair trade, 
itself a contradiction according to some. 107 Further he had 
promised to rejuvenate and support the domestic American 
economy, and to protect and create jobs. To officials such as 
Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown, China offered one of the most 
exciting opportunities in these areas, exemplified by his 
identification of China as one of ten 'Big Emerging Markets'. 108 
This tension raised the question of whether the President would 
place the threat to revoke China's MFN status in the event of 
little human rights progress above the pursuit of economic 
interest. Put simply, where did Clinton's true commitments lie? 
106 See the conclusion in the previous chapter. 
107 Interview with Stephen Yates op cit. 
108 See Michael Cox, US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: 
Superpower without a Mission?i Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, Chatham House Papers, Pinter (London, 1995) Chapter 
Three especially pp.34-36. See also statement of Winston Lord 
before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Ways and Means 
Committee June 8 1993i op cit p.428. 
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This fault line ln the Administration's China policy 
highlighted another critical flaw. Neither the Executive Order, 
nor the statements that accompanied the introduction of the 
policy articulated and clarified the hierarchy of US interests 
in China. While references to the importance of China were 
common, there was no sense of prioritisation, other than the 
desire to adhere to campaign commitments and establish 
consensus with Congress. In effect the Administration had 
neglected to define a long-term strategic vision of China 
policy, that would have orchestrated US interests. The lack of 
commitment to US-China policy shown by the President, the 
Secretary of State and the NSA contributed to this problem. 
Different agencies would be free to pursue their own priorities 
with China undermining Wins ton Lord's task of engaging the 
Chinese on the policy defined by the Executive Order . 109 
The lack of clarity and commitment to China policy 
undermined Washington's credibility with Beijing right from the 
start. The Chinese were not sure what the Administration 
wanted, and this eventually fed Chinese resentment and 
suspicions of American intentions. America's East Asian allies 
were also confused as to Washington's basic policy. They 
opposed America's pursuit of MFN conditionality with Beijing, 
fearing that it would provoke belligerence in their powerful 
though politically unstable neighbour. 110 States such as 
109 In a memorandum to the Secretary of State in April 1994, 
Lord complained bitterly about the lack of hierarchy and 
discipline on China policy. This is discussed in the following 
chapter. 
110 This was in spite of the fact that they could stand to 
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Singapore, Indonesia and to a degree Japan, were also unhappy 
with the moralist tone of the Executive Order, as the Far 
Eastern Economic Review noted: 
"The great danger is that hectoring from the White 
House will not only foreclose progress in China, it 
will unite Asian governments of divergent stripes 
against it ... "111 
In this sense, the Administration's China policy also 
threatened to undermine its ambitious plans for developing 
America's economic, political and strategic ties with the 
countries of the Pacific. 112 
Bureaucracies and officials within the Administration were 
split on China policy from the start. The political purposes 
behind the China policy-making process had precluded the 
development of a policy that tried to reconcile the divergence 
of views. The consensus with and within Congress was also 
highly unstable. The drive for consensus had required 
consideration of a very broad range of views on the Hill, from 
those who advocated the immediate revocation of China's MFN to 
those who favoured unfettered engagement with Beijing, premised 
on a long list of normative, economic, political, security and 
gain economically by replacing US business in China in the 
event of a revocation of MFN. 
111 
'China's Market-Leninism'; Far Eastern Economic Review 
September 23 1993. 
112 See for example Warren Christopher, In the 
History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era; 
University Press (Stanford, 1998) Chapter Seven 
Pacific Community'. 
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Stream of 
Stanford 
'The New 
environmental issues. The ambiguity in the Executive Order 
reflected the challenge of encompassing these views in a single 
policy. 
However, the basis for this consensus made the policy 
highly vulnerable to any rise ln US-PRC tensions, and a lack of 
demonstrable progress in any of the issues. Further, it also 
made the policy vulnerable to a change in the political make-up 
on Congress. As the following chapter shows, the 
Administration's mishandling of China policy, and the 
deterioration in Sino-American relations indeed destroyed the 
consensus created in the spring of 1993. 113 The moderate 
coalition that emerged in the spring of 1993 transformed into a 
centrist bloc throughout 1993-1994, as members of Congress 
underwent their own learning curve on US-China relations. Of 
course, it was one of Clinton's key objectives to respond and 
placate the prevailing views on the Hill regarding China. Thus 
it allowed him to reverse the strategy established in May 1993, 
delink human rights from China's trading status, and reinstate 
the strategy of engagement with the backing of Congress. 114 Yet 
the policy reversal and the new consensus established in 1994 
resulted once more from political calculations, crisis 
management, and a focus on the short-term. The Administration's 
failure to define a long-term framework for US relations with 
Beijing ln 1993 and to provide coherent leadership on the issue 
113 In other words, it may be said that Congressional 
opinion on China was on the brink of change just as the 
Administration developed a policy reflecting that opinion. 
1
,. As stated Mike Jendrzejczyk and others believe that this 
was the President's goal all along. 
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persisted through to, and beyond, the 1994 MFN decision. 
Washington's relations with China, and its ability to pursue 
engagement with Beijing suffered as a result. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
US CHINA POLICY SPRING 1993 TO SPRING 1994 
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION PURSUES A STRATEGY OF LINKAGE 
The Clinton Administration had appeared to establish a new 
strategy for China with Executive Order 12850. Advocates of 
linkage and MFN conditionality were optimistic that US leverage 
could now be employed to secure progress on human rights, and 
other issues, from Beij ing. The policy drew criticism from a 
variety of perspectives. A minority thought that a tougher 
policy of confrontation was required, to challenge China's 
growing power and abuse of international norms of behaviour. A 
larger group thought that linkage undermined US engagement with 
the PRC, would sabotage the pursuit of US interests in China, 
and would hinder China's gradual political and societal 
liberalisation. Another body of opinion, predominantly the 
human rights community, doubted that the strategy of linkage 
defined by the Executive Order was strict and precise enough. 1 
Yet, a broad consensus in Congress had backed Clinton's 
adherence to his electoral pledge to institute MFN 
conditionality. 
However the policy proved unsustainable over the ensuing 
twelve months, and Clinton del inked human rights and other 
broad conditions from US-China trade with his recommendation on 
1 See for example Robert G. Butter (with Seong-Eun Choi), 
Shaping China's Future in World Affairs: The Role of the United 
States; Westview Press (Oxford, 1996) pp.74-76. 
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China's 1994 MFN status. This chapter will show how the 
essential flaws in the formulation of the Executive Order 
manifest themselves in the US China policy-making process and 
the pursuit of China policy through 1993-1994. The particular 
merits or otherwise of a strategy of linkage will not be 
discussed. 2 Rather, the chapter will explain that the policy 
faltered because it was predicated on Clinton's domestic 
political concerns. As a result, the Administration failed to 
move beyond an expression of America's broad objectives toward 
China by defining and articulating a clear and coherent 
framework of China policies and priorities. Further, as 
analysis of the 1993-1994 period will demonstrate, Clinton 
neglected to provide strategic leadership and discipline on 
China policy. This left the policy's main architect, Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston 
Lord, in an exposed and weak position, and facilitated 
fragmented pursuit of US interests in which different agencies 
followed their own agendas with Beijing. 
While the Administration attempted to readdress its 
strategy on China in late summer 1993, these essential defects 
in the policy-making process remained. Therefore, chapter six 
will show how Clinton's first China policy provoked resentment 
and incredulity in Beijing, frustration in the US congress, and 
2 For example Mike Jendrzejczyk of Human Rights Watch: Asia 
argues that the Administration's handling of the policy, rather 
than the policy itself led it to fail. Others, such as Frank 
Jannuzi, a China specialist at the State Department at the time 
insists that a strategy of linkage aimed a China was bound to 
fail anyway. Interview with Mike Jendrzejczyk, November 4 1997, 
Washington D.C., and Interview with FrankS. Jannuzi, November 
12 1997, Washington D.C. 
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divisions within the US Administration. Clinton's decision to 
renew China's 1994 MFN status without conditions, and to return 
to the longstanding policy of broad engagement with the PRC did 
to a degree reflect an acknowledgement of previous policy-
making failings. However, to a much greater extent the decision 
represented another case of crisis management informed by 
domestic political calculations. The essential flaws in the 
Clinton Administration's China policy persisted. 
The Clinton Administration Pursues a Strategy of Linkage 
THE IMMEDIATE DETERIORATION IN US-CHINA RELATIONS FOLLOWING THE 
1993 MFN DECISION 
The Administration embarked upon the pursuit of its redefined 
China policy with optimism. The Executive Order had brought 
harsh criticism from Beij ing, but it was understood that the 
Chinese were privately relieved that its MFN status had been 
renewed without immediate restrictions. 3 However Sino-American 
relations deteriorated rapidly. Pressed by a watchful Congress, 
the Executive wanted to demonstrate its resolve in promoting US 
interests with China, and prove that it was willing to 
challenge unacceptable aspects of China's behaviour.• Congress 
3 
'Clinton MFN Order gets Mixed Reviews; Business, Human-
Rights Groups Back Compromise as China Balks'; Asian Wall 
Street Journal May 31 1993 p .1 and interview with David M. 
Lampton, President of the National Committee on US-China 
Relations, November 14, New York. 
' National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, who many regard as 
having a 'missionary-like' compulsion to change China, was 
relatively involved in China policy-making at this point. 
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too wished to take a tough line with the PRC. Beijing, entering 
a period of political uncertainty related to the succession of 
paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, was typically determined to 
resist US demands and interference. A number of incidents in 
the summer of 1993 reflected this confrontation. 
US and Chinese representatives came to diplomatic blows at 
the UN Conference on Human Rights in mid-June. State Department 
Counsellor Timothy Wirth accused the Chinese of leading an 
effort to prevent the drafting of a "meaningful final 
document". 5 This was followed by a new period of political 
repression in China, highlighted by the arrest of a number of 
prominent political dissidents. Other than the 'political fix' 
embodied in the May 2 8 announcement, it appeared that the 
bilateral human rights dialogue undertaken by Christopher, Lord 
and other officials in the spring of 1993 had achieved little 
else. 6 
The issue of security, absent from the Executive Order's 
MFN conditions, and governed for the US by existing 
legislation, also became a focus for bilateral contention 
within two months of the launch of Clinton•s China policy. 
The month of July saw two incidents that raised American 
anxieties about China's role in the proliferation of militarily 
sensitive materiel to Iran. In the first case, China openly 
Interview with Ted 
Policy and Defence 
Washington D.C. 
Galen Carpenter, Vice-President, Foreign 
Studies, CATO Institute, November 6 1997, 
5 
'US Chides China on Rights'; Chicago Tribune June 18 1993. 
6 See previous chapter for an overview of these discussions. 
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declared that it would assist Iran in building a nuclear power 
plant, in the face of US objections. 7 At the same time, US 
intelligence revealed their suspicions that a Chinese 
freighter, the Yin He, was covertly supplying chemical weapons 
components to Iran." Despite the tough stance taken on the issue 
by the Administration, the Chinese refused to allow an 
inspection of the ship until August 4, when no evidence to 
support US allegations was found. 9 Not for the first time, 
Beijing came out top in the public relations war. 
These disputes were expounded by continued US allegations 
that the People's Republic were shipping missile technology 
(specifically M-11 missiles) to Pakistan. 10 This particular 
issue greatly concerned and annoyed the Administration, in the 
context of the 1992 Memorandum of Understanding secured by 
Secretary of State Baker eliciting Chinese support for the 
Missile Technology Control Regime. Chinese protestations that 
the missiles fell outside the Regime's 300 km limit angered 
Administration officials who hoped not only to limit China's 
role in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but 
7 Vincent A. Auger, Human Rights and Trade: The Clinton 
Administration and China; Pew Case Studies in International 
Affairs, Case 168, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown 
University, Washington D.C. p.7. 
8 
'The Voyage of the Yin He'; Washington Post August 11 1993 
p.A18. 
9 Kerry Dumbaugh, China-US 
Developments During the Clinton 
Congress 97-484 F, Library of 
October 15 1997 p.4. 
Relations: Chronology of 
Administration; Report for 
Congress, Washington D.C., 
10 John Goshko, 'US Warns China of Sanctions for Missile 
Exports to Pakistan'; Washington Post July 26 1993 p.A10. 
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to secure Beij ing' s signature on anti-proliferation measures, 
such as the MTCR. Talks between Warren Christopher and Chinese 
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting in Singapore in late July, and a 
coincidental diplomatic trip by Undersecretary of State Lynn 
Davis to Beijing, proved fruitless. 11 The Administration imposed 
sanctions on the People's Republic in August. 12 Worth almost $1 
billion over a two year period, the sanctions covered a variety 
of high-technology exports predominantly to the Chinese Defence 
and Aerospace ministries. 13 This action raised a significant 
point; namely the suggestion that the Clinton Administration 
was willing to sacrifice US commercial interests to US national 
security interests, but not human rights interests. This 
suspicion, sewn by the May 2 8 Executive Order, would grow on 
the back of bilateral incidents in the run up to the 1994 MFN 
decision. 
Congress too exhibited a desire to punish China. Certain 
members, led by Senator Jesse Helms, pushed officials for a 
more resolute stand on China's proliferatory and arms trading 
11 Ibid. Davis was conducting a five state tour promoting an 
end to nuclear testing. 'US Envoy to Explore Worldwide A-Test 
Ban'; Washington Post July 20 1993 p.A14. 
12 The Defence Agencies expressed frustration with the lack 
of progress on issues of proliferation secured by top officials 
during this period. These sanctions represented a minor 
success, however. Interview with Ronald N. Montaperto, Senior 
Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National 
Defence University, November 12 1997, Washington D.C. 
13 Daniel Williams, 'US Punishes China Over Missile Sales'; 
Washington Post August 26 1993 p.A1. 
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activities. 14 More significantly, Congress voted overwhelmingly 
in opposition to Beijing's bid to host the Olympic Games in the 
year 2000, on the basis of China's human rights record. The 
debate in the Senate was particularly critical of China, and 
the Administration decided to follow its lead. China protested 
strongly at Washington's interference, and blamed the US for 
the narrow defeat of its bid in late September. 15 
The diplomatic fall-out triggered by these disputes left 
US-China relations under significant strain. The US perceived 
the Beij ing regime to be engaged in deliberately provocative 
behaviour, while the Chinese repeated their protests of an 
interfering and imperialist America. The thirty-ninth Chinese 
nuclear test in early October, that broke the five established 
nuclear nations' informal moratorium on testing, only served to 
consolidate these views in the diplomatic clash that ensued. 16 
Administration officials, particularly within the State 
Department and the defence agencies, and certain members of 
Congress such as Rep. Lee Hamilton, were concerned by the 
deterioration in relations. 17 These figures were worried that 
14 Lally Weymouth, 'Chinese Take-Out; Supplying Weapons to 
Rogue States'; Washington Post August 12 1993 p.A27. 
15 Ezra F. Vogel, 'How Can the United States and China 
Pursue Common Interests and Manage Differences?' Introduction 
to Ezra F. Vogel, Living with China: US-China Relations in the 
Twenty-First Century; The American Assembly, W.W.Norton and 
Company Inc. (New York, 1997) pp.25-26. 
16 Lena H. sun, 'China Resumes Nuclear Tests ' ; Washington 
Post October 6 1993 p.A23. Adherence to the moratorium, (which 
the US planned would precede a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty -
CTBT) , was seen as evidence of China's integration into the 
'world community'. 
17 Interview with Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State 
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Sino-American tensions would compromise Washington's ability to 
deal with the deepening crisis regarding North Korea's nuclear 
programme, as Beij ing' s cooperation on the issue was thought 
valuable. 18 This apprehension led to a review of China policy in 
July-September 1993. 
THE ADMINISTRATION ATTEMPTS 'COMPREHENSIVE ENGAGEMENT' WITH 
CHINA 
Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord had argued that 
engagement with Beijing was necessary if the strategy of 
linkage and MFN conditionality was going to work. 19 Indeed, 
State Department officials at junior levels had pursued, or 
more accurately continued diplomatic engagement with their 
Chinese counterparts before and after the announcement of the 
Executive Order. However, tough-sounding statements, often 
issued by White House officials, undermined this endeavour. 20 
This view is supported by Lord: 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 1993-1996, November 7 1993, 
New York and interview with Richard Bush, former professional 
staff on the House Subcommittee for Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
October 29, Washington D.C. 
18 See chapters three and four for discussions of the North 
Korea issue. 
19 Statement of Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs before the Subcommittee on 
Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee, Washington D.C., 
June 8 1993 i reproduced in US Department of State Dispatch 
vol.4 no.24. June 14 1993. 
20 Interview with 
Specialist, Department 
D.C. 
Robert M. 
of State, 
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Perito, former Senior China 
November 10 1997, Washington 
11 I was uncomfortable ... with our style [on China 
policy} .. We Weren't putting the best public face on 
it. 1121 
Feeling that the US-China relationship was accumulating 
problems that needed to be addressed, Lord consulted widely 
within the China policy community. 22 As a consequence, he 
recommended a strategy of 'Comprehensive Engagement' with 
Beij ing in a memorandum to the President in mid-July 1993, 
signed and activated by Clinton in September. 23 Clinton welcomed 
the recommendation. His own reservations regarding the linkage 
policy had been fuelled by Japanese and South Korean 
disapproval voiced to the President on his tour of the 
countries in late July. 24 The memorandum established the basis 
for a series of high-level US visits and exchanges intended to 
secure an improvement and promote understanding in bilateral 
relations. 25 Nevertheless, it was designed to reinforce, not 
replace, the strategy of linkage. 
NSA Lake and Assistant Secretary Lord communicated the new 
21 Interview with Winston Lord op cit. 
22 Lord recalls an 11 ••• undercurrent of dissatisfaction in 
certain elite circles of our policy.'' Ibid. 
23 Ibid. The delay in Cl in ton signing and activating the 
action memorandum indicates the lack of commitment he afforded 
US China policy. 
24 David M. Lampton, 'America's China Policy in the Age of 
the Finance Minister: Clinton Ends Linkage'; The China 
Quarterly no.l39 September 1994 p.610. 
25 see also Elaine Sciolino, 'Clinton and China: How the 
Promise Self-Destructed'; New York Times May 29 1994 p.l. 
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approach to PRC Ambassador to Washington Li Diaoyu on September 
25 1993. 26 Warren Christopher' s reiteration of the message in 
his meeting with Qian Qichen in New York on September 30 drew a 
favourable response from Qian. 27 Accordingly Assistant Secretary 
of State for Human Rights John Shattuck visited Beijing in mid-
October. The fact that Shattuck was the first senior official 
to go to the PRC was intended to symbolise the centrality of 
the human rights issue to Washington's relations with Beijing. 
The Chinese resisted his appeals for progress. 28 
Shattuck was followed to Beijing by Agriculture Secretary 
Mike Espy and Charlene Barshefsky of the Office of the United 
State Trade Representative (USTR). While Espy's visit was 
encouraging, Beij ing dismissed Barshefsky' s claim that China 
was blocking US access to its markets. 29 The most significant 
exchange occurred in early November, when Assistant Secretary 
of Defence Charles Freeman undertook two days of talks in 
Beijing. 30 This represented the highest-level bilateral military 
exchange since Tiananmen June 1989. 31 
26 Kerry Dumbaugh, China-US Relations: Chronology; op cit 
p.4. 
27 Daniel Williams, 'US to Renew 
Military; Meeting Reflects Strategy 
Washington Post November 1 1993 p.A1. 
28 Ibid. 
Contact with Chinese 
of Easing Tension' ; 
29 Using familiar courting tactics, the Chinese raised the 
prospect of major grain purchases with Espy. Ibid. 
30 Lena Sun. 'Military Talks in Beijing 'Productive'; 
Washington Post November 3 1993 p.A12. 
31 Throughout the mid to late 1980s, US-PRC military 
negotiations and exchanges had been at the forefront of the 
burgeoning bilateral relationship. Interview with Ronald N. 
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While little substantive progress was made in the series 
of talks, they did improve the diplomatic atmosphere between 
the two governments in advance of Clinton's scheduled meeting 
with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, at the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Seattle November 19. 32 In 
an echo of the Bush Administration's early tactics toward 
China, and establishing a precedent for future conduct, the 
Administration also offered concessions as a means of improving 
relations. On the eve of the Clinton-Jiang meeting, the 
Administration communicated its willingness to waive the 
sanctions it imposed in August in return for a PRC pledge not 
to export M-11 missiles or similar in the future. Beij ing 
expressed interest in the proposal while denying the transfers 
occurred in the first place. 33 The Administration also revealed 
its decision to permit the sale of a supercomputer requested by 
Beij ing. 34 
The Clinton-Jiang meeting reflected an improvement in 
relations, but yielded no progress. 35 Jiang was unmoved by 
Montaperto op cit. 
32 Interview with Winston Lord op cit. See also Don 
Oberdorfer, 'Replaying the China Card; How Washington and 
Beijing Avoided Diplomatic Disaster'; Washington Post November 
7 1993 p.C3. This meeting was the first between US and Chinese 
leaders since Tiananmen. 
33 R. Jeffrey Smith and Daniel Williams, 'US Offers to Waive 
China Trade Sanctions'; Washington Post November 11 1993 p.A39. 
34 Ruth Marcus and Daniel Williams, 'US Agrees 
Supercomputer to China'; Washington Post November 
p.A48. 
to 
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35 Ruth Marcus and Daniel Williams, 'China Cool to Clinton 
Conditions; President and Jiang Meet in Seattle'; Washington 
Post November 20 1993 p.A1. 
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Cl in ton's insistence on progress on human rights and other 
issues. Indeed to illustrate the importance in which the US 
regarded the matter, Clinton informed Jiang of a letter signed 
by two hundred and seventy members of Congress demanding an 
improvement of human rights progress. 36 
The period after the September instigation of 
'comprehensive' engagement, culminating in the Clinton-Jiang 
meeting in November had a number of important implications for 
the Administration's management of China policy. Firstly, the 
endorsement of high-level contacts led to the resumption of 
bilateral military dialogue. This, according to one defence 
analyst, allowed defence officials with a stronger appreciation 
of the strategic importance of US-China relations a greater 
influence in the policy-making process. Their role was limited 
by the White House's continuing preoccupation with domestic 
political factors. It did, however, facilitate the growing 
influence later in the Administration of William Perry, who 
would replace Les Aspin as Defence Secretary. 37 
On the other hand, the pursuit of engagement undermined US 
credibility in Beij ing. 39 The Administration was determined to 
36 Daniel Williams, 'US, China in Test of Strength'; 
Washington Post November 22 1993 p.Al7. This repeated the China 
policy custom of the Administration informing the Chinese that 
the US Congress would act against China unless progress on 
specified bilateral relations was forthcoming. 
37 Perry was widely acknowledged to have a strong and 
rationale vision of US China policy. Interview with Ronald N. 
Montaperto op cit. 
39 This concern was raised by some officials. 
Williams, 'US to Renew Contact with Chinese Military; 
Reflects Strategy of Easing Tension'; op cit. 
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Daniel 
Meeting 
take a resolute stand on human rights. Clinton, Christopher and 
other high-level officials in the State Department and National 
Security Council (NSC) impressed upon the Chinese that 
compliance with the conditions stipulated in the Executive 
Order was required for MFN renewal. Yet the Administration also 
offered concessions to sweeten the relationship. Some 
commentators considered the talks with the Chinese military, 
key figures in the June 1989 repression, in this vein. 39 Further 
while elite officials such as Clinton issued tough rhetoric and 
demands, more junior officials within the State Department were 
actively pursuing positive engagement. 
The Administration began to doubt that Executive Order 
would be met, and that it would be faced with revoking China's 
MFN status in 1994. These doubts convinced some within the 
Administration, and in particular within the State Department, 
that a firmer stance toward China was required. 40 Others, within 
and outside the Administration believed that engagement was 
necessary, but that the US needed to communicate its interests 
and requirements in a more considered and coherent way. A 
number of private diplomatic initiatives were undertaken in 
line with this recommendation. One congressional staffer 
conducted an ~academic trip' to Beij ing, the real purpose of 
which was; 
" ... a kind of propaganda operation on the Chinese 
community, stating as stronger a case for why it was 
39 For example see John Kruger and Charles Lewis, 'Bills 
Long March'; Washington Post November 7 1993 p.C3. 
40 Interview with Mike Jendrzejczyk op cit. 
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in China's interests to buy on to the E.O. [Executive 
Order] and do the minimum of what was necessary."" 
However the latter months of 1993, and the Clinton-Jiang 
meeting in particular convinced other officials that the policy 
adopted in May was unwise and should not be pursued. The 
economic agencies led by the Commerce Department and the 
National Economic Council were convinced of the value of 
pursuing America's commercial interests in China, or at least 
not having them curtailed by MFN revocation. 42 Similarly, the 
defence agencies wished to expand its reinitiated dialogue with 
the Chinese military, and argued that MFN revocation would be 
detrimental to US security interests. Indeed Clinton came to 
feel that he could not risk the isolation of Beijing, and that 
China was too important to punish, following his APEC meeting 
with Jiang. 43 
These conclusions, when brought together might have 
pointed to a reconcerted effort by the Administration to pursue 
its broad range of interests in China. Instead, it led to 
considerable disunity within the Administration, and even 
greater inconsistency and incoherence in China policy. Despite 
41 Interview with Richard Bush op cit. Bush delivered a 
speech entitled ~The Evolution of US Policy Toward China Under 
the Clinton Administration'. 
42 Interview with Stephen Yates, China Policy Analyst, the 
Heritage Foundation, November 5 1997, Washington D. C. Yates 
served as an aide to Commerce Secretary Ron Brown. 
43 Robert S. Greenberger and Michael K. Frisby, ~Clinton's 
Renewal of Trade Status for China Follows Cabinet Debates, 
Congress's Sea Change'; Wall Street Journal May 31 1994 p.A18. 
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appreciating the importance of China, the President still did 
not commit himself to the issue. The Administration's chaotic 
approach to relations with Beij ing contributed to a further 
deterioration in bilateral relations and a growing political 
crisis in 1994. 
A FURTHER DETERIORATION IN US-CHINA RELATIONS IN 1994 
THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S CHINA POLICY 
In some respects the new year started well for the 
Administration. Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen's trip to 
Beijing towards the end of January secured a Chinese commitment 
vital to the renewal of MFN as defined by the Executive Order. 
Beijing agreed to a round of inspections of Chinese prisons by 
US Custom Officials, pursuant of the 1992 Memorandum of 
Understanding on the export of prison labour to the US. 44 
Further, Beij ing responded positively to an announcement by 
USTR Mickey Kantor that the US would impose sanctions worth 
over $1 billion following evidence of Chinese transshipment of 
textiles to the US. Demonstrating its awareness that Washington 
was gearing itself up for the debate on China's MFN, the 
Chinese government declared a determination to prevent such 
transshipments in the future. 45 The Chinese authorities also 
began talks with the International Committee of the Red Cross 
concerning access to Chinese prisons, and released a number of 
44 Kerry Dumbaugh, China-US Relations: Chronology; op cit 
p.5. 
45 Elaine Sciolino, 'Clinton and China: How Promise Self-
Destructed'; op cit. 
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political prisoners. Administration officials recognised that 
these gestures did not satisfy the conditions of the Executive 
Order. 46 
Anxieties regarding the MFN decision in the face of 
China's lack of progress on human rights continued to grow. 
Senior officials called for improvements while insisting that 
the threat to revoke MFN still stood. Commencing his trip to 
China, Secretary Bentsen said: 
" ... some progress had been made, but we were 
expecting more before this president had to make his 
decision. 1147 
The Secretary of State, known to be supportive of linkage 
backed this demand in late January, maintaining: 
"I think that at this present time, they have not met 
the conditions of the executive order.'' 48 
The Administration defence of linkage came under 
heightened scrutiny at the beginning of February, with the 
release of the annual State Department Report on Human Rights 
in China. 49 While the report recognized that some small steps 
46 Clay Chandler and Daniel Southerland, 'A Slow Pace on 
Rights by Beij ing, but it May Suffice'; International Herald 
Tribune January 22-23 1994 p.1 and p.4. 
47 Thomas L. Friedman, 'Bentsen Says China Isn't Doing 
Enough on Rights'; New York Times January 20 1994. 
48 Elaine Sciolino, 'US Again Warns Beijing on Rights'; New 
York Times January 20 1994. 
49 China 
Department of 
Human 
State, 
Rights 
Bureau 
Practices, 1993; 
of Public Affairs 
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United States 
(United States 
had been taken to improve human rights, such as the release of 
some political prisoners and accession to international 
inspection of its prison labour facilities, the State 
Department largely condemned China's record. The report argued 
that the China' s human rights performance in 1993; 
"··.fell far short of internationally accepted norms 
as it continued to suppress domestic critics and 
failed to control abuses by its own security 
fOrCeS. " 50 
State Department Counsellor Timothy Wirth placed the 
report's conclusions in the context of the Executive Order's 
prescriptions for the 1994 MFN decision, in spite of the fact 
that the report appeared to suggest that linkage was failing. 
He insisted that the progress Beijing had made on human rights 
was "limited'', adding: 
"· .. we must see significant progress before we renew. 
Limited progress does not mean significant 
progreSS. "51 
Despite these statements in defence of the Executive Order 
and the strategy of linkage, conflicting messages were coming 
from the Administration. The economic agencies were becoming 
Government Printing Office, Washington D.C.) February 1994. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Mary E. Kortenak, 'China's Trade Status Tops Debate on 
Human Rights 1 ; Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 
February 5 1994 p.258. 
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increasingly frustrated with a policy that appeared to be 
achieving little specific progress while fuelling a decline in 
relations. Leading figures such as Commerce Secretary Ron Brown 
and NEC Chairman Robert Rubin began to lobby within the 
Administration for an abandonment of the threat to revoke MFN 
and a commitment to open, economically driven engagement with 
the PRC. 52 Indeed, Rubin was reported to have informed 
journalists that he favoured divorcing China's MFN status from 
human rights conditions. 53 
Defence agencies also lobbied for a reassessment. Not only 
were they concerned about proliferation and the growth of the 
Chinese military, they were also demanding that attention be 
given to the issue of North Korea's nuclear programme. 54 Thus 
while the Administration demanded human rights concessions in 
advance of the 1994 MFN recommendation, it was also sending 
Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci to Beij ing to 
request China's assistance with Pyongyang . 55 The 
Administration's disparate approach was further reflected in 
its concession to a Congressional demand to repeal the 1982 
Communique on arms sales to Taiwan. While it prevented the 
repeal going ahead, the Administration did agree to approve a 
52 Interview with Stephen Yates op cit. See also Robert S. 
Greenberger and Michael K. Frisby, 'Clinton's Renewal of Trade 
Status for China Follows Cabinet Debates, Congress's Sea 
Change'; op cit p.Al8. 
53 Daniel Williams and Clay Chandler, 'The Hollowing of a 
Threat'; Washington Post May 12 1994 p.A23. 
54 Interview with Ronald N. Montaperto op cit. 
55 
'US to Seek China's Aid on North Korea' ; International 
Herald Tribune April 12 1994 p.2. 
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considerable number of arms shipments to Taiwan at a 
particularly sensitive point in US-PRC relations. 56 
Congress too expressed its frustration with the 
Administration's China policy. A significant number on the Hill 
were beginning to doubt the wisdom of linkage and MFN 
conditionality. They also chastised the Administration for its 
handling of China, with Democrats as well as Republicans 
decrying the degree of incoherence and uncertainty. 57 The mood 
was particularly angry in the committee hearing on China's MFN 
status, at which Winston Lord announced his Mid-Term Review on 
China. 58 Lord provided a comprehensive brief on the achievements 
and frustrations in bilateral relations since May 1993. He 
highlighted the importance of China in economic and other terms 
and asserted: 
" ... we share the vlew that it would be far more 
desirable to extend MFN than to revoke it.'' 59 
However, having strongly defended the Executive Order and its 
objectives, and implicitly blamed US business and other forces 
for undermining the Administration's stance with the Chinese, 
56 Jim Mann, 'As China Looks on, US Agrees to Sales of Arms 
to Taiwan'; International Herald Tribune April 28 1994 p.6. 
57 Interview with David M. Lampton op cit. 
58 United States-China Trade Relations; Hearing before 
Subcommittee on Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee, 
103rd Congress, 2nd Session, February 24 1994, Washington D.C. 
(United States Government Printing Office, 1994) . 
59 
'Mid-Term Review on China' Statement of Wins ton Lord, 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
before the House Subcommittee on Trade, February 24 1994; op 
cit p.87. 
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Lord added: 
''This is only possible, however, if we all send the 
unambiguous message that further progress on human 
rights is required. 1160 
Clinton's lack of credibility with Congress on China was 
illustrated by the vehemence with which members criticised the 
Administration throughout the hearing. In particular, they 
reproached the lack of unity amongst senior officials, and 
highlighted the fact that the Administration was presenting 
incoherent and contradictory messages on China policy. 
An appreciation that the policy was failing and that a 
political crisis was looming on the MFN decision persuaded a 
centrist bloc of predominantly Democratic members to explore 
compromises and alternatives. Led by Representatives Hamilton, 
Matsui, Senator Baucus and other members of the moderate 
coalition of 1993, they looked for politically-acceptable ways 
of maintaining .MFN. Proposals included imposing limited, 
targeted sanctions to promote human rights, and pursuing the 
issue through non-trade measures. 61 This initiative was a 
doubled-edged sword for Clinton. On the one side, debate on 
this kind strongly undercut the credibility of the existing 
policy in China. Beijing became increasingly convinced that it 
need only rely on domestic forces in the US and do nothing 
60 Ibid. 
61 Thomas L. Friedman, 'Democrats Seek a Compromise on China 
Policy'; International Herald Tribune April 22 1994 p.1 and 
p.8. 
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itself to secure unconditional renewal of its trading status. 
It also fuelled divisions within the Administration. On the 
other side, the initiative offered the prospect of deflating a 
damaging political crisis, an issue of greater personal 
interest to the President. He recognised that the centrist bloc 
could be a crucial counterweight to anti-China group led by 
Rep. Nancy Pelosi, which was already preparing to vote to 
revoke MFN on the back of continued human rights violations. 62 
The debate within the foreign policy community also 
reflected clear opposition to the revocation of MFN in the 
absence of human rights progress. In particular, a forum of the 
Council on Foreign Relations argued that while the objectives 
of the Adminstration were laudable, its tactics were in fact 
simultaneously detrimental. 63 Again this provided support for a 
reversal of policy, easing the domestic cost of doing so, but 
also represented a serious attack on the Clinton 
Administration. 
As the MFN June 3 deadline approached, it was clear that 
the Administration was divided over China policy. Under 
Secretary of Commerce Jeffrey Garten underlined this fact 
during a trip to Beijing, when he emphasised the importance the 
US attached to trade with China. 64 Even Warren Christopher, 
62 Robert S Greenberger, 'Lawmakers Support Report Charging 
China Still Exports Prison Labour Goods'; Wall Street Journal 
May 19 1994. 
63 See Thomas 
Attack at Home'; 
p.l. 
W. Lippman, 'Cl in ton's China Policy Under 
International Herald Tribune March 17 1994 
64 Elaine Sciolino, 'Clinton and China: How Promise Self-
Destructed'; op cit. 
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while continuing to defend the Executive Order in public, 
commissioned legal advice on the minimum progress required to 
satisfy the qualifications for unconditional MFN renewal. 65 
The bureaucratic crisis over China policy came to a head 
with the Secretary of State's visit to Beij ing in mid March. 
The visit not only highlighted the confusion and lack of 
discipline associated with the conduct of China policy, it 
sealed splits within the Administration, and the fate of the 
policy of linkage. 66 
The Chinese proved uncooperative at the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, shortly before Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher was due to undertake the diplomatic stopover in 
Beijing as part of a tour of Asia. Chinese officials obstructed 
an American attempt to censure China for human rights abuses, 
protesting against US interference in their internal affairs. 
In a correlative action, the Chinese also hindered the attempts 
to arrange the Christopher delegation's negotiations in 
Beij ing. 67 
Beijing's reception of Secretary Christopher on March 11 
epitomised the regime's confidence in resisting US calls for 
human rights improvements as the MFN deadline approached. It 
also served as an illustration of the importance the Chinese 
65 Ibid. 
66 See Bruce w. Nelan, ~No Room for Compromise' ; Time March 
21 1994 p.37, and Elaine Sciolino, ~Cold-Shoulder Treatment for 
Christopher In Beijing'; International Herald Tribune March 12-
13 1994 p.l and p.4. 
67 Vincent A. Auger, Human Rights and Trade: The Clinton 
Administration and China; op cit p.9. 
340 
340 
placed on diplomatic and political 'face', Christopher' s trip 
coinciding with the meeting of the National People's Congress. 68 
Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John 
Shattuck, already in Beij ing, had met leading dissident Wei 
Jingshen five days before the Secretary of State's visit, 
without the knowledge of Christopher, Lord or Clinton. 
Shattuck met Wei in public, in the coffee garden of the China 
World Hotel, but did not draw public attention to the ninety 
minute talk. Wei was not so reserved in the days that followed. 
The consequences were highly significant in that the Chinese 
authorities arrested Wei the day Christopher's delegation 
arrived in Beij ing, branding Wei a "criminal on parole" and 
accusing Shattuck of breaking Chinese law. 69 
While he did not cancel the visit, aware that to do so 
would put the policy process towards the MFN decision under 
greater strain, Christopher did cancel several public speeches 
and a tour of Beijing in protest. He also declared that Under 
Secretary of Defence for Policy Frank Wisner would not 
cultivate expanded bilateral military ties as planned, but 
limit his discussions with the Chinese military to the issue of 
human rights. Further, Christopher was explicit in his 
condemnation of the Regime's behaviour, stating: 
''these actions will have a negative effect on my trip 
to China as well as on the subsequent review of the 
68 Interview with David Shambaugh, 
Centre for East Asian Studies, George 
October 27 1997, Washington D.C. 
Director, Gaston Sigur 
Washington University, 
69 Elaine Sciolino, 'Clinton and China'; op cit. 
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favoured nation trade question. "70 
America business executives whose companies traded with 
China were less than pleased with the Secretary's criticism and 
in meetings in Beijing with the US delegation they urged him to 
end the linkage between human rights and MFN. 71 
Nevertheless, three days into the visit, Christopher did 
announce that the US intended to relax the satellite-related 
sanctions imposed in August. When questioned about what 
appeared to be a somewhat inconsistent piece of diplomacy, the 
Secretary of State argued that it "simply sends a signal of 
even-handed treatment. " 72 In fact, despite the difficulties of 
the trip, the US delegation achieved two breakthroughs. 
Firstly, agreement was reached on a joint declaration 
terminating Chinese prison labour exports to the US. This was 
an issue attracting increasing attention within Congress and 
the wider China policy community. Secondly, the Chinese 
promised to resolve a number of unsettled emigration concerns. 
Of course, both breakthroughs related directly to specific 
demands made in Executive Order 12850. 
These achievements did not insulate the Secretary of State 
from intense domestic criticism for his trip, nor did it mask 
serious problems in the Administration's China policy-making 
70 Elaine Sciolino, 'US Showing Frustration Over China's 
Human Rights Policy'; New York Times March 9 1994. 
71 Vincent A. Auger, Human Rights and Trade: The Clinton 
Administration and China; op cit p.9. 
72 Elaine Sciolino, 'US Moves to Ease Beij ing Sanctions' ; 
New York Times March 8 1994. 
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process. 73 Crucially, the President was known to have been 
particularly irritated by Christopher's management of the clash 
and the attention it attracted. 74 This not only demonstrated the 
lack of support for linkage that now existed within the White 
House, but also highlighted Clinton's unwillingness to provide 
leadership on the issue and back those officials attempting to 
implement the China policy he introduced in May 1993. As 
Winston Lord notes: 
"There wasn't, shall we say, immediate support out of 
the White House for Secretary Christopher. "75 
The fact that the White House blamed the Secretary of 
State, rather than the Chinese, reinforced this point. 76 
Further, the whole incident underscored Winston Lord's weakness 
within the policy-making process. His attempts to pursue a 
consistent line with the Chinese, advocating strong engagement 
while requesting at least minimum compliance with the Executive 
Order, were severely compromised by other officials pursuing 
their own agendas with Beijing. Without the commitment of the 
President, or indeed to a lesser extent the Secretary of State, 
Lord was unable to impose the kind on discipline that would 
73 David Lampton is particularly critical of Christopher' s 
handling of the trip. Interview op ci t. Unsurprisingly Lord, 
who accompanied Christopher, is more defensive of the trip. 
Interview op cit. 
74 Elaine Sciolino, 'Cl in ton and China: How the Promise 
Self-Destructed'; op cit. 
75 Interview with Winston Lord op cit. 
76 Ibid. 
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have prevented the Shattuck/Christopher controversy. 77 Indeed 
Lord was highly frustrated with the tendency of officials in 
the economic agencies to voice their disapproval of the 
existing policy. He maintains that " ... very frankly, they were 
not being helpful with the Chinese. " 78 
Lord was not the only official to express frustration with 
the indiscipline exhibited by senior members of the 
Administration. Another complained: 
"Its frustrating. We seem to do the Chinese work for 
them. If they need someone to argue against revoking 
MFN, they only have to get some guy from the economic 
branch of the government. "79 
Nevertheless, it was Wins ton Lord's widely leaked 
confidential memorandum to Warren Christopher in April that 
illustrated the extent of disarray. 80 The memorandum did reflect 
on a broad range of improvements in Washington's relationship 
77 Interviews with David Lampton op cit and Ronald M. 
Montaperto op cit. The economic agencies actually protested 
that the State Department, and Winston Lord in particular, had 
too mush control over China policy. See Elaine Sciolino, 
'Winston Lord; Where the Buck Stops on China and Human Rights'; 
New York Times March 27 1994. 
78 Interview with Winston Lord op cit. 
79 Reported in Daniel Williams, 'China's Hard-Nosed Rights 
Stance Against Trade Status'; Washington Post March 3 1994. 
80 
'Emerging Malaise in our Relations with Asia'; undated 
confidential memorandum to Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher. See Daniel Williams and Clay Chandler, 'US Aide 
Sees Relations with Asia in Peril'; Washington Post May 5 1994 
p.A38. 
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with the Asia-Pacific region. 81 Yet considerable press attention 
was given to his concerns for China policy, and the lack of 
support it received amongst countries of the region. He urged a 
reappraisal of Asia, and China policy, designed to produce a 
more coherent and strategic view of US interests. In other 
words, Lord demanded that Christopher and Clinton establish a 
clear hierarchy of priorities. He also implicitly criticised 
the economic agencies for pursuing their own agendas without 
regard for the greater picture. The Assistant Secretary 
insisted: 
"There will be times when trade-offs are required 
between competing short-term objectives. At times we 
will need to set clear priorities. "82 
Some commentators interpreted this remark as indication 
that Lord had changed his mind on the efficacy of linkage, and 
that he was now advocating unconditional renewal of China's MFN 
irrespective of its human rights performance. 83 Further, 
commentators disagreed as to the purpose of the leaked 
memorandum. While some suggested that it was an declaration of 
an intention to resign, others argued that it was an attempt to 
shift the blame for policy failures away from himself. Some 
observers concurred with Lord's assertion that it was an 
81 Interview with Winston Lord op cit. 
82 ~Emerging Malaise in our Relations with Asia'; in Daniel 
Williams and Clay Chandler, ~us Aide Sees Relations with Asia 
in Peril'; op cit. 
63 Lord suggests that he was addressing problems of style 
rather than substance in the memorandum. Interview op cit. 
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attempt to provoke debate and reassessment within the 
Administration. Nevertheless, all were agreed that the central 
criticisms presented by Lord were valid. 84 
Christopher's disastrous trip to China appeared to 
persuade the White House that it would have to address the 
challenge of either revoking MFN, something it was very 
reluctant to do, or implementing a major policy reversal. 85 Both 
options threatened considerable domestic political costs, yet 
Lord's memorandum had revealed the disarray in which the 
Adminstration found itself in over the present policy of 
linkage. Clinton decided to explore the political possibility 
to delinking human rights from trade and embracing broad and 
open engagement with the PRC. 
The Search for an Acceptable Path to Delinkage 
By April, the Clinton Administration was faced with escalating 
bilateral and political crises. Relations with the Chinese were 
deteriorating. Washington's credibility with Beij ing had 
evaporated, and little progress of substance was being made on 
human rights and other issues. Senior officials had realised 
that Beijing was not going to compromise, knowing that it could 
rely on the US business lobby and centrists in Congress to make 
84 Interviews with Winston Lord op cit, Ted Galen Carpenter 
op cit, David Lampton op cit and interview with James W. 
McCormick, former professional staff of House Subcommittee on 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, November 7 1997, Washington D.C. 
85 Lord explains that the Christopher trip revealed that 
China was not going to make sufficient progress on human rights 
to satisfy the Executive Order. Interview op cit. 
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its case for delinkage. B6 The split within the Administration 
between those defending the Executive Order, and those who had 
already abandoned it and were lobbying for delinkage, continued 
to grow. Lord's memorandum failed to resolve this split, and 
instead highlighted the problems of the existing policy. The 
Administration had also lost significant credibility with 
Congress, a large proportion of which now appeared to favour 
delinkage. 
The President had three options for his MFN 1994 
recommendation. B7 Firstly, he could determine that the PRC had 
satisfied the conditions of the Executive Order, and renew MFN 
accordingly. Officials recognised that this stance would have 
no credibility with neither Beijing nor Congress, and would 
simply attract ridicule. Secondly, Clinton could adhere to the 
Executive Order and revoke MFN in the light of China's failure 
to satisfy the conditions. This was also unpalatable to the 
President, who 11 ••• never wanted to revoke MFN. 11 BB This option 
had its own political implications in the form of the likely 
reaction of the business community. Clinton had often enjoyed 
valuable support from this community for his domestic and geo-
economic policies. B 9 Thirdly, he could attempt to manipulate a 
B6 Interview with Stephen Yates op cit. 
B
7 Interview with Wins ton Lord op cit. 
BB In rejecting this option, Lord's reasoning echoes the 
Bush Administration's defence of engagement. In other words, 
MFN revocation would have hurt reformists in China, undermine 
the incremental liberalising effects of engagement, hurt US 
economic interests, hurt allies in the region, and left the US 
isolated internationally. Ibid. 
B9 Big businesses also provided Clinton with 
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important 
policy reversal. Thus he would acknowledge the PRC's failure to 
satisfy the conditions, but make the case for de linkage and 
engagement as the most effective path ahead. This would 
represent a significant admission of failure, especially in the 
light of his castigation of Bush during the 1992 presidential 
elections. However, ironically, it also offered the route of 
minimum political resistance, and was Clinton's preferred 
option. 
From early April, senior officials within the 
Administration and the White House began a consultative process 
in an effort, once again to gauge prevailing opinion. This 
·process took several paths; debates and discussions involving 
White House and Administrations officials, consultations with 
Congress, consultations with Beijing, and consultations with 
lobby groups and sinologists. Political calculations were 
critical to this process. 
THE INTERNAL POLICY-MAKING PROCESS 
Angered by the lack of support he received following his 
difficult trip to China, and concerned by the splits within the 
Administration, Christopher decided to convene a joint meeting 
of the NSC and NEC on March 22. The Secretary of State still 
favoured the pursuit of linkage, and standing tough on 
demanding human rights improvements. Backed by NSA Anthony 
campaign and political fundraising donations. Interview with 
David Lampton op cit. See John Kruger and Charles Lewis, 'Bills 
Long March'; op cit. 
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Lake, Christopher argued that the Administration needed to 
unify behind a China policy linking human rights with MFN in 
line with the Executive Order. Christopher contended that only 
by presenting a unified position would US China policy appear 
credible to the Chinese, supported by US determination on the 
issue of human rights. The official line, that cosmetic rights 
concessions would be insufficient to renew MFN, was to be 
retained, for the time being. 90 
Nevertheless, the Secretary of State's acknowledged 
commitment to human rights was not the only reason he adhered 
to the US government's stated, but crumbling, position. As one 
senior State Department official explained: 
"This is partly about who is going to be ln charge of 
China policy. The Secretary is trying to keep the 
Commerce and Treasury Departments from trying to make 
a run over taking over the policy. He wants to make 
sure the State Department keeps a very strong control 
over the Chinese relationship, that its not tenable 
to have economic agencies in open revolt against the 
policy. " 91 
Compromise was reached within the Administration, and the 
coordination of the China policy process altered. In return for 
following a unified line in defending linkage (for the time 
90 David M. Lamp ton, 'America's China Policy in the Age of 
the Finance Minister: Clinton Ends Linkage' i op cit p.618. 
91 Elaine Sciolino, 'US to Try a Conciliatory Track with 
China' i New York Times March 23 1994. 
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being), the economic team secured greater access and influence 
in the policy making process. The development of China policy 
towards the MFN deadline would be lead by the top officials 
from the NSC and NEC through a new joint committee, putting the 
process back firmly in the hands of the White House. 92 In 
effect, the NSC and NEC deputies Sandy Berger and Bo Cutter 
directed the joint committee. Berger, a pragmatist, is 
recognised to have favoured delinkage of human rights from 
trade in the MFN 1994 recommendation, and Cutter too favoured 
this option. The fact that Berger and NEC Chair Robert Rubin 
were close friends of the President strengthened the case for 
delinkage. Lake, who like Christopher still favoured a tough 
stand on the human rights issue, was more distant and more 
removed from this tight circle of consultation. 93 
The transfer of effective authority for the China policy-
making process to the White House had a number of important 
implications. Firstly, it strengthened the case for delinking 
trade from human rights and other issues on policy grounds. 
That is to say delinkage and broad engagement was advocated as 
the best way of pursuing US interests in China. For example it 
gave Secretary of Defence William Perry greater access to the 
core of decision-making. The emphasis he placed on the vital 
importance of protecting America's security relationship with 
92 David M. Lampton, 'America's China Policy in the Age of 
the Finance Minister: Clinton Ends Linkage'i op cit p.618. 
93 Interviews with David Lampton op cit and Calman J. Cohen, 
President of the Emergency Committee on American Trade (ECAT), 
November 13 1997, Washington D.C. Cohen cites ·Rubin's 
advocation of delinkage as being of critical importance to the 
President's final decision. 
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the PRC, especially with regard to the ongoing question of the 
North Korean nuclear programme, was also thought to have 
influenced Clinton. 94 
Secondly, the White House's usurpation of policy-making 
gave the economic agencies a greater opportunity to press their 
arguments. For a start Robert Rubin and in particular Bo Cutter 
were in charge of the policy-making process. The tightly 
controlled framework of in-house discussions also allowed 
Clinton confidant Ron Brown an increasingly influential role. 
Brown was entirely committed to delinkage and the enthusiastic 
pursuit of commercial engagement with the PRC. In White House 
discussions, he railed against the moral arrogance of the 
policy of human rights linkage. Yet Brown was also a formidable 
political animal, and his assertions that delinkage was the 
politically most acceptable course of action proved 
irresistible to Clinton. 95 Brown, Rubin and Secretary Bentsen 
also provided a valuable conduit for the business lobby, and 
ECAT in particular. They not only communicated the business 
lobby's intellectual arguments against linkage, but also 
reminded the President of the domestic political implications 
of revoking MFN. 96 The economic agencies were clearly the 
dominant Administrative force in the internal debate by mid May 
94 Interview with Ronald N. Montaperto op cit. 
95 Interviews with Ted Galen Carpenter op cit and Stephen 
Yates op cit. See also Robert S. Greenberger and Michael K. 
Frisby, 'Clinton's Renewal of Trade Status for China Follows 
Cabinet Debates, Congress's Sea Change'; op cit p.A18. 
96 Interview with Calman J. Cohen op cit. 
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1994. 97 
The third important implication of White House control of 
policy, concerns the role of Clinton's political advisors. 
Three in particular, the former Chief of Staff Thomas McLarty, 
a former business executive, personal advisor George 
Stephanopoulos, and senior counsellor David Gergen had constant 
and extensive access to Clinton. All three attended a 
significant White House meeting on China policy on May 18, at 
which the President, Lake, Rubin, Cutter, Berger (but not 
Christopher or Lord) were also present. It is believed that the 
three advisors promoted MFN renewal on political grounds, even 
if they personally thought otherwise. 98 
The fourth implication concerns the diminished role of the 
State Department, and of Warren Christopher and Winston Lord in 
particular. Christopher had attracted a great deal of criticism 
for his handling of China policy, especially since his trip to 
Beij ing in early March. Further his continuing support for 
linkage and the promotion of human rights through 
conditionality isolated him in a debate that was moving rapidly 
in the opposite direction. It is understood that Christopher 
and NSA Lake were the last to hold out on maintaining the 
linkage strategy and the threat to revoke China's 1994 MFN 
status. 99 
97 Interview with David Lampton op cit. 
98 David Lampton, 'America's China Policy in the Age of the 
Finance Minister'i op cit p.617 and Robert S. Greenberger and 
Michael K. Frisby, 'Clinton's Renewal of Trade Status for China 
Follows Cabinet Debates, Congress's Sea Change' i op cit p.A18. 
99 Interviews with David Lampton op cit, Frank Jannuzi op 
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Lord had attempted, with diminishing success, to control 
and coordinate China policy through his role as chairman of an 
inter-agency Senior Steering Group (SSG) on China. Despite 
being the Executive Order's principle architect, he had been 
frustrated with the conduct of China policy since the May 1993 
announcement. He insisted that the lack of commitment to China 
policy at the elite levels had prompted a split within the 
Administration and the subsequent failure of policy. Other 
officials, and in particular those within the economic 
agencies, blamed Lord and the adherence to a strategy of 
linkage. 100 As a result, Lord's ability to control China policy, 
from the relatively weak position of Assistant Secretary of 
State eroded as the MFN decision approached. 101 
Lord's exclusion from the policy-making process in the 
spring of 1994 is illustrated by fact that from mid-March to 
May 26 the joint NSC/NEC committee met nine times, and that 
Lake, Rubin, Berger and Cutter met five times. In contrast, the 
Senior Steering Group on China policy chaired by Winston Lord 
met only twice. 102 Lord was left with the responsibility of 
cit and Ted Galen Carpenter op cit. 
100 Interviews with Ted Galen Carpenter op cit and with 
Edward B. Gresser, Policy Director, Senator Max Baucus (D-MT), 
October 31 1997, Washington D.C. Robert Perito, former Senior 
State Department China analyst supports Lord's view. Interview 
op cit. 
101 Lampton also noted that Lord was neither trusted by the 
Republicans because he had joined a Democratic Administration, 
having chastised President Bush, nor by the Democrats because 
he had been a Republican. Interview with David Lampton op cit. 
102 Lampton, ~America's China Policy in the Age of the 
Finance Minister'; op cit p.618. 
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consulting with Congress (in fact a crucial task to Clinton) 
and selling the subsequent decision to del ink. 103 
The final implication of the transfer of China policy-
making to the White House is that it represented Clinton' s 
inclination toward reactive policy-making and crisis 
management. Though more committed, and at an earlier stage in 
the policy-making process than the previous year, Clinton only 
paid attention to the issue when it threatened to provoke a 
domestic political crisis. He had failed to react with any 
substance to the deterioration in bilateral relations, nor to 
the emerging splits within his Administration. Only when faced 
with the political implications of either revoking MFN or 
conceding to a policy reversal, did Clinton engage himself on 
the issue. 
CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS 
The Administration's consultations with Congress were of 
paramount importance to the president, as they had been the 
year before. He was opposed to revoking China's MFN status, but 
he was also determined to prevent the imposition of 
Congressional legislation on China policy. He feared that with 
China's lack of human rights progress, he could be faced with a 
formidable challenge from Congress when he announced his 
decision to renew MFN without conditions, and to delink trade 
from human rights. Clinton's three principle objectives in 1993 
103 Interview with Mike Jendrzej czyk op ci t. 
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had been to adhere to his campaign promises, (thus) implement a 
policy of linkage, and forge consensus with Congress. In 1994, 
only one objective remained. 
Rather like many Administration officials such as Winston 
Lord, members of Congress had undergone a learning curve on US-
China relations through 1993-1994. 104 As stated, members of 
Congress had initiated a public debate on China policy options 
earlier in the spring. Thus by May/June 1994 a majority of 
members supported the delinkage of human rights and other 
conditions from China's MFN status. A number of factors explain 
this critical shift in opinion. 
Firstly, dissatisfied with simply falling in behind 
established Congressional ~experts' on China such as Pelosi and 
Mitchell, especially as the exposure and controversy of China 
policy increased, members of Congress began to investigate the 
issue of US-China relations themselves. From mid-1993, 
Congresspersons from both main parties became more aware of the 
variety of US interests in bilateral ties. 105 One crucial reason 
for this was that for the first time since the Tiananmen Square 
massacre, large numbers of members of Congress undertook visits 
to China. 106 Senator John Kerry, previously an advocate of 
sanctions for China reported: 
104 Interviews with Edward B. Gresser op cit and Kerry 
Dumbaugh, Specialist in Foreign Affairs, Congressional Research 
Service, November 5 1997, Washington D.C. 
105 Interview with Kerry Dumbaugh op cit. 
106 For example see Senator Max Baucus, China Trip Report; 
August 15-28 1993. 
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"I came back from my visit there just absolutely 
convinced that things are much different now than in 
1989. 11107 
The pace and depth of economic modernisation in particular 
struck the vi si tors, and Kerry for example communicated this 
fact in the number of meetings he had with the President. 108 
A second factor was the Administration's lack of 
credibility on China policy with members of Congress. 109 They 
were particularly critical of the lack of direction, commitment 
and coherence exhibited by senior officials, a charge levied at 
the Administration in the run up to the MFN 1993 decision. 110 As 
early as February 1994, members of Congress had expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the Administration's conduct of China 
policy on the occasion of Wins ton Lord's Mid-Term Review on 
China. 111 One member complained: 
" ... its hard to know what the policy is or who is in 
charge . "112 
107 Robert S. Greenberger and Michael K. Frisby, 'Clinton's 
renewal of Trade Status for China Followed Cabinet debates'; op 
cit p.A 18. 
108 David M. Lampton, 'America's China Policy in the Age of 
the Finance Minister'; op cit p.607. 
109 Rep. Robert Mat sui, chair of the House Ways and Means 
Committee was particularly scathing of the Administration's 
mismanagement of US-China relations. Interview with Richard 
Bush op cit. 
110 See previous chapter. 
111 United States-China Trade Relations; Hearing before 
House Subcommittee on Trade, February 24 1994; op cit. 
112 Hobart Rowen, 'Administration in Disarray on China Trade 
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A third factor of fundamental importance was the lobbying 
of Congress by the business community. The impact of business, 
and in particular ECAT was felt on a number of levels. Firstly, 
the business community provided a strong intellectual argument 
as to why MFN revocation would be detrimental to US 
interests. 113 The argument was expressed not only in narrow 
commercial terms, nor simply as a defence of US jobs. 
Organisations such as ECAT maintained that the US had critical 
strategic, security, environmental and other interests that 
would be seriously threatened by a revocation of MFN. Further 
they reiterated the argument that the best way to promote human 
rights and political liberalisation in the PRC was through US 
economic engagement. 114 Commentators suggested that the lobby 
made a stronger defence of engagement with the PRC than did the 
Bush Administration throughout its term of office. 115 
The business lobby also appealed to America's narrow 
commercial interests in renewing MFN unconditionally. They 
argued that valuable business would be lost to Asian and 
European competitors, that jobs US jobs would be lost, and that 
consumer prices for Chinese -made imports would rise. 116 On a 
Policy'; Washington Post March 20 1994 p.H6. 
113 Interview with James W. McCormick op cit. 
114 Interview with Calman J. Cohen, President of ECAT, op 
cit. See also statement of Robert A. Kapp, President-designate 
of the US-China Business Council before the House Subcommittee 
on Trade, February 24 1994; op cit pp.188-194. 
115 Interview with James W. McCormick op cit. 
116 Interview with Calrnan J. Cohen. 
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third level, the business lobby reminded members of Congress of 
their constituency interests, where those constituencies had 
economic ties with China. Thus members were reminded of their 
own political sensitivities. 117 
A fourth ingredient to the shift in opinion concerned the 
Hill's fatigue with the annual debate on China's MFN status. 
Indeed, this fact had been recognised in 1993, when Clinton 
declared his desire to move beyond the annual debate. An 
increasing number of advocates and opponents of engagement 
regarded this mechanism as a waste of time, given the 
unlikelihood of the Senate supporting conditionality, or the 
fact that President tended to obstruct any initiatives 
anyway. 118 
This line of thinking relates to a fifth factor in 
Congress' approach to China. Irrespective of whether their 
concerns with China lay with human rights, proliferation and 
security, economics and trade or other matters, a significant 
number on the Hill now regarded MFN as an inappropriately blunt 
tool with which to pursue US interests. This informed the 
debate on the possibility of renewing China's 1994 MFN status, 
but imposing a number of specific and targeted sanctions. 119 In 
particular, Democrats who had voted for conditionality during 
117 Ibid and interview with Edward B. Gresser op cit. 
118 Interview with Kerry Dumbaugh op cit. This is a rather 
simplistic view. Congressional threats to revoke MFN prompted 
President Bush to make a number of readjustments in his policy 
on China. See chapter three. 
119 Thomas L. Friedman, 'Democrats Seek a Compromise on 
China Policy'; op cit. 
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the Bush Administration for partisan reasons now considered the 
measure unnecessary. 120 
These factors led to a Congressional awakening on China. 
Following the partisan battles under the Bush Administration, 
and the partisan-tinged desire to see President Clinton adhere 
to his election promises in 1993, consideration of China's 1994 
MFN status was the first time many members had really expressed 
their views on China and voted accordingly. 121 As Kerry Dumbaugh 
notes, in the light of the threat to revoke China's MFN 
established by the Executive Order and China's failure to meet 
its conditions, members of Congress finally realised " .. we 
might actually have to live with this policy. "122 The result was 
the emergence of a strong centrist coalition that advocated 
de linkage and engagement with China. 123 The task facing the 
Administration was to discover and work with this Congressional 
force. 
The need to canvas Congressional opinion in the run up to 
the 1994 MFN decision arose at the initiative of the President 
himself, and was launched at an Executive 'Congressional 
120 Rep. Lee Hamilton voiced this point regularly. Interview 
with Richard Bush op cit. 
121 Interviews with Richard Bush op cit, Edward B. Gresser 
op cit, and James W. McCormick op cit. 
122 Interview with Kerry Dumbaugh. 
123 David M. Lampton, 'America's China Policy in the Age of 
the Finance Minister'; op cit pp.606-607. Lampton identifies 
key actors in this coalition as Senators Dole (R), Boren (D), 
Kerry (D), Baucus (D) , Bradley (D) and Johnston (D), and 
Representatives Fole (D), Hamilton (D), Gibbons {D), Matsui 
(D) , McDermott (D) , Ackerman (D) , and Leach (R) 
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strategy meeting' on April 6. 124 In a reflection of the 1993 MFN 
policy process, it was not the Administration's central 
intention to find a policy that balanced national interests and 
moral dimensions. Rather, by assessing the dominant views on 
the Hill, Clinton hoped to find a policy that would meet 
minimum resistance in the Legislature, and preserve political 
capital for more contentious domestic and foreign policy 
issues. Clinton committed himself directly to the procedure on 
April 20 when he met two Congressional groups representing 
opposing views. Uncharacteristically, he said little. 125 Indeed 
on May 26, the day of the MFN announcement, the President spent 
most of _the day talking to members of Congress by phone. 126 
The centrist bloc in Congress played an instrumental role 
in ascertaining that the votes existed to sustain delinkage. 
One congressional aide, who was a central participant in this 
process, was prompted both by the Administration and by Robert 
Kapp of the US-China Business Council to canvass Congressional 
opinion in advance of the final decision to de link. 127 Working 
with members of the business community, an extensive 
investigation revealed that a minimum of half the House of 
Representatives supported delinkage. 128 
124 Lampton, ~America's China Policy in the Age of the 
Finance Minister'; op cit p.618. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Douglas Jehl, ~A Policy Reversal'; New York Times May 27 
1994 p.AB. 
127 This figure was Richard Bush, congressional aide to Rep. 
Hamilton. Interview with Richard Bush op cit. 
128 The Senate was not expected to block delinkage and the 
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The anti-China bloc, led by Rep. Nancy Pelosi, persuaded 
some within the Administration that delinkage would only prompt 
the introduction of legislation targeting the economic 
activities of the People's Liberation Army, a more specific and 
targeted measure. This raised the prospect of either the 
imposition of restrictive legislation if the Senate backed 
Pelosi, or a potentially disastrous political clash between the 
President and members of his own party. 129 The canvassing 
efforts of the centrist coalition were vital in persuading the 
Administration that linkage was possible. The congressional 
aide suggests: 
11 I don't know if in the end ... whether that helped to 
tip the balance, but I think it was an important data 
point. 11130 
Acting upon this information, Lord and other 
Administration and White House officials encouraged members of 
the centrist bloc to speak out in favour of de linkage, in 
favour of engagement, and in opposition to the platform 
established by Pelosi. Principle amongst these protagonists 
were Representatives Hamilton and Foley, and Senators Baucus, 
Nunn and Bradley, all Democrats. Hamilton, chairman of the 
renewal of China's 1994 MFN status. Interviews with Edward B. 
Gresser op cit and David Lampton op cit. 
129 See Elaine Sciolino, 'Conflicting Pressures On Clinton 
Mount over China's Trade Status'; New York Times May 20 1994 
p.A9. 
130 Interview with Richard Bush op cit. Bush communicated 
his findings to contacts on the NSC staff. 
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Foreign Affairs Committee, argued in defence of MFN and 
expanded economic contact as a means of fuelling the process of 
liberalisation in China, telling the American Enterprise 
Institute "We should seek ways to support those trends. "131 
Democratic Senator John F. Kerry, retracting his previous 
stance of punishing China, added his voice in considering the 
wider picture of bilateral relations: 
"The situation in China changed enough, and dynamics 
between the United States and China have changed 
enough that it is time to begin a new dialogue [on 
all bilateral issues] 0 11132 
The lobbying efforts on the centrist coalition, supported 
strongly by the business community, played a fundamental role 
in establishing and maintaining momentum for approval of a 
decision to delink. They were helped in this regard by media 
reporting and editorials that clearly reflected a pro-delinkage 
bias. 133 In defeating Pelosi's attempt to impose limited 
sanctions on China's MFN (HR 4590) and approving Hamilton's 
endorsement of the decision to delink (HR 4891) Congress 
131 Thomas L. Friedman, 'Legislator Urges Diplomacy to 
Improve Rights in China'; New York Times May 11 1994 p.Al2. 
132 Daniel Williams and Clay Chandler, 'The Hollowing of a 
Threat'; op cit. See also Senator Bill Bradley' s editorial, 
'Trade, the Real Engine of Democracy' ; New York Times May 25 
1993 p.A21. 
133 See for example 'Don't Fudge on China' ; New York Times 
May 22 1994 section 4 p.4, Michael Kramer, 'Keep China Trade'; 
Time May 2 1994 p.41 and Karen Breslau and Michael Elliot, 'Is 
Win Lord's Work Done?'; op cit. 
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appeared to reestablish a moderate bipartisan consensus on 
China. 134 Thus it appeared that Congress was adopting a more 
prudent approach to US-China relations following several years 
of partisan battling. However, the Republican sweep of the 1994 
mid-term Congressional elections, combined with the 
Administration's persistent failure to address China policy-
making problems would prompt the return of partisanship in 
1995. 
CONSULTATIONS WITH BEIJING 
In parallel with the consultation process on the Hill, the 
NSC/NEC joint committee also decided to pursue last-minute 
negotiations with the Chinese. This tack was initiated at the 
funeral of former President Richard Nixon in late April, when 
Lake, Rubin and Lord met with Chinese Ambassador Li Daoyu. 135 Li 
accepted the US officials' suggestion that a special envoy be 
sent to Beij ing on a private mission to seek progress on the 
issue of human rights and MFN. The envoy chosen was veteran 
diplomat Michael H. Armacost, a former Ambassador to Japan, who 
was known for his opposition to the revocation of MFN from 
China. Armacost was briefed by Lake, Rubin, Berger, Cutter and 
134 The Pelosi bill was defeated by 270 votes to 158, and 
the Hamilton bill passed by 280 to 152. Rep. Solomon's bill (HJ 
Res 373) disapproving the President's unconditional renewal of 
China's MFN was overwhelmingly defeated by 356 votes to 75. 
'Congress Lets Renewal of China MFN Stand'; Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac vol.L 103rd Congress 2nd Session (CQ Press, 
1993). 
135 Lampton, 'America's China Policy'; op cit p.619. 
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Lord on April 26 before spending May 7 to 10 ln China. Armacost 
had to be convinced that the Administration was sincere in its 
agreement to delink. Armacost asserts: 
"I wanted to satisfy myself that the Administration 
was serious about getting rid of it, and a visit to 
Washington did confirm that impression. " 136 
Armacost notes that the NSC and the NEC were the catalysts 
both behind the initiative to delink, and concomitantly, the 
decision to send a pro-delinkage emissary to Beijing: 
"It was my impression that the State Department was 
the least enthusiastic about my taking this on, and 
that the White House was more keen on it; probably 
being encouraged by other departments, most notably 
Treasury. "137. 
The purpose of the mission was to investigate whether a 
decision to delink elicit would prompt repricocity from Beijing 
that would make the decision easier and set the stage for 
progressive engagement. Armacost was in no doubt that the 
motivation was political, in that the White House wanted to 
find a solution to dropping the Executive Order position, that 
would generate as little controversy and criticism as possible: 
"I think that the people in the White House ... they 
136 Interview with Ambassador Michael Armacost, President, 
The Brookings Institute, November 12 1997, Washington D.C. 
137 Ibid. Armacost qualified this with "that was just a 
superficial impression at the time." 
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had already pretty well decided to move away from 
MFN ... and were trying to get a better deal for the 
public negotiations." 138 
He returned with several moderate Chinese concessions 
that, naturally hinted more at Chinese realpolitik and 
political tactics than serious long-term progress. 139 Indeed, 
the gestures appeared to be part of the familiar Beijing 
campaign of prisoner releases and commercial deals that had 
accompanied votes on MFN since 1990. 140 Despite the political 
cynicism of the Chinese concessions, their symbolism was highly 
significant. Clinton could highlight these developments as 
indications of progress with China on the human rights issue, 
and the results of a strategy founded on quiet diplomacy and 
bilateral negotiation rather than public posturing and threats. 
Out of the public eye, the Administration understood that, in 
line with the legal advice given to Christopher at the start of 
the year and the acceptance of largely symbolic gestures from 
the Chinese, Clinton had something to work with. China's 
138 Ibid. 
139 The steps made included the release of leading dissident 
Chen Zeroing and six religious prisoners, a degree of progress 
on outstanding emigration cases, headway on Chinese jamming of 
Voice of America broadcasts, and further promises of 
discussions with the International Committee of the Red Cross 
on prison inspections. David M. Lampton, 'America's China 
Policy in the Age of the Finance Minister'; op cit p.619. 
Armacost regards the concessions as minimal, though observes 
that the Chinese knew they need do no more. Interview with 
Michael Armacost op cit. 
140 See for example Patrick E. Tyler, 'In a Surprise 
Gesture, China Releases a Major Dissident'; New York Times May 
14 1994 p.7. 
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earlier agreement to adhere to the prison labour export ban, 
and the progress on emigration achieved by Armacost, satisfied 
the minimum requirements recognised by the Administration to 
allow MFN renewal for China. 
CONSULTATIONS WITH LOBBY GROUPS 
The business lobby had exhibited a large degree of complacency 
during the spring of 1993, and when they did petition the 
government, they found that the policy process dominated by 
State Department officials advocating a strong human rights 
stance. They were determined not to allow a repeat of this in 
the subsequent policy process. Thus organisations representing 
US businesses with ties with the Chinese economy embraced 
various tactics to influence the Administration's assessment of 
Beijing's compliance with the Executive Order. 141 
The lobby was thorough in cultivating a strong pro-MFN 
coalition within the US governmental system, finding fertile 
ground in the swing in China policy sentiments on the Hill, and 
in an economically orientated Bureaucracy. It also displayed 
deft political skill in appealing to public opinion, always a 
predominant factor in the President's own judgements. For 
example, US business ensured widescale media coverage of 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin' s visits to the Boeing factory 
and a worker's home while in the US for the APEC summit in 
November. Their purpose was to highlight the connection between 
141 Interview with Calman J. Cohen op cit. 
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direct economic links with China and jobs in the domestic 
economy. 142 
The business lobby developed this theme in emphasising the 
electoral impact of America's trade with China, with particular 
regard to jobs. In April 1994, the President received a public 
letter from the Business Coalition for US-China Trade, a group 
acting on behalf of over 400 Californian companies, warning 
that MFN revocation could endanger $1.7 billion of Californian 
exports to the People's Republic, along with 35,000 jobs. 
Calman Cohen, the President of the Emergency Committee on 
American Trade (ECAT) acknowledges that these tactics were a 
successful attempt to appeal to Clinton's political 
sensitivity. 143 This highlights Clinton's concern that 
revocation could bring greater political cost than a policy 
reversal of delinkage. 
K R Williams, also of ECAT, provided the intellectual 
argument against linkage when testifying before the 
Subcommittee on Trade of the House Ways and Means Commit tee, 
February 24 1994. Williams argued in favour of the liberalising 
effects of US participation in the PRC economy, pointing to the 
economic, political and societal developments in China's 
wealthy coastal regions. He also placed the issue in broader 
strategic terms: 
" ... the stakes in the China MFN issue are of enormous 
consequence. US trade increasingly is focused on 
142 Peter Behr, 'US Businesses Waged Year-Long Lobbying 
Effort on China Trade'; Washington Post May 27 1993 p.A28. 
143 Interview with Calman J. Cohen op cit. 
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Asia ... Japan and China are the giants of Asia. It is 
critical to our national interest that our relations 
with China be as positive as possible. US security is 
at issue. 11144 
As stated, the business lobby found an influential voice 
within the Administration's policy-making process in the 
officials of the economic agencies, and considered the Chairman 
of the NEC Rubin and Treasury Secretary Bentsen particularly 
influential in making their case in the internal debate. Rather 
like the business lobby, the economic agencies were determined 
not to be sidelined in the 1994 MFN China policy process. 
The principle problem experienced by the human rights 
community at large was their failure to propose a credible 
policy alternative that retained their main objectives. The 
impression that the Executive Order, a policy the rights lobby 
criticised for being too weak and ambiguous, was too 
confrontational and in fact a liability had spread amongst 
decision makers. As stated by late April, very few within the 
decision making elite supported complete revocation of MFN. 
However, the human rights community were unable to find an 
acceptable path short of complete revocation, that would be 
effective, implementable, would not provoke retaliation from 
Beijing, and crucially, would elicit support in Congress. 145 
144 Statement of K.R .. Williams, Vice-President of ECAT 
before the House Subcommittee on Trade, February 24 1994; op 
cit p.l69. 
145 The debate concerning the option of MFN renewal but with 
the imposition of specific and targeted sanctions offered human 
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Indicative of this failure/ were the conspicuous splits 
among the Chinese dissident community as to the most effective 
way to promote human rights in China. Such divisions had been 
evident since June 1989 1 although Clinton had eo-opted the 
affiliation of the section of the community that favoured a 
tougher stance both in his presidential campaign and for his 
presentation of the Executive Order on May 28 1993. 146 Yet in 
early 1994/ it was clear that some dissident groups still 
favoured a tough human rights stance 1 some were opposed and 
preferred engagement 1 and some simply could not come to any 
conclusion. Author Liu Binyan illustrated this confusion when 
he appeared at a Council on Foreign Relations meeting on March 
15 1995. Liu 1 speaking on the wisdom of the threat to withdraw 
MFN 1 revealed: 
''I think that it will discourage rights fighters in 
China/ and encourage the hardliners to be more harsh 
in dealing with the United States ... Maybe we can find 
some middle way here 1 or some conditions on the MFN 
to make it renewed or just - I don't know how to -
how to deal with that. "147 
The incohesion and indecisiveness within the human rights 
rights activists some optimism for a while. Interview with Mike 
Jendrzejczyk op cit. 
146 Interview with Stephen Yates op cit. 
147 Council on Foreign Relations/ 
US-China Relations' i March 15 1994: 
Graphics Inc: in Lampton 1 'America's 
p.609. 
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'Policy Impact Panel on 
transcribed by Journal 
China Policy' i op cit 
community as a whole significantly reduced their ability to 
influence the direction of China policy making between May 1993 
and May 1994. 
Clinton also personally sought the counsel of a wide range 
of informed opinion in the days leading up to the MFN decision. 
The President convened a meeting of his senior advisors, 
consulted cabinet-level officials on May 24, and sounded out 
Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski and former President 
Carter (twice) . 148 The purpose of such meetings was to focus on 
viable China policy options, in contrast to his consultations 
with members of Congress that attempted to identify an amenable 
domestic political environment to the MFN decision. 
Clinton's consultations with Carter were possibly the most 
revealing. Carter had answered a request by the Clinton 
Administration to meet Chinese Ambassador Li on May 19, to ask 
for two further concessions: to establish a date for 
negotiations with the leadership in Tibet, and to release more 
political prisoners. The Chinese did neither. 149 Of greater 
importance was Carter's refusal to head an independent 'blue-
ribbon' panel on human rights in China, as proposed by the 
Secretary of State. Clinton had come to Carter with the idea at 
the very last moment, having already decided in favour of 
extending China's MFN status some time before. The former 
President asserted that such a panel would be queried and 
148 Daniel Williams and Clay Chandler, 'The Hollowing of a 
Threat'; op cit. 
149 Elaine Sciolino, 'Cl in ton and China: How the Promise 
Self-Destructed'; op cit. 
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discredited by 
Carter argued 
human rights organisations. More crucially, 
that the panel would inevitably end up 
embarrassingly impotent and futile, as it would consist of both 
human rights and business leaders, each resolute in its own 
political agenda. In a move highly indicative of his crisis 
management and reactive style of decision-making, Clinton only 
jettisoned the idea moments before he announced his MFN 
decision on May 26. 150 
THE VIEWS OF AMERICA'S EAST ASIAN ALLIES 
It is worth commenting upon America's relationship with the 
East Asian and Pacific region. Relations with the states of 
East Asia, outside the relative success of the Seattle APEC 
summit in November, were problematic. In the realm of economic 
relations, the outstanding dispute concerned the failure to 
conclude a ~framework agreement 1 with Japan regarding trade 
deficits, an issue complicated by Japan 1 s lack of effective 
central government. In fact, Japan had become more directly 
involved in US China policy in March 1994. In Beijing shortly 
after the departure of the frustrated Warren Christopher, 
Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa allegedly told Premier Li Peng 
that Western concepts of human rights should not be applied to 
all nations. David M. Lampton learned from an official in the 
Clinton Administration that Washington believed "Hosokawa 
250 Ibid. 
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undercut us on human rights". 151 
The East Asian states, along with most other states, 
publicly opposed revocation of China's MFN status. 152 Although 
they may have been able to take advantage of diminished US 
economic ties with China, it was in East Asian nations' 
interests to see China continue to develop economically, in 
line with the development of intra-regional trade. More 
critically, all the states in the region feared the rise of a 
belligerent, expansionist China, and hence argued vehemently 
against any US actions that might provoke China down that 
path.153 
SECRETARY OF STATE CHRISTOPHER 'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MFN 1994 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher met with Clinton on May 
23 to report on China's human rights performance in the context 
of the MFN decision, and the conditions stipulated in the 
Executive Order. Christopher was able record that, on the 
information he was receiving, the Chinese had satisfied the two 
explicit conditions of compliance with the prison labour 
exports agreement and progress on emigration. He also reported 
151 David M. Lampton, 'America's China Policy in the Age of 
the Finance Minister'; op cit p.611. The US was also in dispute 
with Singapore over the caning of an American teenager 
convicted of vandalism, and had recently imposed sanctions on 
Taiwan for the trade in tiger bones and rhinoceros horn. Thomas 
L. Friedman, 'US Puts Sanctions on Taiwan'; New York Times 
April 12 1994 p.D1 and p.D10. 
152 Interview with Stephen Yates op cit. 
153 Interview with Ronald M. Montaperto op cit. 
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that Beijing had released a number of prominent Tiananmen and 
Tibetan prisoners, conceded to negotiations concerning 
inspections of prisons by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, and was willing to review the jamming of Voice of 
America with US experts. 154 
However, Christopher observed that, within the whole 
picture; "· .. these positive developments cannot be said to meet 
the expectations set forth in the EO. "155 Indeed, the Secretary 
of State recognised that China had not satisfied ~overall 
significant progress' in the other five criteria defined by the 
Executive Order. Christopher did not offer a recommendation on 
MFN renewal on May 23, leaving the decision to the President. 
He did however urge Clinton to impose sanctions on Chinese 
munitions exports to the US, and to reject Bentsen's proposal 
to ~clean the board' and impose no sanctions at all. 156 
President Clinton had a number of factors to consider in 
deciding whether to delink trade from human rights and other 
issues and to renew China's MFN status without conditions. 
Firstly the economic agencies, with substantial support from 
the business community, had provided the intellectual argument 
for delinkage. Clinton had been extremely reluctant to revoke 
154 It is worth noting that China had released prominent, or 
newsworthy, symbolic dissidents, rather than account for all 
political and religious detainees as requested by the Executive 
Order. 
155 Warren Christopher, China's MFN Status: SWTU1lary of the 
report and recommendations of Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher; released by the Department of State, May 26 1994. 
156 Elaine Sciolino, ~Clinton and China: How the Promise 
Self-Destructed'; op cit. 
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China's MFN status, and he now had a powerful and popular 
rationale for not doing so. For their part, the human rights 
lobby was divided as to the most effective way to pursue the 
issue with the PRC. 157 
Clinton had also been forced to address America's narrow 
strategic and security interests with China and the region. The 
US required China's cooperation in addressing the North Korean 
nuclear programme, in cementing the peace process in Cambodia, 
in moving toward a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and other non-
proliferation measures, and at any time China's cooperation 
within the UN Security Council. The defence agencies, and in 
particular Secretary of Defence William Perry, impressed upon 
the President the importance of these issues. 158 In addition, 
Clinton did not want to expose his much maligned foreign policy 
performance to further criticism, either by taking an unpopular 
decision on China's MFN or being seen to have neglected 
important US interests in taking that decision. 159 
Of greater importance to Clinton were the strong domestic 
political reasons supporting delinkage. The President was 
acutely concerned about the reaction to such a conspicuous 
policy climbdown. However the business lobby had been 
157 The debate on the option of renewing China's MFN but 
imposing specific and targeted sanctions offered some optimism 
for a solid proposal for a while. Interview with Mike 
Jendrzejczyk op cit. 
158 Interview with 
example Kevin Fedarko, 
1994 p.34. 
Ronald M, Montaperto op cit. See for 
~Pushing it to the Limit'; Time May 30 
159 See George J. Church, ~Dropping the Ball'; Time May 2 
1994. 
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successful in persuading Clinton that revoking China's MFN 
status, or indeed imposing limited sanctions on China, carried 
its own political costs. Doing so, they argued, would 
contradict his drive for domestic economic revitalisation and 
geo-economic competitiveness. Further, Clinton was reminded of 
the political value of his close links with the business 
community, not least its political donations . 160 
Moreover the critical shift in the balance of opinion in 
Congress on US-China relations facilitated his decision to 
delink. This shift in opinion, echoed in the press, allowed the 
possibility that delinkage would appear to be a prudent 
decision rather than a humiliating policy reversal. The vital 
role played by the centrist bloc meant that the President 
avoided a politically devastating clash with his own party, 
that might lead to Congressional assaults on his real policy 
priorities. 
THE 1994 MFN DECISION AND DELINKAGE: CLINTON CONFIRMS THE CHINA 
POLICY REVERSAL 
On May 26 1994 Clinton announced that China's MFN status would 
be renewed, and that the Administration would no longer link 
China's human rights performance to its trade with the United 
States. The only future consideration, in line with the 1974 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act, would be the issue of 
freedom of emigration. In explaining the decision, Clinton 
defended the 1993 Executive Order by asserting that " ... linkage 
160 Interview with David Lampton op cit. 
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has been constructive during the past year", but he reasoned 
that "··.based on our aggressive contacts with the Chinese in 
the past several months, that we reached the end of the 
usefulness of that policy ... "161 The President chose not to 
demote the issue of human rights explicitly in justifying his 
position. He argued that the point was not whether human rights 
should be pursued with the People's Republic, but identifying 
the most effective way of doing so, an argument praised by a 
Washington Post editorial. 162 For example, in a statement that 
illustrated the reversal in China policy, Clinton asserted: 
"To those who argue that in the view of China's human 
rights abuses we should revoke MFN status, let me ask 
you the same question I have asked myself: Will we 
do more to advance the cause of human rights if China 
is isolated, or if our nations are engaged in a 
growing web of political and economic cooperation and 
contacts. "163 
Clinton's announcement echoed the Constructive Engagement 
strategy of the Bush Administration further, when he explained 
that delinkage, and the Administration's new approach 
" ... offers the best opportunity to lay the basis for long-term 
161 
Status 
vol.S 
Office 
President Clinton, ·us Renews Most-Favoured-Nation 
for China' May 26 1994; US Department of State Dispatch 
no.22 May 30 1994 United States Government Printing 
(Washington D.C., 1994) p.345-347. 
162 
·necision on China'; Washington Post May 27 1994 p.A24. 
163 Thomas L. Friedman, 
for China's Goods; Clinton 
May 27 1994 p.A1. 
·us is to Maintain Trade Privileges 
Votes for Business'; New York Times 
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sustainable progress on human rights and for the advancement of 
our other interests in China. "164 This was a crucial reflection 
of the intellectual arguments offered by the economic lobbies. 
The President did disclose the new measures through which the 
US would pursue human rights with China, including a ban on 
Chinese munitions exports to the US, increased broadcasts of 
the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia, increased support for 
non-governmental organisations concerned with human rights in 
China, and the promotion of voluntary set of human rights 
principles for US businesses dealing with China. However, ln 
contrast to the previous year, Clinton placed a far greater 
emphasis on other US China policy interests relative to the 
issue of human rights. He was firm on the importance of a good 
US-China relationship to issues such as the North Korean 
crisis, and interests such as the economic benefits to be 
sought in China specifically and in Asia more generally. 
Clinton justified the policy reversal by stating: "I 
believe ... this is in the strategic, economic and political 
interests of the United States. 11165 
Not surprisingly, he did not comment specifically on the 
changes in circumstances ~in the past several months' that had 
rendered the policy defined by the Executive Order obsolete. 
However, the President did acknowledge the continued abuse of 
human rights in China, and that the Regime " ... did not achieve 
164 Ann Devroy, ~Clinton 
Action Separates Human Rights, 
p.Al. 
Reverses Course on China; MFN 
Trade'; Washington Post May 27 
165 Daniel Williams, 
Washington Post May 27 1994 
~us Stress 
p.Al. 
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on Rights Gives Way'; 
overall significant progress in all the areas outlined in the 
executive order." In accordance with these facts, and along 
with the new 'direct' measures, Cl in ton confirmed the 
continuation of sanctions imposed since 1989 in the wake of the 
Tiananmen Square massacre. These were the prohibition of the 
export of US weapons and military equipment to China, the 
obstruction of Chinese participation in a number of US 
development programmes, and US opposition to the majority of 
World Bank loans to China. Clinton admitted that the success of 
the reversal on China policy depended to a large degree on 
China's side of the bargain, a comment that appeared to 
acknowledge Washington's lack of credibility with Beijing. The 
President told White House aides that the argument preached by 
the Chinese government and the Administration's economic team, 
that China policy should be based on concessions and 
cooperation rather than threats, would have to yield results. 
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Conclusion 
In abandoning linkage and embracing a strategy of broad 
engagement with Beijing, Clinton had appeared to revert to the 
long-standing orthodox tradition of China policy that had been 
accepted in the mid to late 1960s and pursued since 1972. There 
was widespread agreement that in abandoning engagement, and 
defining China policy by the Executive Order of May 1993, 
Clinton had created a political time-bomb with respect to the 
1994 MFN recommendation. 166 
Many senior officials in the Administration, including to 
a degree the President himself, had undergone a learning curve 
on China policy through 1993-94. The Administration in 1994 
possessed a stronger awareness of the broader aspects of the 
US-China relationship. 167 This had involved a reassessment of 
America's economic relationship with the PRC, and a stronger 
appreciation of America's security and strategic interests with 
Beij ing. One former State Department official describes this 
learning curve as a ~bottom-up' process in which advice from 
experienced professionals finally began to percolate through to 
the highest decision-making circles within the White House and 
the Administration. 168 This appeared to suggest that the Cl in ton 
Administration was developing a more equitable balance between 
the broad range of US interests in China, and the need to 
166 Interview with Michael Armacost op cit. 
167 Interview with Kerry Dumbaugh op cit. 
168 Interview with Frank Jannuzi op cit. 
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establish domestic legitimacy for the policy. 
Clinton had also overseen the reestablishment within 
Congress of a bipartisan consensus on China. Thus, once again, 
he had satisfied the major preoccupation of his approach to 
China. Administration officials such as Winston Lord understood 
the diplomatic value of a domestically legitimised policy. 
However, the President was more concerned with keeping to the 
path of least political resistance on a policy low on his list 
of personal priorities. Clinton was perhaps fortunate that two 
communities with whom Clinton wanted to maintain good 
relations, Congress and 
toward China, that he 
business, concurred enough on policy 
could follow their lead and effect 
delinkage. What is more ironic is that the Administration 
helped to reestablish a domestic consensus on engagement with 
China through the failure of its 1993 China policy. The lack of 
progress from Beijing, coupled with the Administration's 
falling credibility on the Hill, led to the Congress and the 
Administration moving in the same direction on China. 
The Administration's persistent mishandling of China policy 
following the mid-term elections of 1994 would contribute to a 
resumption of partisan battles between both branches of 
government in 1995. 
Although Clinton had navigated the political crisis 
threatened by the MFN 1994 decision, he had failed to resolve 
serious defects in the policy-making process. The Clinton 
Administration's approach to China was largely reactive; an 
exercise in crisis management. Clinton and certain other senior 
380 
380 
officials had only been prepared to address US-China relations 
when a political crisis loomed. 
It is true that Clinton became more involved at an earlier 
stage in the MFN decision-making process than he had in 1993. 
Nevertheless, his activities were largely confined to exploring 
and manipulating the political options facing him. Once the 
crisis had passed, he withdrew from the issue. This fact 
questioned his proclamations on the importance of China in his 
MFN 1994 announcement, and indicated that Clinton was not 
committed to the issue of China policy in a strategic sense. As 
a result, he failed to provide or articulate a coherent policy 
framework for China policy, that identified clear hierarchies 
of US interests. This led through 1993-94, and beyond, to 
indecision and confusion as to the purposes of the 
Administration's policy, and to a lack of discipline which saw 
different agencies pursuing their own agendas with Beij ing, 
provoking suspicion and incredulity amongst senior Chinese 
officials. As one US official noted: 
"Decisions are never fully made, so the MFN decision 
does not denote a long term strategy ... There is an 
inability in government to sort out domestic needs 
from foreign needs. So you get conflict avoidance and 
a desire for harmony ... This is management by miasma, 
chew the fat, nothing happens ... Most routine 
decisions go big groups where anyone has a voice. So, 
by the end, only in a crisis do you get a 
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decision. " 169 
These problems can be illustrated further by looking at 
the role of Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord. Lord had 
assumed a major hand in the crafting of the Executive Order and 
the strategy of linkage. Nevertheless he had been frustrated 
with the conduct of China policy since the May 1993 
announcement. He did not regard the policy as the problem, 
maintaining that the conditions were realistic and 
achievable. 170 
Lord's main contention was the lack of commitment on China 
exhibited by more senior officials, and especially the 
President. This, he argued, led to the disparate and divided 
approach to China policy, and the deepening splits within the 
Administration through 1993-94. He was particularly critical of 
the failure to articulate America's China policy interests at 
the highest levels, revealing: 
"Very frankly, we pressed to have a presidential 
speech for three years, without success." 171 
169 Unnamed source. David M. Lamp ton, 'America's China 
Policy in the Age of the Finance Minister'; op cit p.614. 
170 Lord did however overestimate the degree to which 
Beijing would resist American overtures for minimal progress on 
human rights. He had consistently argued prior to his 
appointment as Assistant Secretary, that the current Chinese 
regime was a temporary phenomenon, and would be unable to defy 
the global trend toward accountable government. It is perhaps 
on this point that Lord's view of China policy had most altered 
by spring 1994. See Winston Lord, 'Bush's Second Chance on 
China'; New York Times May 9 1990 and Winston Lord, 'Will Bush 
Support the Chinese People?'; New York Times October 6 1991. 
171 Interview with Winston Lord op cit. 
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Lord had insisted that the strategy of linkage, and indeed 
America's broad range of interests with China necessitated 
solid diplomatic engagement with Beijing. Clinton's failure to 
articulate a vision for policy, and to commit himself to US-
China relations except in times of crisis, usually political, 
undermined Lord's objectives. 172 By the spring of 1994, he 
recognised that China was not going to meet the Executive 
Order. According to some, Lord continued to defend linkage 
until it was clear that an alternative course would be taken 
out of a sense of loyalty to the Administration and the 
President. 173 
To some analysts, the period 1992-1994 represented a lost 
opportunity to develop US-China relations. They assert that 
partisan politics and politically-driven decision-making 
obscured the possibility of a Clinton Adminstration pursuing 
engagement with China, backed by a favourably partisan 
Congress. 174 Certainly in mismanaging relations with the PRC, 
Washington lost an enormous amount of credibility in Beijing . 175 
Clinton's failure to appreciate the defects ln the China 
policy-making process in the spring of 1994, married to his 
lack of commitment to the relationship, would mean that the 
172 David Lampton asserts that Lord provided an 'attitude' 
rather than specific proposals on China. Interview op cit. 
173 Interviews with Frank Jannuzi op 
Carpenter op cit. See also Karen Breslau 
'Is Win Lord's Work Done?'; Newsweek May 30 
174 Interview with Ronald N. Montaperto. 
cit and Ted Galen 
and Michael Elliot, 
1994 pp.30-32. 
175 Interview with Mike Jendrzejczyk op cit. 
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Administration would continue to treat China policy like a 
campaign issue. 176 The platform established by the 1994 MFN 
decision did not lead to the successful execution of a 
domestically legitimate China strategy. Rather it precipitated 
a return of imprudent partisan politics, and the worst 
deterioration in bilateral relations since engagement with 
Beijing was embraced. 
176 Interview with Ted Galen Carpenter op cit. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINA 1994-1996 
THE FAILURE TO RESOLVE FLAWS IN THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS 
Clinton' s decision to de link China's MFN status from human 
rights, or other conditions appeared to reestablish a number of 
precepts that had traditionally underscored the long-term 
development of US China policy and US-PRC relations. However, 
the decision was motivated more by domestic political reasons 
than bilateral strategic reasons. In other words, although the 
Administration had appeared to revert to a broad strategy that 
had governed US China policy since the late 1960s, it had 
failed to resolve serious defects in its policy-making 
processes. As a result, the lack of a strong and coherent 
framework for post-Cold War US China policy led to a deepening 
crisis in US-PRC relations over 1994-1996. 
MFN 1994 did have a number of positive features. Firstly, 
it cemented the process of diplomatic engagement that had begun 
in the September of 1993. In removing the threat to withdraw 
MFN in the absence of human rights progress, the Administration 
removed a highly sensitive and provocative issue from bilateral 
negotiations. 
Secondly, MFN 1994 represented an important watershed in 
the US government's handling of China policy. It suggested that 
the domestic policy-making debate had moved beyond the 
political gamesmanship that had arisen during the Bush 
Administration, and shadowed Clinton' s decision to adopt MFN 
385 
conditionality in the spring of 1993. The domestic debate on 
China's 1994 MFN status reflected a more sober consideration of 
US China policy interests 
implying that members of 
Congress had experienced 
through 1993 to early 1994. 
in the post- Cold War environment, 
the Administration and members of 
a learning curve on China policy 
Thirdly, the decision restored a strong degree of domestic 
unity on China policy. A majority of actors within the 
Administration, Congress and the wider domestic community with 
concerns for US-PRC relations now appeared to favour a strategy 
of cautious comprehensive engagement with Beijing. They agreed 
on the need to focus on the long-term progress of Sino-American 
ties, the need to promote US involvement and influence on 
China's development, and to encourage Beijing's growing 
participation in the international community. They also agreed 
on the need to defend US interests by addressing specific 
tensions in the US- PRC relationship. Non-governmental actors 
with interests in China, such as the business community and 
human rights organisations, continued to lobby Washington with 
their particular concerns and protests. Further, there was a 
growing recognition of the areas in which US and PRC post-Cold 
War national interests diverged. Given that Americans still 
viewed Beijing with a strong degree 
apprehension, policy-makers could not 
of scepticism and 
disregard bilateral 
disputes in the name of expanding US-PRC relations. 
However, the positive aspects of the Cl in ton 
Administration's decision on China's 1994 MFN status were 
subverted by its failure to address substantial problems with 
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its policy-making processes. The fact that the decision was 
driven by Clinton's desire to respond to Congressional opinion 
and to pressure from the business community underlined this 
fact. The President had yet to balance his sensitivity to 
domestic political calculations with a considered assessment of 
how best to pursue America's long-term interests with the PRC. 
The emergence of a dominant Congressional coalition 
against a strategy of MFN linkage was due, in part, to 
dissatisfaction with the Administration's handling of China 
policy through 1993 and early 1994. In spite of its attempt to 
reflect the views of this body of opinion, the Administration's 
pursuit of comprehensive engagement after the spring of 1994 
did little to restore its credibility on the Hill, or indeed, 
with Beijing. Thus the Administration's management of relations 
with China over the next two and a half years failed to dispel 
the perception a of reactive, crisis-led China policy-making 
process, in which White House politicos continued to frustrate 
the recommendations of China experts and officials. 1 
As this chapter will explain, the Administration failed to 
provide a considered and meaningful definition of its strategy 
of comprehensive engagement with the PRC. Accordingly, it 
failed to articulate the means and ends of China policy to 
either its domestic audience or to the Chinese government. 2 
1 Interview with Dr. Ronald N. Montaperto, Senior Fellow, 
National Defence University, November 12 1997, Washington D.C. 
2 Secretary of State Christopher admits that his address 
before the Council on Foreign Relations on May 17 1996, 
entitled 'American Interests and the US-China Relationship' 
represented the Administration's first formal speech dedicated 
to the crucial issue of China policy. See Warren Christopher, 
In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy For a New Era; 
Stanford University Press, (Stanford, 1998) p.428. 
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Members of the Administration, senior and junior, did engage in 
negotiations with Chinese counterparts across a broad range of 
important issues. However, engagement of this kind was 
contradicted by condemnations and accusations levelled at the 
Chinese by members of the Administration responding to the 
domestic political environment. 3 Therefore the domestic audience 
was left with the impression of a confused, rudderless China 
policy, while Beij ing became increasingly suspicious of the 
Administration's declared commitment to the positive 
development of Sino-American relations.• 
Despite the political crises prompted by MFN 1993 and 
accompanying Executive Order 128590, Clinton neglected to 
provide consistent leadership on relations with the PRC 
throughout the rest of his first term of office. As a result, 
China policy continued to be an uncoordinated exercise. The MFN 
1994 decision had given the green light to engagement with the 
PRC, but in the absence of leadership at the highest level, 
different agencies were allowed to pursue their own agendas. 
Therefore while agencies such as the State Department and the 
Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
threatened specific sanctions over issues such as proliferation 
and the protection of intellectual property, the Department of 
Commerce continued to chase major trade deals with the Chinese. 
Attempts by the White House to deal with the diplomatic 
confusion that ensued reinforced the image of a policy-making 
3 Interview with Robert M. Perito, former Senior China 
analyst, US Department of State, November 10 1997, Washington 
D.C. 
Karsten Prager, 'China: Waking Up to the Next Superpower'; 
Time March 25 1996 pp.38-39. 
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process dictated by crisis management. 
Concomitantly, Clinton also failed to provide consistent 
leadership on China within the domestic political arena. 
Following their sweeping successes in the mid-term elections of 
November 1994, in which they regained control of both the House 
and the Senate, Republicans in Congress attempted to fill the 
vacuum. The subsequent struggle between the Administration and 
Congress for the control of China policy echoed the standoffs 
that occurred during the Bush Administration. As before, the 
reasons behind Congressional attempts to seize the initiative 
on China were twofold. Firstly, members of both parties held 
genuine concerns for Chinese conduct in the areas of trade, 
proliferation, human rights, and increasingly through 1994 to 
1996, Taiwan. Dissatisfaction with the Clinton Administration's 
ability to deal effectively with these issues prompted certain 
members of Congress into action of their own. Secondly, the 
early mismanagement of China policy exposed the Administration 
to partisan attacks from Republicans, particularly on the issue 
of Taiwan. Having dealt Clinton a serious political blow in the 
mid-term elections, Republicans sought to exploit other areas 
in which the President was perceived to be vulnerable. 
Sino-American relations evolved through three phases from 
the spring of 1994 to the end of the Administration's first 
term of office. The first period, from the MFN 1994 decision in 
late May to early 1995 was characterised by growing uncertainty 
and frustration. Despite the Administration's attempt to 
relocate China policy back towards the established strategy of 
engagement and to restore domestic legitimacy for US-PRC 
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relations, little progress of substance was achieved between 
the two governments, while discontent continued to simmer 
within Congress. 
Following the mid-term elections of November 1994, the 
Republican controlled Congress began to present significant 
challenges to the Administration's control of China policy. 
This domestic situation contributed to a second phase in US-PRC 
relationship which saw a rapid deterioration in bilateral 
relations, and the political resurrection of the controversial 
issue of Taiwan. Relations reached their lowest point for 
twenty five years in the spring of 1996, when the 
Administration attempted to respond to another crisis in the 
Taiwan Strait. 
Sino-American relations recovered throughout the remainder 
the year. The spring crisis proved to be a sobering experience 
for the both governments, and the US Congress. It prompted the 
Administration to re-evaluate its strategy on China, and 
address serious defects in the China policy-making process. 
Beij ing softened its stance towards the US, while Congress 
moderated its approach to China policy. The improved bilateral 
and domestic atmosphere facilitated Clinton's success in 
preventing China policy becoming an issue in the 1996 
presidential elections. 
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Bilateral Uncertainty and Domestic Frustration in 1994 
COMPREHENSIVE ENGAGEMENT AND A NEW PLATFORM FOR CHINA POLICY 
The Administration's decision to delink China's MFN status from 
human rights, and to commit itself in full to a strategy of 
'comprehensive engagement' with Beijing appeared, on the 
surface, to offer better prospects both for the bilateral 
relationship and for the restoration of a domestic consensus on 
China policy. Secretary of State Warren Christopher devoted 
part of his address to the Asia Society on May 27 1994 to an 
explication of China policy in the light of the 1994 MFN 
decision. 5 He defended the President's policy reversal on MFN 
conditionality and provided broad short and long-term reasons 
for US engagement with China. 6 Above all, he justified 
engagement in terms of America's post-Cold War interests: 
"I am convinced our strategy of comprehensive 
engagement offers the best chance to influence 
China's development. In that way, we will advance our 
security, our prosperity, and our values." 7 
5 Warren Christopher, 'America and the Asia-Pacific Future'; 
Address to the Asia Society, New York, May 27 1994, in Warren 
Christopher, In ·the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy 
For a New Era; op cit Chapter Ten. 
6 Christopher cited 'China's evolution' and the developing 
crisis over the North Korean nuclear programme as short-term 
reasons for the necessity of engaging China. Ibid p.160. 
7 Ibid p.162. Christopher insisted that economic engagement 
and Chinese economic liberalization alone would not be 
sufficient for progress on human rights. Thus he reiterated the 
Administration's proposals for new human rights initiatives, 
highlighted by Clinton in his recommendation for China's 1994 
MFN status the day before. Ibid p.161. 
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While offering little in the way of specific policy 
proposals, Christopher's exposition of comprehensive engagement 
on May 27 presented two interesting connotations. Firstly, the 
tone and broad thrust of the strategy closely reflected the 
thinking of Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord. 
Christopher's references to the importance of China echoed 
arguments submitted by Lord in his confirmation hearing the 
previous year. 8 Further, Christopher's commendation of a 
" ... more comprehensive, finely nuanced strategy of 
engagement ... " directly reflected language used by his 
Assistant Secretary of State.• Finally, the emphasis placed by 
Christopher on the importance of domestic consensus on China 
policy echoed Lord's comments on the value of this principle. 10 
Lord had supported the decision to delink human rights 
from MFN, and, it is argued, only defended linkage in the run 
up to the 1994 MFN decision out of a sense of loyalty to the 
Administration. 11 Lord had played a leading role in the design 
8 Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary-designate for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs, Statement before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Confirmation Hearingi Washington D.C., 
March 31 1993. Christopher cited the value of Chinese 
cooperation in areas such as global and regional stability and 
security, its role in the United Nations Security Council, the 
size of its military, the value of Sino-American trade to the 
US environmental protection. 
Warren Christopher, In 
Foreign Policy For a New 
Confirmation Hearing March 31 
the 
Erai 
1993i 
Stream of History: Shaping 
op cit p.160, and Lord, 
op cit. 
10 Ibid (Christopher) . Interview with 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and 
1993-1996, November 7 1997, New York. 
Winston Lord, 
Pacific Affairs 
11 Interview with Frank S. Jannuzi, former China 
specialist, US Department of State, November 12 
1997, Washington D.C. 
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of the President's Executive Order 12850, but was increasingly 
isolated from the China policy-making process through 1993-94. 
From this perspective, the Administration's commitment to a 
nuanced comprehensive engagement strategy in late spring 1994 
represented a resurrection of Lord's role within the policy-
making process. However, as in the period 1993-94, Lord's 
subsequent influence on decision making would erode as the 
Administration attempted to pursue the strategy through 1994-
96. The fact that the official with direct responsibility for 
China policy had little influence on the conduct of that policy 
only contributed to the lack of coordination within the 
Administration. 
The second implication behind Christopher's May 27 address 
concerns the mood and stance of Congress. Knowledge of 
Congressional support for delinkage and a strategy of 
engagement allowed the Secretary of State to pin the 
Administration's colours to the policy reversal before the Hill 
had voted on the renewal of China's MFN status. Of course, this 
highlights the degree to which Clinton' s China policy was a 
product of Congressional opinion and leadership on the issue 
rather than a strategic decision the President was prepared to 
fight for. 
Congressional support for delinkage was confirmed on 
August 9 1994, when the House rejected two bills challenging 
Clinton's 1994 MFN recommendation. A joint resolution of 
disapproval (HJ Res 373) was defeated by seventy five votes to 
three hundred and fifty six, while Rep. Pelosi' s attempt to 
impose PRC state sector-targeted MFN conditionality (HR 4590) 
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was defeated by one hundred and fifty eight votes to two 
hundred and seventy. Further, a substitute bill (HR 4891) 
introduced by Rep. Hamilton and cosponsored by leading figures 
of the moderate coalition in the House, that sought to codify 
Clinton's MFN announcement passed the House by two hundred and 
eighty to one hundred and fifty two. 12 In the wake of the vote 
on HR 4590, Senator Mitchell decided against pushing for his 
companion bill (S 2269) in the Senate. 13 
Led by the moderate coalition that reemerged through 1993-
94, Congress endorsed the Administration's new initiative on 
engagement for a number of reasons. Firstly, the real threat of 
revoking China's MFN status in 1994 had sharpened the debate on 
China policy. Proponents of engagement on the Hill, supported 
by the press and by influential organisations such as the 
Council on Foreign Relations and the business community's 
Emergency Committee on American Trade (ECAT) prevailed in the 
intellectual argument against MFN linkage. 14 During the Bush 
Administration, members of Congress were able to support 
conditionality knowing that a presidential veto of such 
legislation would be sustained in the Senate. In 1994, the real 
12 Richard Bush, professional staff member and Congressional 
aide to Rep. Hamilton at the time, participated in an extensive 
lobbying effort in support of the President's decision. A 
series of 'Dear Colleague' letters designed to appeal to a wid~ 
range of interests were sent to Representatives in the run up 
to the August 9 vote. Interview with Richard Bush, former 
professional staff, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs 
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, October 29 1997, 
Washington D.C. 
13 
'Issue: China MFN'; Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 
vol.52 no.43 November 5 1994 p.3155. 
14 Interview with James M. McCormick, former professional 
staff, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, November 7 1997, Washington D.C. 
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possibility that America might have to live with legislated 
conditionality caused many to rethink their support for such a 
strategy. 15 Secondly, some members were swayed by their 
constituency interests. Those with large industrial and 
agricultural trading links with the Chinese economy, and in 
particular Democrats anticipating_a tough re-election campaign 
in the forthcoming mid-term elections, were easily persuaded of 
the benefits of unconditional renewal of MFN. 16 Partisan 
politics also played a role. The chances of Congress, with the 
Democratic Party in control of both chambers, voting to 
override a veto from their own president were remote. Further, 
although certain Democrats wanted to distance themselves from a 
President drawing low approval ratings for his conduct in 
domestic and foreign policy, they did not want to prompt a 
split within the party on such a conspicuous issue. 17 Once 
again, with the mid-term elections in mind, pragmatic Democrats 
understood the need for unity and solidarity. 18 
Clinton's unconditional renewal of China's MFN status ~n 
1994 reestablished the pivotal role of the pro-engagement 
centrist bloc within Congress. As one experienced professional 
staff member argues: 
15 Interview with 
Specialist, Congressional 
Washington D.C. 
Kerry Dumbaugh, 
Research Service, 
16 Interview with Richard Bush op cit. 
Foreign 
November 
Affairs 
5 19971 
17 See 'American Survey: The Labours of William'; Economist 
July 30-August 5 1994 pp.41-42. 
18 Interviews with Mike Jendrzejczyk, Washington Director of 
Human Rights Watch: Asia, November 4 1997, Washington D.C., and 
Ted Galen Carpenter, CATO Institute, November 6 1997, 
Washington D.C. 
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"You are not going to have a decent relationship with 
China unless you have ... this core centrist bloc 
that's able to fight off attacks from the left and 
the right. 19 
As a result, Clinton achieved his key objective of rebuilding a 
bipartisan consensus on China policy. The fact that this was 
due, in parts, to the failure of his policy of MFN 
conditionality and linkage, as well as to partisan politics, 
was of little concern to the President. 2 ° Clinton was more 
concerned with reserving domestic political capital for issues 
and proposals he cared more about. Clinton and his political 
advisors had carefully assessed, and pursued, the prevailing 
mood within Congress, and opted for the least politically 
contentious policy. This allowed Clinton to delegate the 
oversight of China policy to colleagues, while he diverted his 
attention to other matters. 
The Administration embarked upon a programme of official 
engagement in the summer and autumn of 1994. Symbolically, the 
initiative was spearheaded by two critical areas of US post-
Cold War bilateral engagement with China, trade and economics, 
and military ties. Despite Washington's regret at a PRC nuclear 
weapons test conducted in the June that challenged the 
Administration's appeal for an international voluntary 
moratorium on such testing, Sino-American relations appeared to 
19 Interview with Richard Bush op cit. 
20 Ibid. 
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progress over the period. 21 
Two exchanges in particular signified an improvement in 
relations. Firstly, Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown secured 
over $5 billion worth of business deals on a visit to China in 
early September. Brown's overt promotion and lobbying of 
bilateral economic relations and his claim to have raised human 
rights in private (disputed by some aides on the trip) seemed 
to exemplify the Administration's new approach to Beijing. 22 The 
second exchange saw Secretary of Defence William Perry conduct 
four days of talks in Beij ing in the October. 23 Most obviously, 
this represented the first high-level military exchange between 
the US and the PRC since Tiananmen. 24 In his set-piece address, 
Perry spoke of the importance the Administration attached to a 
strong strategic and security relationship with China. 25 
21 China conducted a second test on October. 
22 See Sam Seibert, Matt Forney and Sudarsan Raghavan, -A 
Blank Check for China on Human Rights?'; Newsweek September 5 
1994 p.24, Kevin Fedarko, -Let's Make a Deal'; Time September 
12 1994 p. 44, and Steven Mufson, -Brown Declared China Trip 
Political, Business Success'; Washington Post August 31 1994 
p.A27 and p.A31. 
23 This followed Perry's meeting with the deputy Chief of 
Staff of the People's Liberation Army in Washington in August. 
Kerry Dumbaugh, China-US Relations: Chronology of Developments 
During the Clinton Administration; Report to Congress 97-484 F, 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, October 15 
1997, p.6. 
24 The Secretary of Defence followed up this trip by leading 
a delegation of fifty US military officials on a four day visit 
to the PRC in December. Robert G. Sutter (with Seong-Eun Choi), 
Shaping China's Future in World Affairs: The Role of the United 
States; Westview Press (Oxford, 1996) Chronology p.168. 
25 Perry highlighted mutual "special responsibility" in 
areas such as stability in the East and South Asian regions, 
proliferation, peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and 
Taiwan. He also stressed the value of expanding military 
dialogue between the US and the PRC. William Perry, -The Sine-
US Relationship and Its Impact on World Peace'; Address at the 
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However, the significance of this trip lay in the fact that 
Perry was now able to play a more prominent role in the 
Administration's engagement of China. Perry is credited by some 
as being the only high level member of the Administration who 
really understood the need for a strong and stable framework 
for US China policy. Dr. Ron Montaperto of the National Defence 
University testifies: 
"He was the only one ... in that whole Administration 
who understood, or had some sense, of the 
overall ... significance of US-China relations. 26 
Perry's influence on the policy-making process had 
previously been restricted for two reasons. Firstly, there was 
still some resistance within and without government to the 
restoration of military ties with the PRC. The role of the 
People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the Tiananmen massacre made 
such a step somewhat contentious. 27 Further, the weakened 
position of the Pentagon and related agencies had been 
reinforced by the determination of the State Department and the 
White House, at different times, to control the China policy-
making process over 1993-1994. Secondly, in spite of the 
Secretary of Defence's opposition to the strategy of linkage 
National Defence University, Beijing, October 18 1994, United 
States Department of State Dispatch vol.S no.44 October 31 
1994. 
26 Interview with Ronald N. Montaperto op cit. David Lampton 
suggests that Perry was the " ... only statesman of the bunch." 
Interview with David M. Lampton, President of the National 
Committee on US-China Relations, November 14 1997, New York. 
27 See for example Michael R. Gordon, 'Perry Visit Seeks to 
Rebuild Ties with Chinese Military'; New York Times October 17 
1994 p.A8. 
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implemented in spring 1993, he remained loyal to Clinton' s 
declaration that the Administration would 'speak with one 
voice' on China policy. Indeed, Perry abandoned an earlier 
speech on US-China relations" ... on the grounds that it was too 
statelike", more appropriate to a Secretary of State or 
president. 28 Further, some have argued that Perry did not wish 
to compromise his position within the Administration by 
challenging the counsel given to Clinton by his political 
advisors. 29 Nevertheless, the President's public espousal of 
comprehensive engagement allowed one of the strongest advocates 
of the strategy greater access to the policy-making process. 
Further signs of progress were achieved before the end of 
the year. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen ended a trip to 
the United States by concluding a bilateral agreement on 
weapons proliferation and fissile material production. In a 
joint statement with Warren Christopher on October 4, Qian 
declared that China would adhere to the guidelines of the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) once the US waived 
sanctions imposed upon the PRC in August 1993 for transferring 
missile parts to Pakistan. Qian also committed China to close 
cooperation with Washington to promote an international 
verifiable ban on the production of nuclear weapons material. 30 
28 Ibid. The author cites Montaperto. 
29 Interview with Ronald M. Montaperto op cit. 
30 
'The US and China: Curbing Missile and Nuclear Weapons 
Proliferation': Joint Statements, October 4 1994, Washington 
D.C.; United States Department of State Dispatch vol.S no.42 
October 17 1994. China had committed itself to adhering to the 
MTCR in March 1992, but had failed to live up to this agreement 
according to US intelligence reports. The agreement was signed 
on December 4 1994. 
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For his part, Christopher noted that he had raised the issue of 
human rights in his talks with his counterpart. 
In his meeting with Clinton on November 3, Qian also 
delivered a letter from Chinese President Jiang Zemin conveying 
his satisfaction at the recent improvement in bilateral 
relations. 31 This communication prepared the ground for 
Clinton's meeting with Jiang at the annual Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Indonesia on November 14. 
Again, this meeting symbolised the Administration's desire for 
cooperation and dialogue with Beijing. During the course of the 
private talks, Cl in ton raised amongst others the issues of 
proliferation, trade, human rights and the question of the 
North Korean nuclear programme. 32 While pursuing proposals for a 
voluntary code of human rights principles for US businesses 
with interests in China prior to the APEC forum, the President 
disappointed American human rights activists by declining to 
make a public statement on human rights before travelling to 
Indonesia. 33 
Nevertheless, Clinton did stiffen the broad diplomatic 
stance toward the PRC in September. Following an internal 
Taiwan policy review, the Administration announced that it 
31 Robert G. Sutter, Shaping China's Future; op cit p.166. 
32 Robert G. Sutter and Kerry Dumbaugh, China-US Relations; 
Issue Brief IB94002, Congressional Research Service, Library of 
Congress, June 19 1995 p.6. Jiang Zemin was reportedly 
enthusiastic about the US-North Korean nuclear accord. The 
North Korean nuclear crisis is discussed later in the chapter. 
33 Bruce W. Nelan, 'Business First, Freedom Second' ; Time 
November 21 1994 pp. 60-62. Clinton instigated a White House 
discussion with interested groups (chaired by deputy head of 
the National Economic Council Bowman Cutter) on the subject of 
voluntary principles. Ibid p.61. 
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would take modest steps to increase contacts with the island. 34 
This included the expansion of high-level exchanges, 
authorization for one-day transits in America for Taiwanese 
officials, and consenting to a higher-profile for the island's 
pseudo-embassy in the US. 35 This initiative also reflected the 
recommendations of Assistant Secretary Wins ton Lord. 36 Beij ing 
lodged an official protest but took no further action. 37 
PROBLEMS BENEATH THE SURFACE OF US ENGAGEMENT, 1994 
High-level negotiations and diplomacy, major trade deals and 
reaffirmation of non-proliferation agreements appeared to 
suggest that the Administration's new approach to comprehensive 
engagement was paying off. 38 However, the new initiative failed 
to address two fundamental problems that would contribute to 
34 Kerry Dumbaugh, China-US Relations: Chronology; op cit 
p.6. 
35 James Walsh, ~Cornell' s Reunion is China's Nightmare'; 
Time June 5 1995 p.34 and ~The Lobby Factor'; Asiaweek June 22 
1995 p. 29. Taiwanese senior officials had been barred from 
entering the US since the 1979 establishment of US-PRC 
diplomatic relations. 
36 Lord believed that such measures would challenge any 
complacency in Beij ing' s approach to Washington, and signal 
America's preference for working with democratic, Western-
orientated governments. See for example Winston Lord, ~Bush's 
Second Chance on China'; New York Times May 9 1990 p.A31. 
37 Beij ing did cancel a prospective visit by Federico F. 
Pena, after the Transportation Secretary undertook a trip to 
Taiwan at the beginning of December. ~China Bars US Aide Who 
Went to Taiwan'; International Herald Tribune December 14 1994 
p.8. 
38 Some commentators regarded the anti-proliferation 
agreement and enhanced atmosphere of US-PRC relations as 
examples of Clinton's improving management of foreign affairs. 
See Christopher Ogden, ~Is it Skill, or is it Just Good Luck?'; 
Time October 31 1994 pp.68-69. 
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the deterioration in US-PRC relations through 1995-96. Firstly, 
serious defects in the policy-making process persisted within 
the Administration. There was still an absence of leadership 
and coordination of strategy, partly due to the failure to 
define a decisive and authoritative framework for Sino-American 
relations. In a sense there had been an attempt to distinguish 
a hierarchy of US interests in China, the subject of Winston 
Lord's memorandum to Warren Christopher in the spring of 1994. 
However, this amounted to different government agencies 
pursuing their own independent agendas with Beijing, with 
little regard for overall prioritization, and thus the 
Administration's approach to China remained highly reactive. 
Secondly, the Administration struggled to deal with the 
perception that US China policy was securing too little 
progress with the Chinese, especially 1.n the area of human 
rights. Indeed, China was seen to be growing in confidence and 
power which, to some American observers, represented a growing 
threat to US strategic and normative interests. As a result, 
the Administration's strategy of comprehensive engagement 
struggled to contain domestic disquiet regarding US-China 
relations. 
Although a matter of dispute, some commentators viewed 
Clinton' s decision to renew China's 1994 MFN status without 
conditions purely in terms of Washington's attempt to deal with 
the crisis regarding the North Korean nuclear weapons 
programme. 39 Due to its traditional links with the regime in 
39 Richard Bush disagrees with this interpretation, arguing 
that the decision was to a greater extent the product of 
domestic politics. Interview with Richard Bush op cit. 
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Pyongyang, Beijing was seen as an important player in efforts 
to resolve the issue. 4° From this interpretation, Clinton' s 
policy reversal in May 1994 had less to do with a reassessment 
of US strategy toward China, than an attempt to court Beijing's 
favour, and thus its assistance in dealing with North Korea. 
There is compelling evidence for this argument. The crisis over 
North Korea's membership of the Nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) and admission of International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) inspectors, that had escalated through 1992 and 
1993, came to a head in the spring of 1994. Thus it coincided 
with the heated debate concerning China's 1994 MFN status. 
Figures such as Rep. Lee Hamilton, who played a critical role 
in the President's decision to renew MFN unconditionally, 
argued that maintaining a strategy of linkage with the Chinese 
would seriously jeopardize US efforts to resolve the North 
Korean crisis. 41 Indeed, one senior sinologist insists that the 
Administration was close to taking unilateral military action 
against Pyongyang, and that Chinese cooperation with, or at 
least acquiesence to, this initiative was required. Thus it 
made no sense to simultaneously declare economic war on Beijing 
through the partial or full revocation of China's MFN status. 42 
4
° For a comprehensive analysis of the crisis, and the US-
North Korean Accord signed on October 21 19 94, see Larry A. 
Niksch, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Programme; Issue Brief 
IB91141, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 
July 27 1995. 
41 A close aide to Rep. Hamilton revealed that the need to 
address the crisis was a vital aspect to the argument against 
linkage and MFN conditionality. Interview with Richard Bush op 
cit. See also Lee Hamilton, 'Introduction', in James R. Lilley 
and Wendell L. Willkie II, Beyond MFN: Trade with China and 
American Interests; The AEI Press (Washington D.C., 1994). 
42 Interview with David M. Lampton op cit. It is likely that 
403 
The PRC indeed proved helpful in placing pressure on the North 
Koreans to concede to an agreement with Washington, informing 
President Kim Il Sung that it would not veto sanctions against 
his country proposed by Clinton to the UN Security Council. 43 
Nevertheless, irrespective of the need to address the 
North Korean nuclear crisis, the Clinton Administration's 
programme of comprehensive engagement with Beijing following 
delinkage remained flawed. Although control of the China 
policy-making process had been transferred to the White House 
ln the spring of 1994, it had been more an exercise in 
political crisis management than a judicious attempt to 
establish a definitive framework for US relations with the PRC. 
Indeed, Stephen Yates of the Heritage Foundation argues that 
the only constructive principle to have come out of the 
Administration's MFN 1994 decision was Clinton's 
acknowledgement that US-China relations could not be held 
hostage to human rights conditions. 44 Further, this reflected a 
learning curve within Congress rather than the White House. 45 
the North Korean issue weighed heavily on the Administration's 
consideration of MFN, given the fact that the China policy-
making process had been transferred, in part, to the National 
Security Council earlier in the spring. Interview with Ronald 
M. Montaperto op cit. 
43 Larry A. Niksch, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Programme; 
op cit p.6. 
44 Interview with Stephen Yates, China Policy Analyst, 
Heritage Foundation, November 5 1997, Washington D.C. 
45 Many in the White House, and indeed in the State 
Department, still favoured the principle of human rights 
linkage, but recognized the political costs of retaining this 
stance; especially through the revocation of China's 1994 MFN 
status. Ibid, and interview with Mike Jendrzejczyk op cit. See 
also Robert S. Greenberger and Michael K. Frisby, 'Clinton' s 
Renewal of Trade Status for China Follows Cabinet Debates, 
Congress's Sea Change'; Wall Street Journal May 31 1994 p.A18. 
404 
Linkage was unacceptable to Clinton because it was unacceptable 
to Congress. The President was less concerned with defining a 
long-term China strategy than he was minimising political 
conflict with Congress and retaining the support of the 
business community. 46 Insisting that the delinkage decision did 
not reflect a Presidential commitment to a considered strategy 
of engagement, but a response to lobbying from Congress and the 
business community, Yates adds: 
"He heard them, they were loud enough, they had 
inflicted enough pain on him that he felt that he had 
to change; and so he just said 'OK, just tell me what 
you want me to say' . 47 
Advocates of engagement within the Cabinet were able to 
exploit this political situation for their own interests, and 
no-one more so than Commerce Secretary Ron Brown. Brown, a 
powerful friend of the President and experienced political 
animal dominated the Cabinet debates on China's 1994 MFN 
status. 48 As a result, the Administration's engagement with 
China in the wake of delinkage centred upon Brown's commercial 
diplomacy and determination to trade with the PRC. 49 
46 The argument that US- PRC relations could not be held 
hostage to MFN conditionality (in particular human rights 
conditionality) was central to ECAT' s lobbying of the White 
House. Interview with Calman J. Cohen, President, ECAT, 
November 13 1997, Washington D.C. 
47 Interview with Stephen Yates op cit. 
48 Interview with Shirley Kan, Foreign Affairs Analyst, 
Congressional Research Service, November 5 1997, Washington 
D.C. See Robert S. Greenberger and Michael K. Frisby, 
'Clinton's Renewal of Trade Status'; op cit. 
49 Yates, who was an aide to Brown in the spring of 19 94 
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His trip to Beijing in September 1994, the first cabinet 
level visit since Clinton delinked trade from human rights in 
May, was regarded as a success in narrow commercial terms. 50 
However, it was also seen as representing the overwhelmingly 
commercial character of the Administration's new engagement 
with Beijing, and the degree to which commerce had superseded 
human rights as a US China policy interest. Although the 
preponderance of domestic opinion had favoured delinkage, 
questions were asked of the Administration's commitment to 
human rights. This unease was fuelled by reports of a fresh 
campaign of political repression and evidence of backtracking 
on human rights commitments made by the Chinese when its MFN 
status was renewed. 51 Clinton's commerce-orientated approach to 
the APEC forum in November reinforced this impression. 52 
A further example of the shift in emphasis came with the 
bilateral debate over China's accession to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was due to 
transform into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) at the 
beginning of 1995. Beijing's insistence upon entry to the 
institutions, and Washington's determination that further 
reflects that Brown was '' ... like a bull unleashed ... '' after the 
decision to renew MFN without conditions. Interview op cit. 
50 Some 
address the 
us. 
observers complained that Brown had failed to 
issue of China's rocketing trade surplus with the 
51 For example, Beijing had suspended talks with the Voice 
of America regarding the jamming of its broadcasts, and with 
the International Red Cross on prison access. See Sam Seibert 
et al, -A Blank Check for China on Human Rights?'; op cit and 
Kevin Fedarko, -Let's Make a Deal'; op cit. 
52 See Bruce w. Nelan, 'Business First, Commerce Second'; op 
cit. 
406 
economic liberalization would be required before this was 
possible/ overshadowed bilateral relations in the latter months 
of 1994. 53 The fact that this issue rather than human rights 1 
proliferation or North Korea (or a combination of these issues) 
dominated US-China relations 1 and media analysis of US-China 
relations 1 revealed the extent to which US China policy had 
changed after Clinton's policy reversal in May. 54 
This commercial realignment of Clinton's China policy 
aided much of the Administration's economic agenda with 
Beijing 1 but undermined other policy goals. For example/ 
following a breakdown of bilateral talks on the issue earlier 
in the month 1 US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor accused 
Beij ing of inadequate protection of US intellectual property 
rights on December 31 1994. 55 With further talks producing no 
progress/ the USTR announced its intention to impose sanctions 
exceeding $1 billion on February 4 1995. The Chinese responded 
with retaliatory action/ intimating that major Sino-American 
deals could be cancelled. 56 However/ in spite of its resistance 
53 Beijing threatened to rescind commercial deals with the 
US unless Washington conceded to China's entry into Gatt/WTO by 
January 1 1995. Anthony Spaeth/ 'Outside Looking In'; Time 
December 19 1994 p.52. Beijing did not carry out its threat 
despite Washington's refusal. 
54 See for example ibid 1 'China and the WTO'; International 
Herald Tribune November 12-13 1994 p. 6/ Reginald Dale 1 'The 
West Must Stay Firm With China'; International Herald Tribune 
November 18 1994 p.13 1 and Patrick E. Tyler/ 'The Harsh Tones 
Coming From Beijing'; International Herald Tribune; December 20 
1994 p.1 and p.S. 
55 
'US Picking Its Targets in China Trade Dispute'; 
International Herald Tribune December 31 1994 p.1 and p.5 1 and 
'A Trade War Between US and China Gets Closer'; International 
Herald Tribune January 1 1995 p.1 and p.5. 
56 Robert Sutter and Kerry Dumbaugh/ China-US Relations; op 
ci t p. 6 and 'China Threatens US Carmakers in Trade Dispute' ; 
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to 'foreign interference', Beijing still did not wish to 
compromise its economic growth and development. 57 Agreement on 
the issue was reached on February 26. 58 Similarly, Beij ing 
proved relatively pliant on the issue of China's accession to 
the WTO, and responded to international allegations of trade 
dumping by Chinese firms. 59 
With the limited exception of gradual developments in the 
bilateral defence relationship, Washington secured very little 
progress in other areas. 60 The most conspicuous and acrimonious 
impasse occurred over human rights. Assistant Secretary of 
State for Human Rights John Shattuck's visit to Beijing in mid 
January proved futile, while China successfully lobbied against 
a US sponsored UN resolution criticizing its human rights 
conditions at the beginning of March. 61 Concern was also 
International Herald Tribune January 11 1995 p.15. 
57 Interviews with Richard Bush op cit and Winston Lord op 
cit. 
58 Robert Sutter and Kerry Dumbaugh, China-US Relations; op 
cit p. 6. One commentator noted that " ... the Clinton 
Administration appears ready to risk confrontation over 
copyright infringement that it wasn't ready to risk over human 
rights concerns six months ago." Sheila Tefft, 'US Will Stress 
Better Human Rights in Visit to China'; Christian Science 
Monitor January 12 1995 p.7. 
59 Washington and Beij ing signed an eight point guideline 
agreement on China's entry to the WTO on March 12 1995. Kerry 
Dumbaugh, China-US Relations: Chronology; op cit p.7. See also 
'Beijing Urges Companies to Shape Up'; International Herald 
Tribune January 6 1995 p.12. 
60 Late March saw the first visit to China by a US warship 
in six years. 
61 Beij ing also protested against the US State Department 
report on China's Human Rights practices in 1994, that 
acknowledged that no progress had been made through the year. 
Robert Sutter and Kerry Dumbaugh, China-us Relations; op cit 
p.6, China Human Rights Practices, 1994; United States 
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs (United States 
40B 
expressed, though no progress achieved, on China's ambitions as 
a nuclear power and its resistance to a global moratorium on 
nuclear testing, its sale of nuclear technology, and its claims 
to sovereignty in the disputed South China Sea region. 62 Thus 
despite Secretary of Commerce Brown's efforts to expand 
economic ties, anxiety regarding Chinese behaviour in other 
areas failed to place Sino-American ties on a firm positive 
footing. Bilateral tensions continued to rise as Washington 
derided Beijing's human rights performance, its 
irresponsibility on strategic and security issues, and its 
failure to open its markets to US producers. 63 
Congressional opposition to linkage, Clinton's desire to 
consolidate links with an increasingly sceptical business 
community, and Brown's dynamism within the Cabinet and the 
Administration's policy-making process resulted in a strategy 
of engagement that had appeared to be achieving progress with 
Beijing towards the end of 1994. Yet as Stephen Yates notes: 
"They got momentum around commercial diplomacy, but 
that's only one part of a relationship, and they kept 
Government Printing Office, Washington D.C.} February 1995, and 
'China Avoids UN Censure'; Guardian March 9 1995 p.8. 
62 See Michael Richardson, 'A Chinese Shadow Over the 
Pacific'; International Herald Tribune April 18 1995 p.7, 
'China Rejects Plea Not to Sell Iran 2 Reactors'; International 
Herald Tribune April 18 1995 p.1 and p.7, Michael Richardson, 
'US Admiral Warns of China's Big New Navy'; International 
Herald Tribune March 8 1995 p.1 and p.8, and Robert G. Sutter, 
Shaping China's Future; op cit p.169. 
63 On February 1 1995, it was announced that China's trade 
surplus with the us had grown to almost 430 billion. See Alan 
Friedman and Jonathan Gage, 'Simmering Feud Between US and 
China Erupts in Public Clash'; International Herald Tribune 
April 11 1995 p.1. 
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dealing ... [with] ... it as the whole relationship. "64 
Thus, as stated, US China policy continued to suffer from 
the absence of overall framework or purpose, and from an 
absence of leadership. The policy-making style shifted from 
domestic political crisis management in the spring of 1994 to 
bilateral crisis management through the rest of the year. This 
meant that when a crisis arose, the Administration found 
someone to react to it. Accordingly, the Defence Department and 
the NSC reacted to Taiwan's accidental shelling of the Chinese 
mainland in mid-November while the USTR reacted to the trade 
crisis late in the year, but each without any reference to the 
overall US stance on the PRC. 65 Moreover, as Secretary of 
I 
Commerce Brown chased major trade deals with Beijing, and spoke 
forcefully of expanding US-China economic ties, Trade 
Representative Mickey Kantor criticised China's trade surplus 
with the US and threatened punitive sanctions over Beij ing' s 
failure to address violations of intellectual property rights. 66 
Despite the Administration's apparent espousal of a strategy 
that more closely reflected his broad recommendations, Winston 
Lord's ability to supervise China policy continued to be 
undermined. With neither the President nor the Secretary of 
64 Interview with Stephen Yates op cit. 
65 See Stephen Strasser and George Wehrfritz, 'A Blast from 
the Past'; Newsweek November 28 1994 p.32, Patrick E. Tyler, 
'Taiwan Apologises for Shelling that Wounded 4 on Mainland'; 
International Herald Tribune November 16 1994 p.7 and 'US 
Suspends Talks with China on Property Rights'; op cit. 
66 For example see Peter Behr, 'US Industry's High-Flying 
Salesman'; International Herald Tribune December 27 1994 and 
'US Picking Its Targets in China Trade Dispute'; International 
Herald Tribune December 31 1994 p.1 and p.S. 
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State committed to China policy, Lord was unable to impose 
discipline on the policy-making process from the relatively 
weak position of Assistant Secretary of State. Indeed, the 
White House had assumed control of policy in its attempt to 
handle the political crisis surrounding China's 1994 MFN 
status. However, having dealt with the crisis the White House 
neglected to provide solid guidance for subsequent policy, and 
failed to delegate particular responsibility for US-China 
relations to any one official. 67 The result was a policy of 
drift. 
The rather perfunctory improvements in the Sino-American 
relationship could not disguise the defects in the 
Administration's China policy-making process, nor its erroneous 
approach to bilateral diplomacy. Despite its willingness to 
concede on economic issues the regime in Beij ing, under the 
grip of a secessionist struggle, did not wish to appear too 
flexible in the face of confused and discrepant signals from 
Washington. 68 
The Administration's discordant China policy invited 
domestic criticism and distrust. The lack of consensus within 
the US as to the most appropriate way of pursuing the wide 
range of American interests in China did not help Clinton, but 
the Administration's persistent failure to address serious 
faults in its policy-making process and its conduct of US-China 
67 Logically, that official should have been either the 
Secretary of State, or the Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Interview with Winston Lord op 
cit. NSA Anthony Lake's naivety regarding China inhibited his 
own strategic influence. Interview with David M. Lampton op 
cit. 
68 Interview with Stephen Yates op cit. 
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relations did little for its domestic credibility on this 
issue. 69 Despite the promise of a moderate improvement in ties 
with Taipei, members of Congress and in particular Republicans 
pushed for more. In November the Senate urged the 
Administration to back Taiwan's entry to the United Nations by 
inviting President Lee Teng-hui and other elite officials to 
Washington, and recommended an expansion in US arms sales to 
the island. Other pro-Taiwanese bills were only impeded by 
political disagreements within Taipei. 1° Furthermore·, the 
Administration's willingness to get tough over issues such as 
intellectual property while apparently doing little to address 
Beijing's persistent violations of human rights attracted 
increasing criticism from opinion leaders and members of 
Congress. 71 The atmosphere was such that Clinton's bid in late 
March 1995 to establish a voluntary code of human rights 
conduct for US businesses with interests in China was 
castigated by human rights proponents within Congress and the 
wider political community.n 
Clinton's political vulnerability in Congress, on China as 
69 See for example 'Hard Line in Beij ing'; International 
Herald Tribune December 21 1994 p.4 and Patrick E. Tyler, 
'China Warns US to Back Off on Rights or Face Break'; 
International Herald Tribune February 24 1995 p.1 and p.lO. 
70 Tony Emerson with 
Matt Fornay, 'Taiwan's 
December 5 1994 p.27. 
Sudarsan Raghavan, David Gordon and 
Cryptodips in Washington' ; Newsweek 
71 See A.M. Rosenthal, ~Those Outside the Prison of Tibet 
Should Protest'; International Herald Tribune December 28 1994 
p.5, Patrick E. Tyler, ~China's Forgotten Prisoners'; 
International Herald Tribune February 22 1995 p.4 and A.M. 
Rosenthal, 'Fine for Trade, but What Happened to Pressure for 
Human Rights?'; International Herald Tribune March 1 1995 p.6. 
72 Robert G. sutter, Shaping China's Future; op cit p.169. 
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well as many other issues, was not helped by the tendency of 
many members of his own party to distance themselves from the 
President. Throughout the autumn of 1994, for example, some 
feared that association with the increasingly derided Clinton 
would harm their chances in the mid-term Congressional 
elections. 73 
The Resurgence of Partisanship and the Issue of Taiwan: 
The Disintegration of Sino-American Relations 
THE IMPACT OF THE 1994 MID-TERM ELECTIONS ON US CHINA POLICY: 
THE US VISIT OF TAIWANESE PRESIDENT LEE TENG-HUI 
The Republican Party's sweeping victory in the November 1994 
mid-term Congressional elections and their acquisition of both 
Houses of Congress had a significant impact on the Clinton 
Administration's conduct of China policy. 74 In an echo of the 
Democrat-controlled Congressional challenge to the Bush 
Administration, Republican contention took two forms. Firstly, 
many members acted upon their frustration with the 
Administration's pursuit of US interests in China by attempting 
to seize the initiative on China policy-making. Secondly, 
Republicans attacked Clinton's China policy for political ends. 
In other words, it represented a return to partisan politics. 
Clinton's mismanagement of policy toward China could no longer 
73 Jonathan Alter, 'The Discipline Gap'; Newsweek August 22 
1994 pp.20-22. 
74 Highlighting the unconditional renewal of China's MFN 
status every year since 1994, Winston Lord maintains that this 
refiguration of the political map did not have a "concrete 
impact" on the Administration's China policy. Interview op cit. 
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be protected by loyal Democrats in Congress, and it presented 
Republicans with an opportunity to inflict further political 
damage on a discredited president. The Republicans were 
determined to maintain the momentum of their political 
ascendency. However, the nature of the Republican victory must 
be noted. Newt Gingrich' s 'Contract with America' platform 
proved to be a powerful weapon against a vilified President 
increasingly estranged from members of his own party. Yet like 
the presidential election two years earlier, the Congressional 
mid-terms were overwhelmingly dominated by domestic issues. As 
a result, a large number of freshmen and women lacked 
experience and expertise in foreign policy and China policy-
making which, according to Winston Lord, complicated the 
Administration's handling of foreign affairs. 75 
The first significant challenge to the Administration by 
the 104th Congress centred on the issue of Taiwan. The status 
of the island and the question of Washington's relationship 
with Taipei had prompted little controversy since the 1982 
Joint Communique on United States Arms Sales to Taiwan. 
However, through 1993-94, the issue had reappeared on the China 
policy agenda for a number of reasons. Firstly, Taiwan's 
growing economic power and its maturing de facto independent 
status had forced both Washington and Beijing to reassess its 
status, exemplified by the Clinton Administration's policy 
review of September 1994. 76 Secondly, the prospect of Taiwan's 
75 Ibid. Also interview with James L. 
specialist at the Asia Business Centre, 
Commerce, November 4 1997, Washington D.C. 
Robb, former China 
US Department of 
76 The Administration remained committed to the principle of 
one China', acknowledged in the three Sino-American 
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first democratic presidential election in 1996 had encouraged 
this reassessment. 77 Thirdly, debate within the US regarding the 
transfer of Hong Kong to PRC sovereignty in June 1997 spilled 
over into debates about the future of Taiwan, especially in the 
light of Beijing's ongoing repression of political dissent in 
mainland China. Fourthly, recent developments in the 
relationship between Beij ing and Taipei had thrown the issue 
into the American media spotlight. 78 Fifthly, an intensive high 
expenditure Taiwanese lobbying campaign was finally bringing 
dividends. Various governmental and non-governmental 
institutions targeted the Republican controlled Congress, US 
lobbying organisations and public relations companies. Major 
trade deals were concluded or promised, raising the pro-
Taiwanese temperature within Washington. 79 
The Administration had already encountered pressure from 
Communiques. For example see Wins ton Lord, ~US Policy Toward 
East Asia and the Pacific' ; statement before the Subcommittee 
on Asia and Pacific Affairs of the House International 
Relations Committee, Washington D.C, February 9 1995. Dispatch 
Magazine, United States Department of State, vol.3 no.9 article 
2 p.l43. 
77 Proponents of improved ties with Taiwan maintained that 
America was obliged to enhance relations with a state with such 
inclinations towards Western-orientated democracy and economic 
liberalism. See Nayan Chanda, ~Winds of Change'; Far Eastern 
Economic Review June 22 1995 p.14. 
78 These developments included the expanding economic and 
diplomatic relationship between the two Chinese entities, 
Beijing's persistent warnings against Taiwanese moves for 
independence, and Taiwan's accidental shelling of the mainland 
in November 1994. See Steven Strasser and George Wehrfritz, ~A 
Blast from the Past'; op cit and ~China Sees Room for Talks 
with Taiwan'; International Herald Tribune April 19 1995 p.4. 
79 $4.5 million was committed to lobbying consultancy 
Cassidy and Associates alone. See ~The Lobbying Factor' ; op 
cit. Washington was host to visits from a large number of 
Taiwanese officials during this period. 
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within the domestic political arena, including the 
Democratically-controlled Congress, to cultivate relations with 
Taiwan. Advocates argued that Taipei's de facto sovereignty and 
improvements in its relationship with Beijing had rendered 
America's long established stance obsolete. 80 The Administration 
managed to resist such initiatives until Congress latched on to 
Cornell University's invitation to Taiwanese President Lee to 
visit his alma mater in early June. The issue triggered a 
critical political standoff between the Administration and 
Congress, and precipitated a rapid disintegration in Sino-
American relations already on shaky ground. 
Disillusioned with the Clinton Administration's policies 
toward China and Taiwan, and determined to reward the Republic 
of China for progress in economic and political liberalization, 
Congress demanded that a visa allowing Lee to visit the US be 
granted by the Administration. 81 Led· by Senators Jesse Helms, 
Frank Murkowski and Alfonse D 'Amato, both Houses of Congress 
voted on a non-binding resolution (H Con. Res. 53) expressing 
support for Lee's visit on June 9. The resolution was finally 
passed unanimously on May 5 1995, with the exception of one 
voice of dissent in the Senate. 82 Although the campaign was 
80 See Lorna Hahn, 'America's Taiwan Policy is Outdated'; 
International Herald Tribune April 3 1995 p.10, and interview 
with Shirley Kan op cit. PRC President Jiang Zemin had 
presented an eight-point proposal for a development of Beijing-
Taipei relations in January. Lee responded with his own 
proposals, and talks on the issue ensued. Anthony Spaeth, 'Into 
the World'; Time June 19 1995 p.19. 
81 Nayan Chanda, 'Winds of Change'; op cit. For a review of 
the economic and political reform undertaken in Taiwan since 
1987 see ibid (Spaeth) pp.17-19. 
82 
'A Visa for Lee Teng-hui' ; International Herald Tribune 
May 11 1995 p.6. 
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driven by Republicans, the measure clearly attracted bipartisan 
patronage. Democrats such as Gary Ackerman, a key figure in the 
centrist China policy coalition, leant their vocal support. 83 
Initially, the Administration refused to give its consent. 
As early as February, Secretary of State Christopher declared 
his opposition to the visit in testimony to the Senate Budget 
Committee. 84 The State Department led the opposition, insisting 
that the move would seriously destabilise US-PRC relations, 
jeopardize Beijing's cooperation on issues such as the US-North 
Korean nuclear accord, and contravene US-PRC agreements on the 
status of Taiwan. Further, the State Department wished to limit 
Congressional leverage on the Administration's management of 
foreign policy. 85 The Administration's official line received 
support from significant quarters. Sinologist and former 
Assistant Secretary of Defence to the Clinton Administration 
Chas Freeman insisted that conceding to Lee's visit would 
inflict unacceptable damage to Sino-American relations. Former 
consul-general in Hong-Kong Burton Levin concurred with this 
view. 86 Even US Ambassador to Beij ing Staple ton Ray was known to 
oppose the trip. 87 
83 
'I Shall Return'; Asiaweek June 22 1995 p.27 and James 
Walsh, 'cornell's Reunion'; op cit p.34. 
84 Mark Frankel,' Old School Ties Undone' ; Newsweek March 20 
1995 p.34. 
85 Steven Greenhouse, 'No Visa for Taiwan Chief, US 
Repeats'; International Herald Tribune May 12 1995 p.4. 
86 Julian Baum, 'Domino Theory'; Far Eastern Economic Review 
June 22 1995 p.17. 
87 Ray publicly supported the Administration's subsequent 
reversal on the issue however. 'I Shall Return' ; Asia week op 
cit p.28. 
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Nevertheless, the Administration disclosed a change of 
mind, and the decision to grant Lee the required visa, in late 
May. 88 Risking a serious deterioration in relations with 
Beijing, which had threatened retaliation if a visa was 
granted, Clinton bowed to pressure from Congress and lobbying 
from Taipei. One the one hand, senior Administration officials 
revealed White House beliefs that the ban had been contrary to 
'American values', and that policy-makers had felt 
uncomfortable with a demand that Lee not leave his plane as it 
refuelled in Hawaii in early 1994. 89 However the decision to 
grant Lee the visa rested more on domestic political 
calculations. Rather like the White House deliberations on 
China's 1994 MFN status (and indeed the formulation of the 
Administration's linkage policy on China), Clinton decided to 
follow Congress' lead on the issue. Thus he avoided a serious 
political showdown with the Hill, and reduced the likelihood of 
further legislative action from a wrathful Republican-
controlled Congress. 9° Certainly, Clinton wished to resolve the 
standoff with the Republican Congress to prevent the issue 
becoming a major foreign policy feature of the 1996 
presidential campaign. 91 
ee Steven Greenhouse I 'Cl in ton to Offer Visa to Taiwan Is 
Leader'; International Herald Tribune May 23 1995 p.4. 
89 James Walsh, 'Cornell's Reunion'; op cit pp.34-35. 
90 Tom Post, 'Welcome for a Tiger'; Newsweek June 5 1995 
p. 17. There was also the suggestion that Washington did not 
want to offend Taiwan, America's sixth largest trading partner. 
Anthony Spaeth, 'Into the World'; Time June 19 1995 p.16. 
91 Robert G. Sutter, Shaping China's Future in World 
Affairs; op cit p.104. 
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It was thought that the President, along with many of his 
political advisors and White House staff, actually favoured 
granting Lee Teng-hui permission to visit the United States. n 
From this perspective, the decision repeated a pattern of 
decision-making established in the spring of 1994; namely that 
in an effort to manage a political crisis, the White House 
usurped the State Department's control of policy on the basis 
of domestic political determinations. This reinforced the 
impression of a decision-making process lacking clear committed 
leadership and a considered long-term strategic framework for 
the execution of policy. This point was not lost on former 
Assistant Secretary of Defence Freeman who, in a speech to the 
Asia Society in Hong Kong, argued: 
"The Lee Teng-hui visit proves that if you spend 
enough money on Washington lobbyists you can 
accomplish wonders, but it does not speak well for 
the clarity, vision and strategic purpose of US 
policy ... There is no strategy. There is no coherent 
purpose in all of these actions. " 93 
The absence of strategic coherence and consistency in the 
Administration's policy toward the PRC, as much as decisions 
such as that regarding the visit of Lee, continued to have a 
detrimental affect of Beijing's view of US China policy. 
Chinese accusations of American duplicity over Taiwan 
92 Anthony Spaeth, ~Into the World' ; op ci t p .16. 
93 Patrick E. Tyler, 'China Increases Pressure Over Taiwan 
Leader's US Visit'; International Herald Tribune May 26 1995 
p.4. 
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exemplified their suspicions about the purposes of US China 
policy. Faced with confusing signals and actions from 
Washington, Beij ing grew increasingly sceptical of Clinton' s 
desire for engagement, and more convinced that the real 
objective was to confront China and undermine its development 
as a regional and global power. 94 The Administration did attempt 
to assuage Beijing's anger by blaming Congress for inciting the 
Lee visit affair. 95 In addition to diplomatic assurances of 
their commitment to positive engagement with the PRC, the 
Administration also took the steps of announcing its intention 
to renew China's 1995 MFN status without conditions, and of 
prohibiting further sales of advanced fighter aircraft to 
Taiwan. 96 Nevertheless Beij ing pursued a number of measures in 
retaliation to the Lee visit. Principal among them were the 
withdrawal of its ambassador in Washington, the postponement of 
a planned visit to the US by the PRC Defence Minister and US 
official visits to Beijing, and the suspension of ongoing 
bilateral talks on missile technology control and cooperation 
on nuclear energy. 97 
94 Karsten Prager, 'Bulls in the China Shop' ; Time June 5 
1995 p.35, Robert G. Sutter, Shaping China's Future in World 
Affairs; op cit pp.l25-130 and interview with David M. Lampton 
op cit. 
95 James Walsh, 'Cornell's Reunion'; op cit p.34. 
96 
'China Retaliates Over US Moves on Taiwan'; International 
Herald Tribune May 27-28 1995 p. 5 and Steven Mufson, 'Angry 
Beijing Suspends US Talks'; International Herald Tribune May 29 
1995 p.4. On the day of Lee's address at Cornell, the Defence 
Department did announce Taipei's decision to purchase military 
aircraft parts to the value of $200 million. 'I Shall Return'; 
Asiaweek op cit p.28. 
97 Robert G. Sutter, Shaping China's Future in World 
Affairs; op cit p.lOl. This latter measure was of particular 
concern to the US Administration suspicious of China's 
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Although Jiang Zemin had been confirmed as successor to 
the ailing Deng Xiaoping, he was yet to consolidate his 
position domestically. 98 In this context, Jiang and other 
members of the regime could not afford to appear conciliatory 
on the issues of Taiwan and relations with America. Beijing, 
already unhappy with Lee Teng-hui's practice of 'vacation 
diplomacy', feared that his visit to the US could facilitate 
international recognition of Taiwan's independence. 99 However, 
the expansion of ties across the Taiwan Strait, and in 
particular the value of Taiwanese investment on the mainland, 
tempered Beijing's hostility toward Taipei. 100 Instead, the PRC 
directed its anger toward Washington. 
CONGRESS RAISES THE PRESSURE ON SING-AMERICAN RELATIONS 
Although the visit of Lee Teng-hui dominated the domestic 
-debate throughout the spring of 1995, Congress also expressed 
increasing frustration with the Administration's strategy for 
China, and the conduct of Beijing, in other areas of Taiwan and 
China policy. Some commentators anticipated moves within 
adherence to non-proliferatory activities. See Steven Mufson, 
'Angry Beijing Suspends US Talks'; op cit p.1 and p.4. 
98 Alan Friedman, 'Deng' s Successor Revealed by China'; 
International Herald Tribune April 13 1995 p.1 and p.6. and 
George Wehrfri tz, 'To Get Rich is Dubious'; Newsweek May 22 
1995 p.36. 
99 Lee • s private trips abroad, primarily throughout East 
Asia, and served to bolster Taiwan's image and independent role 
in the international system. 
100 Taiwan had over $20 billion invested in the PRC. Tom 
'Welcome for a Tiger'; op cit p.16 and Nayan Chanda, 
of Change'; op cit p.15. 
Post, 
'Winds 
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Congress to press for Taiwan's accession to the WTO and 
International Monetary Fund. Chairman of the House Committee 
Rep. Benjamin Gilman suggested that the island should be 
allowed to join the UN if so desired by its population, a step 
bound to provoke considerable ire in Beijing, possibly to the 
point of military action against Taiwan. 101 
Legislation introduced by Gilman in mid May (HR 1561) 
reflected the prevalent anti-PRC mood within Congress. 102 The 
bill strongly criticised China's human rights record, and 
specifically its coercive family planning policies and prison 
"gulag' system. It also criticised China's "occupation" of 
Tibet and called for a US special envoy to Tibet, established 
conditions for American participation in the forthcoming UN 
International Conference on Women to be held in Beijing, and 
sought improved and more formal relations with Taiwan. Finally, 
it condemned China's militarily-driven claims to sovereignty 
over islands in the South China Sea, and warned that such 
activities were of "grave concern' to the US. Some observers, 
such as Republican Asia expert Bill Triplett, suggested that 
military skirmishes between the PRC and the Philippines over 
control of the oil and mineral-rich Spratley Islands pushed 
Congress into assertive anti-PRC action. 103 
101 Ibid (Chanda) p.15. 
102 Robert Sutter, China-US Relations; op 
Senate tabled legislation (S 309) that 
recommendations of the House bill. 
cit p.7. 
echoed 
The 
the 
103 Nayan Chanda, "Winds of Change'; op cit p .16. The 
islands were subject to sovereignty claims of several 
neighbouring countries, and discussed at an April meeting of 
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which 
China is a member. See James Walsh, "China Pushes its Weight 
Around'; Time March 6 1995 pp.30-32 and "Analysts See Chance of 
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Despite introducing legislation (HJ Res 96) that would 
reject Clinton' s unconditional renewal of China's 1995 MFN 
status, Congress decided not to act upon it . 104 Instead the 
House passed HR 2058 in July, which urged the President to 
pursue aggressively issues of human rights, proliferation and 
trade with Beijing, and provide Congress with a report on 
progress every six months. 105 
Such Congressional initiatives on China, whether driven by 
genuine concerns or by partisan politics, were criticised by a 
number of senior Sinologists and diplomats. 106 Despite accusing 
the Administration of a weak China policy, Congress as a whole 
tended to single out specific issues for vociferous summary 
debates. In other words, Congress' handling of China policy was 
often inclined to focus on issues such as forced organ 
transplants and religious repression rather than the long-term 
strategic relationship between the US and the PRC. 107 Further, 
Small Skirmishes in Disputed Spratlys'; International Herald 
Tribune April 21 1995 p.4. 
104 The view that MFN was an inappropriate vehicle for US 
interests in China continued to prevail in Congress. Interview 
with Ted Galen Carpenter op cit. 
105 Robert G. Sutter, Shaping China's Future in World 
Affairs; op cit p.117. 
106 See Patrick E. Tyler, 'As US-China Relations Slide, 
Taiwan Visit Gives a Push'; International Herald Tribune May 24 
1995 p.4. 
107 One former China analyst at the State Department 
observes that Republican members of Congress, perceiving 
Clinton's approach to China to be over-conciliatory, considered 
themselves to be the 'keepers of the flame' of US interests and 
values in China. Winston Lord, amongst others, argues that the 
issues highlighted by the 104th Congress reflected the 
religious right power base within the Republican party; hence 
the focus on issues such as coercive abortion and repression of 
religious (Christian, rather than Muslim) freedom. Interview 
with Frank s. Jannuzi op cit. Interviews with Winston Lord op 
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officials in Beijing were acutely sensitive to issues pursued 
by members of Congress, such as those contained in HR 1561 and 
HR 2058. For example, Congressional initiatives on family 
planning, democratization, Tibet or Taiwan threatened to 
undermine the Chinese Communist Party regime's sovereignty and 
grip on power, especially at a time of domestic political 
uncertainty. Whatever the merits of the concerns risen in 
Congress, critics of this approach lamented the dearth of a 
longer term strategic debate. 
Accordingly, Sinologists such as Burton Levin and Jonathan 
Pollack of the Rand Corporation argued that Congressional 
pressure could prove to be self-defeating and self-fulfilling. 
Rather than prompting or stimulating improvements in China, 
they maintained, Congressional hostility could bolster 
hardliners in Beijing who were convinced of America's desire to 
weaken China. Thus China would only retreat into isolation, 
with little prospect of improvements in its conduct on a broad 
range of issues. 108 However, the more significant danger lay in 
the Clinton Administration's handling of these debates. Lacking 
a clear strategic view of its own, far from committed to China 
policy at the highest levels, and providing little guidance on 
the management of US-PRC relations, Clinton was heavily 
disposed to following Congress' lead on China policy for 
domestic political reasons. Thus it failed, or indeed was 
incapable of engaging members of Congress in a strategic debate 
cit and Kerry Dumbaugh op cit. 
108 Karsten Prager, 'Bulls in the China Shop' ; op ci t, Nayan 
Chanda, 'Winds of Change'; op cit p.l6 and interview with Kerry 
Dumbaugh op cit. 
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on China. 
US-CHINA CONFRONTATION AND THE COLLAPSE OF RELATIONS 
Having avoided a critical political showdown with Congress over 
the visit of Lee Teng-hui (and surmising that Congress would 
not revoke China's 1995 MFN status), the Administration 
publicly and privately expressed confidence in a rejuvenation 
of Sino-American ties. Warren Christopher has suggested that 
his address to the National Press Club in Washington D. C on 
July 18 1995, in which he referred to the importance of US-PRC 
ties and engagement with China had a significant and reassuring 
effect on Beij ing. 109 Christopher maintains that his remarks 
prepared the ground for a meeting with PRC Foreign Minister 
Qian Qichen, at the Asean Regional Forum (ARF) conference in 
Brunei at the beginning of August. While little substantive 
progress was made, Christopher noted that the atmosphere of the 
meeting was surprisingly warm. The Secretary of State suggested 
to the President that the meeting could represent a positive 
turning point in relations. 110 
Other senior officials also spoke positively of the US-PRC 
relationship, and defended past and potential progress of the 
Administration's pursuit of engagement. Despite the critical 
State Department report of China's Human Rights record, 
Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck recommended the 
109 
'America • s Strategy for a Peaceful and Prosperous Asia-
Pacific': address to the National Press Club, Washington D.C., 
July 18 1995; Warren Christopher, In the Stream of History; op 
cit Chapter Twenty p.289. 
110 Ibid p. 290. 
425 
progress made on human rights following delinkage of the issue 
from trade and MFN. 111 Similarly, Assistant Secretary of State 
Lord, in testimony to Congress and press statements in October 
1995, cited a recent stabilization of US-PRC relations, and 
promoted the importance of engagement in optimistic terms. 112 In 
an interview with Current History in September, Lord noted the 
complexities of dealing with China in the post-Cold War world, 
especially during the period of political succession. However 
he insisted that engagement had secured momentum in the 
bilateral relationship. 113 
However, in reality, bilateral relations showed no 
fundamental signs of improvement. The visit of Lee Teng-hui to 
the US, and the Administration's policy reversal after the 
Secretary of State's pledges that the Taiwanese President would 
not be given a visa, had provoked the PRC into suspicion and 
belligerence. Indeed their actions reflected the degree to 
which Clinton's approach to China lacked credibility in 
111 See Statement of John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary for 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, before the Subcommittees on 
Asia and the Pacific, and International Operations and Human 
Rights of the House International Relations Committee, 
Washington D.C., March 16 1995; reproduced in Dispatch Magazine 
vol.6 no.14. article 6 p.273. 
112 See Statement of Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of 
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs before the 
Subcommittee on East Asian and the Pacific Affairs of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington D.C., October 
11 1995; reproduced in Dispatch Magazine vol.6 no.43 article 8 
pp.773-775 and remarks at a press briefing following President 
Clinton's meeting with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, New York, 
October 24 1995; reproduced in Dispatch Magazine vol.6 no.45 
article 3 p.816. Assistant Secretary of Defence Joseph Nye also 
defended the Administration's engagement policy in the summer. 
Joseph s. Nye, ~The Case for Engagement' ; Foreign Affairs 
vol.74 no.4 July-August 1995. 
113 ~A Sweet and Sour Relationship' : 
Winston Lord; Current History vol.94 no.593 
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An Interview 
September 1995. 
with 
Beijing. At a point when direct communication between the two 
governments had reached a deep trough, Beijing's conduct across 
the broad range of bilateral ties challenged US objectives and 
interests. 114 
In the area of human rights, Beij ing' s most conspicuous 
act was its arrest of Chinese-American dissident Harry Wu on 
July 8 1995. 115 Wu, well known within US political and media 
circles, was detained on the charge of stealing state secrets, 
an offence that carried the death penalty. Although convicted, 
Wu was deported late August. 116 The incident seriously impeded 
relations between Washington and Beijing, or, from the view of 
Henry Kissinger, sent the relationship into 'freefall'. 117 
Further, the Chinese authorities instigated a sweeping 
crackdown on political dissent in late 1995 and early 1996 
which included the arrest of another prominent activist 
114 See for example David Shambaugh, 'The United States and 
China: A New Cold War?'; Current History vol.94 no.593 
September 1995. US Ambassador to China Stapleton Roy left his 
position in mid-June before a replacement had been confirmed. 
Some commentators attribute Ray's departure to his frustration 
with the Administration, and Congress's performance on China. 
See Patrick E. Tyler, 'US Envoy to Beij ing Won't Wait for 
Replacement'; International Herald Tribune June 9 1995 p.1 and 
p.6. 
115 Nigel Holloway and Lincoln Kaye, 'The Trouble with 
Harry'; Far Eastern Economic Review July 20 1995 p.17 and p.20. 
116 Although denied by officials, some believed that the 
Administration linked his release to the proposed visit of 
First Lady Hillary Clinton to the UN Conference on Women, held 
in Beij ing in early September. Anthony Spaeth, 'He's Out'; 
Time; September 4 1995 pp.20-21. 
117 Nigel Holloway, 'The Great Divide'; Far Eastern Economic 
Review July 27 1995 p.18. One report suggests that the US was 
considering a Sino-American summit as a means of reviving 
relations, prior to Wu' s arrest. Murray Hiebert, 'Comforting 
Noises'; Far Eastern Economic Review August 10 1995 p.17. 
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acclaimed in the US, Wei Jingsheng. 118 The State Department's 
annual report on human rights in China (1995) acknowledged the 
increase in violations, and went as far as to say that the 
prevailing rationale that US economic engagement in China 
promoted political liberalization was flawed. While noting that 
US trade and investment in the PRC helped to improve standards 
of living, the report argued: 
" ... they cannot by themselves bring about greater 
respect for human rights in the absence of a 
willingness by political authorities to abide by the 
fundamental international norms. 11119 
In effect, this amounted to an admission of failure with 
respect to the Administration's efforts to improve Beij ing' s 
human rights performance. 
Officials also became increasingly concerned about China's 
proliferation of materials related to nuclear, chemical and 
conventional weapons of mass destruction. Late June saw the 
leak of a CIA report declaring evidence of proliferation to 
Iran and Pakistan. 120 In essence, the report accused the PRC of 
transferring missile-guidance technology to Teheran, and M-11 
118 Anthony Spaeth, 'Jiang Plays Bully'; Time January 8 1996 
pp.16-17. 
119 China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1995; 
US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and 
Labour (United States Government Printing Office, Washington 
D.C.) March 1996. See also Thomas W. Lippman, 'China's Economic 
Reforms Fail to Improve Rights, US Finds'; International Herald 
Tribune March 7 1996 p.4. 
120 Lincoln 
June 29 1995 
China's Future 
Kaye, 'Tit for Tat'; 
p . 2 3 and p . 2 6 and 
in World Affairs; op 
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Far Eastern Economic Review 
Robert G. Sut ter, Shaping 
cit pp.108-109. 
missile parts to Islamabad. While the accuracy of the 
intelligence was subject to debate within the Administration, 
the report heightened fears already aroused by Beijing's 
proposed sale of two nuclear reactors and related technology to 
Iran, an issue that surfaced in April 1995. 121 Clinton' s 
decision not to impose sanctions, and Beijing's decision not to 
deliver the reactors to Iran did not allay us suspicions. 122 
Accusations of Chinese transfers to Iran and Pakistan 
resurfaced in March the following year. Firstly, intelligence 
assessments suggested that Beijing was supplying Teheran with 
cruise missiles. 123 Of greater concern was evidence asserting 
that the PRC was providing Teheran with the technology and 
equipment to produce chemical weapons, though doubts existed as 
to the Chinese government's awareness of such activities. 124 
Further, the Administration was forced to consider revelations 
that China had exported to Pakistan ring magnets used in the 
enrichment of uranium. 125 Appraisals of this kind, if accurate, 
demonstrated Beijing's defiance of its commitments to the NPT, 
and its promises to abide by the MTCR and other non-
121 Ibid (Sutter) p.110. If the report was proven, Clinton 
was required by law to invoke appropriate sanctions against the 
PRC. The splits within the Administration prompted by this 
report are discussed later in the chapter. 
122 Judd Ginsberg, 'China Drops Nuclear Reactor Deal with 
Iran'; CNN World News Online September 27 1995. 
123 
'US Eyes China Sanctions'; International Herald Tribune 
March 8 1996 p. 4 
124 R. Jeffrey Smith, 'Chinese Exports Fuel Iran Effort on 
Poison Gas'; International Herald Tribune March 9-10 1996 p.4. 
125 Ibid. 
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proliferatory measures. 126 On the broader front, China's 
execution of an underground nuclear test in May 1995, its test-
firing of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of 
reaching the United States, its claims to sovereignty of areas 
of the South China Sea, and the expansion of its military 
budget fed the perception that the PRC posed a growing threat 
to US East Asian and global security interests. 127 For its part, 
Beijing disclosed its suspicions that the US was attempting to 
contain Chinese influence through regional organisations such 
as APEC and the ARF, and proposals for a regional ballistic 
missile defence system. 128 
Trade disputes continued to contribute to bilateral 
tensions. The USTR remained highly sceptical of Chinese pledges 
to combat piracy of US intellectual property, and in late April 
1996, it threatened punitative sanctioDs over allegations that 
Beijing was failing its commitments to the February 1995 Sino-
American agreement on intellectual property rights. 129 In 
addition, despite or indeed because of the expansion in US-PRC 
trade, US anxiety regarding China's trade surplus with America 
continued to rise. Even Ron Brown's enthusiasm for commercial 
126 The refusal of Republican Senators to ratify America's 
participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention undercut US 
pressure on Beijing on the poison gas issue. Ibid. 
127 Steven Mufson, 'A Nuclear Challenge from China'; 
International Herald Tribune May 16 1995 p.1 and p.6, Steven 
Strasser, 'The Neighbours are Restless'; Newsweek July 17 1995 
pp.20-26 and Michael Richardson, 'Military Rivals Are Worrying 
Asian Forum'; International Herald Tribune November 17 1995 p.1 
and p.6. 
128 Pat rick E. Tyler, 'Chinese Denounce Big Nuclear Powers'; 
International Herald Tribune November 17 1995 p.1 and p.6. 
129 Kerry Dumbaugh, China-US Relations: Chronology; op cit 
p.8. 
430 
expansion with the PRC was tempered by expectations that the 
imbalance would reach $38 billion by the end of 1995. 130 
Beij ing' s hosting of the UN International Conference on 
Women stirred yet more controversy. The US was far from alone 
in criticising the Chinese Government's attempts to bar certain 
participants from the conference, while Hillary Clinton's 
barely concealed attacks on China's coercive birth control 
programmes incited PRC anger and further clouded the atmosphere 
of bilateral relations. 131 
THE ISSUE OF TAIWAN: SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS REACHES A NADIR 
The most antagonistic and destabilising bilateral issue 
continued to be Taiwan. Beijing continued to accuse Taipei and 
Taiwanese President Lee of seeking independence. To a great 
extent, Chinese anxieties were fuelled by the forthcoming 
Taiwanese presidential election, the first democratic election 
for Chinese peoples, due to be held in late March 1996. 
Although the leading contender, incumbent Lee, had not publicly 
endorsed a separate and sovereign Taiwanese identity, there was 
little doubt that he courted elements of pro-independence 
opinion in an effort to boost his campaign. 132 Further, the 
130 Nigel Holloway, ~The Meeting is the Message'; Far 
Eastern Economic Review November 2 1995 p.15. 
131 Beij ing wished to bar participants representing Tibet 
and Taiwan, Asian women's rights, lesbian groups and anti-
abortion groups. Barbara Crossette, ~Disputes Mar Parley On 
Woman Set in China'; International Herald Tribune April 5 1995 
p.5 and Claire Shipman, ~Hillary Clinton Blasts China on 
Harassment, sterilization' ; CNN World News Online September 5 
1995. 
132 See Patrick. E. Tyler, 
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~China, the us and New 
Clinton Administration's policy reversal on Lee's visit to the 
US had bred in Beij ing a deep distrust of US promises and 
objectives concerning the island. 133 
On the diplomatic front, PRC President Jiang Zemin 
demonstrated Chinese sensitivities to the issue by refusing to 
meet with Cl in ton at the Pentagon in October 1995, in what 
would constitute sub-summit negotiations. The Chinese leaders 
were wishing to amplify the differences between the visit of 
Lee in June 1985, and the visit to the US of its own president 
in attendance to the UN' s fiftieth anniversary conference. 134 
High-level bilateral talks, such as Christopher's meeting with 
Qian Qichen in New York in late September, and Clinton's 
meeting with Jiang Zemin in late October, also in New York, 
were overshadowed by the issue of Taiwan. 135 Washington's 
insistence that it abided by the principle that 'there is but 
one China and Taiwan is part of China', enshrined in the three 
Sino-American Communiques, did little to assuage PRC 
convictions that the US wished to contain China, and that it 
was effectively encouraging Taiwan's bid for independence. 
While the Administration continued to be frustrated in its 
negotiations with recalcitrant PRC officials, China's military 
Confrontation Over Taiwan' ; 
February 16 1996 p.2. 
International Herald Tribune 
133 Nigel Holloway, 'The Meeting is the Message'; op cit 
p.15. 
134 Nigel Holloway, 'No Red Carpet' ; Far Eastern Economic 
Review October 12 1995. 
135 Ibid, Nigel Holloway, 'The Meeting is the Message'; op 
cit, Russell Watson, 'Storm Warnings'; Newsweek October 23 
1995, and 'This is Not the Way to Treat Others': Interview with 
Jiang Zemin; Newsweek October 23 1995. 
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activities in the Taiwan Strait proved the greater concern. An 
illustration of Beijing's truculent reacti~n to the Lee Teng-
hui's visit to the US came in July 1995, when it launched four 
days of military exercises in the channel separating Taiwan 
from the mainland, including the firing of missiles close to 
the island. The PRC followed this up in August with ten days of 
naval exercises in the Strait, again involving live ballistic 
missile tests. 136 The US regarded the operations as exercises in 
belligerent diplomacy and an attempt by Beijing to remind 
Taiwan, the US, and other regional powers of their role within 
the region. Indeed, US officials reasoned that China would nor 
want to risk the economic costs, not did it possess the 
military capacity, to launch a military assault on Taiwan. 137 
Nevertheless, Washington protested that such actions were not 
those of a responsible member of the international community. 
Further, officials could not be certain that the PRC would not 
raise the military stakes with the Republic of China, such was 
Beijing's fear of moves towards Taiwanese independence. Indeed, 
analysts with a more pessimistic view of China's ambitions 
toward Taiwan had highlighted the possibility of military 
0 0 t 138 exercises following Lee US VlSl . 
As the Taiwanese presidential elections of March 23 1996 
approached, with both Lee Teng-hui's Nationalist Party and more 
overtly the opposition Democratic Progressive Party so~iciting 
136 David Shambaugh, ~The United st.ates and China'; op c~t 
p.242, Kerry Dumbaugh, China-US Relat~ons: _chronology; op Clt 
p.8 and Peng Ming-min, ~So Concerned Wlth Chlna that they Spurn 
Taiwan'; International Herald Tribune January 11 1996 p.8. 
137 Anthony spaeth, ~war Games' ; Time August 28 1995. 
138 Nayan Chanda, ~winds of Change' ; op cit. 
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pro-independence sentiments, Beijing raised the ante against 
Taiwan. In late 1995, the PRC warned Taiwan not to pursue steps 
towards emancipation from the mainland. Moreover, in the new 
year, Beijing issued explicit threats of military action 
against the island, and revealed that it had completed 
contingency plans for such an attack. 139 Admitting that its 
gunboat diplomacy was intended to dissuade presidential 
frontrunner Lee from promoting Taiwanese independence, and 
dissuade Tai"wanese voters from supporting such proposals, 
Beijing announced its intention to resume military exercises in 
the Strait in early March. 140 Accordingly, Chinese military 
forces began ballistic missile tests on March 8, targeting two 
impact areas close to the island. Missile tests using live 
ammunition ensued near the island of Matsu, while it was 
revealed that the PRC had conducted simulated invasion 
manoeuvres on the island of Pingtan in February. 141 It is worth 
noting that the efforts at intimidation largely failed in that 
they stirred resentment in Taiwan, and had little effect on the 
selection of Lee as Taiwan's first democratically elected 
president. 142 
139 Patrick E. Tyler, 'Chinese Let the US Know they are 
Deadly Serious about Taiwan'; International Herald Tribune 
January 25 1996 p.4 and Bruce W. Nelan, 'Today Hong Kong, 
Tomorrow Taiwan'; Time February 12 1996. Chinese officials 
denied they had prepared plans for a military invasion. Kevin 
Murphy, 'China Denies Report of Plan for Attack on Taiwan'; 
International Herald Tribune January 25 1996 p.l and p.4. 
140 Patrick E. Tyler, 'Intimidation of Taiwan is Justified, 
China Says'; International Herald Tribune March 7 1996 p.l. 
141 Steven Mufson, 'China Sets New Round of Exercises Off 
Taiwan'; International Herald Tribune March 9-10 1996 p.l. 
142 For example see Edward A. Gargan, 
China Tests'· International Herald Tribune I 434 
'Taiwanese Shrug Off 
March 9 1996 p.l and 
The Administration responded with diplomatic efforts viz-
a-viz Beij ing and Taipei, and with gunboat diplomacy of its 
own. The Administrati~n united in publicly denouncing Beijing's 
military operations. While maintaining the view that the PRC 
was incapable of executing a successful military offensive 
against Taiwan, and that the · tests posed little threat to 
international shipping, officials such as Defence Secretary 
Perry raised concerns for the political and diplomatic 
implications of the actions. 143 The Administration also 
reiterated its adherence to its long-standing policy of 
unofficial relations with Taiwan. 144 Indeed, in discussions with 
senior Chinese national security official Liu Huaqiu in early 
March, Perry and NSA Lake did not rule out another private 
visit from Lee Teng-hui, but rejected the idea of an unofficial 
invitation. 145 However, as China conducted its military 
exercises, the Administration also reaffirmed its policy of 
selling defensive arms to Taiwan, by approving the delivery of 
p.4. 
143 
'China Lacks Capability to Take Taiwan, US Asserts'; 
International Herald Tribune February 16 1996 p.2 and 'Citing 
Dangers, US Assails China Over Missile Tests'; International 
Herald Tribune March 6 1996 p.4. See also 'The United States 
and the Security of Taiwan' Statement of Winston Lord before 
the Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Washington D.C., February 7 1996; 
reproduced in Dispatch Magazine vol. 7 no. 6 article 3 (United 
States Government Printing Office, Washington D.C.) p.29. 
144 Ibid (Lord) . 
145 Barton Gellman, 'Face-off Over Taiwan Led to a US-China 
Strategic Partnership' ; International Herald Tribune June 22 
1998 p.2. The Administration did grant a transit visa for the 
Taiwanese vice-president to permit his plane to refuel. at Los 
Angeles on January 11 and 16. 'China Scolds US Over Taiwan 
Visa'; International Herald Tribune January 10 1996 p.6. 
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anti-aircraft missiles and other hardware. 146 
Under considerable pressure from Congress to issue a tough 
response to the crisis, and in fact demonstrating an unusual 
degree of resolve and certitude itself, the Administration 
implied a military rejoinder of its own. The Administration 
reacted to Beijing's warnings to Taipei in late 1995 by 
dispatching the US aircraft carrier Nimi tz, plus four escort 
ships through the Taiwan Strait in December; the first US naval 
presence in the channel since 1979. 147 However, its stance 
stiffened following talks between Anthony Lake and former 
Assistant Secretary of Defence Chas Freeman on January 4 
1996. i•s Freeman, who had conducted private talks with senior 
PRC officials during the winter, notified Lake of the PLA' s 
preparations for a sustained missile attack on the island, and 
its planning for an invasion of some kind. While analysts 
believed that Beijing still sought a peaceful path to 
reunification with Taipei, reports of this kind persuaded some 
that the PRC would launch a military assault if Taiwan declared 
independence. 149 Further, he reported the views of one senior 
Chinese· military official who dismissed the possibility of US 
intervention on behalf of Taiwan, on the basis that US leaders 
146 Bradley Graham, -us Approves Arms Sales to Taiwan' ; 
International Herald Tribune March 21 1996 p.1. 
147 Bruce w. Nelan, -Today Hong Kong, Tomorrow Taiwan'; op 
cit p.25. The PRC interpreted this gesture as clear evidence of 
Washington's sympathies for Taiwan. 
148 Patrick E. Tyler, 
Serious about Taiwan' ; op 
Over Taiwan'; op cit. 
-chinese Let the US Know they are 
cit and Barton Gellman, -Face-off 
149 Thomas L. Friedman, -china will Pull Back from the Brink 
-Won't It?'; International Herald Tribune March 11 1996 p.B. 
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11 
••• care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan. 11 To 
Freeman, this statement implied a threat to use nuclear weapons 
against the United States. 
In their talks with Liu Huaqiu, Perry and Lake expressed 
their anger at the threat, and at Beijing's continuing use of 
military threats against Taiwan. Perry informed Liu that there 
would be ~grave consequences' should PRC missiles hit Taiwan, a 
statement that according to US officials attending the meeting, 
implied the threat of US military intervention. The threat, the 
first of its kind for over twenty five years of Sino-American 
relations, was repeated by Warren Christopher and Anthony Lake 
in their own meetings with Liu. 150 
The Administration's public stance deferred more to the 
established position of ~strategic ambiguity' with regard to 
PRC-Taiwan relations. 151 Senior officials stated that they would 
consider it an issue of grave concern, and there would be 
~grave consequences' should Beijing attempt to resolve tensions 
across the Strait by non-peaceful means. 152 However, they were 
no more explicit about the possible course of US action. 153 
150 The us offered to use its influence to restrain 
Taiwanese ambitions for independence if Beijing forsook the 
military option in its relations with Taipei. Thomas L. 
Friedman, ~With the Crisis Over, Its Time for Statesmanship' i 
International Herald Tribune March 25 1996 p.6. 
151 Pat rick E. Tyler, ~Chinese Let the US Know they are 
Deadly Serious about Taiwan' i op cit. 
152 This ambiguous posture was established and enshrined in 
the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. See statement of Winston Lord 
before the Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific, February 
7 1996i op cit p.2. 
153 See for example ~Secretary Christopher Interview' on 
~Meet the Press', NBC-TV, March 10 1996i US Department of State 
Online China Briefings, March 10 1996. 
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Three main reasons explain the Administration's ambiguous 
' 
platform. Firstly, it was a recognition that relations between 
Beijing and Taipei were an internal dynamic, as acknowledged by 
the three Sino-American Communiques, and thus US influence on 
that relationship was restricted. Secondly, however, the US had 
the option of defending Taiwan should tensions across the 
Strait be addressed by non-peaceful means; a position implied 
by the Taiwan relations Act of 1979. Beij ing disputed this 
interpretation. Further, as indicated by Christopher, the 
Administration wished to keep Beijing guessing about America's 
response to any escalation in the crisis . 154 Thirdly, the us did 
not want to issue an explicit pledge to defend Taiwan, as to do 
so ran the risk of encouraging Taiwanese initiatives toward 
independence, a point made by former Assistant Secretary of 
Defence to the Cl in ton Administration Jqseph Nye. 155 
Beijing's announcement that it would commence live 
ammunition exercises prompted the Pentagon to disclose that it 
1 h ' ' 't 156 had ordered two carrier batt e groups to t e v~clnl y. 
Rejecting China's protests at interference in its internal 
affairs, and warnings not to send the vessels through 
'sovereign' waters in the Taiwan Strait, Washington intended to 
place pressure on the PRC regime through military diplomacy of 
154 Ibid. 
155 
'Military's Muscle-Flexing 
Interview with Joseph Nye Jr. i 
March 18 1996 p.4 
in a Chinese Political Game': 
International Herald Tribune 
156 Brian Knowlton, 'US Moves Carrier Toward Taiwan as 
Warning to China' ; International Herald Tribune March 3 1996 
p.1 and 'Secretary Christopher Interview' on 'Meet the Press'; 
op cit. 
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its own.
157 
Nonetheless, the Administration reiterated its 
commitment to a strategy of engagement with the PRC, insisting 
that confronting or isolating China would not help to resolve 
the crisis. Indeed Winston Lord and Anthony Lake took the brave 
political step of announcing the Administration's determination 
to unconditionally renew China's 1996 MFN status, and indeed 
its willingness to fight domestic opposition to it . 158 Senior 
officials such as Lord highlighted the impact of China's 
internal political struggle on its management of relations with 
Taiwan, and downplayed the significance of the military 
operations. 159 Thus, the decision to deploy a naval presence in 
the region was intended to support the rationale of US 
engagement in China and the region, by symbolising the 
importance of US interests held there. 160 
With the completion of the Taiwanese presidential 
elections, the cessation of Beijing's military exercises, and 
the carrier groups' resumption of normal operations, the Taiwan 
157 Diplomats were reported as expressing doubts that the 
carrier groups would enter the Strait unless China attempted to 
seize or directly attack Taiwanese territory. Michael 
Richardson, 'Legal Ripples in the Strait'; International Herald 
Tribune March 19 1996 p.4. 
158 
'US Department of State: Daily Briefing - Excerpt on 
China', March 11 1996; US Department of State Online China 
Briefings March 11 1996 and 'Clinton to 'Fight' for China 
Trade'; International Herald Tribune March 27 1996 p.4. 
Secretary of Defence Perry did take the step of postponing the 
visit of the PRC's Defence Minister to the US. Kerry Dumbaugh, 
China-US Relations; op cit p.9. 
159 Lord also highlighted the important role played by the 
Chinese military during this period of political transition. 
Brain Knowlton 'A Top China Watcher Plays Down Beijing's 
Threats•; Inter~ational Herald Tribune March 19 1996 p.1. 
160 See 'US Department of State: Daily Briefing - Excerpt on 
China', March 11 1996; op cit. 
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Strait crisis passed without further_ incident. Tensions were 
eased considerably by the conciliatory tone of victor Lee Teng-
hui' s remarks regarding cross-Strait relations, in which he 
called for an improvement in ties and a programme of detente. 161 
The US Administration voiced its satisfaction that the 
immediate crisis had ended and expressed its determination to 
improve ties with Beij ing, starting with a meeting between 
Secretary Christopher and Minister Qian Qichen scheduled for 
April 21 in the Netherlands. 162 White House Press Secretary Mike 
McCurry asserted: 
"We want to work at this relationship ... Its 
desperately important that we work at it and we try 
to get it right despite the differences that do 
exist. "_16 3 
This view represented a profound change in the 
Administration's, and the President's, attitude toward China, 
prompted by the Taiwan Strait crisis. The gravity of the crisis 
had concentrated decision-makers' minds on America's strategic 
relationship with the PRC. As a consequence, it forced the 
Administration to reassess its policy-making process, and the 
definition of the long-term strategic framework of US China 
policy. Further, it compelled members of the Administration and 
161 
'China 
Herald 
The tone was reciprocated in 
Tries Conciliation after Lee 
Tribune March 25 1996 p.1. 
Beijing. 
Victory' ; 
Seth Faison, 
International 
162 'China, us set Meeting'; CNN World News Online March 19 
1996 0 
163 wolf Blitzer, 'US Moves to Ease Tensions with China'; 
CNN World News Online March 25 1996. 
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Congress alike to examine their roles in the formulation and 
implementation of China policy, with the result that the us 
government adopted a more considered and sober perspective on 
Sino-American relations. 
THE NADIR IN US-CHINA RELATIONS: 
REASSESSMENTS IN US CHINA POLICY-MAKING 
As stated earlier, many senior officials within the 
Administration and the White House were optimistic that Sino-
American relations would improve as the political crisis over 
the visit of Lee Teng-hui in June 1995 faded on the domestic 
political scene. The Administration offered only a muted 
reaction to China's military exercises in July and August. One 
unnamed official is reported as explaining this acquiescence in 
terms of a desire amongst some to see Lee reap the consequences 
of soliciting Congressional support for his US visit. 164 However 
the Administration's efforts to secure progress through 
engagement with the PRC continued to be frustrated. China's 
anger at Clinton's concession to the Lee visit was manifest not 
only in its admonishments of the Administration, but also in 
its ir1creasingly belligerent attitude to . US-PRC relations. 165 
One official with long experience of US-PRC diplomacy observed 
that the regime of Jiang Zemin, with its exhibitions of 
nationalism, arrogance and paranoia, had proven to be the most 
164 Barton Gellman, 'Face-off Over Taiwan'; op cit. 
165 Patrick E. Tyler, 'US Condemns 
Dissident' · International Herald Tribune 
I • 
and interview with Stephen Yates op Clt. 
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Sentence of Chinese 
December 14 1995 p. 6 
obstinate to deal with. 166 Secretary of State Christopher' s 
negotiations with PRC officials, and in particular Qian Qichen, 
achieved nothing of substance because of his lack of 
credibility in Beijing. 167 Indeed, relations between the two 
governments deteriorated to such a degree that the very fact 
Jiang Zemin met with Clinton at the United Nations in early 
November was regarded as a significant and positive step by 
sinologists such as Harry Harding. 168 Perhaps the only successes 
of note were Beij ing' s decision to postpone the sale of two 
nuclear reactors to Iran, and the agreement to expand high-
level military exchanges resulting from Assistant Secretary of 
Defence Nye' s trip to Beij ing in mid November 1995. 169 Still, 
the ensuing Taiwan Strait crisis led to Secretary of Defence 
Perry's cancellation of scheduled reciprocal senior military 
meetings the following year. 
The US Administration's failure to restore a constructive 
momentum to Sino-American relations was due to more than 
Chinese obdurance. Firstly, as will be discussed later in the 
chapter, serious defects in the Administration's formulation 
166 Reported in R. Jeffrey 
Shipments'; International Herald 
p.4. 
Smith, 'Chinese Defiance on 
Tribune March 25 1996 p.1 and 
167 Murray Hiebert, 'Comforting Noises' ; op cit. 
Christopher's proposal of pathfinding talks between Deputy 
Secretary of state Peter Tarnoff and senior national security 
official Liu Huaqiu was rebuffed twice by the Chinese. 
168 Nigel Holloway, 'The Meeting is the Message 1 ; op cit 
p.14. 
169 Clinton and Christopher were in fact praised for their 
handling of the nuclear reactor issue. 'A Storm Weathered 1 ; 
International Herald Tribune October 2 1995 p.10. Patrick E. 
Tyler, 'US arid China Set for New Contacts 1 ; International 
Herald Tribune November 18 1995 p.7. 
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and implementation of China policy had yet to be addressed. 
Secondly and correlatively, the Administration had to contend 
with attempts by Congress to influence and shape China policy. 
The controversy over the visit of Lee Teng-hui had not 
only heightened anti-PRC attitudes on the Hill, but it had also 
alienated Clinton from many members of his own party on the 
issue of China policy. 170 Although the Administration received 
strong bipartisan backing for its response to the arrest of 
Harry Wu in June 1995, both Clinton and the regime in Beijing 
were targets for spiralling Congressional pressure through mid 
1995-1996 0 171 
China's proliferatory conduct, assertiveness in the South 
China Sea, violations of human rights, and contentious handling 
of the International Conference on Women prompted some, 
predominantly Republican, members of Congress to demand the 
confrontation and containment of the PRC. Proposals tabled in 
the summer and autumn of 1995 recommended the fortification of 
regional security structures, such as ASEAN, and the 
consolidation of alliances with regional powers, such as the 
Philippines. Initiatives that would have prevented Hillary 
Clinton' s attendance at the Conference on Women were also 
considered. 172 
Nevertheless, Congressional attention focused primarily on 
the issue of Taiwan. For example, in July 1995, the Republican 
170 Robert G. Sutter, Shaping China 1 s Future in World 
Affairs; op cit p.104. 
171 Nigel Holloway 1 'The Trouble with Harry'; op cit p.17. 
172 Lean 
Relationship' ; 
23 1996 p.11. 
T. Hadar 1 'The Sweet-and-Sour Sino-American 
Policy Analysis no.248, CATO Institute, January 
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Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich insisted 
that an independent Taiwan be officially recognised by the US. 
Although his comments did not have the support of the majority 
in Congress, they did epitomise the prevailing inclination to 
offer support to the island while subjecting the PRC to greater 
condemnation and diplomatic pressure. 173 This mood was reflected 
across broad sections of the media. Widely publicised 
Congressional antipathy toward China convinced Beijing that the 
US was bent on containing and humiliating China. 174 As a result, 
Chinese officials proved implacable in the face of the 
Administration's inconsistent attempts at engagement. 175 
While Beijing accused the Clinton Administration of 
containment, Congress accused it of appeasement. Attempts to 
underplay the significance of Beij ing' s anti-Taiwan rhetoric 
and its execution of military exercises infuriated many on the 
Hill. 176 Further, the Administration's reliance on diplomacy 
with Chinese officials in the face of an escalating crisis 
served to solidify the development of an unusual anti-China, 
pro-Taiwan political coalition within Congress. 177 Senior 
173 Gingrich retracted his proposals following a dressing 
down from Henry Kissinger. Nigel Holloway, 'The Great Divide'; 
op cit pp.lB-19 and Simon Reeve 'Thanks but No Thanks' i Far 
Eastern Economic Review July 27 1995 p.19. 
174 
'This is Not the Way to Treat Others' : Interview with 
Jiang Zemin; op cit. 
175 Russell Watson, 'Storm Warnings' ; op cit. 
176 Mark T. Kehoe, 'US Policies Toward Beij ing Increasingly 
Rankle GOP'; Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report February 10 
1996 p.360. 
177 The prevailing coalition brought together disparate 
members such Senator Edward Kennedy, a stern critic of China's 
performance in areas such as human rights and proliferation, 
and Senator Jesse Helms, an old-style cold warrior who regarded 
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Republican Rep. Christopher Cox, who introduced a policy paper 
on the US response to the crisis, charged: 
"Its small wonder that the Chinese Communist ·leaders 
view the Administration's policy as a green light to 
bully Taiwan ... The Cl in ton Administration had 
squandered US credibility through a dizzying series 
of policy flip-flops and retreats in the region. 11178 
Resolutions introduced on the Hill in January and February 
1996 sought to strengthen America's ties and defence commitment 
to Taiwan. Firstly, an amendment to a State Department 
reorganization bill (HR 1561) strove to supersede the 1982 us-
China Joint Communique by dropping a number of restrictions on 
US arms sales to the island. 179 Secondly, Rep Solomon (R-NY) 
introduced a sense of Congress resolution (H. Con Res 138) 
requesting the President to investigate and report back on ways 
in which the US could defend Taiwan against a mainland 
attack. 180 
Despite strong bipartisan support for the decision to 
deploy a naval presence to the region, members of Congress 
continued to assail the Administration's stance of 'strategic 
ambiguity' on the crisis. 181 Consequently, Rep. Cox introduced a 
Taiwan as the last anti-communist country in the international 
system. Karsten Prager, 'China: Waking Up to the Next 
Superpower'; op cit p.37. 
178 Mark T. Kehoe, 'US Policies Toward Beijing'; op cit. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Brian 
'Precaution' ' ; 
Knowlton, 'Second Carrier is Sent by US as 
International. Herald Tribune March 12 l996 p.1 
445 
non-binding resolution (H Con Res 148) calling for an explicit 
commitment to defend Taiwan against invasion, missile attack or 
blockade by the PRC. 182 The resolution, cosponsored by a 
bipartisan group of Representatives was passed with 
overwhelming majority. 183 The Administration raised objections 
to the House measure, on the basis of commitments specified by 
the Taiwan Relations Act 1979, but accepted the Senate's 
diluted version, which censured China's military exercises. It 
is worth noting that US public opinion was split on the 
question of America's response to a PRC assault against Taiwan. 
A CNN/US Today poll revealed that forty six per-cent opposed a 
US use of force, while forty three per-cent were in favour. 184 
This exemplified the fact that Congressional initiatives on 
China policy were pursued with little reference to public 
attitudes. 
The Administration's. mishandling of relations with the 
PRC, and Beijing's recalcitrant and aggressive approach to both 
Taiwan and the United States stimulated, genuine anti-PRC 
attitudes within Congress, exemplified by the bipartisan 
consensus on many proposals. However Congressional attempts to 
seize the initiative on China policy was also strongly 
and p.6. 
182 
'House Republicans Call for the Defence of Taiwan'; 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report March 9 1996 p.635. 
183 carroll J. Doherty, 'Lawmakers Press White House for 
Firm Defence of Taiwan'· Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 
March 16 1996 p. 710 a~d Carroll J. D?he;r-tY; 'Protests .over 
Taiwan Threats Foreshadow Other Frlctlon ; Congress~onal 
Quarterly Weekly Report March 23 1996 p.B09. 
184 'China, us set Meeting'; CNN World News Online op cit. 
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motivated by partisan politics. 185 Policy vacillations and the 
failure to secure substantive progress across a broad range of 
bilateral issues convinced Republicans that China policy 
presented an obvious opport-unity to attack the President . 186 
Although many Republicans wished to demonstrate their support 
for the development of Taiwan as a mature, Western-orientated 
democratic country, they also appreciated that the issue could 
be exploited to embarrass Cl in ton. Proposals such as those 
recommending official recognition of Taiwan, and those inviting 
Lee Teng-hui to undertake an official visit to the US reflected 
this calculation. 187 With Senate Majority leader Robert Dole in 
pole position to secure the Republican nomination for the 1996 
presidential elections, the Grand Old Party hoped to profit 
from the party's traditional association with strong 
presidential management of foreign relations. Thus Republicans 
sought to contrast their demands for a tougher stance on the 
Taiwan Strait crisis with the perception of Clinton's failures 
in China policy. 188 
Congressional agitation on China policy, and in particular 
its response to the Taiwan crisis, drew strong criticism 
185 Interviews with Shirley Kan op cit and Stephen Yates op 
cit. 
186 Nigel Holloway, 'The Great Divide'; op cit p.18. 
181 Ibid and 'US is Cool to Any Visit by Taiwan Chief'; 
International Herald Tribune March 28 1996 p.4. 
188 Republicans also suggested that the Administration had 
failed with respect to the peace process in the Middle East, 
and democratization in Russia. Jim Hoagland, 'Is Beijing 
Playing a China Card in America's Election Game?'; 
International Herald Tribune March 12 1996 p.B and Steven 
Erlanger, 'US Ambiguity on Taiwan's ~efence Runs into Election-
Year Storm'; International Herald Tr~bune March 13 1996 p.4. 
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however. Once again commentators lamented the tendency to focus 
on the immediate and the short-term, to the detriment of the 
longer-term issues at hand in US-China-Taiwan relations. For 
example, Republican demands to 'get tough' with Beijing ignored 
the progress made in the economic, cultural and diplomatic 
aspects of the China-Taiwan relationship. 189 Indeed Wins ton Lord 
pressed this point in his testimony to Congress in February 
1996, arguing: 
"Broad public and congressional support is critical 
for our policy. A prosperous, stable, and open Asia-
Pacific region is neither only a Republican nor only 
a Democratic cause. "190 
It was widely acknowledged that the distinct anti-China 
stance adopted by Congress provoked fears of an American 
strategy of containment within an uncertain Chinese regime. 
Indeed, Newt Gingrich admitted that his proposal to recognise 
Taiwan as an independent state was intended, in part, to 
'rattle their [Beij ing' s] cage". 191 Rather than inducing 
responsibility and reform in China's behaviour, this approach 
189 Patrick E. Tyler, 'China, the US and New Confrontation 
over Taiwan'; op cit. 
190 Statement before the House Subcommittee on Asia and 
Pacific Affairs, February 9 1996; op cit. See also statement of 
Winston Lord before the House Subcommittee on East Asia and the 
Pacific March 14 1996; op cit. This is a further illustration 
of Lord's consistent advocacy of a non-partisan, unified 
approach to US China policy. Interview with David M. Lampton op 
cit. 
191 
'China Memo: A Contract with Asia'; Far Eastern Economic 
Review August 3 1995 p.S. 
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ran the clear risk of provoking deeper hostility and 
belligerence in Beijing; in effect generating a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. 192 This prospect led the Administration to conduct 
talks with Chinese officials in an effort to avoid such 
repercussions, and to cite Chinese assurances that it had no 
plans to attack Taiwan. 193 
Similarly, the strong sentiments expressed by members in 
support of Taiwan ran the risk of encouraging the pro-
independence movement in Taipei. This included propositions to 
invite Lee Teng-hui to Washington following the March 23 
election. Though a Chinese military assault on Taiwan was 
deemed unlikely, many analysts refused to rule out this 
possibility in the event of a Taiwanese declaration of 
independence. Further, it was thought that gestures toward 
independence, such as an official presidential visit to the 
United States, might provoke a severe response from the PRC 
such as a missile attack or blockade. 114 
In addition, rather like the Bush Administration before 
it, Clinton feared that Congressional legislation could tie the 
Administration's hands on China policy, at a critical point in 
the Sino-American relationship and at a time when the regime in 
Beijing was simultaneously nationalistic and paranoid. 195 The 
192 Ibid and Steven Erlanger, ~us Ambiguity on Taiwan's 
Defence'; op cit. 
193 Steven Mufson, ~China Sets New Round of Exercises Off 
Taiwan' ; op cit. 
194 one Chinese military leader implied such action could be 
taken. Patrick E. Tyler, ~Chinese Let the US Know they are 
Deadly Serious about Taiwan'; op cit. 
195 Nigel Holloway, ~No Red Carpet' ; op cit. 
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political standoff on the issue of Lee's June 1995 visit to the 
US had provided a significant precedent for this scenario. 
Moreover, the tendency on the Hill to focus on the short-term, 
the partisan nature of its initiatives on China policy, and the 
unusual and unstable nature of the anti-PRC, pro-Taiwan 
coalition in Congress suggested that such legislation would not 
necessarily be in the interests of US-China relations in the 
long- term. 196 
The fact the Administration's handling of policy attracted 
strong criticism from all sides of the domestic political 
spectrum, in addition to the Chinese, reflects the 
Administration's persistent failure to address defects in its 
policy-making processes. While citing broad objectives of China 
policy, such as urging the PRC into the international system, 
the Administration still had not defined a clear strategic 
vision for Sino-American relations nor articulated a 
comprehensive framework for us China policies. 197 This 
abdication of leadership at the highest levels had significant 
repercussions in two areas. Firstly, it led to disunity, splits 
and confusion within the Administration. Secondly, it resulted 
in reactive decision-making, usually motivated by political 
calculations, and vulnerability to Congressional attempts to 
seize the initiative on China policy. 
Clinton, Christopher, and indeed Lake's lack of long-term 
commitment to China policy undermined the Administration's 
196 Interview with Shirley Kan op cit. 
197 Interview with Winston Lord op cit. 
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ability to ~speak with one voice' . 198 Further, with Assistant 
Secretary of State Winston Lord receiving no support and in too 
weak a position to impose discipline, different government 
agencies continued to pursue their own agendas with the PRC. 199 
This heavily undermined diplomatic coherency and bargaining 
strength with the Chinese. 200 After battling with Warren 
Christopher for the direction of China policy, Deputy 
Undersecretary of Commerce, David Rothkopf claimed that 
confusion reigned in the State Department over the issue. 201 In 
addition, defence intelligence agencies and the Pentagon were 
angered by the White House's irresolute influence on China 
policy-making. One senior defence analyst reveals that 
Department of Defence's perspective on Anthony Lake was that 
" ... he did not understand ... the strategic significance of us-
China relations", and that he possessed a missionary zeal to 
change China. 202 The analyst also highlights the NSC's 
sensitivity to the politics within the White House. He argues 
that proposals would go up from the defence agencies and 
198 For example, one commentator protested at lack of 
attention given by Cl in ton and Christopher to China, when 
compared to Israel, Syria and Bosnia. Thor:'as Friedm":n, ~with 
the Crisis Over, Its Time for Leadershl.p' ; op cl. t. Also 
interview with Shirley Kan op cit. 
199 Ibid (Friedman) and Steven Erlanger and David E. Sanger, 
'Clinton's Perilous Trip Through the Minefield of Foreign 
Affairs'· International Herald Tribune August 1 1996. Ted Galen 
Carpente~ suggests that the policy defects facilitated the 
splits, and that these spl~ts fur.ther encouraged the 
formulation of bad policy. Interv1.ew op cl.t. 
200 Interview with David M. Lampton op cit. 
201 Barton Gellman, ~Face-off Over Taiwan'; op cit. 
202 Interview with Ronald N · 
levies this charge against Warren 
members of the Administration. 
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Montaperto op cit. He also 
Christopher and other senior 
inevitably be rejected by the 'White House' , which was taken to 
mean Clinton' s political advisors. 203 Thus officials with a 
longer-term strategic view of US-PRC relations became highly 
frustrated with the Executive's resolve to control the policy-
making process, but only intermittently, and only in times of 
political crisis. Defence and intelligence officials were 
parti~ularly disheartened by the lack of resolution shown by 
the White House and the State Department on the issue of 
proliferation. 204 In fact the leak of the July 1995 CIA report 
on proliferation to Iran and Pakistan was accredited to 
intelligence officials' disillusionment with the 
Administration's management of policy. 205 
The lack of guidance and congruity on China policy 
reflected differences in opinion as to the appropriate 
rationale for US strategy. 206 Most policy-makers within the 
Departments of State and Defence, the NSC and the White House 
broadly favoured the strategy of comprehensive engagement with 
Beijing, in spite of the flaws contained in the pursuit of the 
strategy. They believed that the importance of US-China 
relations, and China itself necessitated dialogue with the PRC 
Other to address disputes and promote common interests. 
observers and analysts, evident in the Pentagon and Congress as 
well as some non-governmental organisations took a more 
Pessimistic view of China's intentions and ambitions. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Nigel Holloway, ~~The Great Divide'; P .19 · 
206 h 'The United States and China'; op cit David Shambaug , 
PP.243-244. 
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Accordingly, they advocated a more confrontational approach to 
relations with China. 207 A third school of thought, with some 
representation within Congress, favoured a strategy designed to 
destabilize the present political system in the PRC. They 
maintained that no progress or reform would be possible until 
political reform had taken place, and that the US should 
actively work to promote reform while challenging unacceptable 
aspects of Beij ing' s behaviour. 208 
The lack of a governing vision and coherent approach to 
China policy proved highly detrimental to the Adminstration • s 
engagement with Beij ing. Firstly, the Chinese were subject to 
an array of confused signals from Washington. Secondly, while 
the Administration insisted upon the importance of maintaining 
relations and pursuing engagement with the PRC, it 
simultaneously admonished and lectured Beij ing for its 
behaviour in a broad range of areas. 209 Moreover, Clinton' s 
reluctance to impose proliferation-related sanctions in August 
1995 demonstrated that a rather concessionary approach to 
bilateral relations often lay behind the Administration's tough 
rhetoric. A former senior official at the State Department's 
China Desk complained that the concerted and frequently 
207 Senior Pentagon officials, including Secretary Perry 
were strong proponents of the strategy of engagement. 
206 For a reflection of these three schools of thought see 
also Audrey Kurth Cronin and Patrick M. Cronin, 'The Realistic 
Engagement of China' i The Washington Quarterly vol. 19 no .1 
Winter 1996 and Gideon Rachman, 'Containing China' i The 
Washington Quarterly vol.19 no.l. Winter 1996. 
209 Nayan Chanda, 'Free Fall' i Far Eastern Economic Review 
August 10 1995 and Stephen Yates, Why Renewing MFN for China 
Serves us Interests i Backgrounder, Asian Studies Centre, The 
Heritage Foundation, Washington D.C. June 25 1996 p.lO. 
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productive efforts to engage their Chinese counterparts would 
be undercut by sudden public condemnations issued by the senior 
Administration and White House officials. 210 
One critical factor closely associated with this chaotic 
handling of US-PRC relations was the disposition within the 
White House to allow domestic political calculations to 
determine China policy. Certainly, the Department of Defence 
felt that the only criteria by which policy was evaluated was 
its impact on Cl in ton's bid for re-election. 211 Cl in ton's desire 
to prevent Taiwan from becoming an election issue, and the lack 
of a strategic vision for US-PRC relations, regularly persuaded 
him to follow Congress' lead on China policy. 2 " 2 Thus Cl in ton's 
acquiescence to and reflection of Congressional belligerence 
toward China further undermined a coherent and resolute pursuit 
of engagement, and ruined credibility with Beij ing. In turn, 
the Administration's management of bilateral relations was 
characterised by confusion, policy reversals and 
inconsistencies, and an attempt to rely on style over 
substance. 213 As Stephen Yates of the Heritage Foundation 
argues: 
210 Interview with Robert M. Perito op cit. 
211 Interview with Ronald N. Montaperto op cit and Nigel 
Holloway,' The Meeting is the Message'; op cit p.lS. 
212 Nayan chanda, 'Free Fall'; op cit p.20. Clint.on also 
wanted to avoid provoking Congress into passing veto-proof 
legislation on china, while Lord wanted to promote 
consultations with china. See statement of Winston Lord before 
the House subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific, March 14 
1996; op cit. 
213 See for example, Patrick E. Tyler, 'As US-China 
Relations Slide, Taiwan visit Gives a Push'; op cit. 
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"Engagement ... is not a policy; it is simply another 
word for diplomacy. The US needs engagement and 
diplomacy - with a purpose. 11214 
The gravity of the spring 1996 crisis in the Taiwan Strait 
had a significant effect on the Administration's China policy-
making processes, and prompted a reassessment of the strategy 
toward Beijing. 215 In his April 1994 ~Emerging Malaise' 
memorandum to Christopher, Winston Lord had argued that 
strategic incoherence and the lack of commitment to China 
policy would undermine both America's interests and its 
reputation in the region. His warnings appeared to have been 
borne out with the Administration's mishandling of bilateral 
relations leading to the nadir of March 1996. The Taiwan Strait 
crisis brought home to many senior members of the 
Administration, including to a great degree the President 
himself, the strategic importance of the Sino-American 
relationship and the value of bureaucratic unity. Indeed the 
crisis facilitated \:.he identification of a hierarchy of US 
interests in China. Having become preoccupied with economic and 
trade concerns in the post-geostrategic, post-Cold War 
environment, the militarised escalation of the tensions 
reestablished the preeminence of strategic and security 
214 h Step en Yates, Why Renewing MFN for China Serves us 
Interests; op cit p.lO. 
215 David Shambaugh, Director of the Gaston Sigur Centre for 
East Asian Studies, George Washington University, and Robert 
Capp, President of the US-China Business Council: respective 
addresses to the 'US-China Relations forum', Gaston Sigur 
Centre for East Asian Studies, George Washington University, 
Washington D.C., October 27 1997. 
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concerns within China policy-making. 216 In the light of this 
awareness, the framework of policy agendas and decision-makers 
that constituted engagement with China could be reexamined."17 
Secretary of Defence Perry proved a critical actor in the 
Administration's attempt to address the crisis; and in the 
subsequent attempt to reevaluate China policy. Clinton • s at 
least ostensible approval of full engagement with China in the 
spring of 1994 had allowed Perry a greater opportunity to 
pursue his strong vision of US-China relations. Further the 
trilateral and_regional strategic aspect of the Taiwan Strait 
crisis naturally afforded Perry a vital role in the decision-
making process, a role he grasped with both hands. 218 
The Administration's reconsolidated approach to a 
strategic partnership with Beijing was aided by a growing 
recognition of the realities of Sino-American relations within 
the NSC. Although Anthony Lake had taken control of China 
policy at various points during Clinton's term of office, his 
sensitivity to political counsel and his own naivety toward the 
PRC had often led to inconsistent and reactive crisis 
management. The Taiwan Strait crisis proved to be an important 
learning curve for the NSA, and it prepared him for his 
216 Interviews with David M. Lamp ton op ci t and Edward B. 
Gresser, Policy Director, Senator Max Baucus (D-MT), October 31 
1997, Washington D.C. 
217 F l or examp e see 
the Taiwan Strait?'; 
Winter 1996. 
Nancy Berkopf Tucker, 'War or Peace in 
The Washington Quarterly vol.l9 no.l. 
218 P~n;y was behind the Administration's increasingly 
uncompromJ.sJ.ng response to the PRC' s military exercises and 
threats, and was central to diplomatic efforts to resolve the 
tensions. Jim Hoagland, 'Security in the Pacific, and a Message 
for China'; International Herald Tribune April 15 1996 p.6 and 
3arton Gellman, ''Face-Off Over China'; op cit. 
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constructive trip to Beij ing later in July. 219 
The degree of shift in the balance of decision-making, 
away from domestic political considerations toward strategic 
bilateral considerations allowed the Administration to optimise 
Beij ing' s abiding desire for "improvement and development of 
Chinese-US relations". 220 It permitted a clearer appreciation of 
the impact of the Chinese domestic political situation, and 
facilitated a more nuanced approach to bilateral diplomacy. 221 
Some commentators, rather more removed from partisan politics 
than critics in Congress, disparaged the Administration's 
'strategic ambiguity' on the defence of Taiwan as another 
example of Clinton' s hesitancy in foreign affairs. 222 Others, 
however, praised the Administration's "firm and prudent" 
response to the crisis in the Strait. 223 While specific issues 
would continue to cause irritation in the US-PRC relationship 
in the aftermath of the crisis, a new concerted effort to 
address the US strategic relationship over the longer-term had 
been established. 224 
219 . Interview with Stephen Yates op c~t. 
220 Steven Mufson, 'Keep Clear of Strait, Beijing Warns US'; 
International Herald Tribune March 18 1996 p.1. and p.6. 
221 Once again this echoed the recommendations of Winston 
Lord, who favoured promoting US interests by appealing to 
China's self-interests. Interview with Winston Lord op cit. 
222 
'Clarity about Taiwan'; International Herald Tribune 
March 14 1996 p.a. 
223 Flora 
Hurting China 
1996 p.6. 
Lewis, 'The Trouble China Makes will End Up 
Itself'; International Herald Tribune March 15 
224 Winston Lord identifies a stronger more coherent 
strategy from the spring of 1996. Interview op cit. 
457 
The prospects for the Sino-American relationship were 
improved by reassessments undertaken in the US Congress and in 
Beij ing. Despite the entrenched anti-China mood on the Hill, 
neither Republican leader in the House and Senate, Gingrich and 
Dole, called for the revocation of China's MFN status. While 
they demanded a tougher stance viz-a-viz Beijing, they 
continued to advocate engagement with the PRC. For its part, 
Beijing reciprocated President Lee Teng-hui's conciliatory tone 
following the March 23 election, and declared its interest in 
cultivating a better Sino-American relationship. 
Sino-American Rapprochement Through 1996 
THE ADMINISTRATION ATTEMPTS A NEW APPROACH TO CHINA 
The development of the Taiwan Strait crisis had convinced 
senior officials of the need to reassess the management of 
China policy. Secretary of State Warren Christopher hosted a 
series of meetings with policy-makers, in an attempt to 
establish a comprehensive strategy on relations with Beij ing. 225 
In effect, this step amounted to an admission that the present 
strategy was failing. 226 The inclusion of Deputy NSA Sandy 
Berger was notable. Berger had a reputation of being more 
pragmatically-minded than his boss, Lake, and the adoption of a 
225 ' Warren Christopher, In the Stream of History; op cJ.t 
p.426. 
226 Senior officials, however, blamed Beijing and the 
secessionist struggle in particular, for the deterioration in 
US-PRC relations, Michael Dobbs, 'Washington Focuses on 
Strengthening Ties with China'; International Herald Tribune 
July 10 1996 p.1. 
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tougher, more realistic engagement strategy appeared to reflect 
this. 
The Secretary of State's address to the Council on Foreign 
Relations on May 17 1996 was significant for a number of 
reasons. 227 Firstly, Christopher defined a clear framework for 
China policy. He identified the encouragement of a stable, 
secure and open China; the promotion of China's integration and 
participation in the international system; and a dedication to 
dialogue and engagement to resolve bilateral disputes and 
tensions. He also stressed the need to restore the domestic 
political consensus on China. The Administration was already 
anticipating a fight with the coalition of conservatives and 
liberals in Congress for the unconditional renewal of China's 
1996 MFN status.n6 Secondly, Christopher presented a robust and 
realistic approach to engagement that defended US interests. 
This also reflected the anti-China mood prevalent in 
Congress. 229 Thirdly, the Secretary of State emphasised his 
intention to inaugurate frequent cabinet-level meetings between 
the US and Chinese governments. He suggested that this would 
allow negotiations on specific issues, within a coordinated 
framework of bilateral relations. 230 Perhaps most significantly, 
227 
'American Interests and the US-China Relationship' : 
Address before the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington 
D.C., May 17 1996. Reproduced in Warren Christopher, In the 
Stream of History; op cit Chapter Twenty-Nine. 
228 
'Congress Eyeing Action'; CNN World News Online May 8 
1996. In his Washington address, Christopher aimed his comments 
defending unconditional renewal at members of the House. Warren 
Christopher, In the Stream of History; op cit pp.429-430. 
229 See 'Protests Over Taiwan Threats Foreshadow Other 
Friction'; op cit. 
230 The Council on Foreign Relations, to whom the speech was 
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the address represented the Administration's first full dress-
speech on China policy. Indeed Assistant Secretary Lord 
maintained that the failure to articulate policy had been a 
critical flaw in the Administration's handling of US-PRC 
relations. 231 As Christopher acknowledged: 
"Although these approaches were not particularly new 
to the Clinton Administration's policy, their 
formulation in the speech provided for the strategic 
clarity, context., and organisation they had 
theretofore lacked. 11232 
The shift in attitude· amongst senior policy-makers was 
such that the Administration identified China as the preeminent 
challenge in foreign affairs. 233 A strong degree of consensus 
now existed on the importance of US-China relations, and the 
need for commitment to China policy. Clinton was also 
determined to gain domestic and in particular Congressional 
support for the strategy. On the one hand, a China policy that 
drew legitimacy from the domestic political environment would 
augment America's credibility and bargaining power with 
Beijing. In addition it would facilitate Administrative 
addressed, had recommended diplomacy 
'Christopher Rules Out Isolation of 
Herald Tribune May 18 1996 p.1. 
of this kind in April. 
Beij ing'; International 
231 Lord implicitly blames Clinton, for his insufficient 
commitment to the issue. Interview with Wins ton Lord op cit. 
Michael Dobbs, 'Washington Focuses on Strengthening Ties to 
Beijing'; op cit p.4. 
232 Warren Christopher, In the Stream of History; op cit 
p.429. 
233 Michael Dobbs, 'Washington Focuses on Strengthening Ties 
to Beijing'; op cit p.1. 
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leadership on the issue. On the other hand, the drive for 
domestic consensus was also motivated by political 
calculations. Clinton recognised that Republican frontrunner 
Robert Dole would exploit any signs of weakness or failure in 
his attempt to win the 1996 presidential elections. 234 Indeed, 
Dole had responded to right wing pressure from within his own 
party when implying that he might reverse his traditional 
support for unconditional renewal of China's MFN status. Thus 
Clinton wanted to prevent ~he Republicans, and Dole, employing 
same political. tactics used by Congressional Democrats, and 
himself, against the incumbent Bush in the 1992 presidential 
elections. 
One of the greatest challenges facing the Administration 
was convincing Beijing, and the US Congress, that it had indeed 
established a new approach to China. While Beijing offered a 
conciliatory reaction to the US-Japan Security Agreement in 
April, it also issued a condemnation of Washington's policy of 
confrontation on the occasion of President Yeltsin's visit to 
China that same month. 235 Further, US allies in the Asia-Pacific 
region continued to worry about an inconsistent, reactive and 
politically dominated China policy. 236 
234 David E. Sanger, -china Feeling US Heat on Intellectual 
Property'; International Herald Tribune June 4 1996 p.2 and 
Michael Dobbs, 'Washington Focuses on Strengthening Ties to 
Beijing'; op cit p.4. 
235 
'Beij ing Warns Tokyo About Arms Buildup' ; 
Herald Tribune April 19 1996 p.4 and Patrick E. 
Eye on US, Chinese Welcome Yel tsin' s Embrace' ; 
Herald Tribune April 26 1996 p.l. 
International 
Tyler, 'With 
International 
236 Tommy Koh, 'Southeast Asians Want a Stable US-Japan-
China Triangle'; International Herald Tribune May 14 1996 p.lO. 
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Bilateral relations following the Taiwan Strait crisis 
remained tense and suspicious for some time. Despite the 
Administration's declared desire to attend to the broad basis 
of US-PRC ties, two issues dominated the spring and early 
summer of 1996. These issues provided Clinton with the 
opportunity to put his strategy of tough and realistic 
engagement into practice. 
The first dispute concerned US allegations of. transfers of 
nuclear related technology from China to Pakistan. The CIA 
reported evidence of the delivery of ring magnets earlier in 
the year, but the escalation of the crisis in the Strait 
eclipsed the issue. Despite CIA protests, thE; Administration 
raised doubts as to the accuracy of the report, and delayed a 
decision of the imposition of sanctions. 237 Firstly, Clinton did 
not wish to hasten the deterioration of US-PRC relations. 
Secondly, he feared that the sanctions would hurt US business 
more than China, and he was very keen to keep this domestic 
lobby on his side. 238 
Initially, the Administration was divided as to the 
appropriate response. CIA and Defence officials defended the 
report, insisting that to some degree Chinese government 
officials were implicated and that sanctions ought to be 
imposed. They were opposed by Commerce and Treasury 
Departments, and the USTR, agencies with interests in US-PRC 
237 Bruce W. Nelan, 'Pakistan's Bomb vs. Trade'; Time 
February 19 1996 p.38. 
238 Legislation required the suspension of US Export-Import 
Bank loan guarantees if the allegations were founded. The 
Chinese government denied any knowledge of the shipments. 
Jeffrey Smith, 'Chinese Defiant on Shipments'; International 
Herald Tribune March 25 1996 p.1. 
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trade. 239 w~th tens ~ons · th T · St · t ·   ~n e a~wan ra~ eas~ng, the 
proliferation issue came to the fore of US-PRC relations. The 
Administration, encountering enormous pressure from Congress' 
anti-China coalition, and wanting to redefine its approach to 
China, was forced to addre'ss the issue. 240 Talks between 
Christopher and Qian Qichen at the Hague in late April, and an 
earlier trip to Beijing by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
Robert Einhorn, failed to find a solution. On May 10, the 
Administration announced that it would not impose sanctions. 
The decision appeared typical of Clinton's established practice 
of talking tough and then offering conciliation, and it was 
criticised as such. 241 Nevertheless a bilateral deal, declaring 
Chinese assurances that no further proliferation of this kind 
would occur in future, was revealed on May 10. 242 In explaining 
the agreement, the State Department implied that committed 
negotiations, rather than US concessions on the issue of the 
Chinese government's complicity, underpinned the re sol ut ion. 243 
Critics in Congress argued that Clinton had been weak, both in 
waiving sanctions and in accepting Beij ing' s declaration of 
239 Shirley Kan, Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction: Background and Analysis; Report for Congress 96-
767 F, Congressional Research Service, Library of ·congress, 
Washington D.C., September 13 1996. 
24
° Carrell J. Doherty, ~Business Stakes are High in 
Sanctions Debate'; Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report March 
30 1996 pp.891-892. 
241 ~China Fulfils us Demand For Pledge on Nuclear Sales'; 
International Herald Tribune May 13 1996 p.4. 
242 Special Briefing. on US-China Discussions on Non-
Proliferation and Nuclear-Related Exports; US Department of 
State, Bureau of Public Affairs (United States Government 
Printing Office, Washington D.C.) May 10 1996. 
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innocence. 244 
The concurrent dispute concerning copyright infringements 
in the Chinese market proved more intractable. On April 30, the 
USTR announced its intention to impose sanctions worth $2 
billion on Chinese exports to the US, unless China could prove 
its adherence to the February 1995 agreement of intellectual 
property rights (IPR). 245 When bilateral negotiation brought no 
progress, the USTR drew a line in the sand by declaring that it 
would impose the sanctions on June 17. 246 Once again, Beijing 
protested its innocence and threatened retaliation. 247 The 
strong anti-China coalition in Congress were incensed by what 
they saw as the latest example of Chinese duplicity. In effect, 
IPR replaced human rights as the key issue in the China policy 
debate preceding the MFN decision. 248 
Indeed, some observers suggested that Clinton's resilience 
on the IPR issue, and his threat to impose sanctions were 
politically motivated. 249 In other words, Clinton, with at least 
one eye on the election, believed that the US had to be seen to 
taking a tough stand on China, especially· when it threatened 
MFN. In fact, some analysts anticipated that Beijing would 
244 
'China Fulfils US Demand for Pledge on Nuclear Sales'; 
op cit. 
245 
'US, China Appear on Collision Course Over Copyright 
Piracy'; CNN World News Online May 8 1996. 
245 Brian Knowlton, 'US Readies Sanctions In China Trade 
Dispute'; International Herald Tribune May 15 1996 p.1 and p.8. 
247 Steven Mufson, 'China Vows to Strike Back Hard at US 
Sanctions Over Piracy'; International Herald Tribune May 10 
1996 p.4. 
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concede, knowing that a hostile Congress would soon vote on 
Cl in ton's MFN renewal. 250 Along with the threat of sanctions, 
acting US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky conducted 
intense negotiations with her Chinese counterparts. 251 Assistant 
Trade Representative Lee Sands also opened talks on future IPR 
protection. 252 A last minute deal was secured on June 17, and 
the threat to impose sanctions· was lifted. He believed that 
this committed pursuit of US interests gave him the platform to 
defend the strategy of engagement and declare his intention to 
renew China's 1996 MFN status without conditions. Clinton 
argued: 
"This proves that staying involved and engaged with 
China through the difficult times as well as he good 
is the right course of action. " 253 
In fact the IPR agreement, and the calculation that Congress 
would not revoke MFN, allowed Cl in ton to extend the US-China 
Trade Agreement through January 31 1998. 254 
A number of other issues also threatened to derail US-PRC 
engagement during this sensitive period. Perhaps the most 
250 David E. Sanger, ~China Feeling US Heat'; op cit. 
251 Testimony of Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, 
Representative before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House 
Ways and Means Committee, Washington D.C., June 11 1996; Bureau 
of Public Affairs, Washington D.C. 
252 David E. Sanger, ~~China Acts on Piracy May Avert 
Sanctions'; International Herald Tribune June 14 1996 p.1. and 
p.12. 
253 Keith B. Richberg, ~China Escapes US Sanctions'; 
International Herald Tribune June 18 1996 p.10. 
254 Kerry Dumbaugh, China-US Relations: Chronology; op cit 
p.lO. 
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conspicuous of these was the discovery of a Chinese arms-
smuggling ring in the United States. 255 . Beij ing officials denied 
any knowledge or involvement once more, thus fuelling a debate 
within the US as to the sincerity and credibility of Chinese 
assurances. 256 Nonetheless, Warren Christopher accepted 
Beijing's protest of innocence, and the State Department 
declared the issue a judicial matter unrelated to US-China 
relations. 257 Beij ing also revived US security concerns on a 
broader level. Indications that China was seeking to purchase 
SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles from Russia brought a 
reproachful warning from Secretary of Defence Perry. zss The 
Pentagon also revealed that China was planning another 
underground nuclear test, in defiance of Washington's promotion 
of voluntary test -ban. 259 Further, intelligence reports 
persuaded the State Department to warn of sanctions in the 
event of the deployment of Chinese M-11 missiles to Pakistan. 260 
The range of disputes that threatened to sour US-China 
relations encouraged Clinton's critics to accuse him of further 
concessions and weak leadership. Therefore it appeared to offer 
255 Two state-owned arms trading companies were alleged to 
be involved. I bid and Brian Knowl ton, ''Sting' Case Further 
Tests US-China Relations'; International Hera·ld Tribune May 24 
1996 p.l. 
256 For example see 'Chinese Conduct'; Internationa~ Herald 
Tribune May 28 1996 p.S. 
257 R Jeffrey Smith, 'Weapons Scandal Stumps Washington'; 
International Herald Tribune May 25 1996 p.7. 
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Chinese'; International Herald Tribune May 22 1996 p.1. 
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p .10. 
466 
the Republicans a clear political opportunity. 261 However, in 
spite of his reiteration of these criticisms, Robert Dole's 
recommendations on China policy differed little from the 
Administration's policy. 262 Building upon the Administration's 
new commitment to China, the recovery in bilateral relations 
and Clinton's recovery on the issue in the domestic political 
environment owed much to two key cabinet level conferences in 
July. These were NSA Lake's trip to Beij ing and Secretary 
Christopher's consultations with Qian Qichen in Jakarta. 
Anthony Lake's visit proved critical for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, it took place in a much improved atmosphere, 
facilitated by recent resolutions on the proliferation, IPR and 
arms smuggling issues. Moreover, the hard line driven by 
Barshefsky and the Administration had restored some US 
credibility in Beijing. 263 Secondly, it appeared to place the 
relationship back on to a more optimistic and positive footing, 
preparing the ground for other senior exchanges. Plans to 
schedule an exchange of summits between Clinton and Jiang were 
postponed due to Clinton's fear of the effect on his re-
election campaign. 264 Nevertheless, the two sides concurred on 
261 A. M. Rosenthal, 'Another Step Down the Road of US 
Appeasement of China'; International Herald Tribune May 15 1996 
p.10. 
262 Thomas Friedman, 'America Finds Consensus on China, but 
is Anybody Listening?'; International Herald Tribune May 27 
1996 p.8. 
263 Steven Erlanger and David E. Sang er, 'Cl in ton's Perilous 
Trip'; op cit. 
264 
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Herald Tribune July 10 1996 p.1 and p.4 and Keith Richberg, 
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Tribune July 11 1996 p.4. 
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the merit of regular senior-level exchanges. In fact, Lake was 
reported to have established his own channel of communication 
with his Chinese counterpart, and secured an agreement to 
create a high-level bilateral commission on business 
relations. 265 Committed engagement appeared to be making 
progress. Thirdly, and crucially, the visit altered Lake's 
perceptions of China, and thus China policy. The NSA was taken 
aback by the PRC's economic growth and dynamism, and concluded 
that Beijing had to be treated with dignity rather than 
contempt. 266 Thus not only did policy-makers in the White House 
commit themselves the relations with China, but they underwent 
a fundamental learning-curve on China strategy. Stephen Yates 
insists: 
"I would say that the management of China policy made 
it over to the White House in July of 1996, when Tony 
Lake made his trip. That was the National Security 
Council formally taking full control of China 
policy. 267 
Warren Christopher's Jakarta meeting with Qian Qichen in 
late July consolidated this rapprochement. The Secretary of 
State's meeting with Qian at the Hague in April had proved 
disappointing, with the possible exception of Christopher' s 
265 Kerry Dumbaugh, China-US Relations: Chronology; op cit 
p.ll. 
266 Interview with David M. Lampton op cit. Lampton argues 
that Lake epitomised the Administration's moral arrogance on 
China, and that the conclusions Lake reached reflected China 
policy advice he had dismissed for the preceding two years. 
267 Emphasis original. Interview with Stephen Yates op cit. 
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proposals on Four-Way talks on North Korea. 266 However, 
Christopher insists that his address to the Council on Foreign 
Relations in May paved the way for progress at the meeting in 
Indonesia. 269 Critically, the meeting maintained the positive 
momentum affirmed by the Lake trip and further stabilized 
bilateral relations. Christopher raised a broad range of 
issues, including human rights, with his Chinese counterpart. 
However, his treatment of those issues contrasted starkly with 
his trip to Beijing of March 1994, and exemplified the degree 
to which the Administration had committed itself to a longer-
term vision of bilateral relations. As one US official noted: 
''There will be some issues that we just have to take 
the time to resolve or where we have to agree to 
disagree and contain the damage. And there are other 
issues where we can expand our cooperation, and 
that's what we hope to do in a series of these 
meetings. "270 
Therefore, while Christopher urged progress on human 
rights, IPR, cross-Taiwan Strait relations and Hong Kong, he 
was determined to prevent such issues overshadowing the overall 
268 Christopher had communicated a proposal for talks 
involving North and South Korea, China and the US, aimed at 
reducing tensions and creating peace on the Korean Peninsula. 
Beij ing endorsed the proposal during Lake's trip in July. 
'Christopher Presses China on 4-Nation Korean Talks' i 
International Herald Tribune April 20 1996 p.1 and p.S and Mary 
Jordan· and Kevin Sullivan, 'US Security Aide Wraps Up Asia 
trip' i Washington Post July 16 1996 p.A11. 
269 Warren Christopher, In the Stream of Historyi op cit 
p.430. 
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improvement in relations. This was symbolised by concurrence in 
two areas. Firstly, US and Chinese officials agreed to 
establish three cabinet-level commissions on trade, economics, 
and science and technology. 271 Secondly, preparations were made 
for an expansion in high-level exchanges and negotiations.· 
Christopher secured a visit to Beijing in November, and 
responded very positively to proposals for home-home summits 
between Clinton and Jiang following the US presidential 
elections. Further, plans were made for a Beijing trip by Vice-
President Al Gore in early 1997, and for a series of other 
cabinet and sub-cabinet level 
visits. 272 
Accordingly, Washington played host to Chinese Defence 
Minister Chi Haotian and National Security Advisor Liu Huaqiu 
on separate visits in December. 273 While the latter visit led to 
an understanding allowing the US navy to visit Hong Kong 
following the transfer of Sovereignty in June 1997, Chi stirred 
controversy by dismissing criticism of the military's role in 
Tiananmen Square in June 1989. 274 The US reciprocated with the 
visits of Christopher in November, Undersecretary of State Lynn 
Davis in early November, and of Director of the Arms Control 
271 Ibid p. 6. 
272 Warren Christopher, In the Stream of History; op cit 
p.Sll. 
273 These exchanges followed the low-key visit of 
~ndersecretary of State for Defence Walter Slocombe to Beijing 
ln late June. This represented the first military dialogue 
between Washington and Beijing since the Taiwan Strait crisis. 
~Top US Aide on Mission to China'; International Herald Tribune 
July 6 1996 p.4. 
274 Kerry Dumbaugh, China-US Relations: Chronology; op cit 
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and Development Agency John Holum amongst others. 275 
While US analysts and sinologists interpreted the apparent 
improvement in relations with some caution, on the whole the 
reaction was positive. 276 The American press continued to focus 
on areas of dispute, and continued to cite unacceptable Chinese 
practices in the areas · of human rights and proliferation. 
Nonetheless, reports highlighting progress in US-China 
relations began to appear with greater regularity. 
Christopher's trip to Beijing in November was received in this 
vein. 
With Clinton's second term of office secured by his 
presidential victory earlier in the month, Christopher's trip 
maintained the focus on the positive agenda he instigated in 
his speech in May. The Secretary of State recorded progress on 
proliferation, the Korean Peninsula and the environment, and 
held frank but insubstantive talks on human rights. 277 Final 
plans were agreed regarding reciprocal summits between Clinton 
and Jiang, and the two sides concurred on the value of direct 
contacts and engagement. 278 Christopher used his centrepiece 
address at Fundan University, on November 21 1996, to explain 
the framework of the Administration's China policy, 
distinguishing the need for cooperation on international, 
275 Kerry Dumbaugh, China-US Relations; op cit p.11. 
276 For example see Keith B. Richberg, 'New Signs of Warmth 
in US Ties With China'; op cit and 'Keep Heat on China'; 
International Herald Tribune July 27 1996 p.B. 
277 Warren Christopher, In the Stream of History op cit 
pp. 511-513. 
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regional and bilateral levels. 279 Notably, Christopher's 
comments on the importance of China and of US-China relations, 
and his justification of engagement bore strong similarities to 
arguments employed by the previous Administration in defence of 
its China policy: 
"We have a responsibility to ourselves and to the 
world to manage ... differences constructively and to 
approach them in ways that do not undermine our 
ability to achieve our important common goals." 
Rather like Christopher's two experiences in Beijing, 
Clinton's meeting with Jiang Zemin at the APEC summit in Manila 
on November 24 contrasted enormously with their first meeting 
in late 1993. Announcements were made on forthcoming summits 
between the two presidents, and both parties declared the talks 
a success. Further, urged by US diplomacy and in line with its 
application to the WTO, Beijing announced important cuts in its 
tariffs. 280 Significantly, US officials refused to enthuse about 
the Clinton-Jiang meeting. While there no longer was the need 
to pander to electoral politics, they did not want to encourage 
criticism that the improvement in relations came at the cost of 
American appeasement of China, particularly over human rights. 
Indeed, the US had refused to concede on its immediate 
objections to China's accession to the WTO, and officials 
279 
'The United States and China: Building a New Era of 
Cooperation for a New Century': Address at Fudan University, 
Shanghai, November 21 1996. Reproduced in Warren Christopher, 
In the Stream of History; op cit Chapter Thirty-Five. 
280 Nick Cumming-Bruce, 'clinton Salutes APEC Trade Deal'; 
Guardian November 26 1996 p.l8. 
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revealed that the President had stressed the importance of 
progress in human rights and proliferation. This reflected the 
desire to promote US engagement with China as a tough and 
realistic strategy for . the pursuit of America's core 
interests. 281 
THE EMERGENCE OF A CAUTIOUS CONSENSUS ON CHINA 
Despite the evaluation of China strategy, the Administration 
continued to attract criticism from a variety of sources. 
Essentially, doubts were raised along two lines. Firstly, some 
observers remained unconvinced that the Administration had 
altered its approach to China. They argued that the S ino-
American agreements on proliferation and IPR had resulted from 
US concessions rather than genuine progress in Beijing. 
R-esponding to the deals struck on Chinese proliferation to 
Pakistan and Iran, Robert Dole expressed his disappointment 
that targeted sanctions had not been imposed, while erstwhile 
China-critics Rep. Nancy Pelosi and Senator Jesse Helms accused 
the Administration of repeating its pattern of appeasement. 282 
In this sense, the Administration was seen to have capitulated 
on these issues, as it had human rights previously, and in 
doing so both demonstrated a lack of leadership and ignored 
domestic and Congressional opinion. 283 
281 Nick Cumming-Bruce, 'US and China Agree on Summit' i 
Guardian November 25 1996 p.lO. 
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Step Down the Road of US 
A second perspective criticised the Administration's 
pursuit of engagement with Beijing. One analyst contended that 
the Cl in ton China policy relied upon two fallacies; that the 
foreign policies of America or any other power could effect 
fundamental change in China, and that the Chinese market was 
too big to neglect. 284 The key point was that, rather than 
concessionary engagement, the Administration should have been 
pursuing confrontation and the containment of China. 285 Cri tics 
insisted that Beijing could not be trusted, and that acceptance 
of Chinese assurances and promises amounted to weakness. 
Washington's acceptance of Beijing's protests of innocence 
relating to proliferation, IPR infringements and gun smuggling 
was cited as evidence of this fact. As Nancy Pelosi observed of 
the bilateral agreement on proliferation: 
"We have seen the Chinese government repeatedly 
promise to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and repeatedly break those promises. Now 
the Administration seems to have settled yet again 
for an empty promise. "286 
Contentions such as these appeared to present strong 
opportunities for the anti-China coalition within Congress to 
take hold of the 1996 MFN debate, and for the Republicans to 
284 Robert 
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286 
'China Fulfils US Demand for Pledge on Nuclear Sales'; 
op cit. 
474 
exploit the issue in the presidential election. Neither 
occurred. Rather like the experience of US-China relations 
through 1993-94 and the realistic prospect of the revocation of 
China's 1994 MFN status, Chinese sabre-rattling through 1995-96 
and the Taiwan Strait crisis had prompted many members of 
Congress to reassess their views on China. In other words, a 
certain realism replaced the overly symbolic and emotional 
treatment of China by a Congress relatively inexperienced in 
foreign affairs. 287 While both House Speaker Newt Gingrich and 
Republican presidential candidate Robert Dole lambasted Clinton 
' for inconsistency and weak leadership, both recommended the 
kind of engagement pursued by the Administration from the 
spring of 1996. Both urged and voted for the unconditional 
renewal of MFN. 288 
The anticipated battle over MFN never arrived. While the 
crisis in the Strait had encouraged some to demand that China 
be confronted, most participants in the China debate now 
advocated broad and committed engagement of Beijing. The pro-
trade business community were joined by senior analysts in 
lobbying for unconditional renewal. 289 Congressional opponents 
287 Kenneth Lieberthal, 'Domestic Forces and Sino-US 
Relations', Chapter Eight in Ezra F. Vogel (ed), Living with 
China: US-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century; The 
American Assembly, Norton (New York, 1997) pp.261-262. 
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289 Companies such as Boeing, Motorola and Caterpillar 
launched massive pro-MFN campaigns, while Hong Kong Governor 
Chris Patten arrived in Washington to press for renewal with 
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to MFN were joined by human rights organisations, and US labour 
groups angry at cheap Chinese imports and, as they saw it, the 
export of manufacturing jobs to the cheap Chinese labour 
market. 290 The Administration indicated its intention to renew 
China's MFN status early in the year, and presented vigorous 
arguments in its defence. Certainly it represented a stronger 
demonstration of leadership on this issue, than that offered in 
previous years. 291 Further, the case presented by the 
Administration, with specific citations of recent achievements 
and the insistence that MFN status was key to US engagement of 
the PRC, would not have appeared odd coming from the Bush 
Administration. 
The vote on MFN in Congress failed to become a referendum 
on Clinton's China policy. The failure of MFN conditionality in 
1993-94, and Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996 had convinced many 
former advocates of linkage that MFN formed a key aspect of the 
necessary task of engaging China. Proponents of conditionality 
or revocation of MFN became marginalised either on the liberal 
May 7 1996. See also Stephen Yates, Why Renewing MFN for China 
Serves US Interests; op cit and James A. Darn, 'Trade .and Human 
Rights: The Case of China'; The CATO Journal vol.16 no.l. 
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D.C., May 20 1996, testimony of Peter Tarnoff, .Under Secretary 
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Asian and Pacific Affairs and International Economic Policy and 
Trade of the House International Relations Committee, 
Washington D.C., May 16 1996, testimony of Winston Lord, 
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Committee, Washington D. C., June 11 1996; Bureau of Public 
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wing of the Democratic party or the conservative wing of the 
Republicans. 292 Thus the House rejected a resolution 
disapproving Clinton's renewal of MFN, by 286 votes to 141. 
Further, by a vote of 411 to 7, the House passed a bill 
introduced by Rep. Christopher Cox (R-Calif) that condemned the 
annual debate on MFN as detrimental to US-China relations, and 
commissioned a Congressional report on alternative forms of 
legislation. 293 
The Administration succeeded in its attempt to prevent 
China policy becoming an issue in the presidential election for 
a number of reasons. 294 Firstly, foreign policy rarely featured 
in campaigns that perhaps even more than the election of 1992, 
focused on domestic issues. 295 Secondly, in spite of the 
public's disinterest in foreign policy, with the possible 
exception of Iraq and the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, 
approval of his handling of international affairs was rising as 
the election approached. In a New York Times poll that asked 
voters to consider Clinton's 'greatest achievement', as many 
identified foreign policy as chose the economy, a traditional 
Cl in ton strongsui t. 296 Indeed, more recent, if tentative 
292 Interview with Stephen Yates op cit and Thomas Friedman, 
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op cit. 
293 John E. Yang, 'House Backs Cl in ton on China Trade' ; 
Washington Post June 28 1996 p.A8. 
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Sigur Centre of East Asian Studies, George Washington 
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progress on the issues of Haiti, the former Yugoslavia, the 
Middle East, Northern Ireland, the Mexican financial crisis and 
relations with Japan had persuaded the President that foreign 
policy had been the highlight of the latter half of his first 
term of office. 297 Thirdly, the Administration had appeared to 
move beyond the domestic political clash triggered by the 
Spring 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. The demonstration of a 
tougher form of engagement, and the clear improvement in Sino-
American relations coincided with the last few months of the 
election. While Republican challenger Dole was willing to 
accuse Clinton of weak leadership on China policy, he was 
unable to define a distinctly alternative vision for US-China 
relations. A weak challenger found that he could not exploit a 
complex issue such as China policy in an election that 
reflected the voters' cynicism of politics. 
Conclusion 
As Wins ton Lord observes, tensions and difficulties in the 
Sino-American relationship were inevitable. Beijing' s desire 
for a greater role~ in the international community, on its own· 
terms, presented a critical challenge to an America still 
trying to define its own approach to the post-Cold War world. 298 
Further, China's government was overshadowed by uncertainty 
Trip'; op cit. 
297 Ibid. 
298 Edward Friedman, ~The Challenge of a Rising China: 
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triggered by the secessionist crisis, the erosion of its 
centralised power, and its relationships with the US and 
Taiwan. China's turn towards belligerence after the US visit of 
Taiwan's Lee Teng-hui served only to further complicate the 
task of engaging the PRC. Washington's efforts to promote 
progress and responsibility in China received little support 
from America's traditional allies in Europe and Asia, a fact 
that angered Winston Lord. 299 
Nevertheless, Clinton's continuing failure to address 
serious defects in the formulation and pursuit of China policy 
contributed strongly to the deterioration of US-China 
relations. Believing it had overcome the political standoff 
prompted by the visit of Lee, the Administration persisted with 
a flawed policy. Departments still pursued their own 
independent agendas, and further splits occurred between the 
government agencies. Weak and detached leadership failed to 
impose a disciplined vision of US China policy, and this led to 
more inconsistency, confusion, concession and crisis 
management. 300 The Administration's credibility with both the 
Chinese and the US Congress continued to fall. To make the 
299 See testimony of Winston Lord before the Subcommittee on 
Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee, Washington D.C., 
June 11 1996; op cit. Also David E. Sanger, 'Profit in China 
Trade Dispute'; International Herald Tribune June 13 1996 p.1 
and p. 6. These allies were regarded as competitors ready to 
take economic advantage of any US- China fallout, although it 
was recognised that East Asian states did not wish to offend 
such a powerful neighbour as China. 
300 Warren Christopher refutes the allegation that the 
Administration neglected relations with China, highlighting his 
fourteen meetings and other correspondence with Qian Qichen. 
Commentators pointed out however, that although the Secretary 
of State visited Syria over twenty times, he went to Beijing 
only twice. See Andrew Higgins, 'Clinton Coaxes Reluctant 
China'; Guardian November 21 1996 p.14. 
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problem worse, an inexperienced and politically-motivated 
Congress pressed for greater confrontation with China, fuelling 
Beijing's mistrust of America's engagement strategy. 
The Taiwan Strait crisis proved a key turning point. It 
forced a comprehensive reassessment of US interests in and 
relations with the PRC throughout the US China policy-making 
community. There emerged a deeper awareness of the importance 
of China across a broad range of concerns: geo-strategic and 
regional security, economics and trade, human rights, the 
environment, narcotics, international institutions and so on. 
Interestingly~ Lord had stated the case for the importance of 
China in precisely these terms, in his confirmation hearing 
prior to becoming Assistant Secretary of State. 301 
The Administration was also forced to address its failure 
to articulate China policy, a fault that lay with the Bush 
Administration too. Senior officials were expected to present a 
clear and consistent definition of US objectives, explain the 
context to the relationship, and emphasise gains as well as 
problems. 302 Accordingly, the China policy-making process was 
overhauled and tightened. This task was aided by the Secretary 
of State and the State Department's new found consistency and 
commitment to China policy. Similarly, Anthony Lake's trip to 
Beijing swept away his naive, missionary instincts on China. As 
a result, the Administration found greater unity, on a revised 
strategy promoting realistic long-sighted engagement with 
301 Statement of Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary-designate 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Washington D.C., March 31 1993. 
302 Interview with Stephen Yates op cit. 
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China. Beij ing was no longer swamped with confusing signals 
from the Clinton Administration. Moreover, Washington's 
resolution over the IPR dispute restored some credibility with 
the Chinese government. 
The need to root the new strategy in domestic legitimacy 
was deflected by the highly partisan nature of the domestic 
debate. Members of the anti-China coalition in Congress, and in 
particular Republicans, followed their own lead on China 
policy. However, the Administration's new realism towards China 
not only served US-China interests, but it complemented two of 
Clinton's key political objectives. Firstly, it prevented a 
public clash over the renewal of MFN. Secondly, and of greater 
importance to Clinton himself, it prevented China policy 
undermining his bid for re-election. The Administration's new 
strategy, and reassessments in Congress in the wake of the 
Taiwan crisis weighted the balance of power in favour of those 
advocating engagement over those advocating confrontation. This 
helped to vindicate the Administration's, and in particular 
Lord's, assertion that engagement and unconditional MFN were 
bipartisan issues. 303 Even staunch critics of the regime in 
Beijing, such as Mike Jendrezjczyk of Human Rights Watch: Asia, 
agreed with the p:r:inciple of engagement. 304 
The President acknowledged making mistakes on relations 
with China, highlighting the pursuit of MFN conditionality, and 
303 Interview with Winston Lord op cit. See also testimonies 
of Winston Lord and Charlene Barshefsky before the House 
Subcommittee on Trade, Washington D. C., June 11 1996; op cit 
and testimony of Peter Tarnoff before the House Subcommittees 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs and International Economic Policy 
and Trade, Washington D.C., May 16 1996; op cit. 
304 Interview with Mike Jendrzejczyk op cit. 
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undergoing a learning-curve on the issue throughout his first 
term of office. 305 By the summer of 1996, his Administration had 
developed a new found purpose on China policy and the 
confidence to lead the debate on engagement with Beijing. 306 
This does not mean that political calculations played no 
further part in decision-making, or that all policy-making 
defects had been addressed. Clinton himself did not offer a 
speech dedicated to China until October 24 1997, on the 
occasion of President Jiang Zemin's summit visit to Washington. 
The enduring anti-China coalition within and without Congress 
continued to accuse Clinton of timidity, failing to confront 
Beijing on human and Tibetan rights, trade and proliferation, 
and of appeasing China in the interests of US big business. 307 
However, the improvement in bilateral relations, and the 
incremental progress offered by Beij ing reflected a far more 
realistic strategy of engagement with China. 308 As Kenneth 
Lieberthal contends, this strategy presented ' ... a new window 
of opportunity", particularly with the conclusion of the 
presidential election. 309 
305 Steven Erlanger and David E. Sanger, 'Clinton's Perilous 
Trip'; op cit. 
306 Interview with Winston Lord op cit and Anthony Spaeth, 
'Drinking Buddies'; Time April 7 1997 pp. 54-55. 
307 Ibid (Spaeth) pp.SS-56. See also John J. Tierney Jr, 
'Containing China's Aggression' ; Journal of Commerce March 13 
1997, Nigel Holloway, 'Making an Enemy'; Far Eastern Economic 
Review March 20 1997 and Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, 
The Coming Conflict with China; Alfred A. Knopf (New York, 
1997) . 
308 Interview with David M. Lampton op cit. 
309 Kenneth Lieberthal, 
Relations'; op cit p.300. 
'Domestic Forces and 
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CONCLUSION 
In announcing Executive Order 12850 on May 28 1993, President 
Clinton appeared to execute a major redirection in US strategy 
toward the People's Republic of China. The strategy of broad 
engagement had governed US thinking on China since the mid to 
late 1960s, and been pursued since Nixon's rapprochement with 
Beij ing in 1972. The Executive Order did not challenge the 
principle of direct governmental, and increasingly non-
governmental ties with the PRC. Indeed, Clinton emphasised the 
importance of not isolating China. 
strategy of linkage, in which the 
However, it did impose a 
renewal of China' s Most-
Favoured-Nation (MFN) trading status was made conditional on 
progress in designated areas of human rights. By adopting the 
strategy of linkage, Clinton declared his willingness to place 
the pursuit of human rights above America's vast economic 
interests with China. Due to the importance of economics and 
trade to the post-Cold War Sino-American relationship, it 
appeared that Clinton was deferring US-China relations, and 
further broad engagement with the PRC to America's concern for 
human rights in China. However, Clinton did not predicate this 
decision on a vision of America's broad strategic relationship 
with China, in which long-term interests and priorities were 
defined. Rather, the President's decision to invoke linkage was 
a result of political considerations and calculations rooted in 
the 1992 presidential election. 
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Similarly, the President's decision to abandon linkage and 
revert to the entrenched long-term strategy of broad engagement 
with China in May 1994 was also heavily influenced by domestic 
political calculations. These two decisions represent only the 
most conspicuous examples of the degree to which Cl in ton's 
sensitivity to the domestic political environment drove his 
China policy almost throughout his first term of office. This 
approach to decision-making seriously threatened America's 
long-term strategic relationship with China, and contributed 
significantly to a deterioration in bilateral relations that 
reached a nadir in the spring of 1996. In addition, it 
encouraged deep splits within the Administration, and fostered 
an incoherent and discrepant pursuit of US interests. Members 
of Congress, frustrated by the Administration's mismanagement 
of US-China relations and increasingly concerned by China's 
conduct in the areas of human rights, proliferation and trade, 
attempted to take the initiative on China policy. President 
Clinton' s preoccupation with responding to such initiatives 
undermined his performance further. 
An overwhelming majority of foreign policy participants 
and analysts considered relations with China to be one of, if 
not the most important challenge of US foreign policy following 
the end of the Cold War. 1 To address this challenge, policy-
makers had to balance long-term strategic interests in China, 
with securing domestic approval and legitimacy for the policy. 
Relations between two states as powerful and as dissimilar as 
1 Most major studies of 
make this point. 
contemporary US-China relations 
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the US and China requires a clear long-term framework through 
which interests and disputes can be governed. 2 Yet US China 
policy benefits from domestic support. 3 It underscores the 
credibility of Washington's stance, and bolsters America's 
bargaining power with Beij ing. It also permits the president 
greater flexibility and trust in the conduct of bilateral 
relations. The need the balance these two components provides a 
crucial test of China policy-making, especially when the 
recommendations of foreign policy officials appear to 
contradict domestic political opinion on the matter. Clinton 
failed to achieve an adequate balance of these concerns in 
placing domestic political considerations above the need to 
define, articulate and lead on long-term interests in China 
throughout his first term of office.• 
A number of factors must be addressed to understand 
Clinton' s failure to balance strategic China interests with 
domestic political interests. Firstly, while there was 
widespread agreement on the ultimate objectives of US China 
policy, there was considerable disagreement as to the most 
effective ways to achieve them. This exposed any proposal for 
2 See for example Developing a Consensus for the Future: A 
Report of the CSIS US China Policy Task Force; Asian Studies 
Programme, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 
Washington D.C., 1996. 
3 See for example James M. Scott and A. Lane Crothers, 'Out 
of the Cold: The Post-Cold War Context of US Foreign Policy' in 
David M. Scott (ed), After the End: Making US Foreign Policy in 
the Post-Cold War World; Duke University Press (London, 1998) 
pp.6-7. 
4 The 
need to 
China. 
Bush Administration on the other hand neglected the 
forge domestic legitimacy for its strategy toward 
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China policy, from conciliatory engagement to resolute 
confrontation, to a certain amount of dispute. Secondly, the 
erosion of the gee-strategic premise for the Sino-American 
relationship with the end of the Cold War had two significant 
implications. Firstly, it meant that US engagement with China 
adopted a more bilateral character as the strategic triangle 
between Washington, Beijing and Moscow became obsolete. In 
other words, the US developed clear interests in China itself, 
removed from the dictates of the geo-political environment. 
Secondly, the expansion of bilateral relations, from the mid 
1980s on, resulted in an explosion of non-governmental US 
domestic actors with interests in China. As a consequence, 
representatives of business, human rights, science and 
technology and so on felt that they had a stake in influencing 
China policy. Domestic actors were less inclined to defer to 
the Administration in the conduct of US-China relations, making 
the need to balance strategic and domestic concerns all the 
more difficult. Thirdly, the Tiananmen Square massacre 
fundamentally changed American attitudes toward China, and 
destroyed the domestic consensus that advocated positive 
engagement with the PRC. Not only did it increase the salience 
of US China policy, but it redefined the nature of the domestic 
China policy debate. Overwhelming antipathy toward Beijing 
meant that many Americans, inside government and out, focused 
on short-term issues of dispute. This compromised the debate on 
and formulation of more constructive long-term interests. 
It is within this context that US China policy became so 
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politicised and controversial. The annual debate on the renewal 
of China's MFN status provided a convenient platform for 
vociferous and highly partisan battles between the Bush 
Administration and Democratic Congress for the direction of 
China policy. That is not to disregard the existence of a 
genuine and dynamic debate on the means and ends of US policy 
toward Beijing. However, President Bush's failure to take 
account of popular opposition to his attempt to find progress 
through engagement allowed Democrats to exploit China policy 
for partisan ends. Clinton, intent on becoming the first 
Democratic president for twelve years, jumped on this political 
bandwagon. His pursuit of the Democratic Congressional lead on 
China, and his advocacy of linkage established a pat tern of 
policy-making that would endure throughout his first term of 
office. 
President Clinton identified three objectives for his new 
Administration's China policy, all of which related to domestic 
political calculations. Firstly, he had to abide by his pledges 
on China policy. Secondly and correlatively, he had to 
implement a strategy on China based on linking human rights to 
China's trade with the US. Thirdly, he wanted to forge a 
consensus with Congress on this policy. Through a policy-making 
process that reflected Clinton's domestic political 
orientation, the Administration introduced linkage in the form 
of Executive Order 12850. This policy satisfied Clinton's three 
objectives, and appeared to establish a domestically 
legitimised China policy that diverted from the entrenched 
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strategy of open engagement with the PRC. 
However, in formulating the policy, Clinton had failed to 
balance his attentiveness to domestic political concerns with 
an assessment of US strategic interests in China over the 
longer term. Having overseen a deterioration in bilateral 
relations with little progress achieved on its objectives, and 
under considerable pressure from Congress, the Administration 
reversed its stance and dropped linkage one year later. Thus a 
flawed policy was born of a flawed policy-making process. 
The major defects in the Clinton Administration's policy-
making process were threefold. Firstly, Clinton and his senior 
officials failed to define a vision or framework for America's 
relationship with China beyond the short-term. In essence, 
Clinton failed to define a hierarchy of US interests in China. 
Secondly, Clinton failed to articulate his objectives for China 
policy to either his Chinese or his domestic audiences. Rather 
he would refer to broad objectives that most observers agreed 
with, or issue condemnatory rhetoric against Beijing that would 
respond to domestic America's distaste for China. Thirdly, the 
President demonstrated his personal lack of commitment to US 
relations with China. Instead, Clinton directed his attention 
to an ambitious agenda of domestic priorities, and only 
committed himself to China policy to the extent of establishing 
political objectives for its execution. Accordingly, until the 
Taiwan Strait crisis of spring 1996, he only really engaged in 
the China policy-making process in the event of a political 
crisis. Further, his preoccupation with domestic and foreign 
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economic policy conflicted with the Executive Order and other 
prescriptions for China policy. Clinton was faced with a clash 
between the domestic political implications of economic policy 
and the domestic political implications of China policy. 
These defects in the China policy-making process had two 
broad implications fundamentally detrimental to America's 
relationship with Beijing. Firstly, the President's failure to 
provide leadership and to establish a framework of priorities 
led to considerable indiscipline and splits within the 
Administration. Different agencies were able to pursue their 
own agendas with China. Secondly, and consequentially, the 
Administration's China policy appeared incoherent, confused and 
contradictory. While State Department and White House officials 
lambasted China for its human rights performance, the Commerce 
Department chased major commercial deals, and the Office of the 
United States Trade Representative threatened sanctions over 
intellectual property, transshipping and market access. 
Moreover, Clinton's political advisors attempted to orchestrate 
US relations with China in line with the President's political 
needs. As one commentator argues, the White House persisted in 
treating China policy as a campaign issue rather than a 
strategic issue. 5 Thus US policy towards China appeared 
confused, incoherent and discordant. 
The defective policy process led to two detrimental 
consequences, namely that both the strategic imperative of US 
5 Interview with Ted Galen Carpenter, Vice-President, 
Foreign Policy and Defence Studies, CATO Institute, November 6 
1997, Washington D.C. 
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relations with China, and the domestic imperative of 
establishing political legitimacy for the policy, were 
undermined. The Administration's indisciplined and confused 
approach to China policy, exemplified most obviously by its 
pursuit of the Executive Order, prompted incredulity and 
suspicion in Beijing and destabilised the vital US-China 
relationship. It can be seen that despite warnings from senior 
officials such as Winston Lord, the Administration's conduct of 
China policy took little account of the political instability 
within Beijing. Senior 
nationalist sentiments as 
Chinese officials evoked strong 
they manoeuvred to succeed Deng 
Xiaoping, and as they attempted to contain the decentralisation 
of power caused by its modernisation and development 
programmes. The defective policy-making process also undermined 
the Administration's credibility at home and particularly 
within Congress which succeeded in taking the initiative on 
China, most notably with ·the visit of Taiwanese President Lee 
Teng-hui. 
It is clear that the problems associated with Clinton' s 
policy in China went beyond the failure to balance bilateral 
and domestic imperatives. This is demonstrated by Clinton' s 
unconditional renewal of China's 1994 MFN status, and 
Administration's handling of China policy subsequent to 
decision. In abandoning linkage and reverting to 
established strategy of broad engagement with the PRC, 
the 
that 
the 
the 
Administration adopted a stance more amenable to improvements 
in the US-China relationship. The Administration also managed 
492 
492 
to draw Congressional support for this stance, due in part to 
the failure of its strategy of linkage, and appeared to have 
resolved bureaucratic tensions. This opportunity for putting US 
China policy on a firmer footing was not fulfilled. 
Having dealt with the acute political crisis associated 
with the MFN 1994 decision, Clinton failed to address the 
defects in his policy-making process. That is to say he still 
failed to define and articulate a clear hierarchy of US 
interests in China, and failed to commit himself to providing 
leadership and discipline on China policy. This is exemplified 
by the fact that in its first term of office, the 
Administration did not devote a full-dress speech to China 
until May 1996, while the President failed to deliver a speech 
at all despite requests from senior China officials. 6 
As a consequence, the bilateral relationship continued to 
deteriorate to perhaps its worst state in US-PRC history in 
spring 1996. Further, following the Republican sweep of the 
mid-term elections in November 1994, Congressional frustration 
with the Administration's poor performance led to the 
reemergence of partisan politics. Members of Congress once more 
focused their attentions on bilateral disputes and demanded 
immediate action, if only to score points from the 
Administration. Congressional initiatives placed a short-term, 
highly partisan perspective on US-China relations. With the 
failure to define and lead on a strategy of its own, and 
6 Interview with Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 1993-1996, November 7 1997, 
New York. 
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Cl in ton concerned to minimise political fallout, the 
Administration responded to these initiatives to the threat of 
long term interests in China. 
The Taiwan Strait crisis of spring 1996 sobered attitudes 
toward the Sino-American relationship. US officials were 
appalled at how close the US had come to military intervention, 
and this led to a comprehensive reassessment of US China 
policy. National security officials with a stronger vision of 
US interests in the Far East, such as Defence Secretary William 
Perry, played a key role in reestablishing a strategic view of 
US interests in China. In effect, the crisis finally convinced 
senior officials of the need to find a better balance between 
the imperatives of the broad bilateral strategic relationship 
and the imperatives of the domestic political environment. The 
results were clear. Secretary of State Christopher issued the 
first speech dedicated to China policy in May 1996. Anthony 
Lake spearheaded a concerted drive to reinvigorate diplomatic 
engagement with the Chinese officials, and plans were finalised 
for home-home summits between Presidents Cl in ton and Jiang. 
Further, the Taiwan Strait crisis had also sobered attitudes on 
the Hill. Although members of Congress, usually Republicans, 
continued to criticise the Administration, they struggled to 
present an alternative approach to Beij ing. In beginning to 
address the defects at the heart of the China policy-making 
process, Clinton actually succeeded in preventing China policy 
becoming an issue in the 1996 presidential elections. 
To conclude, Clinton' s preoccupation with the domestic 
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political environment to the detriment of America's long-term 
interests in China contributed heavily to the deterioration in 
Sino-American relations, and precipitated vociferous political 
clashes with Congress at home. The President's failure to 
define a long-term vision of a hierarchy of US interests, to 
articulate that vision to his Chinese and domestic audiences, 
and his reluctance to commit himself to and lead on China 
policy had serious implications for the China policy-making 
environment. It prompted deep splits and indiscipline within 
the Administration with the result that China policy appeared 
confused, inconsistent and incoherent. Clinton's fixation with 
opinion in Congress and the wider China policy community, the 
business community in particular, gave a strong role to 
political advisors with the White House. Thus officials with a 
stronger vision of US strategic interests in China, such as 
defence officials, professional staff within the National 
Security Council and the State Department, and indeed Winston 
Lord, were often undermined and excluded from the policy-making 
process. Having handled domestic political crises regarding 
issues such as the 1994 MFN decision and the visit of Lee Tung-
hui in June 1995, Clinton still neglected to address the 
imbalance and the defects within China policy-making. Only with 
the Taiwan Strait crisis in the spring of 1996 did the Clinton 
Administration finally begin the address these problems. 
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